DIRCO & ARF 2019/20 Quarter 4 Report; Conflict hotspots in Africa; with Deputy Ministers

Meeting report

Chairperson on DIRCO priorities

The Chairperson welcomed Committee Members, the Deputy Ministers, as well as the African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) to the meeting. She said organisations such as ACCORD were in positions of influence that could help South Africa’s national interest find expression on the continent, through their policies and outcomes. Candidature diplomacy should be a strategy to get value for money and address the needs of South Africa as a country, including giving exposure to the youth for internship and future employment opportunities.

The information communication technology (ICT) infrastructure of the Department of International Relations and Communications (DIRCO), which had been an elephant in the room, had become an irritant of note to the oversight work of the Portfolio Committee. It had now been a decade since the heightened risk to the security of this Department had become apparent. The world was in a new normal situation brought on by COVID-19, so how was DIRCO planning to conduct diplomacy in the absence of a modernised ICT infrastructure? Did this mean that the Department was willing to be left behind in the fast-growing global movement towards e-diplomacy or digital diplomacy? The world had replaced old diplomacy methods with new ones that were greatly influenced by the internet. DIRCO should embrace change and rethink foreign policy practices. The Corona virus adversity should be turned into an opportunity to conduct a lot of routine diplomatic engagements online. An ICT turnaround strategy was crucial to ensure that solutions were not superficial.

The Committee had observed with concern that DIRCO had been struggling to stay within the stipulated compensation of employees (CoE) ceiling. The overspending on CoE had been attributed to DIRCO’s budget being lower than the required funding to provide fully for the current head count. It had become imperative for DIRCO, in consultation with National Treasury, to devise a strategy with a detailed implementation plan to find a workable solution to stay within the ceiling without compromising service delivery.

The Committee was awaiting the outcomes of the current audit cycle, and hoped it would be positive and not on the same old recurring audit findings which it had found in DIRCO’s first budget review and recommendations report (BRRR) for 2018/19 financial year. The Committee sensed a slower pace on the activities of the BRICS (Brazil-Russia-India-China-South Africa) grouping, and therefore encouraged DIRCO to re-envision foreign policy and address the challenges of the BRICS coalition. It realised that these challenges were brought about mainly by the domestic politics within the BRICS countries and the fact that some BRICS partners were moving towards the right. The Committee was mindful that the significantly unique feature of the group was its geographical spread, as evident from the location of these five states being on four different continents. The Committee felt the need for deeper engagement, with a special meeting on BRICS when it returned from the constituency period to get to the bottom of the geopolitical dynamics of the BRICS grouping.

The Committee wanted to witness a deliberate representation in the Department of the previously disadvantaged group, catering for gender mainstreaming, youth development and access for people with disabilities. The Committee had observed that the youthful workforce was concentrated mostly at the lower levels of DIRCO. Its previous reports had indicated that its senior and top management was aging. In the Committee’s view, this presented an opportunity for a youth development strategic framework. DIRCO required a mentorship programme as well as a clear strategy of developing a second layer of leadership within the Department.

The members of the South African Council of International Relations had been appointed on 21 April 2015. This body was meant to provide a platform for generating public debate on foreign policy and provide a consultative forum for a regular review of South Africa’s foreign policy, and advice for the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation. In 2018/19, the Minister had established the foreign policy review panel and convened the inaugural foreign policy workshop to begin the process of re-assessing South Africa’s foreign policy. In the new normal, the Portfolio Committee had not heard from these two bodies, and it was not clear whether there was link between them. The Committee cautioned against there being too many structures whose terms of reference were likely to create duplication of effort.

The Committee believed that public diplomacy and strategic communication should always strive to support South Africa’s national interest and values. It was her view that all communication and public diplomatic activities should underscore the country’s commitment to freedom, human rights, dignity and equality of every human being.

The Committee had been urging the Department to prioritise the development of a property management policy well in advance of the Foreign Service Bill being operational. The property portfolio of state-owned properties abroad was huge, and it needed a heightened state of readiness to assume custodianship of state-owned properties in use by missions abroad, with new skills in the built environment and project management in the Department.

The integrated agenda of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was of paramount importance in DIRCO’s work. The region served as South Africa’s secure market and partners in a multilateral agenda, including the reform of the UN Security Council. It was the Committee’s belief that the economic integration of SADC remained critical for the region’s economic development and for South Africa’s global competitiveness The Committee wanted the Department to ensure a peaceful SADC region, which was crucial for economic development in the region and for the achievement of the integration agenda. The Committee called upon DIRCO to commit to leading the implementation of domestication of the region’s blueprint in the country, including a revised regional indicative strategy development plan.

In conclusion, the Chairperson said the Committee wanted to shift from the practice of having the African Renaissance Fund performance report and the Department’s performance report attached together. It was her considered view that in the near future, the Committee would call upon the African Renaissance Fund (ARF) to account on its own for a thorough scrutiny of its work. She hoped that the issues raised today would be implemented.

ACCORD: Conflict hotspots in Africa

Dr Vasu Gounden, Executive Director: African Centre for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), presented a report on conflict hotspots in Africa. The report was called “Convergence and Complexity -- Africa’s Crisis over the Next Decade.” As the report had already been sent to Committee Members, Dr Gounden said he would give an overview of the report and focus on the current conflict dynamics on the continent and then zoom in on specific areas such as the Sahel region, Libya, South Sudan and Mozambique, which were all flashpoints and hotspots on the continent.

ACCORD was now 28 years old and was the largest conflict management organisation on the African continent. It had been working with the African Union since 1992. It also works with all the regional organisations such as SADC, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority for Development (IGAD), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the East African Community (EAC), to name a few. In addition, ACCORD had worked very closely with DIRCO since 1994, and had supported all of DIRCO’s interventions on the continent starting with the intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and all the other conflicts DIRCO had been involved in.

What the organisation had seen on the continent over the last three decades was very steady progress, particularly when it came to dealing with peace and security. The peace and security mechanism of the African Union, known as the African Peace and Security Architecture, was one of the most sophisticated peace and security mechanism globally. Unfortunately this was because the continent had to deal with so many conflicts over the years. In addition, as the Committee already knows, the African Free Trade Agreement and the open skies treaty had been signed by African countries, so there had been several positive developments on the continent.

The continent today stood as the continent of opportunity, largely because of its demographic dividend of young people. The continent would be home to the largest population of young people in the world. However, there were many challenges it would have to face. What he would present today would give the Committee a snap shot of the deep structural divides that were driving the conflicts on the continent. He would then switch to COVID-19 to indicate how COVID-19 had acted as a conflict multiplier and what challenges the continent would face going forward.

This report was pre COVID-19, and was ACCORD’s prognosis of what the organisation saw as emerging trends on the continent. It had been presented to DIRCO and the AU, and reached the conclusion that a significant part of Africa was reaching a dangerous tipping point. Africa was in a race against time. Transformation to address the root causes would take between 20 to 40 years.

Mr Gounden said in South Africa, the Committee knew that 26 years after the end of apartheid, the country still faced issues of unemployment, poverty and inequality, and these were still at very high numbers. The organisation had realised that transformation could not happen in one generation, and that and it would take two to three generations for transformation to happen. This was the same issue for the continent, unless there were interruptions such as COVID-19, and this would push back development efforts on the continent, including South Africa. Armed, complex and protracted conflict would characterise large parts of the African landscape in the coming decades. The report’s conclusions also call for the prevention of conflict at the local and national levels to assume the highest priority. Increasingly, mediation would be accompanied by peace enforcement, and South Africa would have to continue to play a role both in peacekeeping and peace enforcement.

Referring to the potential of the African continent, he said that by 2030 about 40 African countries would be oil and gas producers, and this would amount to significant revenue for the continent. In addition, Africa had 60% of the world’s uncultivated arable land, so it could become the bread basket of the world. Africa also had 75% of global platinum deposits and as the Committee knew, platinum would drive the world in the coming years. These were positives elements for the continent.

What Africa had done over the last decades had been to take positive steps which had helped with development. These steps had included African countries managing their economies better. In 1994, the debt to gross domestic product (GDP) ratio had been 130%, but by 2005, the debt to GDP ratio had dropped to 30%. There had also been a telecom revolution on the continent. In 2000, 11 million people had mobile lines, and in 2016, 687 million people had mobile lines, which had set new opportunities for the continent and conflict on the continent had decreased.

There were also things that the continent had done wrong over the last decades, which included:

• Lack of job creation;
• Quality of growth was not sustainable;
• Inequality increased;
• Absolute poverty increased;
• Lack of investment in infrastructure;
• African economies retaining the same structure over decades;
• Governance weak, and in some cases, non-existent institutions;
• New conflicts such as terrorism

One of the deep structural problems that was also facing the continent was its inability to move mainly from an agricultural economy to an industrial economy, and then to an information economy, which was known as the fourth industrial revolution. The deep structural problem was that 80 to 90% of the continent was still largely focused on the agricultural age, and had struggled to make the move to the next level of development. Many African countries, except for a very few such as South Africa and some in north African, had not been able to move towards any meaningful industrialisation, let alone the fourth industrial revolution. This was one of the problems which was driving conflict on the continent. The fact that the continent had not been able to move along had created power and influence at the centre, which included not only governments but also the private sector and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) on the continent. This had resulted in the marginalisation of a large percentage of the people, and this creates problems of its own. The convergence that was driving complexity on the continent, and which was creating a race against time situation for the African continent was a combination of:

• Exponential population growth;
• Rapid urbanisation;
• Global economic slowdown;
• Commodity crisis;
• Climate change;
• Disruptive technology.

All these things coming together were converging and driving huge complexity. Those were pre COVID-19 complexities, and what COVID-19 had created was a new set of complexities which had acted as conflict multipliers on the continent. The spread of Covic-10 had led to:

• Health crisis. In order to deal with the health crisis, African countries have had to take measures to stem the spread of the virus. However, these measures have had consequences such as the rise in gender based violence (GBV) and insurgencies, as seen in Mozambique, Mali and the Eastern DRC, because military forces had been drawn from the borders into urban areas to provide assistance in the COVID crisis.
• Economic crisis. Lockdown measures in countries had resulted in an increase in unemployment and food prices, and there might be a shortage of food in the future.
• Security crisis. The economic crisis would lead to a security crisis on the continent, and in turn would lead to a humanitarian crisis
• Humanitarian crisis.

ACCORD had been tracking conflict in 55 countries across the continent based on the following categories.

• Stigmatisation and discrimination;
• Trust levels between citizens and institutions;
• Livelihood insecurity and economic impacts;
• Domestic and gender based violence;
• Crime-related incidents;
• Political unrest or violence;
• Cross-border or inter-state tensions

What ACCORD had found was that trust between citizens and institutions was slowly eroding across the continent, and these were some of the key findings which were fuelling conflict. Mr Gounden pointed the Committee to a diagram which depicted ACCORD’s prognosis of what they were seeing on the continent. In the centre of the slide was the elite, which had access to capital. The second circle was where the biggest challenges would come from -- the rapidly urbanising population, where people did not have access to capital and did not have mobility in society. This was what ACCORD referred to as the race against time -- to close the gap between these two circles.

The continent could not allow this second circle to grow exponentially without dealing with and solving deep structural problems. African governments needed to think very carefully of what the deep structural interventions were that would ensure that this second circle did not expand continuously because if it did, it would lead to conflict. ACCORD had also witnessed on the continent, as well as globally, the rise of authoritarianism, populism and nationalism. These elements together presented a dangerous situation for the continent.

The drivers of conflict on the continent in the coming years were as follows:

• Constitutional crises;
• Election-related conflicts (intra-party and inter party);
• Struggles over political hegemony;
• Conflicts over scarce resources (land, water, food, education, employment, etc);
• Exploitation of identity (religion, ethnic, racial).

These would manifest themselves through the following ways:

• Urban unrest and social protest;
• Low-intensity violence, escalating to civil war -- which had already happened in Burundi and the Sahel region;
• Creation of new centres of power through secession/self-determination movements;
• Radicalisation and rise of extremist ideologies, which was happening in Northern Mozambique;
• Emergence of criminal syndicates and a proliferation of human, arms and drug trafficking.

The consequences of all of this, if the continent did not take measures and deal with the deep structural problems and social cohesion on the continent and ensure that political competition was managed, would be as follows.

• Violence and death on the continent;
• Economic stagnation (budget deficits, recession, inflation, paralysis);
• Destruction of basic infrastructure and governance capacity;
• Humanitarian crises;
• An overflow of refugees and internally displace persons (IDPs);
• A breakdown in authority and security.

If these were allowed to fester, the continent would experience what had happened in the Arab spring and the responses of the people would be revolution and uprisings, war or dialogue.

Mr Gounden lost connectivity, and the Committee Chairperson took over and asked if there was anyone who could continue the presentation of the report. As there was no one, the Chairperson decided that that would be the end of the presentation, and invited Committee Members to raise questions on what had been presented, since they had already read the report.

Discussion

Mr D Bergman (DA) said inter- Africa trading, infrastructure and peace had always been obstacles to growth on the continent, and the free trade agreement was something that everyone had been welcoming. However, this was also something that could bring a lot of human rights concerns, as there were some countries that had and some that had not, and this could create a gap between countries. For example, Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan were all involved in the Nile river, and had had an agreement -- all that needed to happen was for Ethiopia to sign the agreement, but Ethiopia had decided not to sign it, which had compromised Egypt, as the Nile was an important water source for Egypt. Egypt had called on the help of South Africa, but South Africa had decided to cancel the meeting, which may cause a problem for Egypt. If South Africa was going to help build Africa, it would need to play fair with all the countries on the continent.

Mr Bergman said that the Committee should look at five key areas where the Committee could propose some action. One of the first things should be promoting free and fair elections all around Africa, which was most important, regardless of the political system of a country. The second was ensuring that there was trade and not aid, as a lot of the time when countries received aid it did not reach the people on the ground and was usually given to the few people at the top, so there should be more inter-country trade. The third issue was that raw materials in Africa were taken out of the ground at a low cost, then get exported to a country like China and manufactured into products which were then sold back to African countries for thousands of dollars.  Why could the continent not start manufacturing its own raw materials? Africa had the labour and knowledge to manufacture on its own territories. The fourth point involved the AU. There should be more infrastructure around borders, better roads and better control, and countries really need only one border post, the outdated idea of two border post was ridiculous -- both countries should use the same border gate for monitoring each other and the passage of people. Lastly, there must be proper efforts from the AU to keep terrorism at bay. It must be a consolidated effort between all African countries, and it must be a real effort to keep terrorists from ports of entry.

Mr B Nkosi (ANC) said the Committee should not simplify the problems that beset the continent. The report was saying that the continent faced largely structural problems that were both legacy and also a continuation of the colonisation period. It had excluded the involvement of superpowers or foreign interests in the conflicts on the continent, such as fuelling and funding conflicts for their own purposes. These externalities were based largely on economic exploitation of natural resources that the report identified as a positive bestowment on the continent. Secondly there was the issue of the sustainability of peace initiatives, as most peace initiatives on the continent had not been able to achieve the outcomes that they had envisaged. The post COVID-19 responses that had been identified were quite crucial, but weak and fragile states, a lack of governance, and all socio-economic and political settings had been in place before COVID-19. There might not be a COVID-19 problem, but rather one that stemmed from the old structural problems which African countries had been facing.

Rev K Meshoe (ACDP) referred to mediation, which would be accompanied by peace enforcement, and asked how the enforcement should it be done so that both sides would be convinced that those who were enforcing the peace were not taking sides. In a lot of cases, this had been the reason why peace enforcement had not worked. What did ACCORD recommend to be done in this regard?  Infrastructure investment had always been a problem for Africa, and countries knew the importance of it, yet it had been neglected and pushed to be the last priority on governments’ “to do” lists. Had ACCORD engaged African leaders about infrastructure investment? The rise in nationalism increased conflicts, particularly when a country can not meet the needs of its citizens. One of the consequences of conflict was the breakdown in authority, and one would need peace enforcers to step in before the conflict got out of hand. Lastly, on the issue of foreign interference, there were people who were more interested in making money than in the lives of ordinary people. He questioned whether the organisation had the courage to confront those who were supplying arms to both sides and those that were ensuring that conflicts continued, because the more these conflicts persisted the more money there was to make.

Ms T Msane (EFF) said she believed the report when it stated that transformation would take a up to 40 years, and the Committee expected it to take this long -- even the Abuja treaty said it would take 35 years. She asked what the impact on illicit financial outflows was to the contribution of poverty in Africa and the lack of development. There were also wildlife crimes, forest crimes and human trafficking -- what were the impacts of those? She also asked what the role of US Africom had been in all conflicts on the continent, especially in relation to the role of the AU regional task force. Did US Africom play a role in those structures, and did they assist in conflicts? According to ACCORD’s knowledge, what was the military expenditure on the continent? What impact had aid had on the sovereignty of African countries? What would ACCORD recommend on how Africa could decrease its dependency on the West? She also asked which countries had commenced with spatial development and building new cities, and if they were excelling, so the AU could use them as examples for other countries going forward. When it came to post COVID-19, what would be the dynamic with regard to refugees, as the Committee could see that Africa was very unstable and had a lot of refugees? Lastly, in the African Continental Free Trade Agreement, what role would multinational corporations play in both the production and financial sectors?

Ms B Swarts (ANC) said her questions were mainly around what affected South Africa currently. The AU had set a goal of “silencing the guns” by 2020, which would not be achieved. Why did had it thought it would ever achieve this goal of silencing the guns when conflict hotspots were still rife in some parts of the continent? What advice would ACCORD give President Ramaphosa, as the chairperson of the AU? What needed to be done to accelerate the efforts of silencing the guns and eradicating conflict on the continent?

Mr T Mpanza (ANC) thought it had been a very progressive presentation. He said that there had been fascism and imperialism, and then a move to colonialism, and in South Africa it had been a move to apartheid. In his view, this was one and the same animal -- the difference was merely that the enemy was just changing colours all the time. He asked what the view of ACCORD was on what was called colonialism of a special type, because there were always colonial elements that were re-playing themselves on the continent. There were still former colonisers playing a role in conflicts on the African continent. What was the view of ACCORD on Africa borrowing money from institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF)? The reason he asked this question was that the Committee knew that whatever countries got from these institutions did not come with positive economic benefits for African countries, but always led to structural adjustment of African economies. What was ACCORD proposing as an African solution to an African problem? He also proposed that the Committee should separate its engagements with ACCORD and DIRCO when they reported to the Committee, so that Members had enough time to interrogate and engage.

The Chairperson said she would not allow ACCORD to respond immediately, but would first allow DIRCO to table their fourth quarter report.

DIRCO: Fourth Quarter Report

Ms Candith Mashego-Dlamini, Deputy Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, said the Department had taken note of the concerns that had been raised by the Chairperson. She had also noted that the ARF and DIRCO needed to report to the Committee separately, with the ARF not attached to DIRCO’s reports.

Mr Kgabo Mahoai, Director-General: DIRCO, presented the financial report of DIRCO and the ARF for the fourth quarter of the 2019/20 financial year. He said the performance information would highlight some compliance issues in programme 1, while focusing mainly on programmes 2 to 4. The Department had achieved 19 (68%) of its 28 targets. The underachievement was caused by the fact that the reporting period was too short.

Programme 1: Administration

The Department had set out to achieve 100% compliance with the 30-day payment period, but managed only 78.8% compliance. These delays were ascribed to documentation which could not be processed in time. This was exacerbated by the fact that it was towards the end of the reporting period, followed by the lockdown restrictions, which impacted negatively in achieving the target. Regarding the Department’s training programmes -- continuous professional development (CPD) in line with the foreign service training strategy – only nine of 21 targets were achieved, as scheduled training could not take place in part due to the outbreak of COVID-19 in South Africa. There was over-achievement in the generic skills development training progammes, in line with DIRCO’s workplace skills plan (WSP).

The legal services target for the quarter was a responsive target covering requests for legal services, policy advice and assistance provided on international and domestic law, and DIRCO achieved 100% on this target.

Regarding programmes and projects to advance gender mainstreaming, youth development and access for people with disabilities, both targets were met for the quarter, but the Department did not achieve the annual targets for this indicator, as only eight out of the 10 programmes were achieved. The two targets achieved in this quarter were a multi stakeholder colloquium organised on gender equality, and a disability management workshop for employees in the Department.

Programme 2: International Relations

National interests were pursued through bilateral engagements such as structured bilateral mechanisms, high-level visits and the various economic diplomacy initiatives undertaken by missions. South Africa continued to accelerate its economic diplomacy initiatives: Through its diligent work in this area, it was growing South Africa’s regional, continental and global trade and investment. The economic diplomacy and image building activities undertaken by South African missions abroad were aimed at promoting, amongst others, the country’s economic interests, exploring investment opportunities, tourism promotion, skills development and cultural exchanges. Tourism promotion events and meetings were held by missions abroad to boost tourism into South Africa and to promote South Africa as a preferred tourism destination for business and leisure.

On structural bilateral mechanisms, the Department was able to reach all 18 of its annual targets. The three targets achieved during the fourth quarter were to promote national priorities -- the African Agenda, the Agenda of the South, and discussions on various bilateral and multilateral international issues of interest. The discussions centred on the promotion of South Africa’s national interests and areas of mutual interest, including an exchange of views on a wide spectrum of bilateral and global issues, with a focus on:

• The implementation of visa simplification agreements, as well as the roll-out of e-visa systems;
• Identification of agricultural products for market access;
• Positive consideration of customised training courses for South African civil servants;
• Agreements to conclude memorandums of understanding (MoUs) in the area of water and sanitation, and addressing non-tariff barriers for South African products;
• Agreements on technical cooperation, on cooperation in climate change, cyber security, human rights, trade and investments, science and technology and water management.

The Department had 20 high-level visits targets set out for the year, and 29 were achieved for this year. Four targeted high-level visits were achieved in the fourth quarter involving the following countries.

• Bangui working visit (incoming: President);
• Ethiopia official visit (incoming: President);
• South Sudan, two meetings (outgoing: Deputy President as special envoy);
• South Sudan meeting (incoming: President).

Discussions had centred on the promotion of South Africa’s national interests, and exchanges of views on a wide spectrum of bilateral and global issues of concern with a focus on:

• Strengthening bilateral relations and cooperation, and issues of mutual interest;
• Regional and continental issues;
• Political, diplomacy, defence and security, economic and social cooperation;
• Political and security situations on the continent were also discussed.

The targets for trade and Investment seminars hosted and participated in, to showcase South African products and services, and business seminars hosted on the ease of doing business, were not achieved. The Department had hosted 85 out of 112 planned trade and investment seminars for the year, and only five out of 20 business seminars. The sectors reached included defence products and technology, trade and investment, the textile industry, footwear production, clothing, the beverage sector, renewable energy, aquaculture, electro-technical equipment, and oil and gas and export sales. Some of these meetings had been cancelled due to the unavailability of stakeholders and international developments, including COVID-19.

The Department had planned 126 engagements with Chambers of Commerce to identify trade leads and promote business to business connectivity, but only 109 were achieved for the year. In the fourth quarter, 17 of the 20 meetings were held, but some had cancelled due to the unavailability of stakeholders and COVID-19.

Regarding meetings held with targeted government ministries, 70 had been planned for the year, and 152 had been held. In the fourth quarter, all 16 planned meetings were held. The meetings enabled DIRCO to engage on issues impacting on cooperation between South Africa and other countries, and to remain abreast with the regulatory environment. The ministries engaged ranged from Agriculture, Mines, Water Affairs, Commerce, , Trade and Cooperatives, Education and Scientific Research, Enterprise, Economic Affairs, Trade and Fisheries, and Trade Policy. Additional achievements involved conservative planning due to the expected impact of budget cuts.

The Department achieved 91 of its tourism promotion events indicators against an annual target of 60. In the fourth quarter, 15 indicators were set out and 21 were achieved.

Sub-Programme 2.1: SADC

The Department set seven targets for the financial year on SADC structures and processes engaged in to promote peace, stability and socio-economic development. Five of these targets had been achieved. One meeting had been targeted and achieved for the fourth quarter -- SADC Council of Ministers meeting (via video conferencing). The Council had deliberated and noted the:

• Recommendations from the extraordinary meeting of SADC Ministers of Health in relation to COVID-19;
• Status of the formulation of the SADC Post-2020 Agenda;
• Status on the Union of Comoros’s annual member state contribution;
• Regional Tourism Organisation of Southern Africa;
• SADC’s 40th anniversary;
• Establishment of a SADC liaison office in Brussels; and
• The SADC candidature for the position of Director-General of the International Labour Organisation (ILO).

Programme 3: International Cooperation

Sub Programme 3.1: System of Global Governance

Ten annual targets were set out under this programme, which dealt with negotiated and influenced outcomes of multilateral meetings. The Department was able to achieve 15 of the targets set out, one of which happened during the fourth quarter. South Africa had advanced its positions in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations at COP25 in its national capacity, and as a member of the Africa Group of Negotiators (AGN), the G77 and China, as well as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) group. As Chair of the African Ministerial Conference on the Environment (AMCEN), South Africa had pressed for all three of the pillars of the Paris Agreement to be advanced with equal speed and determination. It had played a leading role in the adoption of a gender action plan and in the incremental progress achieved in several work streams.

Sub programme 3.2: Continental Cooperation

The Department set out to have three peace and stability, socio-economic development, good governance and democracy meetings for the year 2019/20. All three of these meetings were held, two of them in the fourth quarter. These were the:

• Assembly of the ordinary session of the AU. The summit’s deliberations included institutional reform and financing of the continental body; peace and security on the continent; developments related to the African Continental Free Trade Area; and negotiations for a new cooperation agreement between the African, Caribbean and Pacific developing countries and the European Union post-2020.
• The African Union Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) presented reports on its activities and the state of peace and security on the continent, and its fifth report on the implementation of the AU master roadmap (AUMR) of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in 2020.

Sub Programme 3.3: South-South

All 10 indicators for the year were achieved. These targets involved influencing the outcome of 10 meetings to reflect South Africa’s national position. There were no targets set for the fourth quarter under this programme

Sub Programme 3.4: North -South

There were four high-level engagements with strategic formations of the north set out for the year, two of which were targeted for the fourth quarter, but neither was achieved.

Programme 4: Public Diplomacy

The Department set out to achieve 12 public participation programmes for the year, and achieved 15, three of which were targeted and achieved during the fourth quarter. These focused on domestic and international developments, as well as foreign policy. Thirty media statements were issued in response to both national and international developments. DIRCO also released three opinion pieces during this quarter which were titled:

• SA backs UN probe into Hammarskjold’s death;
• South Africa’s agenda as Chair of the AU is to create the Africa the Continent wants;
• South African and the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).

Sub- Programme 4.1: State Protocol and Consular Services

Two strategic engagements were targeted for the year under this programme. One was scheduled to be achieved during the fourth quarter, but was not achieved largely because the engagement with the diplomatic/consular corps had been interrupted by other operational commitments and deferred to March. However, it had to be suspended due to COVID-19.

The Department had received 199 requests for assistance with COVID-19 related matters at its missions all over the world, and had attended to all of them. It was continuing to respond to arising cases. During the fourth quarter, consular services had also helped with the legalisation of 17 926 documents.

Financial Information

Total expenditure for the fourth quarter amounted to R1.615 billion, or 114% of the projected expenditure of R 1.414 billion. The high spending on Programme 2 and Programme 3 was due to compensation of employees (CoE) expenditure, which was also influenced by the high exchange rate experienced in the fourth quarter. The high spending on Programme 5 was due to the payment of the outstanding balance from April 2019 for the Southern African Development Community (SADC) membership contribution. The payment was effected in March 2020, after receiving National Treasury’s approval for the virement of funds from Programme 1, Programme 2 and Programme 4

African Renaissance Fund

Mr Mahoai continued the presentation on behalf of the African Renaissance fund. It included the strategic outcome-oriented goals, strategic objectives, fourth quarter performance information and the ARF’s financial report as at 31 March 2020.

He said four ARF advisory committee meetings were supposed to have been held during the fourth quarter, but only one meeting took place. Four of the five requests received during the fourth quarter had been successfully reviewed. These were:

• Project proposal to the ARF for funds to be contributed to the Special Fund for COVID-19.
• Project proposal to the ARF for funds to be contributed towards the African Centre for Disease Control (African CDC).
• Project proposal to the ARF for the Military Ombud project.
• Project Proposal to the ARF for assistance for the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).

One project proposal to the ARF -- for the Competition Commission -- was not reviewed because the presenters did not attend the meeting.

The following approved disbursements processed by the ARF during quarter four were:

1. Democracy and good governance. The two targets were achieved -- processed payment of R2 721 871 for the South African intervention and contribution to the Kingdom of Lesotho peace process, and R121 747 for South Africa’s participation in the election observer mission to Mozambique, Botswana and Malawi.
2. Socio- Economic Development. No disbursements were approved for this programme during the fourth quarter
3. Capacity Building.  Only one of the two of the targets was reached under this programme -- payment of R1 744 328 to support capacity-building processes -- human resources development for the African Ombudsman Research Centre (AORC)
4. Humanitarian Assistance. This programme did not reach its target, as only two of the four targets were approved for disbursement to support humanitarian assistance – R740 857 and R227 257, both for the Namibia drought relief project.
5. Prevention and Resolution of Conflict. The one target that was set out under this programme for the fourth quarter and was achieved -- payment of R 1 439 622 for South Africa’s intervention and contribution to the In-Transformation Initiative of the Central African Republic.

The ARF had total revenue of R109.4 million, made up of the annual appropriation of R46.2 million and income from investments, which was R63.2 million. Total expenditure was divided among local and foreign aid assistance, which amounted to R45 million, and it had also experienced a forex loss of R44.7 million. This had resulted in a surplus for the year of R19.7 million.

Discussion

Mr Bergman said sometimes the indicators were not aligned between the third and the fourth term, as the DG had pointed out. The previous Minister of DIRCO had hired an independent consultant firm to look at how to solve this issue, but that report had not seen the light of day. Maybe that report needed to be bought to the Committee so that Members could investigate its contents and look at how DIRCO could fix this issue. The third and fourth term indicators were just showing percentages, but were not exactly saying where the Department was, or what the indicators were being benchmarked against, ot what does they meant in the greater scheme of things.

There was also two types of employees at DIRCO -- the one type that were working so hard that they ended up on sick leave or in hospital because of the dedication that they had for their jobs, and then there were the employees in the same positions that did not even know what they doing, and were just waiting for work to come their way. The previous DIRCO Minister had highlighted this and said there were factions within DIRCO that were more interested in playing politics than doing their jobs. Mr Bergman also asked why DIRCO’s legislation unit was closed, even though the country had moved to Level 3 lockdown restrictions.

Mr D Moela (ANC) welcomed the Chairperson’s input, and said the Chairperson had revived the Committee. She had touched on several issues which the Department had been struggling with. The paying of service providers within the stipulated 30 days was still not being implemented. This a very serious concern, since this issue had been raised several times with the Department. It was very important that service providers got paid on time, especially during this period of COVID-19, when businesses were struggling.

Mr Moela also raised the issue of training programmes. The Department had not achieved the target for its training programmes because of COVID-19, but there was another training programme happening in the same quarter and it had been achieved, so how had the Department achieved on this programme but not on the other one? The issue of youth development had been raised continuously and should be at the top of DIRCO’s agenda. There needed to come a time where the Committee could say that DIRCO had dealt with this matter. When would the Department be able to close this gap so it could be transformed? He asked if the ARF payments that were approved in quarter three, but made in quarter four, had had any impact on its financial statements.

Rev Meshoe asked how many missions had been successful in promoting South Africa as an investment and tourist destination, and if some missions were not successful in this regard, was anything being done about it? South Africa made these contributions to influence the outcomes of decisions taken by the AU, the UN, the Commonwealth and SADC -- could the Department give the Committee outcomes that had been made in favour of South Africa?

Regarding the ARF, the Committee had only seen that money had been allocated, for example, to Namibia to assist with drought relief. Could the Department give the Committee any details on how exactly the money was used? When it came to the allocation of money for election observers, it could be helpful for the Department to give the Committee the outcomes of those elections.

Mr Nkosi referred to the virements that were done in the programmes. DIRCO had done virements totalling to R97 million, and in terms of National Treasury regulations any virements between programmes or outside programmes required the approval of National Treasury, and there were those that should be approved by the legislature and by the Minister. Into what category did these virements fall? He suggested they constituted what was called “the March spike” -- where the Department realises that it will not be able to spend the money by the end of the financial year and therefore rushes to move the funds so that Treasury will not be able to penalise the Department for lack of spending.

He said there was something called the AU reformed programme, and DIRCO had allocated funds to this programme to achieve some of the programme’s objectives. What were the objectives that had been achieved, and which had not been achieved? He asked DIRCO to give the Committee and update on the outcomes of the ICT intervention team report, and what progress had been made. What was the Department planning on doing to deal with the CoE challenge, because this was an issue that the Department would face throughout the medium term expenditure framework (MTSF) period in future? The DIRCO had spent R8 million over the last MTEF on the Minister’s review panel, and he asked if the Committee could see the review report itself and what specific actions DIRCO had been taking to implement the review panel’s recommendations. Lastly, he raised the issue of Israel and the annexation of Palestinian land which had been accelerated by COVID-19. DIRCO should make a presentation on this matter to the Committee on what exactly DIRCO’s stance was.

Ms Swarts commented on the ARF officials who had not shown up to present the ARF presentation. She said this was disrespectful towards the Committee -- what exactly were these officials being paid for, if they could not do what was required by them. She said a team had been set up to deal with the ICT problems within the Department, and asked it to share the outcomes of that report with the Committee. The issue of ICT involved a security threat to the Department, and had been on the agenda for almost a decade. At the last Committee meeting, DIRCO had given the Committee long explanation, but to date nothing had been done. What was the way forward on this matter? She asked the Department to give the Department an informative report with results on what was happening within three weeks. She added that DIRCO had very poorly crafted indicators, which had not really given much information. In programme one, the Department continued to take officials to workshops -- did this imply that officials were not adequately skilled?

Ms Msane said that DIRCO should shut down the mission in Israel, and should unsubscribe to the Commonwealth, as it might not be the right affiliation for South Africa. He questioned ARF funding for humanitarian aid to Mozambique and Zimbabwe, and animal disease funding to Lesotho, as none of the requested reviews had been covered. She pointed out a discrepancy in the amount regarding election observers, and asked for an explanation. For capacity building in quarter three, DIRCO had paid R8.1 million and R3.9 million in quarter two, and she wanted to know what had been achieved with these amounts being paid to the Zanele Mbeki Foundation for the Annual Women’s Dialogue. This was a crisis, because the Committee had never seen an engagement where African women had participated in an event by the Zanele Mbeki Foundation that had assisted in dealing with GBV and women’s rights, especially for those women who were refugees, The Department needed to explain what exactly happened to this money.

There had been an oversight programme planned on Palestine which had been abandoned because of political instability -- what had happened to the funds for this project, and would there be another project initiated in the future? In the first quarter, DIRCO’s performance was 98%, and then in the third quarter it had dropped to 78% -- what changes had influenced this? Targets had not been met in programme one, yet there had been overspending -- how did this happen? The SADC targets were not difficult, so why had they not been achieved? SADC had also neglected discussions on critical issues faced by the region, such as terrorism and GBV.

Mr Mpanza referred to the foreign services training, and said the fact that the Department had trained only nine people was very worrying. It was unacceptable that the Department was working at such a slow pace on this matter. On the candidatures for serving on international bodies, the Committee would like to see diversity among people chosen by the Department. It was pointless if people were sent to represent South Africa, but did show diversity and transformation to the world. He also asked for an update on the matter of Kenya replacing South Africa at the UN, which he had seen on the news. He asked why this was happening. There needed to be a clear turnaround strategy to transform the Department. The Committee was also expecting that the Department should get an improved audit outcome

DIRCO’s Response

Mr Mahoai said there had been a problem at the ARF, and the Department even had to close since one official had tested positive for COVID-19. That was the reason for their absence. The DG welcomed the idea that DIRCO and the ARF should have separate presentations, and confirmed that that would happen in the future.

Kenya had replaced South Africa at the UN because South Africa’s two-year tenure representing the south had come to end, and Kenya had been a candidate from the east and had successfully been voted on to the Council.

The DG acknowledged that the indicators were aligned, but the Department was on track to fix this issue and this would be the last time they were skewed.

The Department was also striving with its financial management, and expected to receive an improved audit outcome.

There was a review panel which assisted with foreign policy, and its recommendations were in the implementation phase. The Department would give the Committee feedback on what recommendations were being implemented.

Regarding the 30-day payment question, the Department would look at what the challenges were and ensure that this matter would be dealt with once and for all. There were some problems that happened in this regard which may sometimes hamper payment, such as a dispute of invoices or service providers not providing correct documentation on time.

The training programmes conducted by human resource management were existing programmes, with the aim of upskilling employees, and the targets were easy to achieve since they happened throughout the year. The training programme that was not achieved had been scheduled to begin in the fourth quarter, and unfortunately COVID-19 had affected this.

Countries where missions were located had different environments, and there might be unforeseen challenges, but the Department had implemented a mechanism to monitor mission performance and mission work, and it would be able to see why missions could not implement their tasks. It had recently submitted a framework to Cabinet which helped to ensure it could encourage a diverse set of South Africans to take up positions in strategic international organisations, including internships for young people.

All the virements that were made had been in line with the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA) regulations, and DIRCO had sought the necessary approval from National Treasury.

Mr Mohoai said since ARF officials were not present, DIRCO would not be able to answer all the questions, but would ask the ARF to give the Committee full written responses.

Ms Mathu Joyini, Branch DDG Ambassador, took over from the DG, and assured Members that all 21 training programmes had been advertised before lockdown, but half had been suspended when lockdown took effect.

The panel had successfully reviewed the ICT system and infrastructure, and had conducted a business gap analysis and assessed the Department’s ICT posture. The panel had also looked at the skills within the Department. It had recommended a digital strategy for the next five years that was going to pull all these elements together. It had also recommended short term strategies that the Department could implement. The short term interventions which had been taken by DIRCO was renewing software licences, putting in place the Microsoft enterprise agreement, and widening the network capabilities to help the Department of Home Affairs (DHA) to implement its e-visa. All these short term interventions had been done successfully and had put the Department a step ahead in terms of digitising. The panel had also given the Department terms of reference to help it navigate and successfully implement the digital strategy. DIRCO was now looking at all digital processes -- digital infrastructure, digital skills, digital safety, digital online presence and digital mobility. The reason why this process had taken some time was that there had to be thorough consultations with all missions aboard, informing them what the main points were and what needed to be done to ensure that all stakeholders were ready for the implementation of the strategy. At the moment, the Department was making sure that all stakeholders were ready for the transition to the new digital infrastructure.

Mr Caiphus Ramashau, Chief Financial Officer: DIRCO, confirmed that the virements were processed in terms of section 42(4)B of the PFMA, which allowed the Department to request small movement of funds from goods and services for the payment of membership fees for SADC, because there was a shortfall due to foreign exchange losses. There had also been a request to cover the shortfall with regard to CoE, and at the end of the financial year, 97% of the budget had been spent. There was R119 remaining in the budget, which was under-spending mainly in the area of capital and infrastructure spending. The CoE request was not approved, on the basis that the DIRCO had to have consultations with National Treasury to develop a plan so it could address its challenges. DIRCO and the National Treasury were currently working on a plan that would help the Department in the long run.

Regarding the overspending in the fourth quarter, these were the funds that were used for virements. He said the ARF used a different accounting system from DIRCO, so it would have to give more details on their spending programmes and how they monitored matters, such as funds given to countries or election observers.

Ms Charlotte Lobe, Chief-Director: Transformational Programmes and Organisational Development, DIRCO, said the work of her unit was informed by the White Paper on the rights of persons with disabilities, and the legislation passed concerning youth development and organisational development. The workshops and training programmes were mainly aimed at targeting behaviour and attitudes of senior management officials towards people with disabilities. These workshops also informed unit managers on how they could effect transformation in their respective units. Part of the unit’s work was also to support officials with disabilities in accessing buildings and equipment.

On the issue of youth development, the Department had adopted a youth development policy that was focused not only on young people within its environment, but also outside. It also provided continuous training for young people that were within its environment. The Department had facilitated a channel of information where young people who were outside its environment could access information on bursaries and opportunities available at DIRCO. On women’s empowerment, the Department had been successful in implementing its 10 programmes, and would be happy to give the Committee a report on this matter.

Mr Mahoai continued DIRCO’s response, and referred to the issue of the legalisation unit being closed, and said steps were being taken to open this unit, and it should be open soon. The Department was still putting safety measures in place for level 3 lockdown regulations.

The Chairperson said the ARF had to come to the Committee and account for their report. She had heard what the Ambassador had said about the ICT, but now she wanted time frames for the implementation. The Committee wanted a report on all 65 strategic positions which South Africans were currently filling. DIRCO, as well as the Committee, needed to prepare for the “new normal,” as COVID-19 was here to stay for a long time. She said youth development and women’s empowerment within DIRCO was very blurry and at some point, the Committee would request a proper presentation on this matter. She asked Members to park the issue of the ARF so the Committee could have a day to discuss the ARF at length. The issue of virements left much to be desired.

She asked the DG to respond on the issue of ICT time frames, and then the Committee would revert to ACCORD.

DIRCO’s Response

Mr Mahoai said DIRCO was not able to provide the Committee with exact timeframes at the moment, as he needed to discuss this with other officials. If he had to do give the timeframes now, he would not be doing them justice. He would come back to the Committee with exact timeframes on the ICT matter.

The Chairperson said when the Committee came back from New York, they had given DIRCO a report on what needed to be done regarding the situation there. The Committee would summon the Department soon too check whether it had acted on the recommendations given to it by the Committee.

 ACCORD’s Response

 Mr Gounden led the ACCORD response, and said the Chairperson was quite right -- at this point, one could not speak about a post-COVID, as the virus could still be around for another three years. What should rather be discussed in terms of the conflicts should be a post-lockdown -- what would happen after lockdown.

Regarding the tension between Egypt, Ethiopia and Sudan over the Nile river, ACCORD believed that everything should be done to seek a peaceful solution to this dispute, because it had the potential to undo and undermine the good and positive developments that had been happening with the reconciliation efforts that have been happening in this region, specifically between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and this issue had the potential to bring conflict back into the Horn of Africa region. There was enough expertise in the AU and in those three countries to reach a peaceful agreement, and South Africa would play an important role in making sure that there would be a peaceful agreement.

Regarding foreign interference in Africa’s affairs, this had been a worry for ACCORD for some time because in the last decade it had noticed increasing intervention, which was coupled with foreign military involvement. This was the case in Libya, where the AU had been completely sidelined. ACCORD was of the belief that if there was more unity on the continent, there would be less foreign interference. As a result of COVID-19, many peacekeeping negotiations had been stalled.

ACCORD had been involved with US Africom, and advised it on behalf of the AU. Africom was involved in fighting terrorism and helping the AU with some military arrangements, but they were not involved in mediating peace negotiations. There had also been an increase in military spending in African countries, specifically in the north, because of growing insecurity in these regions. The current situation in Libya had increased insecurity in this region. In West Africa, military expenditure had increased because of terrorism threats from various groups, such as Boko Haram etc. This increase in military spending had happened at the expense of spending on socio-economic development in these countries.

“Silencing the Guns” was an important matter on the AU agenda, and initiatives had been undertaken, but again because of COVID-19 these efforts had stalled.

On the question of those involved in peace enforcement being biased, he said all operations were done through multilateral groupings. To ensure that there was no breakdown of authority, ACCORD was working together with the AU to capacitate local authorities such as the police and NGOs who work at the local level. ACCORD had made a presentation to the UN Security Council, where it had asked the five permanent members to stop producing guns what would be sent to Africa.

ACCORD had noted the Members’ many questions, and was willing to come back to the Committee, as one of the Members had asked it to give more analysis on conflict hotspots on the continent.

The Chairperson said ACCORD would be invited back to the Portfolio Committee because it was interested in ACCORD training and capacity building programmes. The Chairperson asked whether Members had further questions on the DIRCO’s presentation and response.

Follow-up discussion

Ms Swarts said she had requested that the Department be given three weeks to respond in a full report to the Committee on the matter of ICT, and it had to put it on record if they were not able to do that within three weeks. The response that the Committee had got was a very long story on consultations, and the Committee needed full details of what had happened so far. The DIRCO’s ICT unit must work, and must not use COVID-19 as an excuse.

Mr Mahoai asked that the Chairperson give him protection from the Member’s request

The Chairperson responded that she was not able to give him protection, as she was not his Minister, and he had to look to his Deputy Ministers for help.

Mr Mahoai said that he always made sure that when he committed to doing something, he could fulfil that commitment. At the moment, he did not have the privilege of looking at the aspects of ICT. He need to have very clear milestones from his Department first, and would not say anything to the Committee just for the sake of saying it, because of his respect for the Committee.

Mr Nkosi called for a point of order, and said that the DG must give the Committee a progress report, and that three weeks should not be a problem for the Department.

Ms Swarts also called a point of order and said this not the time for the DG to be tongue tied, because at the last meeting the DIRCO officials had been very brave to talk for more than an hour, and had said the Department had gone to tender on ICT twice, and were at a stage of implementation. The Committee was simply looking for answers. The Committee needed to know when would this ICT strategy would be implemented, or if it would never be implemented. The DG must stop protecting his officials because he was scared to implement consequence management in his Department. If the DIRCO did not want to deal with its officials, the Committee would then have to deal with the DG.

Mr Mahoai said the Department would provide a progress report in three weeks’ time.

The Chairperson reminded the DG of the annual performance plant (APP) DIRCO had submitted previously, in which the DG had said this issue would be finalised in the fourth quarter. She did not know why Ambassador Joyini had not touched on that matter. She would not allow a situation where Committee Members were “dribbled” by DIRCO officials -- this was not a soccer team. The Committee could not have a bunch of dribblers in the Department. It wanted people who were results driven, and who were movers and shakers. At the last meeting, DIRCO had had a range of excuses. Its officials were probably fighting for 10% or 15 % for their own pockets, and that was what they were prioritising instead of saving the country on the many issues this Department had. It could not be that after 10 years, this particular issue was still not solved. Was it not in DIRCO’s best interests to solve this problem? DIRCO came up with a new story every time it met with the Committee, and Members were not children who needed to be told stories to sleep peacefully. She asked the DG to be explicit and not come to the Committee with different stories, as if it was not taking note of what it was saying. The DG must be clear on what was required from him, and if he could not do the report back in three weeks, then he should tell the Committee. This was an issue that the Committee had been dealing with since its very first meeting, and it needed clarity on the matter.

Mr Mahoai said they would adhere to the three weeks and would provide the Committee with a progress report that would include an implementation plan, with milestones.

Ms Msane said she had asked a question with regard to closing the mission in Israel. The Committee had received a report from the Deputy Minister, Mr Alvin Botes, that Cabinet was looking into the matter of closing the mission

The Chairperson said this was important, as it could also clear up the confusion of the Chief Justice himself.

Mr Mahoai said this was a political decision that was being dealt with by the Minister, and he was not in a position to comment.

The Chairperson asked if that was the best he could do. She would need a better response, and wanted a return report on this matter the following day. The reason why the Chief Justice of the country had had verbal diarrhoea on the issue of Israel was because DIRCO was unable to give the country direction and clarity on the matter. DIRCO was doing nothing about the matter of Israel. What political decision did DIRCO want, because there had already been a decision taken by the previous Minister to close down the Israel mission -- or had the decision changed with the new Minister? She wanted the report on her desk tomorrow. She would not be wishy-washy on crucial matters that were very important for this country. The DG was being wishy-washy -- who was he serving, his masters or the country?

Chairperson’s closing remarks

The Chairperson said that if there was nothing else from Committee Members, the meeting was considered closed, as there no answers from the DG today.

She summarised the main outcomes of the meeting as follows:

There should be a detailed report on the 30-day payment issue, and on the 65 South Africans occupying strategic positions abroad.

The Committee had also decided that the ARF should be a stand-alone entity when they present their reports to the Committee from today onwards.

In three weeks, the Committee expects a detailed account of the ICT strategy of DIRCO.

She alerted Members that meetings of this Portfolio Committee would convene on any day possible because it was in the new normal, which meant everything was abnormal. So if Members were not available, they should just submit apologies and not suggest otherwise. She said the Committee met on Fridays simply because the Deputy Minister and Minister were usually available on Fridays, so the perception that meetings were postponed based on the preference of certain members was not true. In this Portfolio Committee, all Members were here to contribute to making South Africa better for its citizens. The Chairperson would not allow the spirit of unity of the Committee to be broken.

The meeting was adjourned.