Developments in Swaziland, Zimbabwe, Syria, North Africa and Libya: briefing by Department of International Relations and Cooperation

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International Relations

21 June 2011
Chairperson: Mr T Magama (ANC)
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Meeting Summary

The Department of International Relations and Cooperation identified the issues affecting Swaziland. The country continued to face socio-economic and political challenges. The global economic downturn had a negative impact in the economies of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries as evidenced by the reduced SACU revenues. As a result of the reduced revenue, Swaziland started to experience serious economic problems. That situation had made the Swazi society restless manifesting itself in the recent protests. Swaziland faced a complex political situation which could be traced to the 1973 decree which banned political parties in Swaziland and the 2006 Constitution which also banned political parties. The Swazi government’s response to opposition formations had always been harsh and repressive. Pro democracy formations and labour unions organised mass protests on 18 March and 12 April 2011 in what was dubbed the “12 April Uprising”. The Swazi authorities used the police and military to crush the protests thus rendering the protests ineffective. In response to its economic situation, Swaziland had since approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to obtain financial assistance. The IMF had made a set of recommendations to the Swazi authorities and the country had subsequently developed an intervention strategy called the Fiscal Adjustment Roadmap (FAR).

South Africa was committed to good neighbourliness and non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. However,
noting the latest developments in Swaziland, the South African Government had urged all the relevant parties in the Kingdom to begin a political dialogue with a view to speedily and peacefully resolving all the challenges facing the country. The Swazis needed to reform and receive external donor funding to overcome the current problems it faced.

The political situation in Zimbabwe remained polarized due to the slow movement in the implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which was signed by the three political parties in September 2008. An economic recovery was well under way in the country. In its latest economic forecast, the IMF predicted that the Zimbabwean economy would grow by 7.3% in 2011.
The political situation in Zimbabwe was different from the situation under which sanctions had been imposed. The continued existence of the sanctions now served as a source of tension in the Inclusive Government, as some members of cabinet travelled freely while others were not able to do so. SADC continued to engage those countries who had imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe. South Africa as a SADC mandated facilitator remained seized with the situation in Zimbabwe, assisting the political parties to resolve all outstanding issues in the implementation of the GPA. The focus was for the creation of an environment conducive for credible, peaceful, free and fair elections.

The conflict in Syria was escalating and could descend into civil war. Increasing numbers of refugees were crossing into Turkey due to unrest and military operations against protesters. Protests were continuing on a daily basis and appeared to be escalating. Protesters had made a number of demands: the abolishment of the nearly 50-year-old emergency law; the release of political prisoners, freedom of speech and a multi-party system. Protesters also demanded the elimination of Article 8 of the Syrian constitution, which designated "the Arab Socialist Baath Party" as the leadership of the state. However, the protests had not been able to seriously threaten the regime's existence. Syria's military largely was relying on loyal army units to quash protest hot spots. Despite increasing reports of low-level defections from some military divisions, the upper tiers of the military remained loyal. The likelihood of a UN Security Council resolution against the country was low as Russia and China were in opposition to such a notion.

The Department identified areas of concern which played a role in initiating anti-government protests in North Africa. Amongst the reasons for the discontent in the region were the extended terms of office which leaders in that region held. Most of the governments in that region ruled through emergency laws, enjoyed strong military support, support from the United States of America and the West in the fight against terrorism, and applied or sought to apply hereditary succession. Most of the countries in that region had a poor human rights record, restricted political participation, opposition to religious political participation (Islamist parties) and they exercised media censorship. There was high male youth unemployment, no trickle-down of oil revenue, a high level of unemployed graduates and high food prices. All these factors contributed to the discontent in the region.

The situation in Libya had descended into a civil war. Several thousand foreign nationals from numerous countries had been evacuated and as fighting continued thousands of refugees had crossed into neighbouring countries. Anti-Gaddafi forces had formed a Transitional Council in Benghazi which had been recognised by Western and Arab League countries. Benghazi remained the stronghold for anti government forces. Despite gains in many cities over the past few weeks, pro-Gaddafi forces had pushed back rebels in most of Libya, with only Benghazi still reported to be fully under opposition control. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1973 had been approved for the imposition of a no-fly zone. No signs of a cease-fire were evident as both sides continue to clash in cities across Libya. The security situation was unstable and volatile with government forces continuing to attack rebel forces across the country despite coalition air strikes having disabled the Libyan Air Force. Continued demands for Col Gaddafi and his sons to be removed by the opposition were preventing a cease fire.

South Africa viewed
Libya as a key player within the continent. The country had a strong relationship with Libya at a political level. Libya’s need for infrastructure development and untapped markets presented opportunities for South African companies. South Africa was a member of the African Union (AU) High Level panel on Libya and also a non-permanent member of the UNSC.

Members sought clarity on the loan discussions between South Africa and Swaziland, if such a discussion was taking place. They asked what South Africa’s influence was in the democratization debate in Swaziland and would South Africa intervene if Swaziland did not receive a loan. They asked if the proposed cut in salaries to Swazi public servants would also apply to the Swazi monarchy. They asked why South Africa was only looking to intervene in Swaziland now when the signs had been clear for a long period of time. Some members commented that Zimbabwe was a classic example of South Africa not doing enough to push for democratisation and political reform in the SADC region. Some commented that ZANU PF was the main problem in Zimbabwe. Members asked what South African reaction to the NATO plan to add ground forces to Libya would be. Resolution 1973 showed how ineffective the AU had been on the Libyan issue. They asked whether the entire Libyan and Syrian missions had been evacuated.

Meeting report

Department of International Relations & Cooperation (DIRCO) on Developments in Swaziland
Ambassador Jerry Matjila, Director General: Department of International Relations and Cooperation said Swaziland continued to face socio-economic and political challenges. 2010 had seen a somewhat compounded situation as the political challenges were accompanied by economic difficulties. The global economic downturn had a negative impact on the economies of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries as evidenced by the reduced SACU revenues. As a result of the reduced revenue, Swaziland started to experience serious economic problems. That situation had made the Swazi society restless manifesting itself in the recent protests.

Swaziland faced a complex political situation which could be traced to the 1973 decree which banned political parties in Swaziland and the 2006 Constitution which also banned political parties. The opposition political formations were made up of the Peoples Democratic Movement (PUDEMO); the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA); the Ngwane National Libratory Congress (NNLC) and SIVE SIYANQOBA. The political formations had a set of demands and key was the call for the unbanning of political parties and the call for democracy. The Swazi government’s response to opposition formations had always been harsh and repressive. Pro democracy formations and labour unions organised mass protests on 18 March and 12 April 2011 in what was dubbed the “12 April Uprising”. The Swazi authorities used the police and military to crush the protests, rendering protest ineffective.

Swaziland’s currency was pegged to the South African Rand and the country’s monetary policy was subsumed to South Africa’s. Swaziland received 85% of its imports from South Africa and sent almost 74% of its exports to South Africa. The economic crisis presented a serious challenge to the country’s stability as the country may be unable to continue to pay its public servants. The 2008/9 global economic crisis had a severe impact on the country’s economy. That was followed by a dramatic reduction of the SACU revenue allocations during the financial year 2010/11. Swaziland received R1.9 billion revenue allocation in 2010/11 compared to the R5.1 billion in 2009/10.

In response to its economic situation, Swaziland had since approached the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in order to obtain financial assistance. The IMF had made a set of recommendations to the Swazi authorities and the country had subsequently developed an intervention strategy called the Fiscal Adjustment Roadmap (FAR). The Kingdom had thus far only implemented a few of the FAR recommendations, such as intensive collection of tax and introducing VAT and a fuel levy.

Some of the recommendations made under FAR were:
▪ Wage cuts for public servants, in gradual form; the largest cut from the top by 10%, less from middle income earners between 6% - 8% and none at all for bottom earners;
▪ Improve the business environment thereby promoting economic diversification;
▪ The mobilisation of domestic borrowing through the Treasury and Government Stocks Act of 2010;
▪ Issue 2 billion Euros in long term government bonds;
▪ Increase the levy on fuel in line with South Africa, increase gambling tax from 4.5% to 15%, with alcohol and tobacco tax to follow suit;
▪ Introduce value-added tax by 2011;
▪ Discontinue new government expenditure with the exception  of education and health;
▪ Implement a three-year comprehensive process that will see the government freezing posts and wage increments and auditing  the roster of civil servants to eliminate ghost employees;
▪ Sell telecommunication licences in order to encourage competition among mobile telecommunications.

According to the IMF, if Swaziland were to adopt those measures, its economic situation would improve within six months after which the IMF, depending on the full implementation of the recommendations, would be ready to provide resources. The country faced challenges in meeting the recommendations made by the IMF; as a result the IMF had given the Kingdom the ultimatum of the end of June 2011 to reform. Should the Kingdom fail to meet the deadline set by IMF, it could lose any chance of getting assistance from the African Development Bank, World Bank and other donors. Swaziland had requested financial assistance from South Africa and talks were ongoing between the political principals of departments of finance of the two countries.
The implementation of FAR may have negative implications as it related to proposed job cuts in the public service, which could exacerbate the current over 40% unemployment rate in Swaziland with huge socio-economic ramifications. South Africa could face increased flow of economic and illegal migrants which could have a negative impact on SA economy.
 
In terms of South Africa’s response to the Swazi situation, the country was committed to good neighbourliness and non-interference in other countries’ domestic affairs. However, noting the latest developments in Swaziland, the South African Government had urged all the relevant parties in the Kingdom to begin a political dialogue with a view to speedily and peacefully resolving all the challenges facing the country. The Swazis needed to reform and receive external donor funding to overcome the current problems.

Discussion
Mr S Mokgalapa (DA) sought clarity on the loan discussions between South Africa and Swaziland, if such a discussion was taking place. He asked what South Africa’s influence was in the democratization debate in Swaziland. He asked what the consequences for Swaziland would be if it did not receive a loan, would South Africa intervene?

Amb Matjila responded that the specifics of a possible loan deal were being worked out by National Treasury and the Department was not yet privy to those details. The question was whether South Africa could afford to stand by and watch it implode. Swaziland’s implosion would lead to an influx of immigrants from that country. Thus South Africa might not have a choice but to offer assistance. South Africa sought to apply the African Union principle of non interference in the affairs of other African countries. 

Ms C September (ANC) commented that government should look at its responsibilities with regard to protecting human rights. Parliament should conduct a study of its own to assess what was happening in Swaziland. On the issue of a possible loan to Swaziland, the Committee needed to have interaction with the Portfolio Committee on Finance to get a clearer picture.  

Amb Matjila replied that the key tenet which underpinned all of South Africa’s foreign policy dealings was human rights. The engagement of Swazi officials and other countries counterparts was essential to assisting the country to move on from its problems.

Ms L Jacobus (ANC) commented that Parliament needed to have more interaction with its Swazi counterparts. She asked what informed the allocation to Southern African Custom Union (SACU) countries. She asked whether the proposed cut back in salaries to public servants in Swaziland would also apply to the Swazi monarchy. She commented that the issue of “sin” tax in Swaziland being taken up was very important. 

Amb Matjila replied that as far as the Department was aware, cut backs would only apply to civil servants and not the monarchy. Swaziland did not have taxation in areas where it was essential to have it and the “sin” tax addition would be beneficial. SACU allocations were informed by the size of a country’s import-export percentages. In the next five years, Swaziland would receive less SACU revenue and needed to find alternate revenue streams such as further taxation. 

Mr K Mubu (DA) commented that the Committee was aware of the dire situation that Swaziland faced. In light of that situation, were there any contingencies to deal with the deteriorating security situation in that country? He asked whether it did not worry the Department that Swaziland represented the threat of another failed state along the borders of South Africa. He commented that the IMF’s structural adjustment plans for Swaziland were not going to be helpful. Other African countries which had been subject to structural adjustment enforced by IMF loans had struggled and suffered. He asked whether there had been advice to King Mswati to ‘change his lifestyle’ in light of the dire situation of his country. He asked why South Africa was only looking to intervene in Swaziland now when the signs had been clear for a long time.  

Amb Matjila replied that Swaziland was teetering on a slippery road and if it did not reform it would implode. He was unaware of any contingency plans should the security situation deteriorate. He could not answer whether there had been advice given to the King to ‘change his lifestyle’.

Mr E Suleiman (ANC) asked whether it would be possible for South Africa to help Swaziland financially and whether the country could attach political preconditions prior to granting the loan.

Amb Matjila responded that the specifics of a possible loan deal were being worked out by National Treasury and the Department was not yet privy to those details. If preconditions were to be attached to a loan then it would be up to political leaders to attach such conditions.

Briefing by the Department on developments in Zimbabwe
Amb Matjila said the political situation in the country remained polarized due to the slow movement in the implementation of the Global Political Agreement (GPA) which was signed by the three political parties in September 2008. President Zuma and his Facilitation Team continued to work with the parties assisting them to implement the GPA. This included undertaking frequent visits to Zimbabwe to meet with the parties. The President regularly reported to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) on the progress in the implementation of the GPA.

President Zuma’s latest report had been presented to the SADC Extra-Ordinary Summit that was held on 12 June 2011 in Sandton. The Summit commended President Zuma and the Facilitator for the Zimbabwe Political Dialogue for his efforts towards the full implementation of the Global Political Agreement. The Summit also urged the Organ Troika to remain seized with the implementation of the Global Political Agreement in Zimbabwe.

A key part of the GPA was the drafting of a new constitution. The constitution making process was espoused in the GPA as a process towards the holding of legitimate elections. The steps in this process included the following steps:
• The constitution outreach programme
• Drafting of the constitution on the basis of data collected during outreach the process
• The tabling of a draft constitution to parliament
• A referendum
• Elections.

Thus far only the first step had been completed, namely the outreach programme which was completed on 31 October 2010. The Constitutional Parliamentary Select Committee (COPAC) was now drafting a new constitution based on the inputs received during the outreach process. COPAC had set September 2011 for a referendum on the draft constitution; however it was unlikely to meet this deadline due to continual delays, making it highly unlikely to have elections in 2011 as some parties demanded.

An economic recovery was well under way in Zimbabwe. In its latest economic forecast, the IMF predicted that the Zimbabwean economy would grow by 7.3% in 2011. A rehabilitated and functioning Zimbabwean economy was critical for the SADC’s regional economic integration. Traditionally, South Africa traded more with Zimbabwe than any other country on the continent. The economy of Zimbabwe was linked to that of South Africa. Although the trade balance was hugely in South Africa’s favour.

In 2009, SADC and the AU following the formation of the Inclusive Government and the development of the Zimbabwe economic recovery programme, resolved to call for the lifting of sanctions on Zimbabwe. The political situation in Zimbabwe was different from the situation under which these sanctions were imposed. The continued existence of the sanctions now served as a source of tension in the Inclusive Government, as other members of cabinet travelled freely while others were not able to do so. SADC continued to engage those countries who had imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe.

South Africa as a SADC mandated facilitator remained seized with the situation in Zimbabwe, assisting the political parties to resolve all outstanding issues in the implementation of the GPA. The focus was for the creation of an environment conducive for credible, peaceful, free and fair elections.

Discussion
Ms W Newhoudt-Druchen (ANC) asked what the SACU allocation to Zimbabwe was.

Amb Matjila replied that Zimbabwe was not part of SACU.

Mr Mokgalapa commented that Zimbabwe was a classic example of South Africa not doing enough to push for democratisation and political reform in the SADC region. He said that political violence and intimidation continued to persist in Zimbabwe, would there be any movement after the planned August summit? The Sandton summit had fallen short of expectations in holding parties accountable to the GPA. South Africa had been assisting Zimbabwe for a long time and needed to see tangible reform to validate that assistance. 

Amb Matjila replied that it was not South Africa’s position to advocate for regime change in a sovereign country. The Zimbabwean situation was both difficult and complex as members were aware. There were limitations on how far South Africa’s assistance could go. All parties had agreed to the resolutions of the SADC summit and the Department moved forward with the spirit of that agreement. Zimbabwe was one of South Africa’s biggest trade partners and assisting it ultimately went towards protecting South Africa’s interests.

Ms Jacobus said that the build up to elections was very important. The time spent observing elections should be longer in future to include all aspects of an election. That would assist with adjudging whether an election was truly free and fair.

Amb Matjila replied that the SADC guidelines on the issue of elections was very clear. From the time that elections were announced, observation could take place. The current situation in Zimbabwe was not conducive for the holding of elections in that country.

Ms C Dudley (ACDP) asked why the citizens of Zimbabwe felt like nothing was changing on the ground despite the positive outlook of DIRCO. Why was there a problem in assisting with the implementation of the GPA? 

Amb Matjila replied that there had been tangible progress since 2005 and the political situation was better. The opposition parties had seats in parliament; there were political prisoners who had been released. The Zimbabwean situation was both difficult and complex as members were aware. There were limitations on how far South Africa’s assistance could go.

Ms September asked whether the Department had been able to do a ‘reverse’ presentation on the political and economic impact of the instabilities of the Zimbabwe situation on South Africa.

Amb Matjila responded that he was not aware of such a briefing by DIRCO. There were challenges imposed on South Africa by some of its neighbours but the country did not want to be intrusive in the region.

Mr Mubu commented that ZANU PF was the main problem in Zimbabwe. Jonathan Moyo, a ZANU PF official had been openly critical of South Africa’s role in the SADC negotiations. The pro-Mugabe press had been equally critical.

Amb Matjila responded that the Zimbabwean situation was both difficult and complex as members were aware. There were limitations on how far South Africa’s assistance could go. There would be political attacks on the SADC mediation and there would be intemperate rhetoric but the Department would stick to the issues as they had been outlined by the GPA.

Briefing by the Department on developments in Syria
Ambassador Johan Marx, Chief Director for the Middle East: DIRCO said the conflict in Syria was escalating and could descend into civil war. An increasing number of refugees was crossing into Turkey due to unrest and military operations against protesters. There was increasing pressure from the UK and France to introduce a UNSC resolution on Syria condemning human rights abuses and referring it as a threat to international peace and security. Protests were continuing on a daily basis and appear to escalate.

Calls on the minority Alawite regime to step down were being ignored and promises by the Syrian President Assad to promote internal dialogue, to lift media restrictions, to lift emergency rule and free political prisoners are still wanting. According to Mission reports, the government believed the majority of Syrians were not in favour of the protests despite the fact that there appeared to be a common desire for reforms.

There had been demonstrations in Daraa, calling for political and economic reforms as well as for the release of the children detained for writing pro-democracy graffiti. Demonstrations sparked a governmental and security crackdown on protesters and on the opposition, especially on 22 April 2011, after security forces moved in to disperse the “Good Friday” demonstrations. The protesters were comprised of ordinary Syrians, secularists, leftists, tribal figures, Islamists and students. Protesters had made a number of demands. They demanded the abolishment of the nearly 50-year-old emergency law; the release of political prisoners, freedom of speech and a multi-party system. Protesters also demanded the elimination of Article 8 of the Syrian constitution, which designated "the Arab Socialist Baath Party" as the leadership of the state. However, the protests had not been able to seriously threaten the regime's existence. On 1 May 2011, the government announced a two week amnesty period that called on citizens in possession of weapons to surrender themselves to the government whilst it continued to deploy military tanks and armed vehicles to various cities, especially Daraa, to quell dissent in an effort to silence dissent. The confrontation between protestors and the security forces in Syria escalated on 6 June 2011 in Jisr al-Shughur. On 17 June 2011, military forces were deployed to the remote towns of Deir el-Zour province near the frontier with Iraq, a volatile tribal area.

In June 2011, the government announced it was drafting a new law on general elections with promises that political parties and a freer press would be allowed.

Media reports had suggested that on average, some 500 people were being arrested and intimidated by security forces daily. The government continued to blame the violence on criminal armed gangs and foreign intervention. Syria’s state-controlled media claimed that some 120 Syrian security forces were killed by armed gangs. However, it was impossible to verify the claims.

Syria's military largely was relying on loyal army units to quash protest hot spots. Despite increasing reports of low-level defections from some military divisions, the upper tiers of the military, (drawn almost exclusively from Alawites), remained loyal. On 27 April 2011, a draft statement proposed by France, Britain, Germany and Portugal was opposed by several countries in the 15-member Security Council. China and India called for political dialogue and a peaceful resolution of the crisis, but stopped short of condemning the violence.

Russia did not believe that the Syria situation should be discussed in the Security Council and had indicated its intention to veto any further similar resolutions on Syria. During the Security Council discussion on Syria, South Africa had called on the Syrian authorities to exercise restraint and encourage dialogue in an effort to resolve the current crisis peacefully.

There were some implications for South Africa in the Syrian situation, these included:
• Maintaining South Africa MTN’s investment in Syria.
• Implementation of the bilateral agreements on education and on trade and economic co-operation between South Africa and Syria.
• Defending South Africa’s position on finding a peaceful solution to the internal crisis in Syria through internal dialogue.
• Delinking, in terms of developments in the whole Middle East/North Africa region, UNSC pressures on Syria in line with resolutions adopted for Libya.
• Arguing South Africa’s position on equitable international reaction to developments in the whole of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), including in Yemen, Bahrain on UNSC referral.
• Navigating pressure from both the Western camps (in favour of a Syrian resolution) and the Russia and China alignment (against a resolution) in terms of South Africa’s positioning of its foreign policy interests.

Discussion
The Chairperson asked what stage consultations on a UNSC resolution on Syria were at.

Amb Matjila responded that the Department had learnt a lot from UNSC Resolution 1973 on Libya. What was written on the paper was not as important as the interpretation of the true meaning of what was on the paper. Russia and China were opposed to any resolution against Syria and they had veto power at the UNSC.

Briefing by the Department on developments in North Africa with a specific view on Libya
Amb Matjila said the Department had identified areas of concern which played a role in initiating anti-government protests. Amongst the reasons for the discontent in North Africa were the extended leadership terms which leaders in that region had. Most of the governments in that region ruled through emergency laws, enjoyed strong military support, support from the United States of America (US) and the West in their fight against terrorism, and applied or sought to apply hereditary succession.

Most of the countries in that region had poor human rights records, restricted political participation, opposition to religious political participation (Islamist parties) and they exercised media censorship. There was high male youth unemployment, no trickle-down of oil revenue, a high level of unemployed graduates and high food prices in the region. All these factors contributed to the discontent in the region.

The situation in Libya had descended into a civil war. Several thousand foreign nationals from numerous countries had been evacuated and as fighting continued thousands of refugees had crossed into neighbouring countries. Anti-Gaddafi forces had formed a Transitional Council in Benghazi which had been recognised by Western and Arab League countries. Benghazi remained the stronghold for anti government forces. Despite gains in many cities over the past few weeks, pro-Gaddafi forces had pushed back rebels in most of Libya, with only Benghazi still reported to be fully under opposition control. UNSC Resolution 1973 had been approved for the imposition of a no-fly zone. Bombing raids had been in effect on government anti-aircraft capabilities and government ground forces attacking rebel fighters.

No signs of a cease-fire were evident as both sides continued to clash in cities across Libya. The UNSC had imposed sanctions on Libya and had referred alleged human rights abuses to International Criminal Court. Defections by Libyan diplomats and Ministers had occurred. The most high profile defection had been that of the Foreign Minister, Mussa Kussa. The AU High Level Panel presented the AU Roadmap to Colonel Gaddafi and the opposition. The Roadmap was accepted by Col Gaddafi but was rejected by the opposition in Benghazi.

The security situation was unstable and volatile with government forces continuing to attack rebel forces across the country despite coalition air strikes having disabled the Libyan Air Force. Reports had surfaced that the alliance was considering arming rebels in an attempt to force regime change. Oil exports revenues had dropped and there were proposals by the rebels to export oil. Unemployment amongst Libyans remained relatively high whilst international oil prices had risen. There was a lack of a constitution and dysfunctional governance. There was a lack of civil society organs as well as predominant tribal factions. Continued demands for Col Gaddafi and his sons to be removed by the opposition were preventing a cease fire. Libya had an un-diversified economy with oil wealth not filtering to ordinary people. There was a lack of political freedoms and basic human rights such as freedom of speech and association, and that posed serious challenges.

South Africa viewed Libya as a key player within the continent. The country had a strong relationship with Libya at a political level. Libya’s need for infrastructure development and untapped markets presented opportunities for South African companies. South Africa was a member of the AU High Level panel on Libya and also a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Inflated oil prices impacted negatively on South Africa’s economy and growth prospects. There were negative perceptions of South Africa’s role in Libya and its acceptance of the UNSC Resolution 1973 while the rest of the BRICS nations had abstained.

Discussion
Mr Mubu asked what South Africa’s reaction to NATO’s plan to add ground forces to Libya would be. Resolution 1973 showed how ineffective the AU had been on the Libyan issue. Could consideration be given to granting Colonel Gaddafi asylum in South Africa? Sniper rifles made in South Africa had been found to have been used by Libyan forces in killing people, could the Director General comment on that?

Amb Matjila replied that the government had been clear in its rebuke of the misinterpretation of the 1973 Resolution. Ground forces would be in place to lead a regime change which was against the principles of the Resolution. He said that the Department would take its cue from President Zuma on whether Col Gaddafi would receive asylum in the country. Not everything that was reported by the press was inclusive of all the events that had happened.

Ms Jacobus asked whether the 1973 UNSC Resolution had a loophole which allowed for the killing of Gaddafi.

Amb Matjila replied that there had been no discussion on how to implement the modalities of Resolution 1973. Thus the resolution’s implementation had been modified by those who sought to remove Col Gaddafi.

Ms September commented that there had been bad publicity about President Zuma going to Libya. She commented that there was no clear indication that the AU was going to respond to the unintended consequences of NATO’s airstrikes against Gaddafi. She intimated that the war in Libya was for oil.

Amb Matjila agreed with Ms September and said that the case for reforming the UNSC was growing.

Mr Suleiman asked whether the entire Libyan and Syrian missions had been evacuated. 

Amb Matjila replied that the missions in Damascus and Tripoli were still operating and functioning. There were procedures in place to evacuate in both cities should the situation degenerate. 

The Chairperson thanked the Department. The Committee would continue to monitor the situation in all the countries mentioned in the briefing.

The meeting was adjourned.

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