African conflicts & insurgencies & conflict resolution; SA peace-making in Lesotho, Burundi & South Sudan; Department on International Relations & Cooperation 1st Quarter 2015/16 performance

Meeting report

Department of International Relations and Cooperation
The Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) briefed the Committee on the performance and financial reports for Quarter 1 for the 2015/16 financial year for the Department, as well as the African Renaissance Fund.

Mr Jerry Matjila, Director General, DIRCO, impressed upon the Committee that dialogue was the key to international relations. South Africa was engaging with Iran on nuclear technology and on procuring oil. Iran was the biggest economy in the Middle East. This would impact upon the price of oil. The significance of USA-Cuba relations improving meant that there were less areas of disagreement for SA with the USA. It also meant that there was a lowering of tensions in Latin America. Both developments spoke volumes about SA’s foreign policy.

Mr Caiphus Ramashau, Chief Financial Officer (CFO), DIRCO, provided the Committee with an overview on four of the five programmes of the DIRCO -- Administration, International Relations, International Cooperation and Public Diplomacy and State Protocol Services -- on the first quarter performance. Targets and performance indicators were compared to actual performance. Figures were also provided on each of the programmes on projected expenditure versus actual expenditure and variance, if any. The briefing also spoke to the financials of each of the five Programmes of the DIRCO.

Total expenditure for the DIRCO as at the end of Quarter 1 amounted to R1.4bn, or 24% of the appropriated annual budget.
Administration Programme:
Total expenditure for the programme at the end of Quarter 1 amounted to R248.4m, or 17.5% of the programme’s total appropriation. This expenditure was 29.6% lower than what had been projected for the period. This was as a result of slow spending for the Lilongwe and Dar es Salaam construction projects, as well as outstanding claims relating to the rehabilitation work for The Hague Chancery.

International Relations Programme:
Total expenditure for the programme at the end of Quarter 1 amounted to R827.1m, or 28.2% of the programme’s total appropriation. The expenditure was in line with what had been projected for the period.

International Cooperation Programme:
Total expenditure for the programme at the end of Quarter 1 amounted to R112.4m, or 24.1% of the programme’s total appropriation. The higher expenditure was mainly due to the depreciation of the rand against major foreign currencies
.
Public Diplomacy and State Protocol Services Programme:
Total expenditure for the programme at the end of Quarter 1 amounted to R98.5m, or 40% of the programme’s total appropriation. The higher expenditure was mainly due to the expenditure on SA hosting of the African Union Summit, which had been unforeseeable and unavoidable. National Treasury had been approached through a National Treasury Memorandum for additional funding.

International Transfers Programme:
Total expenditure for the programme at the end of Quarter 1 amounted to R106.8m, or 16.8% of the programme’s total appropriation. The higher expenditure was mainly due to the depreciation of the rand against major foreign currencies, as well as transfer payments that were originally planned for Quarter 2 in terms of cash flow projections
.
Due to the impact of foreign exchange fluctuations, the DIRCO projected a shortfall amounting to R755.5m. This was based on the prevailing rates, due to the depreciation of the rand, on expenditure incurred in foreign currency at missions abroad, as well as transfer payments to international organisations which were projected for the second quarter of the financial year. The R755.5m amount had been requested through a National Treasury Memorandum to augment the DIRCO’s budget to be able to honour all its obligations, and also to perform as per its Annual Performance Plan.

African Renaissance Fund
The Committee was also given a brief overview of the performance and financials of the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) for Quarter 1. The accounting authority had continued with efforts to ensure compliance with the Public Finance Management Act and other prescripts. Actual performance was measured against targets set in meeting key performance indicators. During Quarter 1 of 2015/16, only assistance for technical support of the third general elections of Burundi, amounting to R38m, had been approved. SA had not, however, disbursed the funds to Burundi. The slow spending for the Fund was as a result of the transitional process of establishing the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA). Spending would pick up as soon as the process of establishing SADPA had been concluded. The SADPA Bill would be ready by Quarter 4.
 
Discussion
Mr T Bergman (DA) asked whether, under the Administration Programme, the key performance indicator of DIRCO providing 100% consular assistance response had been affected by the immigration regulations’ requirement of parents requiring an abridged birth certificate for their children when travelling. He also asked, under the International Relations Programme, if 14 high level visits had been done, and which countries had been targeted. DIRCO had also set a target of 16 bilateral meetings -- which regions had been targeted?

Mr Ramashau pointed out that the immigration regulations were not applicable to Quarter 1, as they came into effect in Quarter 2 on 1 July. Among the countries with which high level engagements had taken place were Zimbabwe, South Sudan, Kenya, Russia, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, France and Nigeria. The DIRCO had nine bilaterals in Africa, three with the Americas/Caribbean, five with Asia/Middle East and thirteen with Europe.

Mr Edward Makaya, Acting Deputy Director General: Africa, added that the majority of engagements in Africa were at head of state level. The visit by President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe in April 2015 had been important for SA. Bi-national Commissions between SA and Zimbabwe had been set up, and they would meet on an annual basis. The economic situation of Zimbabwe needed to be attended to. The President of Kenya had also visited SA. SA was establishing close economic cooperation with Kenya, which had the biggest economy in East Africa. SA was also committed to working closely with Nigeria, which had the biggest economy in Africa. President Zuma had attended the inauguration of the Nigerian President.

Ms S Kalyan (DA) referred to the unavoidable and unforeseen expenditure by the DIRCO on hosting the African Union Summit 2015. Who had committed SA financially to host it? If President Zuma had committed SA, why had the Presidency not paid for it? Why had the DIRCO not used its contingency funds to cover the cost of hosting the AU Summit? She pointed out that even National Treasury had not been aware of SA committing itself to hosting the AU Summit. She had on numerous occasions requested the DIRCO to place the Committee on its database so that Members could have access to all information that it was imparting, such as media briefings and opinion pieces etc. She asked Mr Matjila if he could intervene and remedy the matter. She referred to page 5 of the presentation, and asked what ‘service of process’ meant.

Mr Matjila responded that President Zuma had taken the decision that SA should host the AU Summit 2015. The Summit had to take place, as Africa had to take three important decisions. The first was about the First Ten Year Implementation Plan of the African Agenda 2063; the second was about the launch of the Continental Free Trade Area (CFTA); and the third was on Africa’s self-reliance. These issues had entailed ground breaking discussions. The CFTA would bode well for SA’s trade in goods and services. Africa had to become self-reliant. When countries from abroad provided African countries with funds, there were always strings attached. Africa would henceforth try to do things for themselves. It was also important to cement the road to the African Agenda 2063.The idea was to have capacity for peace and security so as to pre-empt conflict. The commitment by SA to host the AU Summit 2015 was through Cabinet memorandums. Cabinet would communicate with departments. There was therefore no way that National Treasury did not know about SA committing to host the Summit. There was a committee in place comprising of all departments, including National Treasury.  

Mr Ramashau said that ‘service of process’ was provided for by the Vienna Convention, and involved consular services. It entailed taking a judiciary process to other countries.

Mr S Mokgalapa (DA) said that the Committee would have appreciated a snapshot of outcomes of the DIRCO’s bilateral and high level visits. On trade and investment, SA lagged behind on economic diplomacy. He asked what the financial implications were of the self-reliance resolution. This was especially important, given the current economic climate with constant currency fluctuations. It was good that Africa should look after itself.

Mr Matjila pointed out that economic diplomacy was carried out in different ways. The DIRCO targeted different people in different sectors – for example, nuclear energy, the ocean economy and infrastructure development. The DIRCO worked with other government departments like the Department of Trade and Industry and the Department of Defence. Chambers of Commerce and industries were engaged. The DIRCO was currently focussing on Latin America and Asia, as there had been an emergence of multinational companies in those regions.

Mr M Maila (ANC) said that there were times when matters in the national interest had unfunded mandates. SA had not planned to host the AU Summit 2015. SA’s involvement in Lesotho and other African countries had not been planned for. It was unfortunate. He asked how these unplanned occurrences had affected the DIRCO’s budget. Did the DIRCO need Parliament’s assistance?

Ms D Raphuti (ANC) asked about the DIRCO’s efforts on public participation. She asked what the outcome had been. She wished to see progress on public participation.

Ms T Kenye (ANC) wished to confirm that the DIRCO actually had training programmes, as alluded to in the briefing. She was concerned that the DIRCO had received qualified audit reports from the Auditor General’s Office over the past few years. There seemed to be a weakness in senior management to supervise employees. Could training be done to prevent a qualified audit report in the future? The explanation given for slow spending in the Administration Programme for Quarter 1 had referred to the Lilongwe and Dar es Salaam construction projects. What had caused the slow spending on the projects? The Committee still needed to be provided with the resolutions that had been taken at various summits. The DIRCO had not provided what had been requested of them in the past. The resolutions from the AU Summit on Agenda 2063 was one of those that the Committee had requested. The Committee was also still awaiting reports on the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM).

Mr Ramashau conceded that there were issues that had led to the DIRCO getting qualified audit reports. The DIRCO was, however, engaged in the robust training of diplomats. A challenging area was change management. The DIRCO was also exploring e-learning as part of its services. There were programmes in place to improve the skills of managers.

Mr Makaya, on the slow expenditure at Lilongwe and other projects, said that the DIRCO had requested that funds be rolled over.

Mr L Mpumlwana (ANC) appreciated the work that the DIRCO was doing to assist South Africans who were in distress, or had passed away abroad. He asked whether South Africans abroad were registered with the Registration of South Africans Abroad (ROSA).

Mr Ramashau said that ROSA was a voluntary registration system for South Africans who went abroad. The problem was that nobody was using the system. The DIRCO wished to encourage people to register.

The Acting Chairperson pointed out that the fluctuations in the foreign exchange rate threatened the budget of the DIRCO. If a project exceeded its budget by 67%, then one might as well assume that the project had no budget. It was a huge problem. He asked how other countries had dealt with the issue. It was indeed admirable that the DIRCO assisted its citizens abroad, but the issue became complex when persons had dual citizenships. He also asked how far the DIRCO was in sorting out its problems on Information Communication Technology (ICT).

Mr Matjila conceded that the issue of dual citizenships, and even triple citizenships, was indeed a challenge. He had raised the issue with the powers that be for the past 20 years. He had encountered the problem in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates and many other countries. It was difficult to manage. He pointed out that the Southern African Development Countries (SADC) were moving away from dual citizenship. The individual should have only one citizenship. He felt it to be a matter that needed resolving. He emphasised that the DIRCO unfortunately had no control over currency fluctuations. The DIRCO did its best to meet its commitments abroad. There had even been an erratic movement in currencies over the past 15 days. The DIRCO simply could not compromise its commitments abroad. The budget of DIRCO was short of R755m, and he hoped that the Committee could assist in convincing the powers that be to provide it with the needed funds. SA’s 126 missions represented the entire country. Missions contained staff from various government departments. He felt that the responsibility should not be laid only at the DIRCO’s door.

Mr Ramashau conceded that the DIRCO had not invested much in ICT in the past. However, things were changing and governance had improved. Plans were also being implemented. The DIRCO had appointed a service provider to increase its internet bandwidth.

The Chairperson asked that the Committee be placed on the mailing list of the DIRCO so that Members could be kept up to date with what was happening. The DIRCO had made 40 statements, but the Committee had not seen any of them.

Mr Matjila agreed to place the Committee on its database so that Members could be kept abreast of happenings.

Ms Kenye said that the Nigerian church disaster was a major concern, given that SA had not been aware which of its citizens had been injured or lost their lives at the time when it happened. She asked whether ROSA should not be made compulsory. Who had established ROSA? Given that SA was having bilaterals with Nigeria, could the issue of Boko Haram not be engaged?

Mr M Lekota (COPE) said that the staff of the DIRCO could deal with practicalities, but not with policy issues. Political leadership should be held accountable. SA had been hosting sports events, summits and meetings since 1994. The problem was that SA was now even hosting peace missions. He asked what the political leadership of SA was doing to ensure that SA’s sister countries came on board. In Europe, the stronger countries were assisting Greece and Spain, but they made sure that there was not dependency forever. The citizens of countries held their leaders accountable for what funds were used for. Even the countries assisting weaker countries had to be held responsible for where they spent their funds. He asked what support had SA received from its sister countries when it had hosted the AU Summit 2015. It was a financial strain on SA to host events.

Mr Matjila responded that it was not a waste for SA to host summits. There were promotional benefits for the country. There were benefits from hosting the AU Summit 2015. Many delegates had attended. They had been staying in hotels, shopping at SA’s stores and spending money in various ways. Some might have stayed behind afterwards to enjoy SA’s tourism. Africans were even coming to SA for medical treatment and were not going to Europe, as they always had. Young Africans were even attending South African universities.

Mr Mokgalapa said that the Committee concurred with what Mr Lekota was saying on the financial strain that SA was feeling in hosting events. The Minister of International Relations and Cooperation needed to speak to political issues, and needed to prioritise a meeting with the Committee. SA was plagued with the ‘big brother’ syndrome. Things needed to change. He asked what the collective contribution on self-reliance was. Concrete governance was needed in Africa. When was the Foreign Services Bill to be presented to Parliament? He noted that Mr Ramashau had already stated that the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) Bill would be ready in Quarter 4 of the current financial year.

Mr Matjila said that the DIRCO would present the Foreign Services Bill to the Committee before it went to Parliament or for public comment. He was not too sure when the SADPA Bill would be coming before the Committee.

Ms Kalyan felt that registration with ROSA being voluntary was problematic. Why could ROSA not be compulsory? ROSA needed to be marketed in a friendly manner.

Mr Matjila was not sure whether the DIRCO had a mandate to make the ROSA compulsory. Parliament could, however, legislate to make it compulsory. He was afraid that the DIRCO might be sued if they made registration with ROSA compulsory. One of the major reasons why people did not register with ROSA was to evade the paying of tax.

Mr Bergman asked DIRCO whether it had a strategy that it followed when engaging in bilateral talks. Given the high investments that multinational companies made, it was important to ensure stability in the region.

Mr Matjila said that over the past 21 years a few things had been learnt. There were certain regions and markets in the world that were known for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). SA targeted certain sectors, like the chemical, automotive and transportation sectors. There were also regional strategies in place. The DIRCO had come up with a Gulf Strategy years ago. A China Strategy was done sixteen years ago and an India Strategy was done 13 years ago. The Brazil, Russia, India, China and SA (BRICS) Strategy had been done six years ago. The DIRCO was currently developing a Columbia, Indonesia, Vietnam, Egypt and SA (CIVET) Strategy.

The Chairperson said that there was reason to be proud of SA’s foreign policy. SA was hosting the Commonwealth Games in 2022. Foreign exchange fluctuations drastically affected the efforts of the DIRCO. The Committee would have to assist the DIRCO to obtain the extra funds that it had requested.

DIRCO briefing on Lesotho, Burundi and South Sudan
Mr Makaya briefed the Committee on the conflicts in Lesotho, Burundi and South Sudan. Members were given insight into what SA’s position was on the respective conflicts.

Kingdom of Lesotho
The political and security situation in Lesotho had been characterised by instability since August 2014, after a failed coup attempt which further politically fractured the country’s already fragile coalition government which came to power in 2012. Additionally, a long standing stand-off between the Lesotho Defence Force (LDF) and the Lesotho Mounted Police Service (LMPS) had compounded the security situation. In response to these developments, SADC had intervened in Lesotho by appointing Deputy President Cyril Ramaphosa as the SADC Facilitator to Lesotho to develop a road map to return stability and security to the Kingdom.

The SADC’s intervention in Lesotho had resulted in Lesotho holding national general elections in February 2015. There was no outright winner, and as a result the political parties opted to form coalitions. The All Basuto Convention (ABC) had ended with 40.31% of the vote, and the Democratic Congress (DC) with 40.99%. The DC and Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) had formed a coalition with an additional five smaller political parties, for a total of 65 seats. The ABC and Basuto National Party (BNP) together had 55 seats. The coalition government had signed an Agreement which committed the parties to a set of goals, including the recommendations of the SADC regarding constitutional review and security sector reform. However, the killing of former Lesotho Defence Force commander, Brigadier Maaparankoe Mahao on 25 June 2015, by army officers who had attempted to arrest him for his alleged involvement in a mutiny plot, had exposed the fault lines in the security sector and had resulted in increased political and security tension.

South Africa continued to support the SADC-led intervention in Lesotho through Mr Ramaphosa, in his capacity as the SADC Facilitator to the Kingdom of Lesotho, whose mandate was renewed by the SADC Extra Ordinary Double Troika Summit on 3 July 2015. Additionally, the SADC Double Troika Summit moved to establish a commission of inquiry to investigate current developments in the Kingdom. There had also been the creation of an oversight committee to work together with stakeholders in Lesotho on constitutional and security sector reforms. On 16 August 2015, the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation reaffirmed the terms of reference, as approved by the SADC Double Troika Summit on 3 July 2015. The terms of reference would guide the investigation of the SADC Commission of Inquiry mandated by the Summit to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of Brigadier Mahao.

The 35th Ordinary Summit of the SADC heads of state and government held in Gaborone, Botswana, on 17-18 August 2015, had supported the decision taken by the SADC Organ to reaffirm the terms of reference for the Commission of Inquiry, and had urged the Kingdom of Lesotho to gazette the SADC’s approved and reaffirmed terms of reference. This would allow the Commission to begin its work. On 21 August 2015, Lesotho had gazetted the terms of reference as approved by the SADC Double Troika Summit on 3 July 2015, and which had been reaffirmed by the same body on 16 August 2015. The Commission would have 60 days to conduct its investigations and present its findings to the Chair of the SADC Organ on Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation.

SA’s position was that it would continue to support Lesotho bilaterally through structured mechanisms and through SADC initiatives. The Government of Lesotho needed to develop a roadmap on constitutional and security sector reforms, assisted by the SADC.

Republic of Burundi
Some background was that SA had been a key role player in the Burundi peace process led by President Mandela as mediator, then by President Mbeki, and the then-Deputy President Zuma. It had resulted in the AU-led Arusha Peace Accords in 2000 – 2005, which had ended the decade-long civil war. In support of the peace process the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) had provided 1 266 troops to protect the returning leaders of the various political factions. This had acted as an important component of the AU and UN stabilisation force. The SANDF troops had withdrawn from Burundi at the end of 2009.

Peace and stability in Burundi were crucial factors for peace in the entire Great Lakes region. The genesis of the current crisis was that on 25 April 2015, the ruling party had announced President Pierre Nkurunziza as a candidate for re-election. Civil unrest had broken out and opposition supporters claimed that a “third term” bid by President Nkurunziza was unconstitutional. An attempted military coup had been squashed by loyalist troops. Presidential elections were held on 24 July 2015, and President Nkurunziza had taken 70% of the votes, and Opposition leader Agathon Rwasa 20%. Since April 2015,180 000 refugees had fled across borders to avoid violence and intimidation. The President had been sworn in at a low-profile inauguration on 20 August 2015, six days earlier than scheduled.

The question therefore remained as to whether the national dialogue would continue. However, it was important to note that to date the differences remained political, and the crisis had not assumed an ethnic (Hutu-Tutsi) identity. Of concern was that donor countries had withdrawn their budgetary support. 55% of Burundi’s budget came from donors. This had serious implications for social programmes. Since the crisis started, SA had participated in three East African Community (EAC) summits as a special guest.

Since 1994, SA had invested significantly in Burundi and would continue to stand by the Burundian people in their search for sustainable peace, security and development. There was a need for a national political dialogue to stop the violence and for the return of refugees. SA had allocated R38m towards the Burundian election process, but had decided to reverse the funding due to the manner in which the elections had taken place.

Republic of Sudan
South Sudan became an independent state on 9 July 2011. In less than three years of independence, the young country had been plunged into conflict on 15 December 2013.The conflict prompted President Zuma to appoint Deputy President Ramaphosa as his Special Envoy to the Republic of South Sudan.

South Africa’s political intervention in South Sudan had focused on reuniting the ruling party Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). From 7-11 August 2015, relevant South Sudanese parties had met in Addis Ababa to consider the compromise agreement and to discuss the issues of contention. Following the consultations all parties to the South Sudanese conflict had met again in Addis Ababa on 17 August 2015 for the signing of the Compromise Peace Agreement. The SPLM-In-Opposition (IO), led by Dr Riek Machar, and the SPLM-Former Detainees, represented by Mr Pagan Amum, had signed the accord. President Salva Kiir, however, had raised reservations over a number of stipulations in the Agreement and had requested a period of 15 days to consult his party and the people of South Sudan. The interlocutors had granted President Kiir the 15 days, but perceived the request as a delaying tactic.

The United States on 21 August 2015 had proposed a draft resolution at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to institute sanctions on South Sudan if President Kiir did not sign the Peace Agreement. The sanctions included a freeze on assets, a travel ban on certain individuals as well as an arms embargo on the country. Regional and International pressure, together with the threat of sanctions from the UNSC, compelled the President to sign, and on 26 August 2015 he had signed the Compromise Agreement. He did, however, ensure that he enclosed an annexure that included a list of 16 reservations that he strongly deemed detrimental to the self-determination of South Sudan, as well as clauses that would impede the path to attaining lasting peace in the young country.

Through its Special Envoy, Mr Ramaphosa, SA would continue to assist the SPLM to unite, reconcile and focus on developmental challenges. SA would work on its bilateral relations with South Sudan and continue with post conflict development and reconstruction.
President Kiir had made it very clear that he was concerned that the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Plus (IGAD- Plus) countries had not had enough time to familiarise themselves with the magnitude of the conflict. This point was instructive, and should be a consideration for the wider IGAD Plus mechanism in trying to address the President’s concerns, which were paramount to the success of the peace deal and thus should be ironed out and addressed as a matter of urgency. If the reservations were not dealt with, there was the risk of a collapse of the peace agreement.

Discussion
Ms Kalyan asked what SA’s position was if the three political parties in South Sudan had not reached agreement by 1 September 2015. She was quietly pleased that SA had held back the R38m that it had pledged towards elections in Burundi.

Mr Makaya explained that the 1 September 2015 deadline had been put in place in recognition of the 15 days that President Salva Kiir had asked for. The 1 September 2015 deadline had been overtaken by subsequent events -- the signing of a peace agreement.

Mr Mokgalapa asked whether, on Lesotho, there had been a breach of the Maseru Security Accord. He commented that in Burundi the opposition party had obtained 20% of the vote in the recently held elections, and that it was aligned with the winning party. What about the smaller opposition parties? He asked what was going to happen to the peace process. In South Sudan, the peace accord had been signed a week earlier, on 26 August 2015. However, it did look as though conflict was increasing again. He asked whether the sanctions called for by the USA against South Sudan had kicked in, or whether the transitional peace period was being given a chance.

Mr Makaya said that there had been no breaches of the Maseru Security Accord. Deputy President Ramaphosa had set up the Maseru Security Accord to manage the heads of security. The new President had to decide who the head of the military was to be. In Burundi, all political parties had participated in the elections, even the smaller opposition parties. Some of the smaller opposition parties had boycotted the elections, even though they still appeared on the ballot papers. Voters had voted for them nevertheless. He confirmed that in South Sudan, an agreement had been signed but the conflict had continued. There was still a great deal of work that needed to be done in South Sudan.

Mr Maila said that constitutional reform was needed in Lesotho. He asked whether it was safe for the former Lesotho Prime Minister, Mr Thomas Thabane, to return to Lesotho. He pointed out that the Constitutional Court of Burundi had ruled in favour of the candidature of President Nkurunziza. If the rule of law prevailed, he asked what the issue was.

Mr Majila referred to constitutional reforms in Lesotho, and stated that the aim was to have long term stability in the kingdom. The situation could perhaps have been better if the King of Lesotho had some power. He highlighted what needed to be done in Lesotho. Firstly, conditions for a coalition government had to be created. Secondly, civil service reforms had to be revisited. Additionally, legislation on the defence force and the police force needed to be reviewed. At present the security of the Lesotho Executive was in the hands of the defence force, when it should be with the police. Lesotho needed the defence force and police force to be under a security cluster. The voters’ roll of Lesotho also needed to be revamped.

Mr Makaya noted that on constitutional reform, the Prime Minister had to develop a roadmap for the reforms that were required. In Burundi, the Constitutional Court had decided that President Nkurunziza was eligible to stand for elections. All that could be done was to ensure that the elections were credible and peaceful.

Ms Raphuti asked what the reason was for Lesotho not toe-ing the line. If SA’s assistance to Burundi of R38m had been held back, she asked what SA’s involvement at present was.

Mr Makaya said that SA had been baffled as to why Lesotho had gazetted different terms of reference. The terms of reference had subsequently been corrected.

Mr M Mncwango (IFP) asked what the status of former the Prime Minister of Lesotho, Mr Thabane, was. Was he considered a refugee in SA? He noted that SA had condemned the actions of the Burundian President Nkurunziza. Given that he had won the elections, did SA recognise him as the President? He also asked what the role of Sudanese President, President Omar al-Bashir in South Sudan was. Was his involvement overt or covert?

Mr Majila said that former Prime Minister Thabane was a visitor in SA, and not a refugee. There was an agreement in place which provided for him to go back to Lesotho. Mr Thabane, however, also wished to be given guarantees that two other opposition leaders could also return to Lesotho. He noted that South Sudan was like a mouse trap. It was surrounded by six countries. There were conflicts all around it. South Sudan also lacked infrastructure.

Mr Makaya said that SA did recognise President Nkurunziza. Sudan was part of Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), so President al-Bashir was involved to solve the conflict in South Sudan.

The Chairperson spoke about the involvement of the United Kingdom in South Sudan, and said that where there was oil, the western countries would be quick to take advantage. He asked what steps had been taken to prevent a similar situation to that which was playing itself out in Libya. If the Constitutional Court in Burundi had given its ruling over the re-election of President Nkurunziza, why had the AU questioned it? The Constitutional Court was, after all, the highest law in any land. He also asked what had caused the conflict in Lesotho. Had an economic plan been put in place?

Mr Makaya responded that the root causes of the Lesotho conflict were firstly due to the defence force causing havoc, which had led to security problems, and secondly the floor crossing rules of Lesotho’s parliament. Constitutional reform was needed to deal with these issues.

Mr Mpumlwana asked what the chances were that the coalition government of Lesotho would last. He asked why the USA had become involved in South Sudan. Was there oil in South Sudan?

Mr Matjila said that South Sudan was rich in mineral resources. It had oil and agricultural products. The USA was a major player in South Sudan. Key South Sudanese military personnel were trained by the USA.

Mr Makaya explained that when the IGAD process had been started the USA, the UK and Norway had been invited to participate in and fund the IGAD meetings. However, these countries had their personal reasons for wanting to be involved in the country.

Ms Kenye asked if 22 of the 66 political prisoners of Lesotho were still in prison, and where the remaining 44 were.

Mr Makaya said that 22 prisoners were in prison, 22 were in SA and the remaining 22 had been released.

Committee Minutes
Due to time constraints, the Committee could not deal with outstanding sets of minutes.

Mr Maila recommended that the Committee adopt minutes on a weekly basis in order to prevent a backlog.

The Committee agreed to the recommendation.

The meeting was adjourned.