Civil society partnerships with Correctional Services; vetting of officials; investigation of unrest at correctional centres
Meeting Summary
The briefing on partnerships with stakeholders emphasised Service Level Agreements (SLA) with non-governmental, faith-based and community organisations, as well as the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) and the Memorandum of Agreement (MoA). There were partnerships with the City of Johannesburg, the University of Pretoria, and Unisa, as well as with the Department of Human Settlements. An integrated database of stakeholders was being developed. There were partnerships with the Agricultural Research Council and the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries to assist farming.
In discussion, a DA member complained that the report was superficial and did not include numbers of offenders involved in workshops and rehabilitation. There was concern about human capacity for programmes. Numbers of students in higher education programmes were questioned, as well as the financial implications of SLAs. The shortage of artisans to run skills programmes, was questioned.
The briefing on vetting divided vetting into confidential, secret and top secret. There were finance and criminality checks. Officials were informed that they needed security clearance to access confidential information. Information gleaned from forms was sent to the State Security Agency (SSA) for processing. Vetting was done by a fieldwork unit. Challenges included a lack of in-house capacity. An informal discussion of cellphone blocking and surveillance cameras in cells followed.
In discussion, the number of officials still unvetted caused concern, and the slow pace at which vetting was proceeding. There were questions about who performed the vetting. There was concern about vetted officials leaving the DCS. Backlogs received attention. The Chairperson suggested that the vetting of officials employed at maximum security centres, be prioritised. Members felt that human capacity for vetting had to be increased. The DCS in-house capacity for screening was questioned. Vetting was seen by the Committee to be non-negotiable. Besides insisting on the establishment of cellphone blocking in centres, the Committee again insisted that the issue of electronic surveillance in cells be resolved. There were also remarks and questions about surveillance of offenders who did community service.
The briefing on recent incidents of unrest at correctional centres included blanket burning at Odi; the death in a fire in a cell of three inmates at Krugersdorp; blanket burning and a refusal by remand detainees to go to court at Grootvlei; stabbings at Ncome, and sexual harassment at Bethal.
In discussion, the Chairperson suggested that the only way to prevent fires was to ban smoking in centres. Lack of staff on duty was questioned. A member remarked that riotous behaviour was a consequence of inhumane treatment of inmates. Officials did not listen to inmate complaints. A DA member remarked that there was a lack of supervision at the regional level.
Meeting report
Status of Department of Correctional Services (DCS) partnerships with stakeholdersMr Zacharia Modise, DCS Chief Deputy Commissioner (Corrections), briefed the Committee on the status of partnerships with non-governmental, faith-based and community-based organisations. Mandates for such partnerships were the Correctional Services Act and the White Paper on Corrections, among others. The DCS regulated its partnerships through a Service Level Agreement (SLA). Relationships with other government departments and tertiary learning institutions through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or Memorandum of Agreement (MoA). The Department had developed a framework on Service Level Agreement . Office were being trained on processes related to Service Level Agreements. There was a partnership with Pillar to Post for crime prevention initiatives in high schools. A partnership with Working with Fire aimed at teaching parolees to deal with bush fires. A template MoU had been developed. There was a partnership with the City of Johannesburg to teach skills like landscaping and general administration. A MoU had been signed with the University of Pretoria and UNISA to use final year Criminology students to do offender and community profiling. An MoU had been proposed to the Department of Human Settlements to utilise offender labour. An integrated database of stakeholders was being developed. External role players were being involved in work opportunities and skills development of offenders.
Mr Modise noted that the DCS had signed an MoU with Foundation of Victims of Crime (FoVoC) to enhance victim participation in Parole Boards. Partnerships with the University of Pretoria and UNISA involved post graduate Criminology students in compiling offender correctional service plans. Faith-based organisations rendered spiritual care services and programmes. There was a partnership with Hospice & Palliative Care for HIV and AIDS persons, as well as with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
DCS beef farms were registered for beef performance testing with the Agricultural Research Council which provided training for officials in beef farming. The Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries provided agriculture extension support to DCS farms. There were partnerships for Education with the Department of Basic Education, and the registration of 97 AET centres for Adult Education and Training.
Discussion
Mr J Selfe (DA) told the DCS that he had in fact been the one who had requested the meeting of the day. He said that he was none the wiser after the briefing. The day’s topic had been covered superficially. Information was needed on how many offenders were involved in workshops and rehabilitation programmes. The briefing had stated that a database was being developed of partnerships with stakeholders. He asked where that database was. The question was what kind of services were being provided to how many. The briefing had verged on being trifling and was certainly superficial. There was a general sloppiness. At the outset there had been a reference to the Criminal Justice Act. No Act by that name existed.
Ms M Phaliso (ANC) expressed concern about vacancy rates in the DCS. There was not enough human capacity to run programmes. She asked what the DCS had done to address that.
Ms Phaliso referred to external service providers. She asked for clarity about spirit care mentioned on page 12 of the briefing. There were officials who formerly worked for the DCS, who were currently acting as external service providers. She asked about reasons for that. An official at a centre had told her that he planned to retire, and thereafter return to present care programmes. She asked how officials benefitted from that course of action.
Mr V Ndlovu (IFP) noted that he agreed with Mr Selfe. He asked how many students were involved in higher education and training.
Mr Ndlovu asked if there was a budget for partnership with stakeholders. He asked what the budget amounted to, and under which item it resorted.
Mr Modise admitted that the presentation had to be beefed up with facts about numbers of offenders involved; the stakeholder database, and vacancy rates. He would see to it that such information be collected by his team.
The Chairperson noted that the Committee would sharpen its questions, and send them to the DCS.
Mr Abram referred to the Service Level Agreement with Pillar to Post. He quipped that he was not sure which pillar to which post. He referred to the financial implications of stakeholder partnerships. The question was what had been the motivation behind entering into partnerships. He asked if it was due to a lack of internal capacity.
The Chairperson advised that Mr Abram, Mr Selfe, Ms Phaliso and Mr Ndlovu get together to formulate questions. Those would be dealt with the following week, during the Quarterly Report. There would be a similar session with stakeholders. People had approached the Committee to say that they could train DCS members to eradicate sexual abuse. The Committee had decided that it was not to be used as a lobbying platform for external service providers. The Committee had to know who was out there, when it came to service providers. The DCS had claimed that there were not enough artisans to help with skills training. In Westbury, where he hailed from, there were large numbers of unemployed plumbers. He wondered how long the DCS was still going to persist with that excuse.
The Chairperson continued that the Committee had asked for a briefing about vetting, but in fact members had a broader concern with security matters. Not more than 3000 members had been vetted. It was not a negotiable matter. He asked for a progress report.
Mr Terence Raseroka, DCS Deputy Commissioner (Executive Management), replied that there were capacity constraints. The DCS would try to maximise available capacity. Current processes would remain as they were, but the DCS would map out what could be done in spite of constraints. A vetting plan had been laid out some years previously, but it had not been implemented. It would be considered again.
Briefing on the status of Vetting
Ms Mahapa, DCS (Vetting), noted that vetting clearance distinguished between confidential, secret and top secret. Vetting would be extended to the office of the Minister. It was based on access to communities. Financial and criminal checks were done, and information was sent to the State Security Agency (SSA) for evaluation.
Discussion
Mr Max interrupted the briefing to say that he could not find the relevant information in the document. The document did not state what the status of vetting had been at a given date, and how many were still outstanding at such a point.
Ms Mahapa responded that the document was so structured that additions to figures submitted the previous year, was presented. Progress since then was recorded. Between May 2010 and October 2011, there had been 61 clearances. 18 of those had since left the employ of the DCS.
Ms Phaliso added that refusals to be vetted had to be added as a separate column.
Ms Mahapa replied that when awareness of vetting was being promoted, officials were informed of the implications of not being vetted. Without security clearance, officials would not be qualified to access certain information.
Mr Selfe asked what “screening” meant in that context. He asked what happened after forms were filled in, and who was responsible for that.
Mr Abram likewise asked who was responsible, and what the terms of reference were.
Ms Mahapa replied that it was the vetting fieldwork unit. The DCS vetting administration section screened files.
Ms Mahapa responded that there was a personnel suitability check, and checks on criminality and finance. Senior managers had to declare any interest they might have that could be of concern to the DCS. Information submitted on the form, was verified. The process ran concurrently with an HR checking process. If a post required confidential clearance, all information was checked, and the file was sent to the SSA. Where secret or top secret clearance was required, the file was made available for fieldwork investigation. Such investigations would go back 15 years, where possible. The subject and previous and current supervisors were interviewed. The SSA would evaluate and issue clearance.
Mr Ndlovu asked about challenges.
Ms Mahapa replied that the DCS was aiming at in-house process education, as there were currently delays of up to 6 months with processing the Z204 form. In-house electronic fingerprinting and checks on illicit activity could speed up the process. Files were allocated to fieldworkers, of which there were only eight. Their output at the most was 15 files per month. The SSA had a backlog of clearance files dating back to 2002. The DCS had no control over that, but it had a screening process for appointment.
The Chairperson expressed concern over the statement that out of 61 members vetted, 18 had already left. It had to be common practice that anyone employed at maximum security centres had to go through vetting to be employed at all. Everyone on board had to be vetted. As regarding regional and deputy commissioners, there had to be emergency measures to vet all of them. Of the chief deputy commissioners, only six out of 11 had been vetted.
The Chairperson advised that vetting become a part of the employment conditions for members employed at maximum centres. That had to be established as a non-negotiable first, dealing with the backlog could follow. Mechanisms had to be found to speed up vetting.
Mr Ndlovu remarked that there could be no compromise on vetting. Eight fieldworkers were not enough. Human resources had to be increased.
Ms Mahapa responded that capacity programmes was an issue. Vetting could be run as a project, which could complete the process in 18 months.
Mr Abram asked who was guarding the guards. The DCS worked according to the prescriptions of the SSA, and that department was in a mess. He asked about the background of screeners.
The Chairperson advised that the DCS did not respond to such questions right there. It had to be taken elsewhere.
Mr Abram asked about the internal screening capacity of the DCS. He asked who ‘annointed’ them, so to speak. He asked about the number of uncleared employees, and what happened to those who refused to be vetted. He asked how many backlog files went back to 2002.
Ms Mahapa replied that the vetting unit was only established in 2008. The DCS had requested new information to deal with backlogs.
The Chairperson remarked that the DCS had to prioritise in order to deal with backlogs. There had been 3 000 vettings. The 41 000 that remained could not be dealt with overnight, so the DCS had to zoom in on senior management, and people employed at maximum security centres. The DCS had to tell the Committee if that was a practical suggestion, or too much was expected. The Committee would put such suggestions in writing.
Ms Mahapa responded that the vetting plan developed earlier bound the DCS to dealing with challenges. Regions were allocated to fieldworkers. The DCS could first look at senior managers and maximum security personnel. Control room officials and Emergency Support Teams (EST) could be included. The SSA had requested finance procurement. New employees were currently screened while undergoing training. Vetting systems had to be aligned with HR. Screening commenced with the letter of appointment.
The Chairperson insisted that vetting was not negotiable. The Committee accepted that it was arduous. At some point everybody had to be cleared. There had be no opportunity for crimes in uniform.
Ms Phaliso asked Ms Mahapa to general laughter if she had been vetted herself. It was clearly a teasing remark.
Cellphone blocking and surveillance cameras
There was no formal briefing. Discussion proceeded from the outset.
Discussion
Mr Selfe remarked that Mr Abram and himself were told on an oversight visit to Helderstroom by an inmate, that one could buy a cellphone in prison for R600. Inmates were using cellphones for criminal activity, to direct operations and transfer money. He asked if consideration had been given to cellphone jamming devices, and if there was a process in place. If not, he asked why not.
Mr Modise responded that the Department had dealt with the matter in a previous meeting. There had been progress, new centres were fitted with cellphone jamming devices. Maximum centres were prioritised. Figures were not available as yet. The rollout would proceed from maximum to other centres. Cellphones did not work in new facilities like Kimberley.
The Chairperson asked for a time frame. It was an easier matter to deal with than vetting. The DCS had to say which centres had cellphone jamming devices. It was known that Kokstad was not cell friendly. There had been resistance to jamming devices in the past, because some officials wanted to use their own cellphones in centres. They could use landlines or walkie talkies. He asked when the process would be concluded.
Mr Selfe said, to much laughter, that he took a cellphone call at the opening of the Kimberley Centre.
The Chairperson remarked that the Committee did its homework. He could phone someone in Kokstad on that very day to see if there was cellphone jamming or not. The DCS had to supply a list of foolproof facilities. He asked if resistance from officials had been breached. Offenders had to be restricted from conducting business in centres. It was no use to have blocks only in cells. It had to be everywhere. The question was how to ensure that once sentenced, inmates did not have access to cellphones.
Mr Modise replied that the remark by Mr Selfe had caused him to age by five years. He was embarassed by the news, and would check up on the matter.
The Chairperson asked where the DCS was with regard to surveillance cameras. The Committee had initiated a debate on the matter. Its stance was that the rights of vulnerable inmates outweighed the right to privacy of those who assaulted and abused them. He had as yet not encountered a single South African who had called him out of order. The argument of privacy did not make sense in an environment where toilets did not have doors. Electronic surveillance would not be a Big Brother show. Those who operated the cameras would be vetted officials. Recorded material would be used as evidence. It was not for public consumption. The privacy argument had to be diffused. A stabber could not claim rights to privacy, whether that be an inmate stabbing an official, or another inmate. At Zonderwater someone died because it took two hours for officials to respond to a raised alarm. Cameras could have picked that up earlier.
Mr Selfe added that the report on Krugersdorp had referred to only one official on duty on a Saturday afternoon. Cameras could alleviate such situations.
Mr Modise responded that the National Commissioner welcomed the new thinking on surveillance cameras. The DCS was willing to talk. There were heinous crimes committed in cells, especially after lockup. The DCS had been unable to explain to the public why it was so difficult to place cameras in cells. The DCS had abandoned the perceived privacy rights of offenders. Abuse of human rights of other inmates had become the priority. It could be a deterrent to abuse. The DCS agreed with the Committee. Its leadership in the matter assisted the DCS.
Mr Max remarked that the DCS would be tested against the Constitution on the matter. He was personally in favour of cameras. It multiplied resources, and could help officials anticipate riotous behaviour. But the question was where to start. It would have to be tabled for discussion in Parliament. There were NGOs and human rights activists who were bound to oppose it. For him, the pros overshadowed the cons. But it would have to be tested against Section 36.
Mr Abram referred to surveillance in general. A person had been sentenced for sex with teenage girls, and had received a nine year sentence, suspended for five years. He had to do three years of community service. The person did not properly perform the community service. He asked what surveillance mechanisms there were to prevent breaking the conditions of a sentence. The consequences were drastic. Somewhere officials had not done their duty, and the person ended up committing a string of heinous offences. Some of the crimes were committed on a day when he was supposed to report for duty, and did not.
Mr Max asked that the DCS report the following week on who had been responsible to oversee the person, and whether steps had been taken against them.
Mr Modise answered that the alleged perpetrator was to serve a probation sentence. He had been given to the DCS to serve his time outside prison. The matter of his monitoring was under investigation. It was a high profile investigation that had drawn the attention of the Prosecuting Authority, and Justice, and included the magistrate who had decided on that form of sentencing. DCS staff would also be investigated. The perpetrator claimed that he had made arrangements, and had done the programmes he was supposed to do.
Ms Phaliso asked about senior SAPS officials involved in contracts at Kimberley.
Mr Modise replied that information was sought for an in depth investigation. Even the office of the area commissioner had been involved. The Departmental Investigations Unit (DIU) would investigate.
Investigations into recent incidents of unrest at correctional centres
Mr Modise commenced with an account of the incident at Odi Centre that resorted under Pretoria.
On Saturday 22 October, inmates burned blankets and an office. Inmates stated that their complaints about conditions had fallen on deaf ears. Management had done nothing. They had complained about lack of clothing, bedding and hot water, cockroaches and bad food. They alleged that officials took the best of inmate food for themselves. They would take the meat and leave the bones to inmates. There were no newspapers. Items sold at the tuck shop were highly priced. There was not enough time spent on programmes. The Area Commissioner went to talk to them, and appointed an investigation team. The object was to see if management were attending to complaints, and to assess management competency. Investigations brought to light that there were three inmates who had played a prominent part in instigating unrest.
At Krugersdorp on 28 October, in the B unit, three juveniles who had been involved in a fight were separated from other inmates and locked in a cell. They were left unguarded. At 12h30, they set the mattresses in the cell alight. They had apparently obtained matches from someone in the A block. When officers returned, they found the grille barricaded by a bed. A subsequent report stated that all prisoners had been locked up at the time, and that there had not been a fight. The DCS was sifting through the evidence. It was another instance of a lack of staff present to guard effectively. The three juveniles died. It was a traumatic event that could have been prevented. The question was why non-inflammable mattresses were not used in cells.
At Grootvlei on 25 October, 23 remandees refused to go to court. They had presented a memorandum that expressed dissatisfaction with care. They complained that they had been assaulted when they made statements. The issue had been raised and nothing had happened. Legal Aid did not consult with them in prison. They were met with at court in a hurry and advised to plead guilty. Whites could arrange bail, blacks not. Foreigners fared even worse. There was overcrowding and no bail. The region engaged the police and the Legal Aid Board to look into the matter. There were complaints about bail raised at courts. In terms of the Criminal Procedure Act they were not eligible for bail, as their cases included murder, rape and robbery. The Legal Aid Board asked for specific instances of lawyers at fault. Information had not yet been received. The refusal to go to court had been accompanied by the burning of curtains and blankets, and the office of the unit manager. A special police task force team was called out to quell the unrest, and to identify instigators. Those were isolated and deployed to other facilities. By the previous week, the situation had calmed down, and offenders all went to court.
Mr Modise told the Committee that offenders were intelligent and had vested interests. Three of the ringleaders identified were said to be former MK operatives from Johannesburg. They had been arrested for armed robbery and refused bail. They committed crimes in remote areas. They had money and the ability to plan. They had money with which to bribe DCS and police officials. He had been to the centre and had talked to officials and offenders. The Free State prison population were usually calm and well mannered. They had been influenced. The DCS team worked with the police. The MEC and Office of the Premier in the Free State were in support.
Mr Modise proceeded to the case of the inmate Zwane at Ncome Centre. Two inmates had been killed in a stabbing during a gang fight. Zwane and two others had been involved, but there was no evidence to link Zwane to the killing. The matter had been referred to the Director of Public Prosecutions. If there were no grounds for prosecution, the Minister could order his release.
Mr Modise proceeded to sexual harassment at Bethal Centre. The Regional Commissioner had investigated the matter. If harassment on the part of the Head of Centre could be proved, it would be taken seriously. He would be replaced. Mr Modise would personally attend to the matter.
Discussion
The Chairperson noted that there had been a fire at Pollsmoor before the term of the current Committee, in which three people had died. The obvious solution was to ban smoking in centres. Prison was not a holiday. People could not smoke in hospitals, and it had to be the same for prisons. As long as matches were at hand, fire was a possibility. State assets had been destroyed at Kimberley. Consequences had to be harsh. That had to be communicated to inmates. An inmate who committed arson at Grootvlei, had to know that he would be sent to Kokstad.
The Chairperson noted that the Committee had taken bold stances with regard to the blocking of cell phones and surveillance cameras in centres. To stop smoking was another step in that direction. There had been a letter about Zwane to tell his wife that he could not be released on parole.
Mr Ndlovu remarked that staff shortages were to blame. The shift pattern had to be reviewed.
Mr Modise replied that the shift pattern had to be resolved between the DCS and labour. That would be attended to before the end of the month. There was an urgent need for more staff. 39 000 could not execute the mandate of safe custody. There was staff training to deal with the challenge. More people had to be employed.
Mr Abram remarked that the central threat was a breakdown in terms of moral responsibility. There was a constant obligation to treat inmates humanely. South Africa was a constitutional state. There had been reports of Heads of Centre promising to meet inmates at 10h00, only to keep inmates waiting until 14h00, at which point the inmates resorted to action. The actions were not justified, but when officials act on behalf of the state, it was incumbent on them to be humane. Inmates had reported that a Head of Centre had called them “bandiete”, a derogatory term. So-called civil servants were not listening, and people had to approach Parliament. High officials did not even acknowledge correspondence from Parliament. Offenders had wronged society, but they were still in the care of officials, and that care had to be humane. Officials did not listen. Matters were taken up with senior officials, and nothing came of it.
Mr Abram continued that where expectations were created and not met, the result was violence. It was sometimes necessary to act against offenders. But they also had to be listened to in a humane manner. He asked if the former MK members with lots of money were merely able to buy people, or whether it had actually happened. He asked if such cases had been investigated.
Mr Modise responded that it was expected of senior officials appointed, to execute responsibilities. Such responsibilities were indeed related to humane care. The DCS had asked in investigations what had been done to attend to complaints, and whether the conduct of heads of centres had been correct. Compliance training was under way. The former MK members were suspected of bribing, but it was not a proven fact. The intelligence community were saying that there were implicated officials. Crime intelligence was investigating the matter.
Mr Abram protested that a person who ran a tuck shop at a centre should not be allowed to inflate prices. The Department had to run that on a non-profit basis.
Mr Modise replied that the tuck shop was run by the DCS, along with clubs and messes. Prices were provided to managers. Prices were lower than on the outside.
Mr Max asked how many people had died at Ncome, and what the nature of their injuries were. There was intelligence capacity in centres to pick up who could be bribed. The competency of management had to be investigated. Head Office managed directly, without sufficient supervision at regional level. Regional and area managers had to be called to account about why certain things had been allowed. As Police Commander, he had visited stations over weekends. He had sat in Atlantis at 21h00 with complainants. The question was if DCS managers were committed, or had lapsed into laziness and a lax attitude.
Mr Modise responded that two people were killed in the fight at Ncome. Three died at Krugersdorp, from severe burns and inhalation of fumes. The burnings at Grootvlei were problematic. It had happened during the day. Collusion with officials was suspected. With regard to intelligence capacity, he noted that it had only recently begun to be effective. The DCS was looking at training for information gathering. There were always signs that could be heeded. The SANDF and National Intelligence could assist with intelligence gathering.
Mr Selfe remarked that Mr Modise’s version of what had happened at Krugersdorp was different from that of the Judicial Inspectorate for Correctional Services (JICS). It seemed that the left hand did not know what the right was doing.
The Chairperson agreed that it was not acceptable to have contradictory accounts.
Mr Modise replied that at Grootvlei, the first fire had occurred with offenders unlocked and officials present. The second fire occurred when 50 injured were taken to hospital. The others were locked in at the time. The third fire occurred when everyone was out. The question was whether the fire was already there when offenders were taken out. Some were saying that the fires were instigated. Others said that officials had been involved. Information was being gathered and tested.
Mr Umesh Raga, of the Judicial Inspectorate, noted that there had been three inspections and reports to the Ministry and Committee. Time had been limited and inspections carried out under less than ideal conditions. Mr Raga introduced Mr de Souza, the manager of the Inspections Unit, who was with him.
The Chairperson implored Mr De Souza to be thorough with the investigations.
The Chairperson asked about a new IT person for the Department. He asked why it was that the DCS lost cases when people were suspended. The DCS Legal Manager had in the past appeared very confident about DCS ability to handle such cases, but that appeared doubtful.
Mr Ndlovu referred to concerns expressed by Ms Ngwenya (ANC) about unfilled senior positions. Some had been budgeted for. He asked what was causing the blockage.
The Chairperson asked that relevant information be made available to the Committee by the 21 November.
The Chairperson adjourned the meeting.
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