Department of Justice and Constitutional Development & NPA 2021/22 APPs, with Deputy Minister

Meeting report

The Chairperson welcomed Deputy Minister John Jeffery of the Department for Justice and Constitutional Development (DOJ&CD).

Briefing: DOJ&CDAnnual Performance Plan

Deputy Minister Jeffery introduced Adv Doctor Mashabane, Director-General (DG), DoJ&CD. He said that Adv Mashabane had started his term on 1 March, right as the DoJ&CD annual performance plan (APP) and strategic plan had had to be finalised, and he had obviously needed to provide input into those plans. Thus there had been “a bit of a rush,” and parts of the plans might need to be revisited.

Adv Mashabane said that he was honoured to lead a skilled and experienced senior management team, and was grateful to the acting DGs who had “held the fort” prior to his appointment. In October 2020, following a meeting with the Committee, senior management had held a retreat to develop a turnaround plan for DoJ&CD. After his appointment, they had attended a strategic planning session to refine the strategic plan and APP. They had emerged with plans that would place DoJ&CD on a trajectory towards “outstanding performance.” Its performance had already improved over the last six months. DoJ&CD’s “unabated regression and downward spiral” had been halted, and DoJ&CD would be “out of the woods” by halfway through the performance cycle. DoJ&CD was grateful for the “chastisement and guidance” the Committee had provided. The challenges it faced were great, but surmountable. The next day, 8 May, would mark 25 years since the adoption of the Constitution. Senior management had agreed that the anniversary would serve as inspiration in its attempts to “reclaim centre stage” as a critical department. The APP was not just an APP, but also a turnaround plan.

Adv Mashabane said that DoJ&CD had identified ten strategic outcomes across its five programmes. Particular emphasis was placed on two outcomes: the modernisation of DoJ&CD and its services, in order to increase access to justice; and public education around the Constitution and DoJ&CD services. The Minister had been advocating for modernisation since his appointment. Adv Mashabane noted that the APP included 77 indicators. This was a drop from the number of indicators in the previous APP, but no indicators had been removed – rather, they had been realigned and consolidated.

Adv Mashabane said that DoJ&CD was committed to achieving the following before the end of the first quarter:

• Finalise the review of the macro structure of the Department, as required by the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA);
• Stabilise senior management by filling key strategic vacancies;
• Develop a strategy to reposition the Justice College, in order to build human resources;
• Conduct a skills audit to identify gaps and necessary interventions; and
• Conduct a culture and climate survey.

Mr Terence Raseroka, Chief Director: Strategic Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation, DoJ&CD, discussed the strategic outcomes as they applied to each programme. In programme one, administration, the identified outcomes were:

• Modernising and digitising justice services, including through online court services, “cashless courts,” and court audio-visual systems;
• Improving organisational capability and good governance, including through improving audit outcomes, addressing the skills gap, and empowering women and small, medium and micro-enterprises (SMMEs); and
• Improving awareness of justice services and constitutionalism, through communications.

DoJ&CD’s targets in programme two, court services, revolved around:

• Increasing access to justice through the protection of women and children;
• Increasing access to justice through access to physical infrastructure and justice services; and
• Reducing crime and corruption through effective prosecution, including by establishing specialised commercial crime courts.

DoJ&CD’s targets in programme three, state legal services, revolved around:

• Improving high court masters’ services;
• Reviewing and replacing colonial and apartheid-era justice-related legislation;
• Transforming state legal services, especially by implementing the State Attorney Amendment Act (SAAA);
• Transforming the legal profession, especially by advancing the careers of legal practitioners from previously disadvantaged groups; and
• Advancing constitutionalism, human rights, and the rule of law, including by addressing “racism, xenophobia and general intolerance.”

Programme four was the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA) (see next presentation). In programme five, auxiliary services, DoJ&CD was focusing on modernisation and digitisation. In particular, it was implementing the integrated justice system (IJS) programme governance structure, and expanding the number of entities connected on the transversal hub for the electronic exchange of information.

Over the medium-term strategic framework period, DoJ&CD planned to introduce the Commissions of Inquiry Bill, the Criminal Procedure Bill, the Land Court Bill, the Lower Courts Bill, the Magistrates’ Court Bill, the Insolvency Bill, the Community Advice Offices and Paralegals Bill, the Domestic Violence Amendment Bill, the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, the Sheriffs Bill, the Small Claims Court Bill, the Administration of Estates Bill, the Regulation of Trusts Bill, and the Regulation of Interception and Communications Amendment Bill. It also planned to develop and implement several institutional policies (see slides).

Mr Venile Mahlangu, Director: Risk Management, DoJCD, said that DoJ&CD had identified the following as its top risks:

• Ageing and unstable ICT infrastructure, resulting in disruption of systems – especially an obstacle to modernisation;
• Poor contract management, especially contract extensions due to poor planning, leading to irregular expenditure;
• Non-compliance with departmental supply chain management policies and procedures in relation to procurement of legal services;
• Inadequate management of people;
• Compromised physical and information security;
• Delays in delivering infrastructure projects, particularly due to dependence on the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure (DPWI);
• Inadequate disclosure processes of contingency liabilities in state attorneys;
• Inability to implement COVID-19 risk adjusted plan for the effective management of COVID-19 resurgence; and
• Vacancy in key positions and inadequate organisational structure resulting in instability across the Department.

Mr Mahlangu said that DoJ&CD had plans in place to mitigate these risks. For example, DOJ&CD was implementing a human resources (HR) development plan, establishing COVID-19 steering teams at all service points, and requiring that new contracts should be awarded before existing contracts expired. Corporate Services had taken steps to fill vacancies and that situation should improve by the end of the quarter. 

Mr Johan Johnson, Chief Director: Finance, DoJ&CD, made the budget presentation on behalf of the acting Chief Financial Officer (CFO). DoJ&CD had planned on receiving a baseline budget of around R23 billion. Following unexpected budget cuts, however, DoJ&CD’s approved budget in 2021/22 was around R21.5 billion. This was only a 2% increase over the last financial year, in comparison to cost pressures of up to 5-6%. Budget growth was predicted to decrease to 1% in 2022/23 and 2023/24. Limited budgetary capacity would be a challenge over the medium-term.

There had been a baseline increase in the budget of the Information Regulator, with R105 million allocated for its expansion over the next three years. However, over the next three years, over R7 billion in baseline reductions would be effected across DoJ&CD programmes and entities, starting with R2.3 billion in 2021/22. In the current financial year, the employee compensation budget would be reduced by R1.6 billion from the baseline, meaning that DoJ&CD could effectively “only fund the warm bodies.” There would also be reductions of R422 million at the NPA, R182 million at Legal Aid South Africa, R41 million at the Special Investigating Unit (SIU), R28 million at the Public Protector, and R289 million in magistrates’ salaries.

Mr Johnson spoke in detail about how budget cuts would affect the various programmes and expenditure areas (see slides). He highlighted that facilities management was a central challenge. However, fortunately, the amounts earmarked for municipal services would increase by about 7% on average over the next three years – meaning that DoJ&CD would be able to cover its municipal rates and charges, provided they were kept within inflation range by local authorities. 

The DoJ&CD budget was allocated as follows across programmes:

• 30.8% to court services;
• 20.6% to the NPA;
• 19.2% to auxiliary and associated services;
• 11.8% to administration;
• 11.3% to magistrates’ salaries; and
• 6.4% to state legal services.  

Mr Johnson highlighted the following as key budget implementation risks:

• Untimely filling of vacancies and implementation of strategic procurement initiatives;
• Poor tracking of progress in the implementation of plans;
• Unfunded mandates, for example the extension of the Zondo Commission;
• Misalignment of approved plans, budget, and capacity;
• Centralised delegations, both internal and external; and
• Unavailability of enabling systems.

Adv Mashabane flagged two additional issues. Firstly, he was concerned about the general state of DoJ&CD facilities. He had visited three provinces – the Western Cape, the Free State, and the North West – and stakeholders, including DoJ&CD officials and the judiciary, had raised facilities as “a major challenge.” He knew that it was a challenge across the country. Due to ageing and other issues, the facilities were in “a serious state of disrepair, dilapidation, and collapse.” Problems included leaking roofs, sewage blockages, unreliable water supply, and a lack of generators to cope with frequent loadshedding. Unfortunately, DoJ&CD was dependent on DPWI, whose processes were slow, for infrastructure maintenance. DoJ&CD was developing a proposal for DPWI and he would meet with its DG within the next fortnight to try to find a solution.

Secondly, Adv Mashabane was concerned about the high median age of DoJ&CD personnel. Out of 16 000 staff members, only 23% were under the age of 35. Over the next five years, many of the most skilled and experienced officials – particularly in senior management – would be lost through attrition. DoJ&CD was taking this seriously. In filling the vacancies that it could with its available resources, it would try to improve the situation and build capacity that would be available in the long-term.

Deputy Minister Jeffery said that he would help the DOJ&CD delegation to respond to Members’ questions.

Discussion

Ms N Maseko-Jele (ANC) said that the presentation made her “shiver” – it gave the false impression that DoJ&CD, under its new DG, was starting afresh. Many of the Department’s problems had a long history. For example, the DG’s comment that the staff complement was aging suggested that there were experienced officials who had been at the Department for a long time, though without achieving the results that the Committee wanted. The presentation gave the impression that nothing had been done in terms of modernising the Department. As Mr Mahlangu had mentioned, its IT infrastructure was aging. Although the briefing concerned the Department’s plans, she had expected to hear that the Department had made some progress in addressing the issues that had been brought up over the Committee’s frequent (almost quarterly) engagements with officials in the past. Another example of such an issue was the maintenance of the online portal. Poor contract management, non-compliance, and wasteful expenditure were all risks to DoJ&CD. But who had been given responsibility for these issues, and what was being done? Adv Mashabane had to provide a detailed plan for handling these issues.

Ms Maseko-Jele said that she appreciated that Adv Mashabane had provided a timeframe in which the Committee could expect to see progress in the implementation of the plans. She suggested that at future meetings the Committee would return to the APP, and the accompanying presentation, and simply “tick off” what had been achieved. The Committee’s patience was low and waning; it wanted to see progress, but the plan made her feel as though the Department was “not going anywhere.” She apologised to Adv Mashabane if the Committee was “harsh.” Most of DoJ&CD’s budget went to compensating officials, so the Committee had to be “very strict” in holding officials accountable for fulfilling their responsibilities efficiently. She asked Adv Mashabane to describe what he had done since taking office, and what his experience had been so far. The APP reflected the problems he had observed at DOJ&CD, and those should be shared with the Committee. Then, in future meetings, the Committee could revisit those problems and look for progress.

Mr X Nqola (ANC) asked what form the public awareness campaigns would take – whether media interviews, workshops, imbizos, or indabas. The form they took would determine how cost-effective they were.

Mr Nqola said that Parliament was finalising three gender-based violence and femicide (GBVF) bills. Had the Department prepared itself for the roll-out of those bills’ provisions? Was it prepared to administer the National Register for Sex Offenders (NRSO)?

Adv JB Skosana, Deputy Director-General (DDG): Court Services, DoJ&CD, reminded Members that, in a meeting about the NRSO in March, the Committee had instructed DoJ&CD to meet with the South African Police Service (SAPS) to look into ways of improving the NRSO. That meeting had since been held. He had convened the meeting and had prepared a report which he would present to his principals – the Minister, Deputy Minister, and DG – and thereafter make available to the Chairperson. It was “amazing” that the country kept three registers – the NRSO, the Child Protection Register, and the Register for Abuse of Older Persons – each of which aimed to protect the rights of vulnerable persons and each of which had faced challenges. DoJ&CD’s engagements should give it a “clear view” across all three registers, so that DoJ&CD did not adopt ineffective processes.

Mr Nqola asked whether the Department was planning to continue with the establishment of sexual offences courts, which the Minister and Deputy Minister had pursued in the last financial year. If so, how many courts was it planning to launch this year?

Adv Skosana replied that the programme would be extended. The programme had started “roughly” with very high standards for the courts, for example, in terms of its requirements for infrastructure and IT. DOJ&CD had now reduced the standards to allow more sexual offences courts to be established. The quality of their services, however, would not be reduced. In the 2021/22 financial year, DoJ&CD planned to designate 100 courts as fully functional, while at the same time developing a framework which would enable expansion in the future. DoJ&CD had many courts that were not optimally used, because their usage was not guided by caseloads and needs on the ground. 

Mr Nqola asked about the transformation of the services of the Master of the High Court. What came to mind were allegations that the Master’s office assigned the execution of large estates to white males, and assigned smaller estates to black and female practitioners. What plans were in place to address this, and what progress had been made?

Adv Martin Mafojane, Chief Master of the High Court, DoJ&CD, said that he had left the Master’s office around 2018 and returned on 1 November 2020. He had known, for example from the Department’s reputation in the media, that the environment he was returning to was “not so attractive.” However, he had returned believing that he could make a difference in helping DoJ&CD to serve South Africans better than it had in the past. With the APP, DoJ&CD officials were communicating what they intended to do going forward. The Committee should be assured that DoJ&CD was “likely to turn a corner,” and thereafter to improve its performance. He agreed with Adv Mashabane that DOJ&CD’s challenges were surmountable.

Adv Mafojane said that the execution of deceased estates operated under strict legal guidelines providing people freedom of testation and freedom to choose an executor. In such cases, therefore, there was largely no question of the Master’s office having the power to assign executors, let alone to assign them on the basis of race. Insolvency estates, however, presented a challenge. In those cases, and according to legislation, the appointment of an executor depended on which party had a majority in numbers or a majority in value. Those in business tended to appoint practitioners with whom they associated or identified. The Master’s office had not chosen this situation, and South Africa’s business community had to “come to the party” in finding a solution. The business community must join government and others in trying to rectify the demographic imbalance in business ownership and financial control.

Adv Mafojane said that DoJ&CD was not neglecting the importance of trying to empower practitioners from previously disadvantaged groups. The situation needed to change. DoJ&CD had “entered the arena” at the provisional stage of execution, but this was a “circumscribed space” in which the administration of insolvency estates did not necessarily occur. Instead, there needed to be a drive – including in correcting the Insolvency Bill – to expand the government’s involvement in the appointment of liquidators. The government should be involved not just in the provisional stage but in the actual administration of the insolvent estate.

Mr Nqola asked about DOJ&CD’s attempts to review and repeal apartheid-era legislation. It was not ideal that this was still ongoing, 27 years after the advent of democracy. But the process involved not only DoJ&CD but also Parliament, which was obligated to make laws. He suggested that Parliament should receive a written report on the work that had been done so far in this regard.

Mr Nelson Matibe, Acting DDG: Legislative Development, DoJ&CD, provided an overview of the Project 25 statutory law review. As early as 2004, the South African Law Reform Commission (SALRC) had embarked on a provisional audit of national legislation, stretching back to 1910. It had found that roughly 2 800 individual national statutes were on the statute books. The review had had to be systematic, proceeding at the level of individual national departments. For each department, SALRC investigated the national legislation administered by that department, reviewing each statute for equality and redundancy. SALRC’s preliminary findings and proposals were compiled in a consultation paper and verified with DoJ&CD. Thereafter, discussion papers were written – in respect of each department and its legislation – and, upon approval from SALRC, published for general information and comment. Finally, SALRC developed a report, which incorporated the comments of respondents, and submitted it to the departments.

However, Mr Matibe said that it had been left to the individual departments to enact SALRC’s recommendations. Some departments had accepted the recommendations and had gone on to promote new legislation through their various portfolio committees. Because the approach of Project 25 had been “very limited,” DoJ&CD was now reviewing apartheid-era legislation again. That project was ongoing. The Project 25 report, and a shorter version of it, would be made available to Members.

Mr Nqola asked whether DoJ&CD was planning to continue with the online court system. It had proved “a bit effective” in 2020, when COVID-19 was rife. Was the system progressing well, and would DoJ&CD continue to use measures like online hearings? 

Adv Skosana replied that online court services were advancing. Since the lockdown, DoJ&CD had run several trials on the virtual platform, and had learned further lessons. The Criminal Procedure Act, however, was strict in requiring the physical presence of parties before the court. DoJ&CD was working on draft legislation which would allow it to expand the use of the online court system to criminal cases; in the interim, it continued to do what was permissible under current legislation.  

Adv Skosana added that an important innovation was the new online maintenance applications and enquiries system, similar to that offered by the South African Revenue Service (SARS). The programme would be launched at DoJ&CD’s newest court, recently opened in Durban by the Minister. In the coming year, DoJ&CD hoped to perfect the model in order to launch it at all courts in the future. Even court orders would be delivered online. This would reduce the “commotion” and the size of the queues at courts.

Adv G Breytenbach (DA) agreed strongly with Ms Maseko-Jele’s criticisms. The presentation spoke extensively about what was going to happen, but not at all about what had already happened. She had expected more of a “can-do” attitude, given the situation that the Department found itself in and given its last interaction with the Committee. She had expected to see that some measures had already been implemented – that is, to see more than “nicely set-out” objectives for the future. It was “very disappointing.” At a meeting in November 2020, the Minister, along with the Committee itself, had expressed alarm at the decline in DOJ&CD’s performance. Underperformance was “an ongoing issue” that had now reached a critical level. At the time, the Minister had said that measures were being put in place to rebuild the administration. He had identified the root causes of the decline: high levels of instability in leadership; a lack of capacity; a lack of performance management; a lack of decisive decision-making; an ill-defined organisational culture, leading to “a culture of non-performance”; and the lack of “an ethical tone” in the Department. It had been months since that meeting. What had been done since then to address those critical issues? She wanted to hear what had already been done, not what would be done or what DoJ&CD planned to do.

Adv Breytenbach asked about the high vacancy rate in the senior management service. What had been done, already, to address it? How many of those vacancies had been filled? Had a skills audit been done? If not, why not; and if it had, what had it found?

Ms Thabitha Mametja, DDG: Corporate Services, DoJ&CD, replied that the vacancy rate in the senior management service had indeed been very high, at 24%, at the time of DoJ&CD’s last engagement with the Committee. That rate was now 22.5%. Of the 38 vacancies that remained, 23 had been advertised and were in the process of being filled. DoJ&CD was mindful that there were budget cuts, so it would accommodate those appointments within the R114 million surplus in the employee compensation budget. Whatever was left over would be used to fill vacancies at lower levels, especially in the courts, in the Master of the High Court’s office, and in the Family Advocate’s office.

Adv Mashabane said that DoJ&CD would try to fill any remaining vacancies in senior management, especially in contract management, before the end of the quarter. Currently, half of the executive committee, which he chaired, were recent appointments. This showed the progress that had been made, and he thought that senior vacancies had been halved since the previous year. The two outstanding vacancies at that level were the Solicitor-General and the Chief State Law Adviser. He had been informed that the appointment process for the latter would be concluded by the end of the first quarter.

Adv Breytenbach said that the performance management system at DoJ&CD was “appalling” and “non-existent.” What had been done there?

Adv Breytenbach asked which of the Auditor-General’s recommendations had been attended to, and what the outcomes had been. If they had not been attended to, why not?

Adv Mashabane said that he had been addressing the issue of consequence management and performance management, as identified in the Auditor-General’s report. Efforts had begun to rebuild the labour relations unit, which had collapsed following years of challenges. DoJ&CD was also committed to building external capacity, through short-term contracts, to address all backlogs concerning grievances and disciplinary procedures. By the end of the first quarter, at the end of June, senior management intended to have reduced all grievances and disciplinary matters to below 5%.

Adv Mashabane said he had noticed that contract extensions contributed significantly to DoJ&CD’s irregular expenditure. Since his appointment he had received many requests to extend expired contracts. He had told the Acting CFO that any request to extend an expired contract must henceforth be accompanied by a plan for consequence management, identifying who was responsible for the expiry. He was also moving to fill the vacancies in contract management. Members would be aware of the current challenge posed by the forensic reports and by the disciplinary procedures involving various senior managers, including the CFO and the Chief Director: Supply Chain. In the next 30 days, those processes had to be concluded. There had been delays since last year – COVID-19 had been “used as an excuse,” and the defendants had caused intentional delays.

Adv Breytenbach noted Adv Mashabane’s reference to the attrition rate. This was a problem, but it was a problem everywhere. What plans had Adv Mashabane put in place to retain the skills of experienced officials? Specifically, were there plans for some kind of mentorship programme, so that skills could be passed on to a new generation of officials? Newly appointed staff should be properly inducted and mentored so that they could learn from those with extensive experience. One could not simply replace experienced officials with newcomers and expect the Department to continue functioning.

Adv Skosana said that he had been surprised to learn that 77% of DoJ&CD officials were older than 35, and joked that he was not among the youths. It was a clear message that experienced officials must “give way” to the youth to come into DoJ&CD and take over their positions. Yet even then the experienced officials had to commit to “holding the young ones by their hands” until they were able to keep the Department afloat on their own. After he left the Department, he would personally continue to contribute to the development of young officials and to attend the Justice College for an hour or two every week. Unlike Bafana Bafana, DoJ&CD should not look for a 69-year-old coach to rescue it. Fortunately, the new DG was young. Adv Mashabane was also only the sixth DG since 1994 – not the twenty-fourth coach of Bafana Bafana – which showed that there had been some stability in the position.

Adv Mashabane agreed that DoJ&CD had to build capacity to deal with attrition. He had asked Ms Mametja to work on a plan for talent management, career pathing, and succession. The plan should be completed by the end of the first quarter. Experienced officials, before they left DoJ&CD, had to train the young officials to whom they would pass the baton. He was grateful to officials like Adv Skosana, who had personally availed himself to help in developing the next generation of senior management. In addition, part of what he had discovered during his time at DoJ&CD was the “terrifying reality” that there were no entry-level positions in the core branches. The entry-level pipeline existed in support-related areas, but not in the Master’s office, Legislative Development, Constitutional Development, or Court Services. This “shocked him.” He had told Ms Mametja that DoJ&CD needed a clear plan to build capacity and reopen entry points for these career pipelines. It could not be the case that DoJ&CD had no junior posts into which it could absorb newly qualified young lawyers.

Dr W Newhoudt-Druchen (ANC) joined other Members in expressing “disappointment.” The APP had been presented as though it was the first time that DoJ&CD was presenting to the Committee. She had not heard anything about improvements that DoJ&CD had made in line with the recommendations that the Committee had made in previous years.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen was concerned that the presentation mentioned, as a risk to DOJ&CD, the Department’s “inability to implement COVID-19 risk-adjusted plan for the effective management of COVID-19 resurgence” (see slide 70). In what sense was the Department unable to implement these measures? The first and second waves of COVID-19 infections had already passed and had been surmounted. Everyone should be familiar with the protocols by now. Was DoJ&CD saying that, as the third wave approached, it was still unable to take steps to protect people from COVID-19?

Adv Skosana said that, as acting DG, he had coordinated the development of the plan that had allowed DoJ&CD to survive and maintain its services during the hard lockdowns. That plan was still “in motion.” The presentation should not be taken to imply that the plan was “dysfunctional,” but rather that it had not yet had the desired “outcomes.”

Ms Mametja added that DoJ&CD had established various governance committees, called COVID-19 steering committees, at the national, provincial, and local levels. It was managing those committees and ensuring that every employee adhered to the protocols.

Mr Mahlangu outlined a few further factors that were causing difficulties around COVID-19 protocols. Firstly, DoJ&CD was temporarily using mobile offices as it upgraded certain courts. Those structures were not always compliant with the COVID-19 protocols, because they were small and the public visited them for services. To mitigate this, DOJ&CD was providing visors, as well as masks, to officials, and was speeding up the turnaround time for services, especially services for which the public visited the mobile offices. Secondly, some officials had comorbidities but held positions in which their primarily function was to serve or interact with the public. For example, court clerks worked solely in the courtroom. DoJ&CD was trying its best to keep these officials safe, especially through social distancing, but it was very difficult to relocate them away from their positions and, within their positions, they could not be removed from service points. Lastly, it caused problems when the national coronavirus command council (NCCC) instated regulations that required DoJ&CD to reduce capacity at its service points to below 100%. DoJ&CD implemented rotations in those times. At small courts, where a given responsibility or position was often covered by only two officials, this meant that one official would be on rotation while the other was physically on duty. But, if the official on duty fell ill, it was difficult to recall the other official quickly. Those delays compromised service delivery.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen asked how, specifically, DoJ&CD would be ensuring universal access to its services for people with disabilities. She asked for a detailed breakdown of the interventions. She also asked for an update on the national strategy on universal access. 

Adv Skosana said that universal access for persons with disabilities was built into the sexual offences court model. DoJ&CD had developed a set of minimum standards which applied across all sexual offences courts. In fact, those courts had been selected because their infrastructure was already amenable to or compliant with the standards. The minimum standards regulated both physical access and, for example, sign language interpretation. The APP referenced plans to introduce an amendment to the Constitution, designating sign language an official language of South Africa. However, DoJ&CD was not waiting for the legislation to be effected. It was already putting in place measures to provide sign language services, including working with non-governmental organisations to build a pool of service providers. Thus, by the time the legislation came into effect, DoJ&CD would be prepared to meet its constitutional obligations. Because it would be a constitutional amendment, any non-compliance with the new law would expose the government to litigation. He could share the minimum standards with the Committee, and those would be expanded to apply to all courts moving forward.

Ms Newhoudt-Druchen was “extremely concerned” about the surge of hate speech, hate crimes, and even murders targeting people within the LGBTIA+ community. Had DoJ&CD condemned this? Had it made a statement? If it had, that statement had not been very “visible.” 

Dr Gabriella La Foy, DDG: Constitutional Development, DoJ&CD, replied that the Department shared Dr Newhoudt-Druchen’s concern. The work of the Constitutional Development branch aimed to enhance and promote the rights of LGBTIQ persons through interventions directed at prevention, promotion, and protection. This was “a priority area,” and the relevant work was both “well-established” and ongoing. The branch had put in place a number of indicators relating to these aims. The indicators in its operational plan would provide a fuller picture, but some relevant indicators were included under outcomes 2, 3, and 8 of the APP. Under outcome 3, DoJ&CD would continue with awareness-raising campaigns and would increase the number of awareness sessions it provided. Public awareness was related to prevention and the need to shift people’s mindsets. In addition, the national intervention strategy (NIS) would be relaunched later that year following policy revision. DoJ&CD was also in conversation with the European Union about a conference or dialogue looking into policy and legislative developments to enhance the protection of the rights of LGBTIQ persons. Finally, DoJ&CD had several interventions focused on implementation. In particular, the rapid response mechanism, a collaboration with SAPS and the NPA, was used for implementation and enforcement and would continue to operate. DoJ&CD would report throughout the year to the Committee on these efforts.

Adv Mashabane said that DoJ&CD was aware that it had “dropped the ball” in this area. It had allowed structures like the national and provincial task teams to “collapse.” But it was taking “drastic steps” to address the situation. Two days ago, he, the Minister, and the Deputy Minister had met with representatives of the LGBTQIA+ community. They had clearly voiced their concern about the “non-availability” of DoJ&CD in addressing these issues. DoJ&CD had committed itself to addressing the matter within the next 21 days. Adv Mashabane would lead the effort on the administrative, departmental level, and the Minister and Deputy Minister would deal with the high-level concerns. LGBTQIA+ issues should be reflected prominently in DOJ&CD’s plans, even at the branch-operational level. DoJ&CD would monitor the situation and he was willing to provide an account when he next engaged with the Committee.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen asked where DoJ&CD’s youth interns were, and whether they were being absorbed into the Department. The Committee often heard about the work of interns in various departments and state entities, but she did not think she had ever heard such an update from DOJ&CD.

Ms Mametja replied that, in addition to the interns employed in the previous year, DoJ&CD had employed about 254 new interns in the current financial year. Moreover, DoJ&CD had just signed a memorandum of understanding with the Safety and Security Sector Education and Training Authority (SASSETA) for an additional 30 graduate interns and 87 candidate attorneys. It would focus on candidates aged 18 to 35, because of the need to increase the Department’s youth complement. The interns and candidate attorneys hired with the SASSETA funds would be placed across the country. DoJ&CD wanted to develop an internship framework that would allow it to identify the “best and brightest” for permanent absorption into the Department.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen said that, two months ago, a young boy had written to the President to say that the office of the Master of the High Court had not provided him access to funds for meals, accommodation, and school. What had happened in that particular case? Had the funds been released to the boy?

Adv Mafojane said that he was unaware of that specific case, although the Master’s office did monitor queries that were sent to the President, to Ministers, and to the DG. He would prefer not to speculate. However, he shared the broad plans for the Guardian’s Fund. Members would be aware that in September 2020 there had been an attempt to defraud the fund of the Pietermaritzburg Master’s office. Since then, the office had received reports from ABSA’s IT team and from the departmental IT team, and had learned some important lessons. It was commendable that the fund had been set up such that the fraud had been noticed before all R10 million could be irrevocably stolen – this had limited the damage done by the incident. 

Adv Mafojane said that the plans going forward involved, first, an improved relationship with the Government Employees Pension Fund (GEPF). They were working on a memorandum of understanding together. GEPF had presented a proposal and was now considering a counterproposal from the Master’s office, and the agreement should be finalised soon. Second, in the coming year, the Master’s Office was planning to change its approach to the management of the fund. Currently the management system was purely administrative, so it aimed to develop a new financial system that could be implemented in alignment with a new IT system. This would enable better and quicker work. The financial system and the IT system were being developed concurrently in the interests of being proactive and ensuring compatibility between them.   

Ms Newhoudt-Druchen noted that online protection orders had been implemented. However, she had not seen any public announcements about the service or any information about how to use it. How was DoJ&CD sharing this information with the public?

Adv S Swart (ACDP) congratulated Adv Mashabane on his appointment, and said that he clearly understood that there were many challenges at DoJ&CD. He joined Ms Maseko-Jele and Adv Breytenbach in expressing “deep concern” about the state of DoJ&CD and the lack of progress. DoJ&CD had presented “wonderful plans” for the future, but the Committee had “engage robustly” on its current underperformance. DoJ&CD was the heart of South Africa’s constitutional democracy. The Committee had to take time to “grapple with the hard questions” – while keeping in mind that the Department operated under significant budget constraints.

Adv Swart referred to recommendations made in an SIU report regarding systemic problems at the office of the Master of the High Court. He asked about the operation of the complaints management mechanism. He also asked about the vacancy rate. The high vacancy rate might partially be a budgetary problem, but were there funded vacancies too? Moreover, when last had the small estate threshold been adjusted? The figure was currently at R250 000, to his knowledge. Small estate processes were much easier to finalise, so adjusting the amount upwards could release a lot of pressure on the Master’s office.

Adv Mafojane replied that the Master’s office had taken note of the SIU report. However, it had not received the final report. It had received an interim report regarding legislative changes that might inform how the Master’s office changed its systems. He was also aware that there was an ongoing process to amend the Administration of Estates Act. The threshold for the administration of simpler estates had last been adjusted in 2014-5. Irrespective of whether an estate met that threshold, the Master’s office had an arrangement with Legal Aid that the latter came aboard to manage any estate which involved minors. The office was currently considering how, in those small estates, it could institute “simplified” accountability measures – more simple than requiring that accounts had to be advertised in the newspaper and so on. Once this environment had “stabilised,” the office would be better prepared to consider changing the threshold amount. The threshold could certainly be adjusted. However, it could not be adjusted in isolation, because it was linked to other figures elsewhere in the system, such as in the Guardian’s Fund.

Adv Swart asked whether the term of the Acting Solicitor-General would be extended. Usually, acting appointments to that role lasted only two years, but the Committee had heard a very positive briefing from the office of the Solicitor-General.

Adv Mashabane said that the Acting Solicitor-General position was sui generis, unlike other acting positions in DoJ&CD, because the State Attorney Amendment Act specifically mentioned that the Minister could appoint an acting Solicitor-General. He would pursue the matter with the Minister and Deputy Minister to move forward in seeking a long-term appointment.

Adv Swart asked about supply chain management, especially in relation to issues involving Bosasa, security contracts, and the three forensic investigations that related to DoJ&CD. What was the progress in that regard?

Adv Swart asked for an update on the office of the Legal Services Ombudsman, to which Judge Siraj Desai had been appointed. Was the office operational?

Ms Mametja replied that DoJ&CD had begun to operationalise the office. A team of officials and an acting director had been seconded from the Department, and they were currently looking for office space. Judge Desai would meet with the team on the following Monday, Tuesday, and Wednesday, to brainstorm about operationalising. In the interim, DoJ&CD had dedicated two cell phones to the office, with a number that could be advertised and used by those who wanted to submit queries. On Monday, it would give the number to the team to publicise.

Adv Swart said that the Committee had had a “very good” meeting with the judiciary on 28 February. The Committee had undertaken to urgently examine the “ongoing issue” of the institutional independence of the judiciary. What was the progress on the court administration model? What progress had been made – either politically or departmentally – regarding the institutional independence of the judiciary?

Adv Skosana replied that DoJ&CD had completed its research on the court administration model, studying various options suitable for South Africa’s constitutional democracy. It had scheduled an engagement with the Minister, who had asked officials to prepare a submission to Cabinet. Hopefully, the Committee would be briefed on the matter soon, once Cabinet had provided guidance. The process would eventually lead to a bill, and DoJ&CD also hoped to brief the Committee on those legislative implications.

Adv Swart asked how the Zondo Commission’s remaining work would be funded. When he had raised the issue with the Minister, the Minister had said that funding would be found in DoJ&CD. But he appreciated the “candour” of Mr Johnson, who, in his presentation, had been direct about the budgetary constraints at DoJ&CD. Given that the Minister of Finance had said that no further funds would be released for the Commission, where would the additional funding come from, to ensure that the Commission completed its work?

Adv Mashabane said that the Minister had previously spoken about the R75 million deficit that the Zondo Commission had incurred between January and March. The National Treasury, when approached for funding, had explained its constraints – the budgeting process had already been finalised. So DoJ&CD had been asked to “scrap around” to find R75 million, and it had done so. Now, the courts had extended the Commission’s term to the end of June. At the request of DOJ&CD, the Commission had provided a projected budget, according to which it would require about R90 million. DoJ&CD had again approached Treasury and impressed upon them that the Zondo Commission was not a DOJ&CD commission, though it was established in terms of an act over which DoJ&CD had custodianship. It would therefore be unfair for Treasury to require that DoJ&CD fund the Commission using its baseline budget. In previous years, DoJ&CD had underspent and thus had been able to come forward to “rescue” the Commission. In the current year, however, DoJ&CD was committed to spending somewhere around 99.9% of its budget, and he was confident that it would do so. He was therefore in discussion with the DG at Treasury to find a source for the R90 million. One possibility was to roll-over the budget that DoJ&CD had not spent in the previous financial year. For now, DoJ&CD had provided R4.4 million for April, to pay the salaries of the Commission’s staff and to pay for miscellaneous services like communications. Hopefully the rest of the money would be found soon, and hopefully the Commission would not exceed its projected budget.

Regarding budgetary constraints, Adv Swart said that it was time for Members to “step forward” as Members of Parliament (MPs). As the President had mentioned, weak state capacity had allowed state capture, corruption, and “looting” to take place. He had served on the Eskom inquiry and was aware that tens of billions of rands had been “stolen.” It was “absolutely disgraceful” that the entities which could collect the stolen funds, and “lock away” those responsible, were having their budgets reduced. It made “no sense” to him. These entities included the NPA and its units, the SIU – which could use special tribunals to cancel contracts and to collect money – and DoJ&CD itself. How could the Committee allow these budget cuts? There were tens of billions of rands that could be collected, and that had to be collected, but budget cuts were disabling the very entities that could collect them. The Chairperson had previously mentioned the impact that this had on crime and on the economy. For example, the primary constraint on foreign investment in South Africa was the perception of corruption. Thus the Rand had strengthened recently when steps had been taken to address corruption. DoJ&CD was “at the heart of access to justice,” and a lot revolved around that.

Adv Swart felt “very strongly” that solutions had to be found. One solution might be the Criminal Assets Recovery Account (CARA), which the Minister had jurisdiction over. Although he believed that the fund was intended to be used to compensate victims of crime, a portion of the fund could be used to cover the funding shortfalls at the SIU, the NPA, and DoJ&CD. These entities could not afford to lose any more “warm bodies” or forensic capacities. Moreover, Members should “seriously consider” the powers they had, as MPs, in terms of the Money Bills Act. He suggested that the Committee’s researchers should look into the issue. DoJ&CD could not continue to “go with a begging bowl” to Treasury seeking funding. Nationwide fiscal constraints notwithstanding, funding to criminal justice entities should, at the least, not be reduced. The Committee had to be “robust” and hold state entities accountable – but, at the same time, Members should remember that it was Parliament that allocated funds. MPs should “stop wringing [their] hands” and remember that, within the constraints established by the Minister of Finance, they had the power to appropriate funds.

Adv Skosana replied that although Members might be familiar with the CARA fund primarily as a fund for victims of crime, the fund could already be used for measures to fight crime and to strengthen the criminal justice system. CARA was central to the national strategic plan on GBVF – CARA funds were received by sexual offences courts, by the Department of Social Development (DSD), and by Thutuzela care centres. The care centres had been introduced by the NPA mainly using donor funding, but CARA had provided coverage when those funds had dwindled. However, CARA funds were sparse. DoJ&CD was “waiting anxiously” to receive more funds, particularly through the efforts of the NPA’s Investigating Directorate (ID). In the long-term, CARA’s mandate could be expanded to support “a respectable balance” of services.

Mr R Dyantyi (ANC) welcomed Adv Mashabane to his first presentation before the Committee as DG. Members expected him to fix the airplane while flying it. He appreciated DoJ&CD’s presentation, but he asked for the Chairperson’s guidance on how Members should approach it. His understanding was that the meeting concerned DoJ&CD’s APP, as presented, and strategic plan, which was not presented but which Members had read. It was therefore a “forward-looking” discussion. Backward-looking considerations – like those raised by other Members – were more relevant in discussing entities’ annual reports. When the meeting concluded, the Committee needed to know DoJ&CD’s plans, and its role was to judge the “effectiveness and integrity” of those plans. Moreover, to deal with the concerns of other Members, the Committee could call a specific meeting to hear more about DoJ&CD’s progress and the work it had done in the past, and thus avoid mixing those backward-looking concerns with the forward-looking orientation of the APP.

The Chairperson confirmed that, in that meeting, the Committee was considering DoJ&CD’s APP and budget, not its annual report and therefore not, strictly speaking, its past performance. Yet Mr Dyantyi himself had mentioned the “integrity” of the APP, and that was not a wholly forward-looking consideration. Members had to consider DoJ&CD’s past performance in order to evaluate whether the APP was realistic, and that was where Members’ frustration came from.

Mr Dyantyi reminded Members and DoJ&CD delegates that when the Department had last briefed the Committee, in October or November 2020, the Committee’s “diagnosis” had been that the Department was “dysfunctional.” It had concluded that DoJ&CD had needed not just a turnaround plan but “a rescue plan.” In that meeting, the Chairperson had said that DoJ&CD had been declining over three or four years and that something needed to be done. There had been challenges in virtually every DoJ&CD programme. According to Adv Mashabane, the Department had arranged a planning session in response to the Committee’s “harsh criticism,” and then, after Adv Mashabane’s appointment, had held a further session. He was “very happy” if DoJ&CD’s APP presentation was based on plans responding to the need to “fix” the Department. This was better than rehashing familiar problems without any results. He asked DoJ&CD delegates whether the presentation was indeed a response intending to “rescue” and turn around the Department.  

Adv Mashabane said that DoJ&CD’s plans did indeed respond to the concerns that the Committee had raised in the past. He took the matter seriously. Upon his appointment as DG, he had met with the chairperson of the Public Service Commission (PSC), who knew that the Committee had been considering having DoJ&CD placed under administration at the PSC. At Adv Mashabane’s request, the chairperson had met with DoJ&CD senior management to present his concerns. Senior management had asked for 100 days to implement the turnaround plans – starting on 1 April and ending at the end of June. They had invited the PSC to put DoJ&CD under administration if they did not “turn the corner” within those 100 days. Performance had improved over the last quarter, and “the light at the end of the tunnel” was getting brighter. In 2019/20, DoJ&CD had been at just over 50% performance, but it had now broken through the “psychological threshold” of 60%. This was encouraging news and indicated that DoJ&CD had arrested its “unabated downward spiral and regression.”

Mr Dyantyi informed Adv Mashabane that, at every subsequent engagement, and at the request of his party, his concern would be court services. He appreciated DoJ&CD’s focus on modernising and increasing access to justice and to DoJ&CD services. It seemed that DoJ&CD was making a “forward leap” in that regard.

Ms Mametja confirmed that DoJ&CD was advancing its modernisation programme. It had completed and tested various online services, including online maintenance. The pilots of two such services – for deceased estates and for trust services – would begin that month. Online protection orders had been signed off on, with the business requirements finalised. Software had been developed for the expungement of criminal records online. The roll-out of the NRSO to digital channels was being finalised, with the business requirements specification ongoing. DoJ&CD had also finalised and implemented SMS notifications relating to maintenance payments and to information about family advocate services. Moreover, to modernise the courts, DoJ&CD was implementing “cashless courts.” It had deployed point-of-sales devices, which could be used for bail payments, to at least 25 courts. DoJ&CD aimed to roll the devices out in 400 courts. It was also rolling out wifi systems in various courts to support modernisation initiatives. Wifi infrastructure had been created in 43 courts already. The judicial e-workspace was at the testing stage. 

Mr Dyantyi noted that the APP identified 45 sites for the implementation of audio-visual services in court. But there were hundreds, or even thousands, of courts in South Africa. What was DoJ&CD’s plan for this facility over the medium- to long-term, perhaps over the next three years?

Adv Skosana said that he looked forward to engaging with Mr Dyantyi about court services. The 45 sites identified for audio-visual services were located across the country in all nine provinces, but they were large central courts. DoJ&CD first wanted to ensure that the central courts – which provided the greatest volume of services and handled the greatest volume of cases –  were equipped with internet and virtual platforms. Thereafter, the programme could be expanded to the sub-districts and to other sites linked to the central 45. The Court Services branch’s operational plan already included plans for expanding to new sites, and those would be elevated to DOJ&CD’s APP the following year.

Ms Mametja provided DoJ&CD’s three-year plan for the initiative. DoJ&CD planned to roll out audio-visual services to 45 courts in the current financial year, to 55 courts in 2022/23, and to 70 courts in 2023/24. Yesterday, the North West regional court president had indicated that all courts in her province had already been connected.

Mr Dyantyi referred to a report by the Democratic Governance and Rights Unit (DGRU), which covered issues such as infrastructure, security, and work environment in courts. It painted a “very gloomy,” but familiar, picture. Security was “almost non-existent” in the courts, and this affected the administration of justice. Infrastructure was also a concern. Adv Mashabane had indicated that he too was “alarmed” by the state of DoJ&CD infrastructure, and the presentation identified ageing infrastructure as a risk (see slide 70). Yet the problems did not only stem from age. For example, in Bitou municipality around Plettenberg Bay, a court had been built just a few years ago under the Independent Development Trust (IDT). But last year the court had been non-operational due to flooding. How did DoJ&CD deal with these kinds of issues?

Adv Skosana replied that DoJ&CD had taken note of the DGRU report. For many years, infrastructure had been “a thorny issue” in DoJ&CD’s relationship with DPWI. At the request of Adv Mashabane, he was developing a framework to guide engagements between DoJ&CD and DPWI. Currently, their engagements were governed by service-level agreements, which did not punish non-compliance. The new framework, however, would include measures enabling DoJ&CD to withhold money from DPWI upon non-delivery. The situation had reached a point where this was necessary. DoJ&CD transferred money to DPWI on accommodation charges annually. When it spent, for example, R3 billion on infrastructure, R2.1 billion of that amount went to DPWI and the rest to new infrastructure. Under the envisaged arrangement, DoJ&CD would not transfer the relevant amount until DPWI had delivered on its obligations as outlined in the framework. 

Adv Skosana said that DoJ&CD also wanted DPWI to devolve more infrastructure maintenance functions to DoJ&CD. With the support of the Minister, these efforts could be quite productive. It was common knowledge that DPWI had capacity problems. DoJ&CD could deal with the issues – such as leaking roofs and worn carpets – that did not require engineering or rocket science. That would leave DPWI responsible for ensuring the integrity of the infrastructure from an engineering point of view.

Adv Skosana said that he would respond in writing to any unanswered questions regarding court services.

Mr Dyantyi noted that the presentation included a list of the top risks facing DOJ&CD (see slide 70). But six of the nine risks were marked as “high risk” or “extreme risk,” which was worrying. He might have missed part of the presentation, because he had not heard anything about mitigating factors. How was DoJ&CD going to mitigate these risks?

Mr Fhedzisani Pandelani, Acting Solicitor-General, said that contingent liability, an issue which naturally related to the state attorneys, was the highest risk to the Department. He had previously made a high-level presentation to the Committee on the subject, in which he had said that contingent liability could “collapse the state” if not properly arrested. This remained true. The state was currently dealing with 328 000 cases, which represented a “huge risk,” especially when it did not know the content of those cases. Part of the APP involved interrogating those cases to see what they contained. About 154 241 cases had been interrogated so far, all manually, so about half remained to be interrogated. This was an important process – his office needed to clean the data, assess the state’s exposure to litigation, and eliminate opportunistic litigation and duplicated matters. The aim was to reduce the exposure of the state and thereby mitigate the corresponding risk. However, there were challenges in this process. The current systems hampered “agility” in interrogations, and required manual interrogations. Investment in the systems might be required. Moreover, DoJ was the “repository” for the state’s contingent liability, since both capital claims and litigation were paid for by DoJ. Those amounts ought to be recovered from client government departments. In the past, there had been issues with amounts being written off, because departments which consumed state legal services did not remit to DoJ what was due to it. Another limitation of the ongoing interrogation process was that the 328 000 cases under interrogation did not provide a “holistic” pictures of matters requiring consideration. His office would be reforming the situation around parallel state litigation processes by introducing policies in terms of section 3(4) of the SAAA. Government departments should be able to manage litigation independently using various mechanisms.

The Chairperson joked that Mr Pandelani was giving another presentation, one which the Committee had not asked to hear.

To Mr Dyantyi’s question, Mr Mahlangu indicated that officials, including himself and Ms Mametja, had provided information about DOJ&CD’s various risk mitigation plans in their responses to other questions from Members. 

Mr Dyantyi said he would have liked to hear about the Magistrate’s Bill, which he expected to see before Parliament soon. Was it reflected in the APP?

Adv Skosana said that the Bill was being drafted under the guidance of the Deputy Minister. It would be shared at an appropriate time.

Mr Dyantyi said that many of the questions raised by Members required further interaction with DoJ&CD. He suggested that the Committee could even hold further sessions to “drill into” specific issues.

The Chairperson noted that DoJ&CD’s budget was over R21 billion, yet according to its APP it aimed to reduce wasteful and fruitless expenditure by only 70% and irregular expenditure by only 55%. In his view, these targets were too low. DoJ&CD had also been told it had to invest in financial management, internal auditing, and professionalising supply chain management. An audit committee would help ensure a reduction in wasteful and fruitless expenditure and in irregular expenditure, and could ensure that the funding and the programmes were aligned and in dialogue. Yet he was not aware that DoJ&CD had yet appointed an audit committee. DoJ&CD had been “non-compliant” insofar as R676 million had been spent without following its procurement processes. That was money that had not been well-spent, and during a period in which South Africans were experiencing serious economic hardship. Moreover, by December 2020, the end of the third quarter, DoJ&CD had only spent R13.8 billion – about 65% of its budget. This raised concerns that DoJ&CD would not be able to spend all its budget going forward, even if its budget was cut. For the Committee to be able to tell South Africans that the budget cuts were “too deep,” it had to know that DoJ&CD was able to spend what it had been given. Finally, DoJ&CD officials had previously promised that they would introduce gender-based budgeting, but he did not see this reflected properly in the APP. Gender-based budgeting appeared in “snippets,” but not as a thread cutting across the plan.

The Chairperson concluded that such issues had to be clarified if the Committee was going to advocate to protect DOJ&CD’s budget, as Adv Swart urged. The Committee had to be convinced of the Department’s ability to spend the taxpayers’ money and to spend it carefully and efficiently. The Committee had to get an assurance that DoJ&CD’s APP was indeed going to address these issues. Because of the upcoming local elections, the Committee might not be able to meet with DoJ&CD before October, but, by then, it had to see “drastic change” in DoJ&CD’s performance. If the Department’s plans were not “believable,” it would run into serious problems.

Mr Nhlanhla Mtembu, Acting CFO, DoJ&CD, responded to the Chairperson’s financial concerns. He agreed, to an extent, with the Chairperson’s view that the targets for irregular and wasteful expenditure were too low. However, he hoped to provide context for the targets. First, those targets related to the reduction of historical irregular and wasteful expenditure. The aim was to ensure that historical cases were dealt with and the balances reduced. DoJ&CD was working hard in this regard. Second, there was a related target in the operational plan. According to the operational plan, irregular and wasteful expenditure should not exceed 5% of total expenditure. 

On underspending, Mr Mtembu agreed that DoJ&CD’s reported expenditure at the end of the third quarter – just over 60% – had not looked “promising.” However, during the fourth quarter, expenditure had moved by just over 30%, so that the Department had spent 95% of its budget by the end of the financial year. 95% was not ideal, but there had been a tremendous improvement in the fourth quarter. Filling staff vacancies would improve expenditure performance in the current year. Many positions had been advertised and some filled, in the Magistrates Commission and the NPA as well as in the Department. Because just under 60% of the budget was dedicated to employee compensation, filling positions would have a substantial direct impact on expenditure. It would also have indirect implications for expenditure on goods and services, as the newly appointed staff began work on Department projects and programmes. Procurement processes would also be used to improve expenditure performance. DoJ&CD had implemented a system by which all procurement contracts would be awarded at least two months before the existing contracts expired. This would drastically reduce the opportunity for contracts to be extended or for work to continue beyond the end of a contract’s term, and therefore would reduce irregular expenditure. Vacancies in contract management were being advertised and filled. A shortlist had been drawn up to fill the deputy director of contract management position, and two other deputy director posts would be advertised that weekend. DoJ&CD aimed to fill those positions within two months.

On auditing, Mr Mtembu said that the audit had already begun both at the national office and in the regions. The auditors were in Gauteng that week and would move on to the Eastern Cape the following week. He chaired the weekly meetings of the audit steering committee, and the committee had not yet received any reports of concern.

On gender-based budgeting, Mr Mtembu said that gender-based budgeting might not appear explicitly in various targets, but that it already sat in every cost item of the budget. For example, as part of its recruitment drive, DoJ&CD was working hard to ensure a gender balance, especially in senior management. At the level of the senior management service, it was targeting women for most vacant positions, including for financial officers. The same applied for positions in middle management and at many lower levels. The APP also included an indicator that specifically targeted female suppliers in procurement. That target was about 10%. DoJ&CD was promoting the participation of women in all of its procurement activities. 

The Chairperson asked for confirmation that DOJ&CD’s target was for 10% of procurement to go to businesses owned by women.

Mr Mtembu said that was correct. Women had benefited from DOJ&CD’s procurement processes in the past, but usually as directors or partners in the businesses. The 10% target pertained only to businesses that were owned entirely by women. In the past, that figure was closer to 5%, which he had thought was insufficient. There would be targeted interventions to achieve the 10% target. Of course, DoJ&CD would like to exceed the target, and it would be increased in subsequent years.

The Chairperson said that there was a Cabinet-approved policy requiring that 40% of public procurement – far above 10% – should be reserved for women-owned businesses.

Mr Mtembu replied that he was unaware of that policy. With the permission of the Deputy Minister and Adv Mashabane, DoJ&CD would amend the target as soon as the opportunity to review the APP arose. The target in the operational plan would be adjusted to 40%.

Adv Mashabane told the Chairperson that he had instructed DoJ&CD strategy officials to ensure that the target in the branch operational plan was raised to a number exceeding 40%. The target in the APP would serve as a “base,” but he would monitor the indicator through the operational plan. In reporting to the Committee, he would focus on the Cabinet-mandated 40% target and not “run away” to hide behind the 10% target.

On auditing, Adv Mashabane added that DoJ&CD had extended the term of the current audit committee. Though its term had been scheduled to end at the start of the financial year, the audit period continued until the end of June. DoJ&CD had advertised the seats and members of the public had responded, so DoJ&CD would run that process in the interim and would assemble a new committee by 15 August. DoJ&CD had met with the audit committee to induct two new members and to present its APP and strategic plan, and the audit committee should brief the Minister and Deputy Minister the following week. He hoped that the audit committee would be able to appear before the Justice Committee at some point. The audit committee shared many of the concerns that Members had raised over the last year, and it was assisting DoJ&CD in attending to some of those issues in order to “nip them in the bud.”

Mr Dyantyi said that he was “happy” with the Department’s response to the Chairperson’s question about gender-based budgeting, but nevertheless that response was “limited.” It was important to prioritise appointments of women to positions within the Department, but gender-based budgeting went beyond that. DoJ&CD should respond through its services, not just its appointments. Both sexual offences courts and digital maintenance systems were good examples of such responses. The idea was that gender-based issues should be mainstreamed, and so they should appear in the plans. As “homework,” DoJ&CD should reflect on these issues.

Adv Mashabane appreciated Mr Dyantyi offering a “leaf of wisdom” and broadening officials’ understanding of gender-based budgeting. DoJ&CD would reflect on related issues in future engagements with the Committee.

The Chairperson asked whether DoJ&CD had removed the indicator, included in the last APP, that tracked appointments of people with disabilities.

Mr Raseroka replied that the target had not been removed, but rather was managed at the level of the business operational plan.

The Chairperson said that the Committee could not monitor an indicator if that indicator was in a plan not shared with Members. The same thing applied to the gender-based procurement target which Mr Mtembu undertook to increase in his branch’s operational plan. Officials’ explanations and commitments notwithstanding, if the Committee could not see an indicator, that indicator was, for Committee oversight purposes, not there. Greater transparency was needed. 

Mr Raseroka agreed. The target had been moved because it had been met in the previous financial year. DoJ&CD would include it in its reporting to the Committee.

In closing, Adv Mashabane discussed several key points that senior management had agreed on. These points might not have been explicit in the plans, but they were “embedded” in the plans as part of the turnaround strategy. Firstly, senior management had agreed that the strategic plan and APP had to be clear, concise, and in line with the SMART principles. DoJ&CD was institutionalising a norm of requiring both branches and regions to develop operational plans that expanded on, and directly aligned with, the APP. Those plans would cascade down from the APP to the court and court management level. Moreover, the performance agreements of senior managers would also align with the APP and strategic plan, so that it was clear which official was responsible for which outcomes. Even in future engagements with the Committee, each of the senior officials would be accountable for underperformance in the areas he was responsible for. 

Secondly, Adv Mashabane said that senior management was prioritising the structure of the Department, which had to be guided by its strategy. A review was being finalised, with senior management ensuring that the right people were staffed in the right places. DoJ&CD was also focusing on human development and capacity building. It was finalising a strategy that would reposition the Justice College and entail strategic interventions to develop officials’ skills. A skills audit would be conducted in May to determine what skills DoJ&CD officials lacked. Moreover, a culture and climate survey would be conducted that quarter to see what officials thought about the Department, so that any challenges could be addressed. DoJ&CD was also reviewing its departmental service delivery improvement plan, which had been in place over the last five years, and was committed to finalising it before the end of the quarter. DoJ&CD was also prioritising compliance. This was a concern of DPSA – that DoJ&CD was not in the habit of complying with laws, regulations, or directives. Senior management had agreed that their performance agreements would reflect compliance considerations, so that non-compliance would meet consequences.

Finally, Adv Mashabane said that DoJ&CD was implementing an “audit turnaround” to address the historical matters raised by the Auditor-General. Until those were addressed, DoJ&CD would continue to receive qualified audits. So it had developed an audit turnaround plan, which the chief internal audit executive would help implement. If Adv Mashabane was the football coach, his plan for the year was not to win the league but to move out of relegation into the top eight. By the following year, DoJ&CD had to receive an unqualified audit. In the medium term – within the next 36 months – DoJ&CD had to receive a clean audit. This had been impressed on all members of the Department.

Together with Adv Skosana, who was responsible for regional operations, he and other senior managers were travelling the country to visit the “coalface of service delivery.” They were meeting with officials to see where they were and what could be done to assist them and to “clarify the vision.” All nine provinces would be visited by halfway through the year, by which point DoJ&CD would hopefully have a “clear picture” of operations and would also have shared the turnaround plan with officials. DoJ&CD was also enlisting the services of change management experts, both from elsewhere in the state and from the private sector, because it did not necessarily have those skills within the Department. By the end of the performance cycle, DoJ&CD must have a report that could clearly account for how it had expended the resources that had been entrusted to it.

Closing remarks by the Deputy Minister  

Deputy Minister Jeffery said that the APP and strategic plan were largely a departmental exercise. After the DG’s appointment, a lot of work had been put into the plans, and the resulting document was a product of those efforts. He was glad that the officials were engaging with the Committee. Adv Mashabane was the first permanent DG “in a while.” Though the acting DGs had “done their best,” it was more difficult to do the job in an acting capacity. Hopefully Adv Mashabane would bring substantial changes to DOJ&CD.

Deputy Minister Jeffery said that a court optimisation committee had been set up in the plans to try to address the backlogs in the magistrates’ courts, the district courts, and the regional courts. DoJ&CD could return to the Committee to provide a specific presentation on the matter if necessary. The court optimisation committee involved all the stakeholders – the magistrates, the chief magistrates, the regional court presidents, the Court Services officials from DOJ&CD, and officials from the NPA, the Department of Correctional Services (DCS), and SAPS. There had been something of a “teething problem,” because senior DoJ&CD officials had not seen the committee as a priority, but that had since been addressed. Currently, there was a problem with the regional court presidents, who did not want to attend the committee because they felt it impinged on their independence. He had challenged them to provide specific instances when they felt they had been told what to do, as they claimed they did, but they had not responded. He had referred the matter to the chairperson of the Magistrates Commission, and he was hopeful that the chairperson would address it. The chief magistrates had not raised such complaints. 

Deputy Minister Jeffery said that independent court administration was “a work in progress.” But further engagement was needed. If the judiciary administered the courts, who did the judiciary account to when things went wrong? Because there was a separation of powers, the judiciary could not account to Parliament on judicial functions, and there would be “confusion” if it accounted to Parliament on court-administrative functions. Currently, DoJ&CD was implementing the Superior Courts Act (SCA), which set out the exclusive judicial functions and provided that, at the superior courts level, court administration was “basically shared.” In his view, everyone, the Committee included, needed to engage with the issue. How would independent court administration work in practice, particularly when it came to accountability? If the judiciary appointed staff members, who dealt with labour disputes? Currently, under the SCA, the Minister appointed staff with the concurrence of the head of court, so the Minister got taken to court in any disputes. But if it was the judiciary itself which appointed staff, which court could adjudicate any subsequent disputes? In any case, the Constitution referred to a member of Cabinet responsible for the administration of justice. The issue needed to be debated further.

Deputy Minister Jeffery agreed with Adv Mashabane that DoJ&CD had not performed as it should have regarding LGBTIA+ issues. As Adv Mashabane had said, he, the Minister, and Adv Mashabane had met with civil society in the LGBTIA+ sector. He was “extremely unhappy” with DoJ&CD, and DoJ&CD and Adv Mashabane knew this. It was deeply problematic that the national task team and rapid response team had not been functioning properly. Hopefully those issues would be addressed.

Deputy Minister Jeffery said that the designation of sign language as an official language had proceeded slower than DoJ&CD had hoped. The constitutional amendment, as the President had announced, would be going to Cabinet shortly. Since it was a constitutional amendment, there was a specific procedure that had to be followed – the bill had to be published, then sent to the provincial legislatures, and so on.

In closing, Deputy Minister Jeffery said that the new DG was bringing “stability and accountability” to the position. The executive would be looking both to support him and to monitor DoJ&CD’s work, to ensure that the Department functioned better and did better in bringing access to justice to the people of South Africa.

The Chairperson said that the Committee looked forward to engaging with DoJ&CD when it returned with its quarterly report. From what officials had said, a lot of work had been done and a lot was “in the pipeline.” If everything that they had discussed could be implemented, DoJ&CD would be positioned for change and improved performance. DoJ&CD should consider the issue of infrastructure further. In engagements with the judiciary, judges had highlighted infrastructure issues that were primarily “an irritation” – for example, leaking roofs, and other issues that could easily be dealt with by artisans. These were not major infrastructure matters but rather irritations that could be resolved with quick interventions. He knew that the process of engaging with DPWI was “complicated.” But DoJ&CD should also consider the possibility of sharing services with other state entities. At one point, Adv Skosana had reported to the Committee about an innovative programme whereby one of the high courts had put inmates to work in the court. In the current situation, with the economy performing badly and the state extremely short on funds, managers and politicians needed to innovate in order to “do more with less.” For example, DCS had dealt with the infrastructure issue by appointing engineers and quantity surveyors. Could those services not be shared between DCS and DoJ&CD? The state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially Eskom, Transnet, and Denel, had more than 4 000 artisans who could be used to deal with plumbing and electricity in courts. Adv Mashabane should meet with the National Commissioner at DCS and with the DG at the Department of Public Enterprises (DPE). These kinds of innovative programs could bring immediate relief to the lower judiciary, especially the magistrates’ courts. He had also heard of some high courts, such as in Mpumalanga, facing problems with plumbing. The artisans trained by Eskom and Denel were “the best in the country.” No TVET college produced better artisans. Most had been trained by the state and were paid for by the state, so the state had to use their services to mitigate the challenges it currently faced.

The Chairperson said that the Committee would be able to “test” DoJ&CD’s plans when it presented its quarterly report. The proof would be in the pudding. He would not comment on Adv Mashabane’s arrangement with the PSC chairperson – that was now “a resolution of the house.” The Committee would engage with the matter at its next meeting with DOJ&CD.

The Committee adjourned for a tea break.

Briefing by NPA on 2021/22 Annual Performance Plan

The Chairperson congratulated and welcomed four recently appointed directors at the NPA: Adv Anton du Plessis, Adv Lebogang Baloyi, Adv Bonnie Currie-Gamwo, and Adv Priya Biseswar.

Adv Shamila Batohi, National Director of Public Prosecutions (NDPP), NPA, noted that these appointments included three “extremely competent” women. 

Adv Batohi presented the NPA’s APP. She said that she had taken office two years and two months ago, and that it was “no mean feat” to rebuild the NPA. It made a big difference that she was now supported by “very competent” deputies. The NPA continued to face “immense challenges,” but it could see “the light at the end of the tunnel.” The rule of law was “battered,” but “far from defeated.” Although the NPA’s presentation would be fundamentally forward-looking, focusing on its plans and priorities for the next financial year, it would also be informed by what the NPA had already been doing. The aim was to ensure that the NPA was “firmly action-oriented for impact.”

Adv Batohi said that the NPA’s four priorities for the 2021/22 financial year were:

• Expediting high-profile corruption cases nationally and provincially;
• Focusing on serious violent and organised crime, and crimes that disproportionately undermined public safety;
• Capacitating the organisation by recruiting crucial additional skills, expertise and capabilities; and
• Enhancing staff morale and wellbeing.

The situation arising from the occupation-specific dispensation policy (OSD) affected staff wellbeing and motivation, and was of “huge concern.” Deputy directors, at LP-10 level, sometimes earned lower salaries than those they supervised at LP-9 level. The matter was at the Supreme Court of Appeal and, while awaiting the decision, the NPA was preparing internally for the different scenarios that might emerge.

In dealing with high-profile corruption, the ID was a “game-changer,” and “on the brink” of making a significant impact. Although the NPA was working well with the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), commonly known as the Hawks, the ID had a unique and important methodology. It had been able to overcome some of the “teething challenges” it faced, particularly in capacity-building – for example, it had recruited 21 financial investigators. Following the change in its regulations, the Zondo Commission was also sharing information and resources with the ID. However, there were challenges – for example, prosecution had to be delayed in cases where evidence had not yet been given before the Commission.

Adv Batohi described measures that had been taken to strengthen the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) (see slides). The AFU had the potential to be important not only in high-profile corruption cases but potentially in a wide range of other cases.

Adv Batohi discussed the indicators that the NPA had selected to measure performance towards each of its strategic outcomes. It targeted three strategic outcomes: increased feelings of safety and security among residents, improved investor confidence through high-impact prosecutions, and improved access to NPA services for all.

Towards increased feelings of safety and security, the NPA’s targets were:

• 87% conviction rate in high court;
• 74% conviction rate in regional court;
• 88% conviction rate in district court;
• 74% conviction rate in cable theft; and
• Zero witnesses and related persons threatened, harmed, or killed while in the witness protection programme.

In each case, the target was based on the NPA’s estimated (unaudited) performance in 2020/21, such that achieving the targets would entail maintaining performance at current levels. The exception was the cable theft convictions target, which was a new indicator. 

Towards high-impact prosecutions to improve investor confidence, the NPA’s targets were:

• 93% conviction rate in complex commercial crime (estimated at 93% in 2020/21);
• 158 persons convicted of private sector corruption (estimated at 150 in 2020/21);
• 232 government officials convicted of corruption or related offences (estimated at 220 in 2020/21);
• 100 cases involving money laundering (estimated at 90 in 2020/21);
• R2.4 billion in freezing orders obtained for corruption or related offences (estimated at R2.4 billion in 2020/21); and
• R1.4 billion in recoveries relating to corruption or related offences (estimated at R1.4 billion in 2020/21).

Towards improved access to NPA services for all, the NPA’s targets were:

• 59 operational Thuthuzela care centres in place (estimated at 58 in 2021/2);
• 70% conviction rate in sexual offences (estimated at 70% in 2020/21); and
• 150 public awareness sessions conducted (estimated at 140 in 2020/21).

Adv Batohi said that the conviction rate for sexual offences was high, but that many such cases were not reported and brought before the NPA in the first place. GBVF could not be addressed through the criminal justice system alone.

Mr Tebogo Sethabela, Acting Head of Finance, NPA, gave a high-level budget overview. In 2020/21, the NPA had spent 98.36% of its R4.267 billion budget. It overspent in all areas except for in employee compensation. In employee compensation, it underspent by R107 million, primarily because COVID-19 had interfered with recruitment processes. In the current year, the budget had increased by only 2.1% – well below inflation. The employee compensation budget would be sufficient to cover recruitment, including through the Aspirant Prosecutor Programme. However, the NPA was particularly concerned about the budget for goods and services and, given the acceleration of recruitment, the budget for machinery and equipment. Prosecutors had to be equipped with laptops and other “tools of the trade.”

Adv Batohi said in closing that the NPA wanted to be a “cutting-edge” prosecution service, but that this required proper funding. Although there were currently financial constraints across government, the NPA was posed to deliver “a good return on investment,” including direct financial returns. DPCI also had to receive the necessary resources, since the NPA relied on DPCI for investigative support. 

Discussion

Adv Breytenbach asked for an explanation about the handling of the LP-10 issue arising from OSD. There had been no progress since Adv Batohi had taken office. The NPA was awaiting the Supreme Court’s decision, meaning that, effectively, after the deputy directors had won their case, the NPA had taken it on appeal. She did not understand why the NPA had done so. It was not conducive to building morale or “corporate goodwill.” At the same time, the deputy directors had lost their case in the Labour Court but would be appealing that decision. The NPA’s deputy directors – the main body of its senior management – were thus “at odds” with the NPA. This did not look good, and it did make the deputy directors feel good. Some experienced managers earned less than inexperienced managers, and promotions to the LP-10 level did not always come with a salary increase; the situation was unfair and unacceptable.

Adv Batohi replied that the Chairperson had previously raised the same issue, and that, when she had answered the same question before the Committee in the past, she had highlighted the difficult situation that she found herself in as NDPP. It was not ideal for her to engage in litigation against “key and valued” members of her staff, but she had spoken to those staff members. The issue had been dealt with “very badly” by previous NDPPs. She had been in office for four days when the matter went to court – an “induction by fire” for her. She was not opposed to implementing the LP-10. The NPA wanted to implement the LP-10 correctly, in the manner in which it had been envisaged, across government – since the LP-10 affected legal professionals across government, and not just at the NPA. The NPA was not doing nothing while the matter was before court – it was planning for implementation. She was working very hard with human resources. Next week, stakeholders – including the State Attorney, Adv Nomvula Mokhatla at the NPA, Adv Mashabane at DoJ&CD, and officials from DPSA and Treasury – would be meeting to look for solutions. She agreed with Adv Breytenbach that the situation was “untenable” and “a total mess.” It did not make sense that officials were applying for promotions to positions that, though more senior, came with a pay cut. Those who had created the OSD had been “really short-sighted.” They had not expected the “tsunami” that had hit later, creating the “terrible imbalance” that now existed in government. It had left stakeholders “scrambling around” trying to work out how to address the situation.

Adv Breytenbach asked about the NPA’s new Innovation and Policy Support Office. It sounded good “on paper,” but had it in fact been established? Was it doing anything and, if so, what?

Adv Anton du Plessis, Deputy NDPP: Strategy, Operations and Compliance, NPA, replied that the office was “very much up and running.” It had initially been established in the office of the NDPP, but it was more of a “cross-cutting capacity” than a stand-alone one. It infused innovation and research into all of the NPA’s work. It spoke to the NPA’s need to ensure that everything it did was driven by evidence and the latest research, providing a body of evidence that could guide problem-solving. In establishing the office, the NPA had followed international best practice at leading prosecution services. Though it was a small unit and still being staffed, the NPA hoped to grow it and “institutionalise” it across the organisation. 

Adv Breytenbach asked about the progress in prosecuting COVID-19-related corruption matters. She also asked for an update on the anti-corruption fusion centre and the Anti-Corruption Task Team. Both had been much vaunted but seemed to be “non-functional.”

Adv Rodney de Kock, Deputy NDPP: National Prosecutions Service (NPS), NPA, replied that the fusion centre was still actively working. The fusion centre had a multi-disciplinary approach and dealt with corruption involving funds that had been earmarked for the COVID-19 response. It received “strong leadership”: it reported monthly to the principals of all the relevant law enforcement agencies, including the head of the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC), in which it was located, and the heads of the NPA, DPCI, and SIU. The fusion centre had looked at 288 matters to date. Prosecutors had made decisions in 71 of those cases, following investigations. They had decided not to proceed with prosecution in 49 cases, and 22 cases were on the court rolls, with accused parties appearing before the courts.

Adv Batohi agreed that the fusion centre was doing “a lot of good work,” but added that it faced challenges. Due to a lack of SAPS resources – particularly detectives – cases were not moving as quickly as the NPA wanted. There had recently been a meeting to consider the risks, and possible solutions, in order to ensure that the centre was able to meet its original objective of “speedy prosecutions.”

Adv Breytenbach asked for the total number of prosecutors at the NPA currently, and for their average conviction rate. She offered to accept a written response if necessary.

Adv du Plessis replied that the NPA currently employed 3 550 prosecutors. This was an increase of just over 700 from the end of the last financial year, when the number had been 2 833. The increase had largely been due to the success of the NPA’s Aspirant Prosecutor Programme.

Adv Breytenbach observed that a growing number of cases were being finalised by way of informal mediation. It seemed that this could have potential benefits for everybody, but what exactly did informal mediation entail? Was there oversight over or supervision of those processes and their outcomes?

Adv de Kock replied that informal mediation had been “part and parcel” of prosecutors’ work for many years. It stemmed in part from the desire to find alternative ways of resolving prosecutions. It was not always necessary for matters referred to the criminal justice system to be prosecuted. It was sometimes in the interests of justice to look at alternative dispute resolution methods – which also saved the court valuable time, and could help reduce backlogs. Informal mediation took place with the consent of both the complainant and the accused, and the prosecutor was central to the process.

Adv de Kock said that there was a policy framework to guide prosecutors in informal mediation, and senior prosecutors were required to ensure that there was strict compliance with the policy. About two years ago, the NPA had done research into how prosecutors dealt with informal mediation matters, to ensure that their approach was consistent and uniform, and to identify any challenges. The NPA had subsequently recommended that a legal regulatory framework was needed going forward. It would provide certainty and protection for prosecutors, who were often put in difficult positions due to their caseload and the onerous decisions they were expected to make. The NPA had recently heard, through DoJ&CD, that SALRC would be looking at the role of mediation in criminal matters. The NPA welcomed this. Adv de Kock had offered to share the NPA’s information and research with SALRC, and they would meet in that regard.

Adv Breytenbach asked for an update on the Life Esidimeni matter.

Adv de Kock replied that the Director of Public Prosecutions for South Gauteng had decided that the matter should be referred to an inquest, which would start in June 2021.

Adv Breytenbach asked for an update on progress in certain high-profile matters, particularly those involving Bosasa and Steinhoff. There seemed to have been “little to no movement” in those matters. She also asked for an update on the matter involving the Bobroffs. The Bobroffs had been “annihilated” in the asset forfeiture process, which had provoked “warm and fuzzy feelings,” but when would they return to South Africa to face justice? Ronald Bobroff shared his opinions on the South African criminal justice system, and even tried to interfere in it, while “cowering under a rock” in Australia.

Adv de Kock replied that the Bobroff matter was ongoing and legal challenges were being addressed. However, the NPA would prefer not to provide an update on a public platform, and would instead make a written report to the Committee.

Adv Breytenbach said that there had been very encouraging results in asset forfeitures, extraditions, and arrests abroad. She agreed with Adv Batohi that there was light at the end of the tunnel, although she joked that hopefully the light was not an oncoming train. There had been visible progress, which was “gratifying.” She congratulated the NPA team on the magnitude of their achievement.

Ms Maseko-Jele said that she appreciated the work the NPA had done. The Committee was assured, by the NPA’s reports and by the “atmosphere” around it, that there was “something happening” at the NPA. She particularly applauded the work of the AFU, but urged them to do more – to “bring back the money” that had been misappropriated during state capture. South Africa needed that money.

Ms Maseko-Jele asked what criteria the ID used in choosing which cases to pursue.

Adv Hermione Cronje, Investigating Director, NPA, replied that the ID’s ambit was serious, complex, and high-profile corruption cases. It also had a mandate to investigate any criminal activity identified in the reports of the Zondo Commission, the SARS Commission, and the Public Investment Corporation (PIC) Commission. The NPA Act provided that the NPDD, or any member of the public, could refer a matter to the ID for investigation. She, as Investigating Director, made the ultimate decision about which matters the ID considered. The ID had internal selection criteria, which Adv Cronje would provide to the Committee in writing. There was no shortage of cases to investigate, so investigations were primarily limited by resources and capacity. As mentioned in a previous meeting, the ID had taken on investigations primarily in the security sector – that is, in the higher ranks of SAPS, in criminal intelligence, in the NPA, and in the State Security Agency (SSA) – and in the SOEs, primarily Transnet and Eskom. She had on her desk a request to authorise further investigations in South African Airways (SAA) and the Passenger Rail Agency of South Africa (PRASA), but it made no sense to authorise them until ID had the requisite capacity. Because of these constraints, the ID focused on cases where it believed it was dealing with those “most responsible” for the crimes. Therefore, it primarily investigated senior members and officials – investigations which tended to be difficult and complex. Under the Act, to increase its capacity, the ID had to “knock on doors for investigative resources” in other parts of the government and to relocate prosecutors from the NPA. It had advertised for three-year contract prosecutors and had, in December, appointed 21 investigators, but those personnel had to be equipped with tools of the trade.

Ms Maseko-Jele asked about the impact the Thutuzela care centres had had in their communities thus far. In the past, the Committee had received many complaints about the centres, but recently it had been “quiet.”

Adv Pierre Smith, Senior Deputy Director: Sexual Offences and Community Affairs (SOCA), NPA, replied that the Thutuzela centres were one-stop centres dedicated to a “victim-centred approach”: their aim was to assist victims. In the last five years, the centres had assisted approximately 160 000 victims at 55 sites. In the previous year, COVID-19 had had a negative influence on the number of cases reported through the centres – the number had fallen by 5 876 or 16.6%. However, the quality of the services had been maintained. The conviction rate for sexual offences had been 48% when the Thutuzela process began in 2000, and it was now at 75%. Moreover, with help from other stakeholders and from the national strategic plan on GBVF, progress had also been made in sentencing. In the past two years, there had been a considerable trend towards more severe sentencing, specifically in relation to rape matters that went through the Thutuzela centres and that were heard in regional courts. Life imprisonment sentences in such cases had increased by about 4%. Last year, 141 of 779 accused parties in Thutuzela-related cases had received life imprisonment sentences. This was a slight drop from the number in the previous year (167), but the drop was a result of fewer cases being finalised during the COVID-19 pandemic.

Adv Smith said that, as the NPA had previously reported to the Committee, the NPA was planning to establish six new Thutuzela sites using CARA funding. The NPA had intended for three of these sites to be established by the end of March 2021, but had been unable to proceed because crucial suppliers had been unavailable. However, services had commenced at two of the six sites – one in the Eastern Cape and one in the Western Cape – and all six sites would be established by the end of the financial year.

Ms Maseko-Jele said that the Committee encouraged state entities to introduce new and innovative performance indicators, as the NPA had done. It showed movement. So she welcomed the addition of the indicator measuring conviction in cable theft cases; cable theft was very serious. But why was the target for this indicator 74%? She would have guessed it would be 80% or 90%, given the magnitude of the problem.

Adv de Kock replied that the target had been set at 74% to align with the conviction rate in regional courts. In fact, the NPA was outperforming that target, and currently had an 88% conviction rate for cable theft. The NPA took the matter very seriously, which was why the indicator had been elevated from the NPS plan to the NPA’s APP.

The Chairperson said that it was not acceptable to set a target of 74% while performing at 88%. The target was so low that it could be achieved without the NPA lifting a finger.

Adv de Kock agreed, and said that the target should be adjusted. The low target was a result of the way the targets were set. According to the NPA’s strategy officials, it was difficult to change those numbers. But in the divisions, where the relevant work happened, any drops in performance would be closely monitored.

Ms Maseko-Jele asked why the NPA had removed the indicator that accounted for the quality of prosecutions.

Adv Batohi replied that the relevant target had been “very ambitious” and that the NPA believed it was a critical indicator of the quality of NPA services. She was glad that the Committee had noticed its absence. The indicator involved collecting data about NPA services, which in turn involved engaging with other partners – such as magistrates and SAPS – to get their views on the quality of prosecutions. This had been difficult during the COVID-19 pandemic. The indicator was still included in the NPS’s operational plan, and the NPA hoped to elevate it back to the NPA’s APP once it was better organised and able to measure the indicator better.

Ms Maseko-Jele asked for more detail about the community prosecution initiatives.

Adv Smith replied that the community prosecution initiative had recently been revived by the NPA. In the previous financial year, the NPA had identified 22 sites across its eleven divisions. Nine of those sites were specifically focused on GBVF, meaning that prosecutors visited the communities to identify GBVF “irritants.” The prosecutors then worked out what could collectively be implemented to ensure that those irritants were removed or that processes were improved. Other sites looked at substance and drug abuse in communities, particularly in schools. Recently, a “huge crisis” in bullying had been identified within schools. There would be a concerted effort across SOCA to implement public awareness campaigns in communities, and specifically at schools, to address bullying and to try to remove that particular irritant. In addition to the community prosecution initiatives, the NPA had developed a comprehensive framework reporting method for a monitoring and evaluation process, with experienced prosecutors assigned to assist with the roll-out and implementation.

Adv Swart agreed with the other Members that he saw progress, and he commended the NPA team on having done complex work under difficult circumstances. He joked that the light Adv Batohi saw at the end of the tunnel might not be an oncoming train but rather the Committee, watching the NPA very closely.

Adv Swart asked about mutual legal assistance and extradition agreements. He had sat on the Eskom inquiry, which the Guptas had failed to appear before, and it was “disgraceful” that the Guptas were currently overseas. The Minister at DoJ&CD had welcomed the United Kingdom’s sanctions against the Gupta family. Was the NPA cooperating with international partners to return the Guptas to South Africa?

Adv Cronje replied that she could not say much, though she thought there would soon be an announcement providing some information. She confirmed that the Guptas were not in South Africa, but said that the NPA had not “relented.” Its efforts to secure the Guptas’ presence in South Africa were “certainly ongoing,” and involved cooperation with counterparts in a number of countries.

Adv Swart commended the AFU’s work. He repeated his “impassioned plea” for better funding of the NPA, SIU, DPCI, and DoJ&CD. It made no sense to decrease those entities’ funding, when they could collect billions of rands, improve investor confidence, and help people to feel safer. The Committee could not support such budget cuts.

Adv Swart noted that the presentation mentioned the AFU’s cooperation with the FIC and the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) (see slide 6). Though this was “belated,” the Committee welcomed it. Looking back, it was difficult to understand how billions in misappropriated funds could have left the country, when attempts to send even small amounts overseas typically involved a great number of forms and checks. But, looking towards the future, he asked to hear more about the NPA’s cooperation with SARS. Of all his crimes, Al Capone was jailed for tax evasion. SARS had powers that the AFU lacked – for example, it could immediately issue a section 88 notice, appointing a bank as agent for a delinquent taxpayer. Moreover, the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) had heard earlier that week that SARS was working on seven projects related to state capture, involving up to R4 billion across 500 cases. Given that SARS was handing the criminal cases to the NPA, could the NPA update the Committee on the prosecution of those cases? Moreover, to what extent did the Tax Act allow the NPA to use tax-related information in criminal courts? 

Adv de Kock replied that the NPA could, and did, use the provisions of tax legislation to prosecute criminals. For example, in one current matter, a “notorious” figure in organised crime was being prosecuted on the basis of SARS investigations and using the provisions of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act. There were dedicated tax prosecutors in all NPA offices, and tax capacity was being built in divisions where it was lacking. The NPA’s tax prosecutors only worked on tax-related matters, and this was being refined further such that they would only work on complex tax-related matters involving fraud. They worked very closely with the investigation and compliance units at SARS. Next week, the NDPP and the SARS Commissioner would be meeting, along with members of their teams, to solidify the relationship between the two agencies.

Adv Cronje said that the ID collaborated closely with SARS investigators. Of SARS’s two enforcement arms, civil and criminal, the ID had a “very close working relationship” with the latter. Together they targeted suspects either with tax offences or with other common law and statutory offences within the ID’s ambit. In the context of asset recovery, a good example was the seizure of R2.4 billion that had been held by SARB to the credit of one of the original equipment manufacturers in the Transnet 1064 contract. The ID and SARS had been in communication throughout, collaborating and sharing information to the extent that the law allowed. In that case, SARS had been in a better position to speedily bring a court application to seize the funds, and they had agreed to proceed on that basis. SARS had successfully obtained a preservation order over the funds – though that did not preclude the ID from also pursuing those funds at a later stage.

Adv Batohi confirmed that teams from SARS and the NPA, including SARS investigators and tax unit prosecutors, would be meeting in Cape Town. She and the SARS Commissioner would open the session. The NPA put a lot of importance on dealing more efficiently with tax matters, and was “fully cognisant” of “the Al Capone strategy” that Mr Swart mentioned. 

Mr Swart said that one could become “discouraged,” reading the newspapers and seeing the extent of corruption. For example, mineral resources officials, when implicated in corruption, had responded that the system itself was corrupt. It would take time to reverse systemic corruption, but high-level prosecutions would be helpful to that end. Forensics were thus crucial. He asked for comment on the fact that Steinhoff had funded the forensic investigation into its own executive. The situation illustrated the difficulty that DPCI had with forensic capacities: DPCI had indicated that it would not otherwise have been able to investigate properly. On the other hand, the situation led to a potential conflict of interest. Also, one should also keep in mind that the private sector had a role in much corruption. There had been evidence at the Eskom inquiry implicating auditors and lawyers.

Adv Lebogang Baloyi, Special Director: Specialised Commercial Crime Unit, NPA, replied that, although the investigation was funded by Steinhoff, it was the DPCI, not Steinhoff, which had appointed the investigators. The NPA had supported DPCI’s appointment of PwC because PwC was in an ideal position to produce the forensic audit report within a reasonable timeframe. Before the criminal investigation had begun, PwC had been directly contracted by Steinhoff to investigate accounting irregularities, and over those two years PwC had accumulated significant knowledge of the case. PwC had already compiled a comprehensive forensic audit report, dealing with accounting irregularities between 2009 and 2017 – though that initial report had not primarily focused on criminality and criminal court processes. If another firm had been appointed, the forensic investigation would have had to “start afresh,” and it would have taken years for the new firm to acquire the relevant documents and become familiar with the matter.

Adv Baloyi said that measures had been taken to manage the perceived conflict of interest that arose from PwC’s appointment. PwC had signed a certificate in terms of section four of the Protection of Information Act, which provided protection against unlawful disclosures of confidential information or documentation during the investigation. PwC had also agreed that no evidence obtained during the investigation would be divulged to Steinhoff. All implicated persons had been removed from Steinhoff structures, and PwC’s findings were to be supported by independent, objective evidence. Moreover, Adv Baloyi said that it was “neither irregular nor uncommon” for prosecutors to successfully use, during a criminal trial, the results of a forensic investigation that the complainant had earlier directed into its own affairs.

Adv Swart said that he appreciated the explanation. He understood concerns about a potential conflict of interest, but he had not intended to pass judgement or to criticise. The situation primarily indicated the severity of funding constraints.

Adv Swart asked about the preparations being made for the conclusion of the Zondo Commission’s work in June. Where would the Commission’s investigators and technology go when the Commission concluded – perhaps to the NPA or DPCI? It would not be sensible to lose the capacity that the Commission had built up over years. Yet the Minister of Finance had said that the Commission would receive no further funding, so the NPA had to be “proactive” in looking for any resources that would be needed. Thus it was concerning that, for example, engagement about transferring the commission’s cybertechnology was apparently still underway (see slide 5). Could the Committee assist the NPA in this regard?

Adv Cronje replied that one of the biggest issues affecting the migration of digital forensic capability was the fact that the Zondo Commission was still busy doing its work. A migration plan was in place, but the delivery dates had been extended twice as the Commission’s work had been extended. There was an in-principle agreement that the Commission’s capability would be made available to the ID. This included hardware infrastructure, software (involving licenses that had to be renewed on an ongoing basis), and data. There was currently an arrangement in place in relation to the data. In terms of the agreed protocol, the ID made a request to the Commission for a particular data set or piece of evidence, justifying the NPA’s entitlement to it, and the Commission made it available to the ID. But there were challenges in other areas. The investigators could not access the software – the analytical tools – and the prosecutors could not use the e-discovery platform for dockets. There were matters that the ID was ready to enrol, but it had decided only to enrol cases when it was prepared to submit a complete indictment and a complete docket – and dockets consisted of vast sets of digital material, including email accounts, cellphone records, and bank records. The ID had spent that day trying to resolve the issue, including meeting with the Commission and the Treasury officials overseeing the migration, in order to ensure that the ID would be able to include that digital material in its dockets and later make it available to the accused. Moreover, both the hardware and the software were managed by digital forensics experts. There was a deviation in place to on-board some of those resources on an ad-hoc basis, but the transition plan had to make provisions for them to be available on a long-term and affordable basis. In summary, the migration plan was in place, but it had had to change, and it had to consider long-term stability and availability. 

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen was pleased that cable theft had been included in the indicators. She was also concerned about the burning of trains. Like cable theft, it had negative economic consequences. She lived near the train line and trains were the “heartbeat of the economy,” especially in Cape Town, where people needed them to get to work. What was the NPA doing to address this? 

Adv de Kock replied that rail safety, including the burning of trains, was an important issue for the NPA. It had assigned responsibility for rail safety to its organised crime components. It had also developed a broad strategy, working with law enforcement and the Department of Transport, to address rail safety, taking into account not just infrastructure but also community and public safety. The NPA had indicated that the Department of Transport had to take the lead in the response, and the department had committed to providing additional security on railway lines and platforms. “Lawlessness” on rail services was “a growing concern,” clearly of economic importance. The whole of society had to be involved in addressing it.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen asked about the indicator measuring the value of money and assets recovered in cases involving corruption and related offences. The 2019-20 audit had shown that the NPA had recovered R3.05 billion in that year, but the targets for subsequent years were lower than that, at R1.4 billion (see slide 16). What explained this reduction?

Adv Ouma Rabaji-Rasethaba, Deputy NDPP: AFU, NPA, replied that the reduction had been made during the medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF) process. However, after internal discussions, the NPA was going to increase the target back to R3 billion. The delay was due to following the requisite processes for changing targets midway through the five-year MTEF process. The NPA was “really ready for the challenge of bringing back the stolen money,” so she was confident that it would be able to exceed this target. As reported in the media, the AFU had recently recovered R103 million in the Bobroff matter and had frozen R1.4 billion in the Eskom matter.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen asked about the backlog in DNA testing, which affected prosecution of GBVF. What was the NPA doing to assist in reducing the backlog?

Adv Batohi replied that the backlog was predominantly a SAPS issue, but it had been affecting the NPA “really badly.”

Adv Smith agreed that the DNA backlog was currently “a huge challenge,” especially because it caused a backlog in sexual offences cases at courts. The NPA had identified 1847 cases that were “long outstanding” under the backlog. The NPA had reached out to SAPS, and especially to its forensic science laboratory (FSL), and had received 482 DNA reports as a result of this intervention. In fact, he had received additional reports earlier that week. The NPA was also in the process of developing, with SAPS, a specific action plan to address the backlog step-by-step. It would be meeting with SAPS in this regard on Monday afternoon. A low number of reports were received in certain divisions – the Eastern Cape, the Western Cape, and KwaZulu-Natal – so there would be a “concerted effort” to focus on those provinces and divisions. Fortunately, most of the long outstanding cases in Mpumalanga had been dealt with.

Dr Newhoudt-Druchen said that she had visited a Thutuzela care centre. The centres had to be reviewed, because they were not standardised. What differed across the centres, and why were not they not standardised? 

Adv de Kock thanked Dr Newhoudt-Druchen for taking the time to visit a centre. He agreed that the centres should be standardised, with a particular focus on uniform quality of service. Under the recently appointed Special Director at SOCA, the NPA had begun an efficiency review of all the sites to determine the shortfalls. Staff shortages had had a negative impact on service delivery.

Ms Newhoudt-Druchen asked how much the NPA had spent on measures preventing the spread of COVID-19. 

Adv Batohi replied that the NPA had spent R5.1 million to date.

Mr Dyantyi said that the Committee had shared Adv Batohi’s journey at the NPA over the last two years. They had rightly put a lot of pressure on her initially, given where the country had been at that time. It made a difference that now the Committee was not just making abstract judgements based on documents, but rather was reflecting on concrete actions, visible to the entire country, that the NPA had taken. He appreciated the presentation and was “very happy” with how the NPA’s plans had evolved and continued to “get better all the time.” 

Mr Dyantyi said that he supported all four of the NPA’s priorities for the year. However, he was concerned about the third priority: capacitating the organisation. The NPA faced risks in this area going forward. For example, he gave the NPA “the bad news” that several of its prosecutors would soon become magistrates. He belonged to the appointments committee of the Magistrates Commission, which had just finished recruiting magistrates for the district courts. Of 476 applicants, 166 were prosecutors and advocates; and of the 167 applicants selected, more than 30% were from the NPA. The Commission had recognised those prosecutors as high-performing “stars.” So the NPA was a very good “school” or “nursery” for other institutions in the justice system, and it served as a “conduit” for its employees’ ambitions. But to avoid losing its top performers, the NPA urgently needed to develop an attractive retention strategy.

Adv du Plessis replied that one of the NPA’s priorities for the year, and beyond, was capacitating the organisation to deal not only with the challenges that it currently faced but with challenges that would arise in the future. This objective was linked to the Minister’s focus on modernisation and digitisation, but it also arose from “the changing nature of crime.” The NPA anticipated significantly more complex cyber-criminality in coming years. The NPA was pursuing a range of initiatives that aimed to return its status as “employer of choice.” Part of this, of course, was training, capacitating, and developing employees so that they wanted to stay at the NPA. One such initiative was the cultural enhancement initiative, linked to staff morale – though it had been hindered by the COVID-19 pandemic. However, it was “not always a bad thing” that NPA staff moved on to positions elsewhere. The NPA was “working within a broader system,” and those transitions were part of prosecutors’ career development prospects. 

Mr Dyantyi supported the inclusion of cable theft in the NPA’s indicators. Cable theft was more than a crime – it was “economic sabotage,” and the response to it should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence.

Mr Dyantyi also agreed with Adv Batohi’s remark that, given underreporting of sexual offences, serious work had to be done in society. The solution was not in prosecution or in the courts.

The Chairperson said that the APP was well-written and that it gave the Committee “hope and confidence that things are changing.” He asked how the NPA had decided its targets for recoveries and freezing orders in corruption-related offences (see slide 16). Given what had happened since 2014, the targets seemed too low. They should be based on a “scientific” assessment of the size of the illicit industry in South Africa.

Adv Rabaji-Rasethaba replied that the targets were based on an assessment that illicit financial flows linked to state capture amounted to R4 billion in total. This assessment came from research done by the FIC, which was leading an inter-agency working group on illicit financial flows, composed of agencies – including the NPA, SARB, and SARS – which would each play a role in recovering that R4 billion. The working group had prioritised ten cases and met periodically to assess its progress. The AFU took the issue very seriously and prioritised matters of this nature. Since she was appointed, the AFU had already handled three such matters, amounting to forfeitures of R55 million, and it was currently finalising matters amounting to R100 million.

Adv Cronje said that she had worked for the global Stolen Asset Recovery Initiative attached to the World Bank. There were many studies which calculated the value of the overall criminal economy, but the NPA had decided not to base its targets on that figure. Around the world, even countries with very effective asset recovery programmes and anti-corruption programmes rarely recovered more than 1% of that figure. She confirmed that the NPA had based its targets on the FIC’s assessment of the value of illicit financial flows linked to state capture. She thought that the Zondo Commission would present a similar assessment. The NPA would be pursuing a proportion of that amount over the five-year MTEF period. In deciding where to focus its attention, the ID also prioritised the SOEs where there had been the greatest illicit outflows, and thus where asset recoveries could be greatest. For example, Transnet and Eskom had the biggest budgets and the biggest infrastructure projects in which “looting” had taken place.

The Chairperson asked about the NPA’s capacity to deal with terrorism. Terrorism overlapped with the NPA’s central priorities – both with violent crime and, because terrorist financing often involved money laundering and similar methods, with organised crime. Terrorism was already a problem in northern Mozambique, and South Africa did not have to wait until it had been attacked itself. Instead, law enforcement agencies should prepare to address that eventuality, should it arise.

Adv de Kock replied that the NPA, through its Priority Crimes Litigation Unit, was “actively involved” in addressing the threat of terrorism. Alongside law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies, it was identifying threats at a national level, and was even involved in responding to the current crisis in Mozambique. The NPA’s strategy was to build strategy through its organised crimes component. Selected prosecutors within that component attended special training programmes.

Adv Batohi agreed that the threat of terrorism was “hugely important.” The NPA “stood ready” to deal with it, and had met with General de Beer of SAPS. However, it was a matter of national security, and called for a government strategy. The NPA could provide prosecutors and investigators, but the country needed a “high-level security plan,” probably led by SSA. The justice, crime prevention and security cluster (JCPS) had never included terrorism on its agenda, an oversight which she had raised at the last JCPS meeting. An interagency task team had been set up some time ago, but it had not sat for a long time. She had raised that issue with Robert McBride and the SSA was looking into it.

The Chairperson said that the Committee was “very pleased” with the progress that the NPA had made, and that the APP contained “a very good strategy.” Adv Batohi as NDPP, and the NPA under her leadership, were “growing up very nicely,” and the Committee no longer had to be as “harsh” as it had initially been. The NPA should, however, take into account Members’ comments and revisit some issues, particularly some of its targets. Before its term ended, the Committee wanted to see a fully independent NPA. He therefore urged the NPA to prioritise a bill dealing with its independence. The Committee would not be satisfied with policies “in the pipeline.” It had to process about three or four “long overdue” bills, including one realigning the Public Protector Act with the Constitution and another providing for NPA independence. Moreover, the NPA should be not only fully independent but also “fully capacitated.” Within the “justice family,” there were two entities – the NPA and the SIU – which could raise money. Particularly given the current economic climate, it was important that those entities were fully capacitated. Prosecutors worldwide now faced the challenge that criminals, including terrorists, had more resources than prosecutors did. Terrorists, for example, had a lot of money going through the banking system.

On the retention issue raised by Mr Dyantyi, the Chairperson said that there were two sides to the issue. The Committee should be “proud,” as Adv du Plessis said, that the NPA fit into the wider criminal justice system. Many senior people – including the current Chief Justice, one other Chief Justice, a number of judges, and many senior counsel in the private sector – were former prosecutors. The NPA would not be able to retain all its staff but it should try to. In any case, he was pleased that the NPA was prioritising the wellbeing of its staff. As had emerged in the Committee’s judicial interviews, and as Adv Breytenbach could confirm, both prosecutorial and judicial careers were “high-stress.” However, programmes promoting employee wellbeing would also require resources. He was also pleased that there was more stability in the NPA’s senior management, at the deputy NDPP and special director level. However, the NPA had to move quickly to fill other positions, for example the Director of Public Prosecutions in the North West division. Recently a number of NPA prosecutors had been charged with crimes, and the NPA would also have to “move with speed” to begin the relevant disciplinary processes. 

The Chairperson concluded that the NPA’s APP was “fit for purpose.” The Committee did not want to promise too much in regard to resources – it was “becoming more difficult every year.” However, “in principle,” the Committee agreed that the NPA’s budget should not be “tampered with” and that its growth should correspond to the NPA’s sizeable responsibilities. The Committee would take forward the “fight” for resources on the NPA’s behalf.

Adv Batohi said that the NPA would “take on board” Members’ comments. She was pleased that the Committee agreed that the independence of the NPA was crucial. Adv du Plessis was engaging with Adv Mashabane at DOJ&CD, and the NPA looked forward to sharing its “roadmaps” with the Committee at some point. It was a very complex process but the team was working hard to ensure that they left the NPA independent, protected, and governed by the right frameworks and a clear understanding of the role of the executive. She thanked her team and thanked the Committee for its support and guidance. The NPA was “on the right path,” but the delegation had “a lot more to deliver” before they would be satisfied with their achievements, and they demanded much more from themselves.

The Chairperson said that the Committee would soon arrange to meet again with the NPA regarding complaints from prosecutors in the Eastern Cape. The Committee wanted to deal with that as a stand-alone item so that it could be fully addressed. 

Closing remarks

The Chairperson said that the Committee would meet again on Tuesday. The Committee team would work through the weekend to ensure that the draft revised programme could be presented then.

The meeting was adjourned.