Ratification of Agreement on the IBSA Fund for the Alleviation of Poverty and Hunger: DIRCO briefing; with Deputy Minister

Meeting report

The Select Committee met to be briefed by the Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) on the ratification of the Agreement between India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) on the IBSA Fund for the alleviation of poverty and hunger, and the Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the African Union relating to the Pan African Parliament of 2014.

Deputy Minister’s overview

Ms Candith Mashego-Dlamini, Deputy Minister: DIRCO, said the IBSA Fund agreement had to be tabled and approved by both Houses of Parliament for ratification. It had previously been presented in 2019. The Preamble contained the wording’ millennium development goals,’ which the previous Committee Chairperson requested be changed to ‘sustainable development goals.’ South Africa had consulted with other partners and the recommended changes could not be made, as India and Brazil had already ratified the agreement. The Department was therefore calling for support for ratifying the agreement with the old text in place. Upon completion of the ratification, the Department would re-submit an addendum to the original agreement to effect the changes as recommended in 2019. South Africa had already received positive feedback for the option to amend later.

The IBSA dialogue forum was established in 2003, and in 2004 the IBSA Fund was created to support the international developmental agenda, especially the global south and the least developed countries, to address extreme poverty and inequality. The Fund’s capitalisation was derived from annual contributions of US$1m. The Fund supported all 17 developmental goals. R44m had been committed for 35 projects in 31 partner countries, and eight countries with 14 projects in Africa since 2003. Africa had received the largest share of the total Fund allocation.

South Africa had contributed to the Fund since its inception without supporting the ratification of the IBSA Fund agreement. It was therefore important that the Committee support the ratification of the agreement. South Africa was leveraging political capital through a broad global footprint of the IBSA Fund, allowing IBSA members to extend their global reach through this financial agreement. The ratification was the first step in that direction.

Request for ratification
Mr Ben Joubert, Director: DIRCO, said the briefing was to inform the Committee of the IBSA Fund agreement between India, Brazil and South Africa, and to request the Committee’s approval of the ratification of the IBSA Fund agreement in its current form, without the proposed amendments. The IBSA Fund was an initiative at the level of Head of State, created in 2004 by the three emerging market economies of India, Brazil and South Africa to promote South-South cooperation. The capitalisation for the Fund was derived from annual contributions of US$1m made by each of the three IBSA states. The Fund agreement was signed in Durban in 2017.

The Fund’s objective was to support the international development agenda, particularly the global south and the least developed countries (LDCs), in addressing extreme poverty and inequality. It currently has a balance of approximately $2.3m. In 2022, the Fund was busy approving a project in Lesotho, and would soon be considering a project in Mozambique. The Fund also received updates on the progress of active projects in African countries.

The Fund supported all 17 sustainable development goals (SDGs) in developing and least developing countries, directly contributing to the UN Agenda 2030.

South Africa leveraged greater political capital and an extension of its soft diplomacy through the broad global footprint of the IBSA Fund. The Fund was managed by the UN Office for South-South Cooperation (UNOSSC) in New York, and has received global awards for its role in supporting sustainable development.

Discussion

Mr T Dodovu (ANC, North West) raised concerns about the impact of the Fund. He wanted to know the extent to which the funding had impacted the recipient countries regarding the SDGs. He understood that when the migration from MDGs to SDGs was made, it was to expand the goals from eight to 17 goals, and to improve accountability, monitoring and evaluation. To what extent were these countries accountable for the funds allocated, and was IBSA monitoring disbursements and their impact on SDGs? He was unsure whether human rights and advancing democracy were being used as criteria to fund countries. He pointed out Swaziland’s human rights record as being problematic.

Mr G Michalakis (DA, Free State) asked that the adoption of the agreement stand over till the next meeting for ratification, to allow Members to consider the information they had received.

Mr M Dangor (ANC, Gauteng) said the Committee was being asked to ratify the existing wording of the Preamble to the agreement, and consider the amendment to it subsequent to the adoption of the agreement. He said the issue was how to advance SA’s soft power in south-south relations.

The Chairperson asked for elaboration on the projects the Fund was collaborating on in Lesotho. Was Mozambique a proposed project? Generally, how would the Fund contribute to SA’s economic and political interests?

DIRCO’s response

Mr Joubert said the impact and contribution of the Fund was a key element in all the projects. The projects operated through UN offices and had won recognition for the work done. The SA missions were also tasked with monitoring the projects. Member states were also part of the Fund’s board meetings. The Fund, and how it operated, was divorced from politics. The funds disbursed were small amounts of money on high impact projects in local communities at the grassroots level, like women’s empowerment, clean water and sanitation, for example.

He said the heads of state of the three countries had already signed the agreement in Durban in 2017, and they were now asking Parliament to ratify the Fund. Once it entered into force, the amendment to the Preamble would be submitted, and the amendment would already have been agreed to.

Mr Khuzwayo, a DIRCO official, referred to the criteria used to allocate funds. The UN disbursed the funds to the projects, and the countries were allowed only 5% as an administration fee -- the rest of the money was for use at the grassroots level. The Fund did not prescribe to the host government where to direct the spending. Instead, the development programmes of the countries were requested, and the projects fitted into these programmes and the countries would continue them once the Fund’s participation ended.

Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini responded to why the Fund was contributing to countries like Swaziland, and said the Fund was not political. It looked at the difficulties faced by communities on the ground regarding poverty, and at helping that country achieve some of the millennium goals.

On the soft power mentioned by Mr Dangor, she said the least developed countries were the most vulnerable, mostly in Africa. They would become the prey of the first world, and African unity would be jeopardised. 

Mr Michalakis said he found the Deputy Minister’s comments on African countries having to be protected from first-world countries disturbing, as no similar comments were made regarding China. Such comments were not appropriate, coming from the Department of International Relations. 

Mr Dodovu said he had not heard a response to the Chairperson’s questions.

Mr Joubert said the most important issue was the soft power exercised through the Fund, so the Department had to work harder on ensuring its visibility. The way the Fund operated on the African continent opened other doors that had political and economic benefit.

Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini said that all the projects IBSA was involved in would be given to the Committee in writing.
 
The Chairperson said the report would be considered at their next meeting.

Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the African Union
Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini introduced the Protocol to the Constitutive Act of the African Union of 2014 relating to the Pan African Parliament (PAP), especially since, at the moment, the PAP was experiencing management and leadership challenges. The Department was hopeful that the 2014 Protocol, when adopted, would contribute to strengthening the institution and hence contribute to good governance on the continent. The PAP needed to be strengthened, especially the mandate of the Parliament, and this would move it closer to the goal of it having a legislative component.

The seat for the Parliament was still South Africa, even after a concerted effort to move it away, and South Africa had the responsibility to make sure the PAP worked effectively and efficiently. The 2014 protocol would align with, and enforce, the rule of law on the continent. The ratification would demonstrate South Africa’s contribution to strengthening the institution of the African Union. The Protocol did not impose any obligation that was in conflict or contradictory to any domestic laws or international obligations.

Mr Luvuyo Ndimeni, Chief Director: African Union, DIRCO, provided an overview of developments regarding the PAP; the host country agreement which spelt out South Africa’s obligations; the various articles comprising the Protocol; and the technical annexes. (See attached document)

Latest developments included regular meetings with the Department of Public Works and Infrastructure (DPWI) to resolve outstanding issues on the permanent precinct project. More efficient information communication technology (ICT) equipment had been procured to allow virtual meetings to occur. DIRCO’s role was as a facilitator, logistical support, and responsibility for the revision of the host country agreement.

Referring to the ratification process, he said the Protocol had been adopted in June 2014, to replace the 2001 Protocol. The 2014 Protocol had not yet entered into force, since the majority of the AU member states had not yet signed and ratified it. 28 member states were required to ratify it for the Protocol to enter into force. South Africa had signed the Protocol in January 2019 and was in the process of ratifying it, which required parliamentary approval. The Minister had formally written to the Speaker of the National Assembly to submit the Protocol to both Houses of Parliament for ratification in March 2022.

Discussion
Mr Dangor asked if the Protocol had already been presented to the Portfolio Committee for its ratification. Regarding immunity for PAP representatives, he asked if SA would be obliged to hand a person over if that person was a wanted person in another country, or if that person would have the same immunity given to someone going to the UN.

Mr Dodovu asked why it had taken eight years since the agreement was signed for the ratification to be presented to Parliament, as the PAP was an important organisation on the continent.

As 28 member states were required for the ratification to be enforced, the Chairperson asked how far other countries were in ratifying the Protocol.

Mr Dangor moved for the ratification of the Protocol.

DIRCO’s response

Mr Ndimeni said the Protocol had been presented to the Portfolio Committee earlier in the year.

It took so long to ratify the Protocol because the PAP itself had been in turmoil for some time. The rotation of the presidency was one of the challenges, and the Protocol addressed this particular issue.

On how this assisted Africa, he said the current president of the PAP had a different approach regarding engagement with the African Union. This approach created a high level of awareness amongst members of PAP. The Department was working on ironing out all the issues contained in the host country agreement with the DPWI.

Adv Sandea de Wet, Chief State Law Adviser: International Law, said that in general terms of diplomatic immunity, international organisations such as the PAP would enjoy the immunities in the agreement once it was recognised as an organisation.

Adv Keke Motsepe, State Law Advisor, said article 9 in the Protocol said that PAP parliamentarians enjoyed functional immunity. This meant immunity from civil and criminal proceedings, arrests or imprisonment on actions or words they may have said while exercising their duties as parliamentarians. It included immunities covered by the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations. The PAP could waive these immunities if there was a request to waive them.

Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini responded to the issue of the delay, and said that the Department had to sign the Protocol, which had happened in 2019. Cabinet had then referred it to Parliament, and there had been a wait for Parliament to give DIRCO a date to give briefings and take the process forward.

As the seat for the PAP parliament was still in South Africa, South Africa needed to provide the buildings. The Department of Public Works and Infrastructure had provided a site to put up the new buildings. Currently, their offices are being rented, and the IT systems have been improved to allow virtual meetings.

The Chairperson asked how many member states had ratified the Protocol.

Deputy Minister Mashego-Dlamini said 28 countries had signed, but she was unsure whether these countries had ratified the protocols.

Adv Motsepe said 14 countries had ratified the Protocol.

The Chairperson said the Committee’s report would be considered at its next meeting.

The meeting was adjourned.