Disengagement Plan: Israeli and Palestinian Embassy briefings

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International Relations

03 August 2005
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE
3 August 2005
DISENGAGEMENT PLAN: ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN EMBASSY BRIEFINGS

Chairperson:
Mr D Sithole (ANC)

Documents handed out:
Speech of Ambassador El-Herfi
Israel’s Disengagement Plan PowerPoint presentation
Israel’s Disengagement Plan Document
Tipa Information Sheet
Parliament Information Services briefing notes

SUMMARY
The Israeli Embassy addressed the Committee on the vision, purpose and philosophy of Israel’s unilateral disengagement process in the Gaza Strip. The Charge d’ Affaires discussed the challenges that Israel faced and the role Palestine was expected to play in the process. He called on South Africa to play a role in the disengagement process by encouraging Palestinians to end terror tactics and to enter into peace negotiations.

The Committee expressed their support for the disengagement process but had a number of concerns. These included the unilateral nature of the process and the continued condemnation of Yasser Arafat after his death. The non-recognition of Palestine as a state was another issue. The Committee was also concerned about the lack of distinction made between the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and Palestinian terrorists. The Committee hoped to visit Israel and Palestine early in 2006 to gain a better understanding of the situation.

In the afternoon session, the Palestinian Ambassador briefed the Committee on their perception of Israel’s Disengagement Plan. It was viewed with concern and perceived to be an entrenchment of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, while apparently conceding land in Gaza. An advisor to the Israeli Prime Minister had stated in an interview that it was a measure to disrupt the plan for a viable and independent Palestinian state.

The Committee expressed concern at the continued construction of ‘The Wall’, and it was confirmed that this was viewed with grave suspicion by Palestine. Palestinian land had been annexed and Palestinian properties destroyed in the construction of the wall, and it was perceived to be a permanent structure intended to force the emigration of Palestinians. The need for assistance from the international community was emphasised. The Committee reiterated South Africa’s commitment to finding a peaceful solution to the conflict in the region.

MINUTES

Israeli Embassy briefing
Mr Ilan Fluss, the Charge d’ Affaires of the Israeli Embassy, briefed the Committee on the disengagement process whereby 25 Jewish towns and villages (9 000 people) would be evacuated in four stages to outside the Gaza Strip. These evacuations would begin on 17 August 2005. Israel and the international community would also assist in facilitating normal economy activity and security in Palestine. The disengagement process had come about because of the need for a new programme to change the present reality in the Gaza Strip, to restart the peace process, and to address the security needs of the Israeli population after more than four years of terror. Palestine’s new leader, Mr Mahmoud Abbas, had also shown himself to be committed to restoring peace.

The vision of the disengagement process was to restart direct negotiations. The final status of the disengagement process would hopefully result in the establishment of full and peaceful relations between the two parties. The process would also end the occupation of the area and enforced control over the lives of Palestinian people. Lastly, the economy of the region would be boosted.

The disengagement process was a unilateral process as Israel felt it had no partner to create a chance to achieve peace. It would hopefully create a platform for renewed negotiations and a partnership to promote peace through security. Israel faced a number of challenges. The disengagement was an unprecedented move as Israel had never dismantled any settlements before. Some of the Israeli people had been living in these settlements for up to four generations. The process had also led to a growing social and political rift within Israel, as could be seen by the existence of opposition movements among the Israeli population (the colour orange represented those who opposed disengagement), and a new coalition forming between the former right-wing Likud Party and the former left-wing Labour Party. There were also a number of security risks involved, as evacuation of the Gaza Strip could lead to terrorists moving closer to the larger Israeli towns. Israel was a small country and therefore had no strategic depth. It could not withstand the attacks of penetrating armies. The disengagement process would cost the Israeli economy US$900 million. Evacuated families would also have to be provided with housing and employment.

A number of open issues had to be resolved, particularly the border between the Gaza Strip and Egypt, known as the ‘Philadelphi Route’. This route was notorious for its arms smuggling tunnels and any changes in the area would have implications for the agreement between Israel and Egypt. Control over the air and seaports in the Gaza Strip would have to be discussed, as well as the future of a number of real estate assets, such as the Erez Industrial Zone on the border of the Gaza Strip, Egypt and Israel. Israel would however continue to provide civil infrastructure to the Palestinians, and economic arrangements between the two sides would remain intact.

A number of commitments were expected of the Palestinian Authority during the process. They would have to meet their promises on administrative reform, greater transparency, and their fight to end terrorism and dismantle its infrastructure. They would also have to assist in the co-ordination of key elements of the disengagement plan and take control of the Gaza Strip. The Palestinian Authority needed to demonstrate its ability to govern its own areas, including the Gaza Strip. It would also have to show its commitment to renewing peace negotiations once the disengagement process had taken place.

The two main players in the disengagement process were Israel and Palestine, but other key players were Egypt; the ‘Quartet’ of the United States of America, the European Union, Russia and the United Nations; the World Bank, and other organisations. The international community had been called on both to help Palestine to fulfill its commitments and to support it economically. South Africa had also been requested to assist, based on its own political experiences, to promote peace between Israel and Palestine.

Discussion
The Chairperson explained that a proposed Committee visit to Israel and Palestine had not been approved by Parliament. He would reapply for this visit to take place in the first term of next year, but he noted that this could be delayed due to local government elections. It was important for Members to visit Palestine and Israel in order to gain first-hand knowledge of the disengagement process and other important issues.

Mr D Gibson (DA) asked about the chances of representative and comprehensive negotiations between the two sides, and how priorities would be determined.

Mr Fluss emphasised that in the past, there had been large-scale opposition to achieving peace, where Israel had blamed Palestine for not promoting peace and Palestine had done the same to Israel. As the disengagement deadline approached, more meetings were taking place to ensure co-ordination between the two sides. The Quartet were also trying to create the possibility for renegotiations. A number of tough issues needed to be resolved however, such as an end to terror and the fact that the Israeli government would not allow Palestinian refugees into Israel. Israel hoped that the disengagement would restart the peace process.

Mr Gibson asked whether Israel still stood by the Camp David offers made to Palestine. Mr Fluss replied in the negative, as nothing had been signed at this meeting. It was merely another opportunity for peace that had been missed

Mr M Sibande (ANC) asked why it had been so difficult to implement past peace accords such as the 1993 Oslo Accord and the 2002 Road Map. Mr Fluss explained that the Road Map had been introduced when it was realised that the Oslo Accord had failed. It was up to the negotiating sides to determine whether the process could be restarted. In respect of the Road Map, Israel had fought five wars against neighbouring countries trying to destroy Israel, and the region was still a hostile environment. There had to be partners for peace.

Mr Sibande asked why Israel was continuing with the building of the wall between Israel and Palestine, suggesting that it was no different from the Berlin Wall. Mr Fluss clarified that Israel termed the wall a ‘security fence’, as only 3% of it was concrete. The fence was still under construction because of ongoing terrorist threats to Israeli citizens, as demonstrated by the bomb that had exploded in a shopping mall in the Netanya province two weeks previously. The security barrier had been successful in reducing terror attacks by 90%. Terrorists had had to find new ways to launch attacks and many had given up as too complicated. The barrier was not permanent and would be dismantled when the threat of terrorism ended. This had already been demonstrated by the fact that it had been moved a number of times by the order of the Israeli courts in order to reduce human rights violations.

Mr Sibande asked how many political prisoners had been released since the 8 February 2002 meeting between Israel and Palestine. Mr Fluss replied that approximately 1 000 prisoners had been released.

Mr K Bapela (ANC) noted that many Israelis were angry over the disengagement process and had begun to distrust the Israeli government. Some had adopted the colour orange as a sign of their opposition to the process and a number of large demonstrations had taken place in Israel. There was also opposition to the process in Palestine. The problem of ports in the Gaza Strip had already been mentioned but airspace over the area was also an issue. Surely this should be included in the disengagement plan? What was the future of the Palestinian people in the Gaza Strip and the services supplied to them once the disengagement process had ended? Most had not been engaged in the process due to its unilateral nature.

Mr Fluss agreed that many Israelis did not support the unilateral process, with many of them accusing the government of merely giving in to the Palestinians. The ‘orange movement’ was noticeable and there was mistrust, but the lawful agreements of the government were being followed. The existence of a responsible government and police system meant that these demonstrations were not a threat to Israel’s stability or the disengagement process. The Palestinian opposition to the process was a greater problem as there was no control over it. The problem of smuggling at the various ports was being tackled, but Israel was aware that these ports were economically important to Palestine. Once the disengagement process had ended, Israel would continue to supply water, electricity and other infrastructure to the Palestinians. However, once it had pulled out, Israel would not enter the territory, so it was important for the Palestinian Authority to gain control over the area.

Mr Bapela remarked that he had visited the region and noted that the wall was still being built, and that construction was continuing in the disputed areas. Mr Fluss replied that building was continuing in a limited way in specific areas. Some so-called ‘settlements’ were in fact cities, with a naturally growing population.

Mr M Ramgobin (ANC) reminded Members that Israel had itself been created through the inorganic process of the Balfour Declaration. Throughout the presentation, Palestine had been referred to as an "area" or "hopeful state". South Africa had official diplomatic ties with both the State of Israel and the State of Palestine, and suggested that this reluctance to refer to a Palestinian state could fall foul of international law. Two other issues also needed to be explained. Firstly, Israel had expressed their wish to stop controlling the lives of other people, yet refugees had stayed in their own separate areas since 1948 and Israel had denied the Palestinian people’s aspirations for nationhood. The second issue was that Israel and America were strong allies so the unilateral disengagement process could not seen to exist outside the American experience. Israel should perhaps learn from the realities of South Africa.

Mr Fluss noted that the Balfour Declaration had ended 2 000 years of persecution of the Jewish people, including the genocide of one-third of the population by the Nazis. Although South Africa recognised a Palestinian State, Israel and the United Nations (UN) did not as it was not recognised by international law. The idea of recognising a Palestinian State in the future was important, but Palestine would also have to recognise the Jewish state and its people. Palestine still aimed to destroy the Jewish state by bringing refugees into Israel. The agreement was unilateral because Israel had not had a national partner in the past. The late Mr Yasser Arafat had missed a number of opportunities to bring peace.

The intention of the unilateral process was to restart a bilateral process as the only way to bring peace to the area. It was difficult to compare South Africa’s conflict to that of Israel as they differed greatly. Most importantly, the conflict in Israel existed between two states while the conflict in South Africa existed within a state. South Africa could still aid the process greatly as both Israel and Palestine could learn from its reconciliation process. It could encourage Palestine to end terror and once again enter into political dialogue.

Professor B Turok (ANC) recognised that trust was a critical issue in the disengagement process and creating peace, but noted that the address had drawn no apparent distinction between terrorists and people who were members of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO). There was no chance for trust if this distinction was not recognised. It was vital that the historical aspirations of the Palestinian people be separated from the aspirations of terrorists. The address had not given a full description of the disengagement process, and he requested that a detailed document on the disengagement process be sent to Members. Did Israel accept that the Palestinians had a historical right to a Palestinian State, as the ANC had always recognised the PLO as a genuine freedom movement?

Mr Fluss responded that it had not been his intention to imply that all Palestinians were terrorists and stressed that only a minority of Palestinians were trying to destroy Israel. He felt however, that to compare the ANC and PLO was an insult to the former party as the leadership of the ANC had tried to avoid violence while the Palestinian Authority did not do so. Israel recognised that the Palestinian Authority was an Authority and not just a movement. The lack of trust between Israel and Palestine was unfortunate but was a result of the years of intifada. Israel hoped to rebuild this trust by restarting negotiations after the disengagement process. Israel required the Palestinian Authority to show an effort for peace.

The Chairperson emphasised that the ANC did not regard the PLO as a terror organisation, and reminded Israel of the close relationship between the two organisations. It was unfair to continue to condemn Mr Arafat even after his death, as Israel could equally be accused of not being a partner to Mr Arafat. The creation of trust would be impossible if Israel refused to recognise a Palestinian state. He advised Israel to accept the historical symbols of the Palestinian people. He reiterated that it was important for the Committee to visit Israel to come to a broader understanding of the situation.

Palestinian Ambassador’s briefing
In the afternoon session, Mr S El-Herfi (Ambassador Extraordinary Plenipotentiary, Embassy of the State of Palestine) reminded the Committee that President Mbeki had given the Israelis and Palestinians an opportunity to meet in South Africa, after the breakdown of the Camp David meeting in July 2000. This had formed the cornerstone of the current progress in the region.

The Disengagement Plan had been initiated by Israeli Prime Minister Sharon. The Palestinian Authority and the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) were not against any Israeli withdrawal, but the Israeli government’s goal with this disengagement was not the same goal as that of the international community, the Palestinian Authority or the PLO. In an interview with the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, Mr D Weisglass, senior advisor to Prime Minister Sharon, stated that the disengagement plan was in fact a "freezing of the peace process", and the prevention of the establishment of a viable independent Palestinian state. This went against the will of the international community, United Nations (UN) resolutions, and the quoted plan of the Israeli government. Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza was a cover-up of the increased occupation of the West Bank, and was intended to mislead the international community. The maps of the intended division of the West Bank showed its division into four or five "Bantustans", surrounded by an ugly "apartheid wall".

Despite all the difficulties and atrocities faced by the Palestinian Authority, it had never undertaken any unilateral act like the proposed disengagement. The Israel and Palestine problem would never be solved by violence, but by peace and the acceptance of the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The Palestinian Authority and the PLO had accepted the UN Security Council Resolutions. These should also be accepted and implemented by Israel, and the United States needed to change its of double standards. The only solution for the conflict was to show respect for international decisions. The PLO recognised the State of Israel and its right of existence on the basis of mutual recognition of the PLO and national rights for the Palestinians.

Since the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin, the situation had deteriorated further. The PLO had implemented all agreements signed, and were at all times ready to confirm their support for and to implement all agreements signed with the State of Israel. The international community needed to press the State of Israel to make unilateral withdrawal part of the integral implementation of the Road Map.

Discussion
Mr Bapela noted that the disengagement was envisaged for Gaza and asked whether there would be disengagement in the West Bank as well.

Mr El Herfi replied that the Israeli’s government’s goal was to intensify its presence in the West Bank and minimise its losses in Gaza. The international community, particularly the Quartet, were putting pressure on Israel to make the disengagement part of the Road Map, and this would involve withdrawing from part of the West Bank. Mr Sharon and his government had put 14 ‘reservations’ on the Road Map, completely destroying the whole plan. They had been forced to accede to pressure to withdraw from four isolated settlements in the north of the West Bank, and Palestine welcomed this. Israel would have to accept that its unilateral disengagement from Gaza should form part of the Road Map. Once out of Gaza, they would have to move to Phase Two of the Road Map, with an international conference on the Palestine-Israeli conflict, and a further withdrawal from the West Bank.

Mr Bapela noted that Mr Fluss had stated that the Wall was not a permanent structure, and would disappear as soon as agreement was reached. Was this the understanding of the State of Palestine as well?

Mr El Herfi replied that Palestine did not share this view. It was not possible to confiscate 58% of Palestinian land and say that it was a temporary structure. There would have been no objection if the wall had been on Israeli territory, but Palestinian land was being annexed and Palestinian property being destroyed. It was hoped that it was temporary. If was, Israel should have accepted the International Court of Justice’s Advisory. The wall was there to put an end to the process of peace.

Mr Sibande asked about the trenches that had been dug around the Palestinian territories, and asked whether these remained in addition to the wall.

Mr El Herfi replied that the situation had deteriorated. The intention of the wall was perceived to be the enforced emigration of the Palestinian people as it prevented their migration to work. This condemned them to death or emigration, and this was a crime against humanity. There had been no positive developments from the side of the Israeli government, and the wall was legalising the annexation of Palestinian territory.

Mr Bapela remarked on the continued building of settlements in the disputed areas, which Mr Fluss had described as minimal, and asked for comment. Mr El Herfi replied that settlement continued daily, and that land was annexed and new settlements were built, dividing families and homes.

Mr Bapela referred to the recent local government elections in which Hamas had won a number of seats, and asked if this meant that Hamas had converted itself into a political party.

Mr El Herfi replied that the PLO and Palestinian Authority were working very hard to build up national unity. Through dialogue, Hamas had been convinced to join the peace process. Although originally a creation of the USA and Israel as an alternative to the PLO, Hamas consisted of Palestinians, and the Palestinian Authority felt that it was its duty to get them in the ranks of the Palestinian political parties. Hamas had been convinced of the ceasefire and had accepted the PLO’s political charter. A mutual ceasefire had been agreed with Israel in the Sharm El Sheikh talks, but over 700 Palestinian resistance members had been assassinated by Israel. Although Israel had agreed to release prisoners, the only prisoners released thus far were 900 common-law prisoners, and more than 8 000 political prisoners remained in jail. The PLO was continuing its dialogue with Hamas regardless, and would accept the result of any elections. Israel had stated that it would no longer deal with Palestine if Hamas were to win, but was contrary to the policy of the Palestinian Authority that recognised whatever leader Israel elected.

Mr Bapela remarked that there had been talk of a postponement of the October elections. He asked why this had been proposed as it might start to create doubts about democratisation in the Authority. Mr El Herfi replied that the election would be delayed because an agreement had been reached with Jihad and Hamas to change the law, and the National Legislative Council had to change the Constitution. The first reading had been on 19 July 2005, and it was hoped that the process would be finished in October or November 2005. This was not a political decision, but a legal one.

Mr Sibande asked about identity permits and whether any progress had been made with simplifying checkpoints at Palestinian areas, particularly in Fatah. Mr El Herfi replied that all means had been used to destroy the will of the Palestinian people. The Israeli government had attacked individuals with sophisticated planes in Gaza and Palestine, and had even tried to involve Egypt in the dispute. Under the Disengagement Plan, Israel retained control of Gaza, the border with Egypt, and the coast. The wall was being erected between Jordanians and Palestinians, and this could hardly be for security. It was felt that the Israeli government had no desire to reach agreement with the Palestinian people.

Mr L Labuschagne (DA) asked when it was envisaged that Palestine would be a State, and what the stumbling blocks were, as Palestine seemed to comply with the requirements for a State.

Mr El Herfi replied that this depended on Israel’s implementation of international resolutions. The way forward, according to UN Resolution 242, would be a Palestinian State. Agreement had been reached with the late Prime Minister Rabin, and further agreement with Mr Netanyahu, but it had not been implemented. Pressure was needed from the international community, possibly to the extent of imposing sanctions against Israel.

Mr S Huang (ANC) asked whether the renewed peace negotiations would include Hamas. Mr El Herfi replied that Palestine had always been in favour of reviving these. An agreement had been reached with Israel in 2001, shortly before Prime Minister Sharon had won power. Israel had been forced to recognise some aspects of the problem, but not the fundamental right of the Palestinian people to a viable independent state. All Palestinian political parties should be involved. This was why the Palestinian Authority had worked so hard to include Jihad and Hamas.

Mr Huang asked whether the Palestinian State could expect to be economically independent of Israel. Mr El Herfi admitted that the State of Palestine was very poor and needed help from the international community, but emphasised that it did not depend on Israel for water, but rather the reverse. This was one of the reasons for the wall, so that the Nablus area was annexed as a water source.

Mr Huang asked what Palestine expected of South Africa in facilitating peace in the region. Mr El Herfi replied that South Africa’s experience was regarded as extremely important, particularly in respect of tolerance and truth and reconciliation. The South African government had shown that it was never anti-Israeli, even if at times it opposed the policies of the Israeli government, and had shown itself to be pro-justice, rather than pro-Palestine.

Professor Turok noted that the whole world was looking for an end to the conflict, but asked whether the situation was a stalemate. All parties had taken a resolution on a ceasefire, but there was evidence that this had not been implemented. There was a history of disunity within the Palestinian people and there might be a perception at an international level that there was insufficient unity, even within the PLO.

Mr El Herfi replied that he was very optimistic, despite the stalemate. Hope had to be created for both sides, and they looked to the international community for help. The Quartet was insisting that the unilateral disengagement be a part of the Road Map, and the Israeli government was creating the stalemate. Before the death of President Arafat, Prime Minister Abbas had convinced all Palestinian parties to join a 51-day ceasefire. Despite this agreement, Israel had broken the ceasefire ‘at least once an hour’. The Israeli government had consistently violated a further agreement brokered by Egypt and Jordan, and Palestinian groups had retaliated. The agreement would still hold provided Israel respected the ceasefire. The Palestinian Authority and the PLO had censured Palestinians who had violated the ceasefire, but no similar action had been taken by Israel. Peace was a necessity for both sides, and talks had to be resumed.

The Chairperson agreed that the creation of peace was a challenge. It was important to ensure that Israel be surrounded by states that acknowledged its legitimacy, to make it feel less vulnerable. South Africa would continue to support the cause of peace in the region.

The meeting was adjourned.

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