NNR, NRWDI, MHSC 2020/21 Annual Performance Plans

Meeting report

The Chairperson noted that the three entities had only 15 minutes to present in the three-hour meeting.

Adv Thabo Mokoena, Director General: Department of Mineral Resources and Energy (DMRE), confirmed the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy had sent his apology as he was busy with an engagement.

National Radioactive Waste Disposal Institute (NRWDI) 2020/21 Annual Performance Plan
Mr Alan Carolissen, CEO: NRWDI, said the NRWDI draws its mandate from Section 24(b) of the Constitution and Section 5 of NRWDI Act (2008). Key legislation governing the management and disposal of radioactive waste are the Nuclear Energy Act – according to s45 the Minister has ultimate responsibility for radioactive waste and according to s50 any institutional obligation rests with the Minister; NNR Act – according to s21 anyone who wants to construct or operate a nuclear installation must apply for a licence prescribed by the NNR and accompanied by a safety case; National Environmental Management Act – provides that the NRWDI must undertake any environmental impact assessments; Hazardous Substances Act; National Water Act; Disaster Management Act; and Dumping at Sea Control Act – prevents the disposal of waste at sea.

Response to COVID-19
NRWDI’s priority is the health and wellbeing of our employees, partners, customers, members of the public and the communities surrounding Vaalputs. All employees are currently working from home. NRWDI has established a COVID-19 task team to develop and implement plans to curb the spread of COVID-19 in the workplace. A COVID-19 Health and Safety Plan has been developed and approved for implementation.

Situational Analysis – SWOT list of Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, and Threats
• Strengths: NRWDI mandate is legislated and unambiguous; World-class low-level waste disposal facility, Vaalputs, which is in operation for more than 30 years; and Clean audits as part of good reputation.
• Weaknesses: Sustainability of funding – negatively influences acting on the mandate.
• Opportunities: Funding opportunities – offer professional services, project waste consultation services, Association for Rural Advancement (AFRA) training opportunities; Render advisory services to the African Union and SADC countries with regard to radioactive waste; Build strong cooperative partnerships with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), global and local waste management organisations to enhance and complement NRWDI competencies.
• Threats: Communication with stakeholders not adequate; Impact of COVID-19 pandemic on our mandate.

Key Strategic Projects
Currently there is only a facility for the disposal of low-level waste which is 95% of all waste generated. 5% is high-level waste which includes spent fuel. The target is for the establishment of an off-site above ground Centralized Interim Storage Facility (CISF) for spent fuel by 2025. Ministerial approval has been obtained for the establishment of CISF for the long-term storage of spent nuclear fuel. NRWDI will use this critical and national infrastructure project as a catalyst and an enabler to forge durable partnerships and social compacts between government, business, labour, communities and civil society that will result in job creation, skills development, inclusive growth and economic transformation.

A key project involves supporting the Koeberg Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP); lifetime extension. KNPP will be reaching its end of life and will be extended by 20 years to 2045. This will occur through the replacement of key critical components necessary that will result in disposal of large nuclear components such as Original Steam Generators (OSGs). NRWDI is to develop new disposal solutions for these waste categories.

2020/21 APP
Key Performance Indicators (KPI) outputs for the four programmes are:
• Programme 1 Administration outputs: Implemented finance strategic plan; Implemented human capital strategic plan; and Unqualified Audit Report.
• Programme 2 Radioactive Waste Disposal Operations output: All radioactive waste classes disposed.
• Programme 3: Science, Engineering and Technology output: CISF established.
• Programme 4: Radioactive Waste Compliance Management output: Management systems requirements implemented.

Budget Allocations
The budget is fairly simple with a growth of 4 – 5% per year. The key income stream is government grant transfers. Other income streams which are to come on board include waste disposal fees and waste management income. NRWDI moves from a budget of R47.5 million in 2019/20 to R54 million in 2022/23.

Concluding Remarks
NRWDI maintained a clean audit for two consecutive years which will bear testimony that a culture of accountability and responsibility prevails in NRWDI. It is deeply committed to deliver safe, sustainable and publicly acceptable solutions for the long-term management and disposal of all radioactive waste classes to ensure that no undue burden is placed on future generations. NRWDI will never compromise on safety and security, taking full accountability for its social and environmental responsibilities. NRWDI remains committed to fulfilling the expectations of South Africans that radioactive waste can be safely managed.

Discussion
Mr K Mileham (DA) asked what the plan was for high-level waste disposal. What is NRWDI going to do and when is this to be done by? What is the long-term plan? In terms of the KPIs, there was no improvement on the targets over the MTEF. For example, when looking at implementing the finance strategic plan it says 80% implementation in year 1, 2 and 3. Surely we should be looking at an improvement over that timeframe? The targets for acceptance rate for disposal of waste received from waste generators stay at 95%. What happens to the other 5%? The target for the implementation of the CISF plan reads 20%, 40% and 60% over the MTEF period. What exactly is meant by this? The SWOT analysis states: "Sustainability of funding is problematic” is a weakness. Can you indicate what your shortfall is over the long term? Your budget expenditure shows 65% of NRWDI budget is spent on administration and only 7% goes to its core function of radioactive waste disposal. How do you justify that given that your purpose is not administration but to dispose of waste?

Ms N Hlonyana (EFF) asked who is on its COVID-19 task team. What is the expertise of those people in the task team on COVID-19? Exactly what kind of support was the NRWDI giving to Koeberg? It was understood where the low-level waste of 95% went, but not where the 5% of high-level waste went. Could an explanation be given on the 5% high-level waste?

Ms V Malinga (ANC) said given the pandemic, NRWDI could not conduct public participation. What is NRWDI’s plan moving forward? People still needed to educated on the dangers of radioactive waste.

Mr D Mthenjane (EFF) asked what the NRWDI’s waste acceptance criteria was. Is there any transparency in the management of your activities? What is your commitment to local and international peer review? Does Vaalputs contribute to the local community besides through employment such as social development contributions? What are your health, safety and environmental requirements?

Ms C Phillips (DA) was concerned that the NRWDI still had an Acting CEO. Nothing had changed since the last Committee meeting about the CEO appointment. What is the utilisation of existing storage? How much spent fuel has been received per annum in the last three years? What is NRWDI expecting to receive in the next five years?

Mr M Wolmarans (ANC) commended the NRWDI response to COVID-19. They had an approved health and safety plan and a plan for their return to work. In the situational analysis there were no mitigating factors or plans to overcome their identified weaknesses and threats. In previous years NRWDI had four Public Safety Information Forums (PSIF) meetings per year. Now and for future years there are only two, which means it has downscaled public participation. Are there alterative platforms in which these engagements will be done? Why only two instead of four PSIFs? Are there not supposed to be more?

NRWDI Response
Mr Carolissen replied about the management of spent fuel. Currently, spent fuel was not disposed of. All 5% of the spent fuel was stored under a reactor site. For example, they are stored in the Koeberg wet storage pool and dry storage cask. The same applied for South African Nuclear Energy Corporation (NECSA). For the strategy on spent fuel, NRWDI identified key critical projects, which is the centralised interim storage facility that needs to be built by 2025. As other counties had done, NRWDI was also contemplating a deep geological repository that would normally be anything from 500 metres to 1-kilometre underground. NRWDI had not received any spent fuel but had identified key critical infrastructure for long-term management of spent fuel.

The CISF implementation over the three-year MTEF is 20%, 40% and 60% but over the five-year period it would be 100%. In the first year NRWDI would focus on the pre-feasibility studies, environmental impact assessment and selection of technology. Only after this can NRWDI apply for a nuclear licence as per s21 of the NNR Act, which provides that if NRWDI wants to site, design, construct or operate any nuclear facility a nuclear licence needs to be issued by the Regulator. These activities were necessary for NRWDI to have the nuclear facility operational by 2025.

The COVID-19 task team was chaired by the Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) Manager who has vast experience to ensure compliance. The OHS Manager is supported by health and safety representatives as required by the OHS Act. The Department of Labour is part and parcel of the task team, so they oversee everything. On top of this, the measures implemented are then audited by the NRWDI compliance team to ensure they comply with the OHS Act and Disaster Management Act and regulations.

In terms of public engagements, the NRWDI had scaled down and set only two because it was not known when the lockdown would end. Ideally, the NRWDI would go back to four engagements. He reminded Members that the PSIF meetings took place in very deep rural areas in the Northern Cape, so it was challenging in getting people there via public transport and ensuring sanitation and to mitigate health risks. However, NRWDI intended to have an alternative solution to regularly engage with all stakeholders. The NRWDI was looking at social media and the distribution of a quarterly report to all stakeholders. All information would be put on the NRWDI website. Northern Cape areas were very poor and still used fax machines, so the NRWDI would fax information to the community service point for distribution to the community. It is important to have a social licence and technical licence to operate. Public participation was non-negotiable as people had to be empowered and have that knowledge so they could participate in any decision-making process on an equal footing. This was the transparency with which the NRWDI managed the Vaalputs. When there was an audit by a third-party, such as the Regulator or SA Bureau of Standards (SABS), NRWDI invited representatives from the communities to attend and observe the audit and made available audit or environmental monitoring reports to the Kamiesberg and Nama-khoi municipalities.

He agreed that NRWDI needed to improve its KPIs year on year. On sustainable funding, NRWDI would have a financial sustainability model, as indicated in Opportunities, looking for additional revenue from parliamentary appropriations, waste generator fees, providing professional services to SADC countries etc. NRWDI wanted to become more sustainable and put less pressure on the fiscus of the country so that more money could be made available to address other urgent priorities of government.

Mr Tshepo Mofokeng, NRWDI Board Chairperson, replied on how NRWDI would interact with the community going forward and what was being done about the community. The challenge was that it was a poor community. NRWDI had, for a number of years, been looking at means to find ways to assist the community but NRWDI itself was a relatively new entity as it was not even in existence for five years. What NRWDI had in its financial budget and what its needs were for the borehole and long-term storage facility and CISF was not enough, so this needed to be done as soon as funding was achieved. Secondly, given that NRWDI had moved, it probably needed to engage radio stations, the internet and other mediums to continue with public participation activities as these were required. NRWDI had made recommendations to the Minster on a CEO but there were challenges that arose. NRWDI was starting again but COVID-19 had disturbed some of their plans. As soon as this was done, NRWDI would be able to restart and finalise the CEO appointment.

The Chairperson noted that after the 15 minutes presentation, NRWDI was only on slide 20. The Committee knew what the vision, mission and mandate of the entities were. With the limited time that there was, he appealed that the rest of the entities not do this. The Committee had the advantage of reading the report beforehand. He requested that they cover the substantive matters only. After the presentation, the Committee had to be clear about the challenges and how the Committee’s support was needed. He asked that the entities mention only points of emphasis that they wanted the Committee to hear.

National Nuclear Regulator (NNR) 2020/21 Annual Performance Plan
Mr Andiswa Tobeka, Acting COO: NNR, focused on the NNR Strategic Goals; Regulatory Footprint; Regulated Facilities; Strategic Outlook; APP 2020/21 and Financial Perspective.

Regulatory Footprint
NNR regulated three major areas: NECSA in Gauteng; Vaalputs in Northern Cape; and KNPP in Western Cape. NNR also regulated the mines and mineral processing facilities which formed part of the nuclear technology, waste and natural occurring radioactive materials.

Strategic Outlook 2020 – 2025
Strategic Outcomes: Outcome 1 – To provide an independent radio-analyticalverification capability and capacity; Outcome 2 – To establish and promote a strong safetyculture; Outcome 3 – To implement regulatory programmes to assureeffective nuclear safety regulation; Outcome 4 – To strengthen regulatory framework long term operation (LTO); Outcome 5 – To ensure the long-term sustainability of the Centre of Nuclear Safety and Security (CNSS); Outcome 6 – To develop and maintain mechanisms to ensurefinancial viability and sustainability of the organisation; Outcome 7 – To accelerate equity in procurement; Outcome 8 – To implement the Information Communication Technology (ICT) strategic deliverables; Outcome 9 – To develop and implement an integrated strategy to enhance the NNR corporate image and reputation.

Output indicators and targets:
• Documents for South African National Accreditation System (SANAS) Accreditation done by Quarter 4.
• Report on safety culture 100% implementation of planned safety culture improvement plan by Q4.
• 100% of the Compliance Assurance and Enforcement (CAP) activities implementation per quarter.
• 100% of planned reviews and assessments per programme undertaken per quarter.
• Review categories of Naturally Occurring Radioactive Material (NORM) conditions of authorisations.
• Conduct benchmark study on Regulatory Framework for Radon in Dwellings and produce report by Q4.
• Approved Resource Plan for LTO by Q4.
• Approved Integrated CNSS Sustainability Plan by Q4.
• Produce Revenue Report from overdue accounts by Q3.
• Implementation of pilot plan and produce report by Q3.
• 50% procurement spent on Preferential Procurement Policy Framework Act (PPPFA) designated groups.
• 100% implementation of the approved ICT strategic deliverables per quarter.
• 100% implementation of the approved strategy per quarter.

Financial Perspective
Over the MTEF, total revenue is forecast to grow at an average rate of 6.1 %. The income stream from authorisation fees has been growing steadily and the big jump in 2020/21 is as a result of the forecast of licence fees to be received from Eskom for the CISF.

Expenditure per programme is split like this: 40% Administration; 20% Nuclear Power Plants (NPP); 18% Nuclear Technology and NORM (NTN); 22% Regulatory Improvement and Technical Services (RITS).

Over the MTEF, compensation of employees to grow at 5.1 % while goods and services will grow at 7.6%.

Discussion
Mr Wolmarans noted that in the past NNR spoke about having challenges with NECSA and its subsidiary, NTP-Radioisotopes. This was to do with structure and safety compliance which was compromised. He had not heard much about the matter. How far was this matter? Has NECSA met the required compliance to resume functionality?  

Mr Mthenjane asked what the NNR position was on COVID-19. What was the plan? 

Ms Malinga referred to Outcome 3. How was the NNR to ensure that entities adhered to safety measures? How did the NNR assist the entities to ensure they adhere to the regulations rather than shutting them down? Once an entity was shut down it meant no revenue anticipated by that entity for the NNR budget.

Mr Nxumalo (IFP) referred to Outcome 6 on NNR financial viability and sustainability. How did the NNR intend on maintaining sustainability?  He saw growth in the MTEF allocation. Does this take COVID-19 into consideration as the pandemic had resulted in the declaration of a national disaster?

Mr Mileham added on to the question about regulatory investigations and interventions which had occurred over the last couple of years causing the entity to shut down for an extended period of time. What is NNR doing to speed up the investigation and intervention process to turn it around as quickly as possible? How is the NNR going to work with the sector to ensure compliance in the long-term? On slide 11, he commended the NNR from a financial perspective, as being one of the few entities to come before the Committee and shown how outside revenue has played a role in making sure that it is sustainable. This can be seen because the amount of government grants has remained relatively static while income from authorisation fees, application fees and other income has contributed significantly.  

Mr M Mahlaule (ANC) referred to Outcome 2 Promoting a strong safety culture, which was the one that saw NTP-Radioisotopes-Radioisotopes closing for quite some time and losing clients, meaning that its market share dropped. The NNR presentation said that they were going to strive to regain 20% in the market share. Would NNR say that entity is in a position to do this in how they are adhering to regulations? This would help the Committee when they met with NECSA in looking at what NTP-Radioisotopes was reporting and what other possibilities there were of regaining the 20% market share. Output Indicator 2 was very clear in stating that NNR was going to implement its Regulatory Framework at 100%. This meant that NNR was geared up to implement the Regulatory Framework even if it meant shutting down anyone who did not adhere to the regulations.

NNR Response
Mr Tobeka responded to the question about NTP-Radioisotopes-Radioisotopes compliance. Member had noted that there had been non-compliance problems at NTP-Radioisotopes in the requirements and consequent breaching of their own operational technical certification. This forced the hand of the NNR to invoke its compliance assurance and enforcement mandate. NTP-Radioisotopes had serious problems in safety culture which extended to a lack in leadership for appreciation for safety from the top echelon of the organisation. Safety must be a priority before pushing profits. The NNR had over the years realised that profit was NTP-Radioisotopes’s priority over safety – perhaps rightfully so as it was a profit-driven organisation. When working with nuclear organisations one realised that this was a wrong way of looking at it. To remain operational and profitable for a long time one had to take care of safety culture.

The NNR was glad to report that since it last engaged with the Committee, it had seen quite a number of improvements. These improvements had come about as a result of regulatory intervention as NNR had emphasised and impressed on NTP-Radioisotopes not to rush to come back to operation as they would go back offline due to rushing. NTP-Radioisotopes had to ensure that it had a sustainable plan for returning to operation. The NNR interrogated the plan and gave feedback, which has seemingly saved the day and the NNR wanted to commend NTP-Radioisotopes. The NNR did not take pleasure in shutting them down but had an obligation by law that when they were not adhering to standards and regulations, the NNR was forced to take regulatory intervention which included curtailing operations or shutting them down completely.

So far NECSA NTP-Radioisotopes has done a good job in returning to operations and were doing so steadily. He did not want to comment on whether the 20% market share would be regained as this was not part of what the NRR was looking at. The NNR’s concern was whether NTP-Radioisotopes was complying with the NNR’s requirements and targets they had set for themselves. Nuclear regulation operates on a graded approach which meant that operators themselves first had to be in a position to self-regulate. In other words, it presented a safety case and set out how it was going to operate and the ambit of safety that it binds itself to operate within. The NNR would watch them over the period. Where an entity geared off target, the NNR would have to call it out because it would be a violation of the entity’s own standard operation procedures and the NNR regulations and licence compliance. At this point the NNR could not say if the 20% market share would be regained as it was the entity’s responsibility, but the NNR was happy with NTP-Radioisotopes’s steady return to operation.

On how entities are assisted to ensure adherence to regulations instead of shutting them down, NNR did not take pleasure in shutting them down but it was transparent in its requirements and regulatory approach. From the beginning the NNR made sure that the rules of the game were understood by all parties and the consequences of breaching those rules. Where entities did not adhere to regulations, the NNR was forced to take certain steps by law. Over the last 18 months, the NNR had as much as possible changed its approach to more physical talking instead of writing letters. What happened before was that the NNR would send a directive and the entity would respond, but this did not work out well because at some point one would realise that not everyone was reading from the same book. The NNR needed to sit down and have workshops to provide an even deeper level of understanding of regulatory requirements. This has helped in getting entities to comply. In terms of the audits on safety culture, the NNR had the IAEA come in and provide the audit outcomes on how good or bad they were doing. The entities had taken this to heart and have action plans to address the IAEA findings. NNR hoped compliance would be maintained in the long run.

On financial viability and COVID-19, the NNR currently derived their income from two streams: government and authorisation fees. The biggest chunk of revenue came from authorisation fees, which was Eskom, NECSA and the mines. The mines have been adversely affected by COVID-19 and the NNR was already jittery about how much they were going to claw back from the mines for authorisation fees in the new financial year. The NNR did not want to pre-empt noncompliance, but it was expected that some of the licensees would not be able to honour the fees. The NNR may therefore have problems in this revenue stream. Eskom had excellently adhered to compliance to pay authorisation fees on time and in full. The NNR had problems with NECSA again, which juxtaposed very well with its organisational financial troubles. The NNR had been able to discuss how they could honour their authorisation fees obligations – which they had duly done. Given that some licence holders go bankrupt due to COVID-19 consequences, the NNR requested from the Committee that they get the government grant increased to make up for that shortfall .

As far as how COVID-19 affected NNR operations, they were working from home. Long before COVID-19, the NNR had a business continuity management system in place which had been tested from time to time. Some inspectors had been on a work-from-home period of four weeks, and the lockdown had been implemented just before the four weeks was completed. The NNR was very experienced in working from home and ensuring that they delivered on their mandate. However, in the situation where some of the facilitates regulated may have been shut down, such as the mines, the NNR was unable to inspect those which affected their work. Since the mines were now back online despite not being at 100% capacity, the NRR had a plan to ensure that inspectors had the necessary Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and performed only the very essential inspections for the health and safety of the inspectors. The NNR had not seen any lapse in compliance as a result of COVID-19.

Mine Health and Safety Council (MHSC) 2020/21 Annual Performance Plan
Mr Thabo Dube, MHSC CEO, spoke about the MHSC role and journey to Zero Harm. In terms of performance the MHSC has come very far starting from the Leon Commission of 1994 and the Vaal Reefs Disaster which was the turning point and led to the promulgation of the MHS Act and establishment of Council in 1997. He noted the expansion of MHSC structures (1999) and Tripartite Partnership; OHS Summits and Milestones (2003 and 2014); 2016 OHS Summit; and OHS Summit Milestones Implementation Progress Review (2018). From 1993 to 2019 there has been an overall 91% reduction of fatalities. 2019 was the best year, with a 37% improvement year on year. MHSC started to effectively manage date on occupational diseased since 2008. From 2008 to 2016 there has been a 65% reduction in occupational diseases and 67% reduction in TB cases.

Improvements are due to the contributions of technical interventions; promotion of best practice; regulations; engagements with stakeholders; enforcement; monitoring; improved OHS culture; and implementation of MHSC OHS research outcomes.

In 2014 MHSC set the OHS Summit milestones, with performance reviews every two years with 2020 being such a year. As a result of COVID-19 the utilisation of virtual platforms was being looked at. MHSC would be looking at its Culture Transformation Framework until December 2020, including leadership, risk management, data management, diversity management, leading practice and bonus and performance incentive. Thereafter the other pillars would be looked at from 2021.

Strategic Priorities 2020/21
Ten strategic objectives provided for customer, internal process, learning and growth, and financial perspectives (see document).

MHSC Response to COVID-19
• Outward looking: MHSC tripartite stakeholders developed the “Guiding Principles on the Prevention and Management of COVID-19 in South African Mining Industry (SAMI)”, which requires employers to prepare and implement a code of practice for the mitigation and management of COVD-19 outbreak.
• Inward looking – New normal: OHS research; develop/review guidelines; business continuity plan; ICT infrastructure; reducing impact of job losses; and financial sustainability.

MHSC Budget for 2020-21 to 2024-25
Mr Dumisani Dlamini, COO: MHSC, noted 2020/21 total budget income is R140.5 million. The main income stream is levies, which is has been consistent at 90%. Due to the COVID-19 impact on mines, the 90% might not be achieved going forward but MHSC predicts achieving at least 65%. On the utilisation of surplus funds, it is earmarked for MHSC to purchase its own property to house staff. The balance will be used to cover the shortfall in levies. R6.5 million is budgeted for the Kloppersbos Research Facility, but challenges might see it not materialising in 2020/21. However, money will not be spent so it will break even. Finance income is expected to reduce by 10% due to the decline in cash surplus for the purchase of the property.

The total budget is expected to be spent. Research expenditure funds will be utilised effectively and optimally to achieve zero harm. MHSC is exploring the increase of internal research capacity and less reliance on outsourcing research work. Regional Tripartite Forums (RTF) costs are expected to decrease as there will not be a lot of conferences with all meetings taking place virtually. Administration expenditure will be kept at R3.2 million and cost containment measures are being implemented. Office rental will be reduced through the purchasing of MHSC’s own building.

Conclusion
Mr David Msiza, Chairperson: MHSC, stated that MHSC worked with DMRE, focusing on zero harm and COVID-19. Support is pleaded from the Committee in terms of capacity as this will help achieve the goal of zero harm.

Discussion
Mr Mahlaule stated that operating in a tripartite industry where there was organised labour, business and the state, one would argue that when the mines began operating at 100%, miners would return and this meant more risk for communities where the miners resided. Mine health facilities did not necessarily cater for those who did not work at the mine. What assistance are mines committing to in terms of PPE for the community and infections of those in the community? There might be a situation where the state health system is congested. There are mine health facilities that can assist. What is MHSC doing to salvage this situation?

Mr Mileham thought that the MSHC well illustrated the very important role that they played. There was clearly a need for a focus on COVID-19. He welcomed the MSHC inputs, the guidelines they were instrumental in developing and the interactions that they had had with stakeholders to date. What is the MSHC doing to reprioritise its APP, strategies and budgets to mitigate the COVID-19 impact on both health and viability of the mining sector? How could people’s lives, jobs, the economy, and viability of mining companies be equally preserved? There is an important role to be played by DMRE with regard to COVID-19 monitoring, screening and implementing the MSHC guidelines developed. What is MHSC doing to assist? How is MSHC helping and ensuring companies to be compliant?

Ms Hlonyana asked what happens to mine companies that do not comply with COVID-19 health and safety?

Ms Malinga commended the MHSC for the sterling work they were doing to curb fatalities as the percentage was very encouraging. On slide 10 it referred to the reduction and prevention of TB and HIV & AIDS. How was this going to be done during COVID-19? From what is heard in the media, people who got infected with COVID-19 were people with weak immune systems. Mineworkers went underground in a cage. How were inspectors checking if those cages were sanitised and if PPEs were in place? This extended to where miners were staying. Miners could be tested at work but go back to where they resided and might live with people who were infected. How is the mining industry going to prevent screened miners from getting the virus from the Zama Zamas? There were Zama Zamas who went underground without the knowledge of the mines.

Mr Mthenjane noted that there were many diseases in mines – some of which had not been reported on. Requesting numbers not percentages, how many fatalities were there in 2019? Why did the platinum mines have more fatalities than any other mine? How many mines and mineworkers were infected with COVID-19? Did MHSC advise DMRE or the Minister on the pandemic? It seemed all the mines were being reopened and there were more COVID-19 cases every day. Did the MHSC advise DMRE on the danger of COVID-19? The pandemic was worsening every day and it was worrying that the mines were continuing to operate. The 19 people infected at Marula mine had families who they went back to after work. Did MHSC go to the families to find out if they were infected with COVID-19?

Ms Phillips said that it was heartening that lives were being saved. What is the rate of inspection for smaller mining operations to ensure they adhere to the COVID-19 protocols? Is there a way to develop a protocol so mines affected by COVID-19 needed to close only the affected section and not the whole mine? Is the mine closed until all of the contact tracing has been done?

Mr Wolmarans stated that MHSC had made good strides for COVID-19 preparations and had gone beyond in presenting the reality of a new normal on slide 25. MHSC had prepared for post-COVID-19 and this was impressive. On governance and compliance, there was mention of the appointment of a Social and Ethics committee by December 2019. Was this done? If this was done, is it effective? Social ethics training was also envisaged for management across the board. Was this taking place? How far was the appointment of the Compliance Officer? Has this been done?

MHSC response
Mr Msiza spoke to the risk placed on communities. The MHSC, through the leadership of the Minister and DMRE, encouraged the mines to assist in responding to COVID-19. For example, in the last few weeks, the Minister had been to the North West Province Office where two hospitals were made available by the sector to the province, to assist in public health and COVID-19. Some of the mines had indicated that they were supporting communities with the provision of sanitisers and PPE. The COVID-19 guidelines to mitigate and manage the pandemic in the mining sector noted that the sector should work together with and assist local authorities. On how MHSC ensured and prevented the spread of COVID-19 from mine workers to communities, and as the Minister had previously mentioned, in the guidelines there was a provision that required the mines to quarantine all workers that returned from epicentre areas with high levels of COVID-19. The Disaster Management Act gazetted regulations also required mines to have quarantine facilities. Some mines had already quarantined workers who were found to have COVID-19.

In terms of compliance, after President Ramaphosa had made announcements on the government’s approach and through the leadership of the Minister, MSHC had been conducting unannounced visits to the mines. MHSC started off by going to the coal mines which, at the time, had one reported incident. This was to ensure that the coal mines followed the directives. Generally throughout the mining sector, through compliance visits, it had been seen that the protocols were in place, there were clear markings for social distancing, PPEs were provided, and there was sanitising and screening every day. However, as previously raised, there needed to be more focus on testing. In Marula, 17 colleagues had tested positive for COVID-19 because the sector had been responding to DMRE’s insistence that both screening and testing need to be done. Those 17 miners were asymptomatic before the testing. In terms of what was done in cases of noncompliance, MHSC followed the law. Depending on the level of noncompliance – different instructions could be issued in terms of the law, depending on the level of compliance and the risk to workers.

The guideline also had a section on how mines were to deal with vulnerable employees who had existing medical conditions. MHSC encouraged mines not to bring those people back as their immune system might be impacted. On preventing infection by Zama Zamas, this was an interesting question as people were not currently comfortable with the use of the biometric system or fingerprints. People feared that they might be infected. One of the reasons why biometric systems were used in the sector was to prevent Zama Zamas from accessing the mines. Significant work has been done by the operating mines to prevent Zama Zamas from going inside the mines. To prevent further infection, the mines are providing PPEs, sanitisers, and doing screening and testing.

MHSC was also concerned about platinum fatalities. Since 2008 a significant improvement was seen. The gold and platinum mines were generally the major contributors to fatalities, mainly because they were labour intensive sectors in comparison to the other mines. Gold and platinum mines were also deep mines, hence the risk of falling ground and transport related accidents. This was not a matter for complacency. MHSC had been engaging with the CEOs and Boards of those companies to improve.

MHSC weighed the risk of a particular mine and did not just close the mine in its protocol. This included weighing the risk of who had a risk of being infected. MHSC did inspections. Members would have noticed that in the Disaster Management Regulations there was a condition that as mines had ramped up, specific sub-sectors were allowed to operate – mainly the open cast and coal mines that provided coal to Eskom. The small mines were generally placed on hold. However, MHSC would ensure the inspection of those mines who were coming on board.

Mr Dube replied that MHSC started the process of advertising for members for the Social and Ethics Committee and were at the point of conducting interviews. MHSC had already appointed a Social Ethics Compliance Officer. The statistics received from the Minerals Council South Africa (MCSA) on COVID-19 showed that 168 000 employees had been screened and 1 466 employees had been tested. There were 41 confirmed cases and two deaths.

MHSC had not finalised the reprioritisation of the APP and budget but was looking at moving money, especially when it came to dissemination and promotional work. MHSC was going reprioritise money towards establishing a virtual platform infrastructure. If MHSC to not get fees from those companies likely going into liquidation, MHSC would be looking into the surplus funds it had. MHSC was also looking into assisting those companies through the difficult period in terms of their payment terms. This was not yet finalised but was currently being looked at.

Further questions
Mr Mathenjane asked how asbestos was being addressed as many people are affected by asbestos, including communities around mines. How were these people assisted in terms of compensation?

Ms Malinga asked MHSC, with COVID-19 having engulfed the country, whether they had enough inspectors to check that mining companies adhered to the regulations as gazetted by the Minister?

Mr Mileham noted that the MSHC had said that they were encouraging mines not to bring back mineworkers who had existing medical conditions. What is the incidence of silicosis, pneumoconiosis, and TB amongst mineworkers? This would allow Members to see the impact on the industry as a whole.

Discussion
The Chairperson said that he would not delve deeper into questions on COVID-19 as the Minister was expected to present the overarching strategy for the mining and energy sectors in the following week. MHSC was not to look at their mandate as their mandate stood, but what was their role? This would provide a distinction between the role played by DMRE in exercising its effective authority over compliance with mine health and safety. The MHSC role was one of exercising an advisory role to the Minister and DMRE. The MHSC presentation did not give a sense of its legislative framework challenges so that as the Committee prepares it report on the budget, they could ensure the costs were in the DMRE budget if this process kicked in. If this was not reflected in the presentation but the MHSC mandate is to review and develop legislative amendments, the Committee needed to see this. He could not find this and his fear was that in six months the Committee would get a document saying what amendments needed to be done.

The budget spoke to an investment on development and skilling but did not note the expenditure. MHSC did not have to revisit this as this was the task of the DMRE. An advisory body may not necessarily have such authority. It was expected that equal status would be given to the tripartite body of Business, Labour and DMRE. To what extent has there been engagement within this body to look at improvement? The question of accountability within the body remains a serious matter on the basis that the DMRE was expected to make those kinds of implementations to personnel. How many inspectors were there within DMRE? What are their areas of specialisation? Where are they geographically located? Is there a motivation for this? This information was critical to make a proper analysis. This would allow the Committee to know if what MHSC had would be adequate.

The Chairperson asked what the projected budget is with the addition of COVID-19 and what specialised skills would be required? The fact many companies were testing did not necessarily mean that DMRE monitoring and oversight responsibility would automatically be met by this. As MHSC ensured compliance with the regulations, there had to be professional experts to ensure that what was expected did happen through their inspections.

He asked who were the members of the Social and Ethics Committee and were they going to be paid? Had MHSC set up better determining criteria? The reason he had asked about the inspectorate was there was a possibility that what had been put down as targets would not be met. If the information on the inspectorate had to be prepared, could the turnaround time for the provision of this information in writing be provided. Mention was made that MHSC had not yet finalised the reprioritisation of their APP and budget. This meant that the focus point on operational needs could be highly affected. Could clarity be received on this?

MSHC response
Mr Msiza replied that all asbestos mines had been decommissioned more than 20 years ago. The sites were being rehabilitated, especially those in close proximity to communities. These programmes were run through Mintek and the Council for Geoscience. MHSC was working to ensure that there was no further exposure to communities. In terms of compensation, MHSC worked together with the Department of Health (DOH), Department of Labour (DOL), and Minerals Council SA. On the number of inspectors, COVID-19 was obviously unexpected. DMRE and MHSC had their own strike plan, however, they continued to strive, enhance and develop their inspector capacity. Even before COVID-19 had arrived, due to the goal of zero harm in the sector and despite the state of the economy, DMRE and MHSC agreed they needed funding for 130 identified positions. This was more so specifically for health inspectors as they helped MHSC on silicosis and TB and now COVID-19. MHSC believed that this need was still valid. The budget had also been looked at. MHSC identified that it still had needs but respected that the economy was not doing well.

Mr Dube replied on compensation, MHSC had had a project on the integration of compensation systems found in the DOH and DOL. MHSC has since completed this work and sent through recommendations to both DOH and DOL. This was a work in progress in mproving the compensation system. Currently there was compensation from both DOH and DOL for occupational diseases, depending on what diseases the miners were exposed to. Slide 9 stated the total confirmed cases as verified by DMRE for all occupational diseases amounted to 3 500 by the end of 2018. DMRE was currently verifying the statistics for 2019 and should be releasing the statistics for occupational diseases which would include statistics on silicosis.

Ms Msiza confirmed that MHSC was finalising the statistics for the previous year. In 2018 there had been 465 silicosis cases which came down from 662 in 2017.

Adv Mokoena would provide the Committee with the written information on questions about the inspectorate by Wednesday 27 May.

Mr Dube reiterated that MHSC had not finalised its APP and budget reprioritisation yet. It was something that was still being worked on. The Social and Ethics Committee was not yet appointed but would be made up of independent members. He confirmed that they would be paid at the rate stipulated by National Treasury. This would be similar to what was paid to those members on the Audit Committee.

The meeting was adjourned.