Quarterly briefing by SAPS on SCM corruption cases pertaining to SAPS officials

Meeting report

The Chairperson welcomed the Members and the South African Police Service (SAPS) management in respect of the ongoing matter between the Standing Committee on Public Accounts (SCOPA) and SAPS regarding its corruption cases, who were present to give the Committee an update in respect of its consequence management.

SAPS initiatives to combat corruption

Gen Khehla Sitole, National Commissioner: SAPS, introduced his team which included:

• Lt Gen Godfrey Lebeya, National Head: Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (DPCI), also known as the Hawks;
• Lt Gen Francina Vuma, Deputy National Commissioner: Asset and Legal Management; and
• Lt Gen Sindile Mfazi, Deputy National Commissioner: Crime Detection.

Introduction

Gen Sitole began by informing the Committee that since its previous reporting sessions on corruption-related cases, the SAPS had conducted an integrated investigative value chain which was inclusive of forensic audits. This had been followed by an investigating team comprised of SAPS, the DPCI, the Independent Police Investigative Directorate (IPID) and National Treasury. This later progressed to the corporate renewal of supply chain management (SCM), because it was the most affected environment.

It had then appointed a new divisional commissioner for the environment, who was also present in the meeting. After this, in proceeding to try and address corruption in the division, it ended up appointing a special investigation task team which conducted the current investigation, particularly on the marking of state vehicles. The SAPS investigative value chain had also recently been joined by the Investigative Directorate (ID) from the National Prosecuting Authority (NPA).

At present, this was where the investigations stood. SAPS had undertaken both criminal and departmental investigations, which had resulted in a number of officers at both junior and senior levels being charged.

SCM corruption cases pertaining to SAPS officials

Lt Gen Lineo Ntshiea, Divisional Commissioner: Human Resource Management (HRM), SAPS, said that after dealing specifically with corruption cases, the presentation would provide an update on disciplinary proceedings which included both corruption and cases categorised as high profile, “blue lights,” marking of SAPS vehicles, forensic data analysis and irregular expenditure.

SAPS acknowledged through its National Commissioner that police corruption had become increasingly topical. Such a negative perception undermined the entire policing fraternity.

Institutions such as the DPCI, IPID and the ID had been established to effectively tackle corruption in state departments, including the SAPS.

There had been some instances where forensic investigations of corruption had led to the initiation of criminal and departmental proceedings. The presentation covered both avenues, the former being handled by SAPS’s detective service, and the latter being managed by HRM.

The regulatory framework for the investigative process included:

• Prevention of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (Act No. 12 of 2004)
• Public Finance Management Act (Act No.1 of 1999)
• Independent Police Investigative Directorate Act (Act No, 1 of 2011)
• South African Police Service Act (Act No.68 of 1995)
• SAPS Discipline Regulations, 2016
• SAPS Code of Conduct

 

The total number of cases being investigated by all agencies was 397. These were broken up among the ID (nine), the DPCI (146), IPID (five), and the National Anti-Corruption Unit (Detective Services), which had 237. Given the opportunity, she was sure the other institutions would be able to brief the Committee on progress in their respective cases. However, the focus of this presentation would be on the 237 cases of the Detective Services.

Corruption cases currently on hand

Lt Gen Ntshiea listed the statistics based on whether the cases were still under investigation, pending a decision and with the NPA, or arrested and at court. A provincial breakdown was given of the 29 cases currently under investigation, the 30 cases pending decision with the NPA, and the 178 cases at court. The national total of arrested officials amounted to 257, and was categorised according to the ranks of the arrested officials.

Corruption-related cases

Management had the responsibility to institute parallel disciplinary proceedings in terms of SAPS Discipline Regulations, 2016, into allegations of corrupt activities by SAPS employees.

As soon as SAPS was informed of allegations of corrupt activities, the necessary disciplinary proceedings were immediately initiated. The presentation listed contraventions in terms of the Disaster Management Act. Of the 286 cases, 216 had been finalised, with the presentation giving a breakdown of dismissals, terminations, withdrawals, sanctions short of dismissals and cases without prima facie evidence.

High profile cases involved senior managers in the main, with 79 cases including 50 senior members and 29 other officials below the level of a brigadier.

Blue lights case

The blue lights matter consisted of two phases. The first phase had been investigated by the IPID, and had resulted in the arrest of seven employees by the IPID and ID. The second phase had been conducted through the determination test in terms of the National Treasury Framework. The determination test, or preliminary investigations, had established that 10 other employees were involved.

Of the 17 employees in total involved in this case, 11 were part of the Senior Management Service (SMS), and six were below the level of senior managers. Of the 11 SMS employees, four were lieutenant generals, three were major generals, and four were brigadiers. The remaining six employees were below the SMS level.

Current outcomes of this case were that there were five employees who had left the SAPS, one dismissed on an unrelated matter, four exonerated, one on suspension, two with an uplifted suspension, four who were not suspended, and seven with disciplinary proceedings in progress.

Marking of SAPS vehicles case

This case involved the manipulation of procurement documents for the branding of SAPS vehicles. A total of 22 SAPS employees had been arrested and subsequently suspended from the service. Eight of the 22 had had their suspensions uplifted due to the expiry of the 90-day timeframe in terms of the SAPS disciplinary regulations. They had been placed in different environments and were not in the SCM environment. The remaining 14 were still on suspension. Disciplinary proceedings for all 22 employees were ongoing, and were being monitored on a monthly basis. The case involved three brigadiers and 19 other officials below the level of a brigadier.

Forensic data analysis (FDA) case

SAPS had appointed Sizwe Ntsaluba Gobodo Advisory Services to conduct a forensic investigation into the procurement processes followed in the appointment of Forensic Data Analysts (FDA) in respect of five contracts.

The investigation of these contracts had arisen from allegations of corruption raised by the IPID against the former Acting National Commissioner.

The forensic investigation into alleged irregularities at the FDA for the procurement of forensic light sources had been finalised had implicated several SAPS members, and criminal cases had been opened against them.

She listed the statistics on the five contracts and the 15 employees involved in phase one of the investigations, noting the verdicts of the finalised disciplinary proceedings.

Phase two of this case involved four contracts implicating 19 employees, with the presentation listing their ranks.

Irregular expenditure

Of the 85 incidents reported in terms of section s 38 of the PFMA, 66 incidents had been finalised and the remaining 19 were still in progress. Disciplinary proceedings had been finalised with results listed in the presentation.

Telkom contract

This related to alleged irregular expenditure involving the wide area core customer specific solution agreement between Telkom and the SAPS. The SAPS had outsourced external forensic investigation which had yielded recommendations that four SAPS employees implicated must be charged criminally, and 11 departmentally. 

After studying the forensic investigation report, the SAPS had referred it to counsel through the State Attorney for a legal opinion. The breakdown of implicated official ranks was listed in the presentation.

Conclusion

The SAPS’ anti-corruption strategy had been developed to strengthen the fight against crime and corruption within its ranks, and to encourage employees to act with integrity that was beyond reproach.

The focus of the strategy had been based on the following pillars: detection, prevention, investigation and resolution of corruption.

National Commissioner’s concluding remarks

Gen Sitole said that two of the lieutenant generals mentioned in the presentation have been dismissed already. Of the 22 terminations, most members had resigned the moment they learnt that disciplinary process had been invoked, so SAPS had instructed that s 81 of the PFMA be enforced in those instances.

On the anti-corruption strategies cited in the conclusion, he added that contract management processes had been included in order to ensure that the SAPS’ processes were fully monitored. It had also reviewed its enterprise risk management processes and had brought in a professor to assist and guide it in this process, as most of the cases emanated from strategic risks taken in the existing processes. These were the steps taken to ensure that the situation did not repeat itself. The situation had required SAPS to act very decisively and effectively, and it had adopted a clean-up campaign in order to clear the organisation.

Discussion

Mr A Lees (DA) said it was clear that there was good work being done, but it was also clear that the rot ran very deep. He was encouraged by the General’s concluding remarks, but asked what was being done to provide comfort to the Committee that the vast majority had been exposed.

Mr S Somyo (ANC) agreed that these results were different in comparison to the previous actions of the Chief of Police and his team.  If this continued, it would not only ensure a fight against corruption, but would also ensure that the image of the SAPS was improved as well.

Ms V Mente-Nqweniso (EFF) asked about the officials who resigned when disciplinary action was pending, and whether there were any other people like this. There was the tendency of officials resigning in order to access their pensions and hinder the recovery of money which had been stolen. Since the people who had resigned were not dead, she asked whether criminal cases were being pursued against them. She wanted details as to the type of corruption cases which had been dealt with. She was not confident that all the cases dealt with in the previous meeting had been dealt with regarding specific cases which had happened in specific places involving specific amounts. She would be comforted only when she understood which instances the cases were referring to.

Ms N Tolashe (ANC) she expressed concern about the cases where it had been found that there was no prima facie evidence. It raised the question of whether the police could police themselves. She asked the Commissioner if SAPS could trust its system, because if it could not, it might open itself up to being sued by members of society who, after being exposed, could sue the SAPS because they had no trust in the system. If the system was not water-tight, criminals could go free as a result.

She asked the National Commissioner to explain what he meant when he said that section 81 of the PFMA would kicks in. Although it may be clear to the Committee, it may not be clear to the public, and assurances must be given so that the public understands that even if the accused resign, they would still not be able to access their pensions, as the law would take its course. She asked for clarity on this matter, because the public needed to be informed, and was looking to the SAPS to address corruption and keep its trust.

Ms C Mkhonto (EFF) said that since she was young, there had been a belief that the arm of the law was very long and that it would catch up with those who decided to resign, rather than face the consequences of their actions. She asked whether police officers, apart from their police duties, were qualified in supply chain management. She asked whether SAPS had professional counsel, and if it did, what role did it play when senior police officials were breaking the law. She asked for a presentation to be made in the future about preventive steps being taken by the SAPS to prevent this from happening in the future.

Ms B Zibula (ANC) asked for clarity on what it meant by some people being charged criminally and others being charged departmentally.

Ms B van Minnen (DA) asked for a proportional breakdown of the ranks to determine the higher risk ranks, as it was probably more difficult for lower ranking officials to engage in dubious activities because they probably did not have the requisite decision-making powers. She would like this proportional breakdown in terms of where the problems sat in the organisation.

Mr Somyo referred to the involvement of senior ranking officials, saying that this would have created problems in terms of the command structure at SAPS relating to corruption, criminality and fraud. He asked the Commissioner what this told the country about the nature of the top of the police hierarchy and its ability to maintain stability and exercise discipline responsibility within the SAPS as a force. Regarding the dragging out of disciplinary processes so that some members were brought back into the employ of the SAPS, he asked what it was that impeded the easy flow of disciplinary processes, such that they could be completed speedily. He commended the work of the SAPS, noting that the challenges presented to the SAPS by bodies such as the Auditor-General (AG) appeared to have begun to be addressed. He stressed the desire that the SAPS not lose momentum.

The Chairperson said that as much as the Committee was pleased to see movement in areas where there did not appear to have been any, he was concerned about officials who resigned on the eve of disciplinary processes, only to move to other entities in government. This had been discovered in the last few weeks as a norm, which was derailing the effectiveness of consequence management. It was becoming a revolving door, which was not in the interests of state machinery. He asked whether the National Commissioner had conducted an exercise to check where these people were, and whether the SAPS had informed their new employers.

He recalled that when the Special Investigating Unit (SIU) was present, it had raised the issue of the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of the Department of Correctional Services (DCS). At that time, it had escaped his mind that SCOPA had dealt with the CFO, where it had emerged in a hearing that he had previously worked at a municipal demarcation board, and had left under a cloud and moved to the DCS.  Since the municipal demarcation board had advised the DCS, the question was what it had done with that information. He asked whether SAPS was co-operating with other arms of the state in order to close the revolving door when these circumstances arose. In the future, he asked that future reports list, for example, that Lt. Gen. X was charged with this, and this was where the case was, or that Maj. Gen. Y was charged with this, and this was where his case was. This was so that SCOPA could keep track of the progress of cases involving specific individuals, because when presented as a package, it may lose sight of problematic individuals who may appear in other matters it was dealing with. The issue of names was therefore very important. He asked that the reporting take this format going forward.

He said that more often than not, lower ranking officials were often charged and appeared before the courts. It was therefore encouraging to see that a Deputy National Commissioner was being charged, as it was unlikely that lower ranking officials could break the law entirely without being aided, abetted and instructed by a senior official. Although lower ranking officials should be held accountable for their own actions, he hoped that SAPS would not lose momentum in pursuing higher ranking officials. Even if it was the case that this had to happen in every institution, this should be done.

SAPS response

Gen Sitole expressed his appreciation to the Committee for its guidance, encouragement and its questions. He would answer the strategic aspects of the questions, and hand the rest of the responses over to the rest of his team.

Resignations

On the question relating to the terminations of service, and the request for clarification for public understanding, he first wanted to explain why service terminations were increasing. It had started to intensify the expediting process. When the SAPS applied the process where there was a clear case of departmental or criminal conduct, those cases were normally dealt with within a week. By that time, those involved would know that they faced dismissal. SAPS no-longer followed a long disciplinary process. Most cases to do with corruption warranted the expeditious process, so some people resigned. In terms of s 81 of the PFMA, he had given an instruction that the CFO must scrutinise all disciplinary functions, together with HRM.  This was so that SAPS could see whether the persons charged departmentally did not cause damage to the state, either financially or otherwise. This had to be done in terms of s 81(2) and s 81(3).

The CFO function was currently scrutinising all SAPS cases. If a member happened to resign, SAPS checked whether there were any criminal processes against the person, as well as whether they had not caused the state to either lose money or spend money inappropriately. Once the CFO function had scrutinised and come to the conclusion that this person owed money to the state, SAPS immediately instructed HRM to freeze access to pensions. There were other investigation components, such as the DPCI and the Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU), who would then also kick-start their processes of recovery. SAPS would then task the Criminal Intelligence (CI) with establishing the whereabouts of the people involved so that it could communicate with all other intelligence agencies, so that if the person ended up earning a salary elsewhere, they could continue to pay back SAPS. SAPS also wanted the new employer to know the history of that employer with the SAPS.

National Joint Operations and Intelligence Structure

Within the National Joint Operations and Intelligence Structure (NatJoints), SAPS was currently working on the nerve centre, and within the investigation families there was fusion centre which was formally working on an integrated data observatory, so that the data concerning these matters could be shared.

Exposure of SAPS officials

The forensic audit foundation was still in place, but SAPS had decided to extend its scope and was now working with the AG and other oversight bodies such as the inspectorate within SAPS and the secretariat within the Ministry.

Within the anti-corruption strategy, there also existed an ethics committee which continued to look at matters like this, and included a risk management committee. It was also in the process of capacitating CI in order to assist the SAPS in picking up cases at its earliest convenience.

No prima facie evidence

The moment that there was a criminal case against someone, a departmental case was immediately opened. It sometimes happened that there may be no prima facie evidence in the criminal case, but SAPS may still be able to proceed internally. It could also happen in reverse -- that departmentally, SAPS would find no transgression, but the matter continued in court.

SCM qualifications of officials

The SAPS had found that the majority of the charged members were qualified in SCM, but had chosen to exploit the system in order to commit mischief. It was also picking up cases which had encouraged SAPS to undergo a corporate renewal strategy of SCM, which would require it to conduct a total restructuring of SCM. There were therefore some employees who would not be employed in SCM in the near future as it worked towards a total corporate renewal of the environment.

Preventative measures

The SAPS undertook to provide a detailed report of the control measures it had put in place, as it was extremely important to prevent the situation from recurring.

Names and presentation details

In future, SAPS would provide the names of those involved, although there may be cases where names could not be shared because of the criminal status of the cases. Those names would still be shared through the Chairperson, but SAPS would request that those names not be made public as it may compromise certain cases.

Prolonged departmental disciplinary process

This problem cut across the whole public sector. In its discussions with the other criminal justice role players, SAPS had proposed a review of the regulations pertaining to internal investigations. Within SAPS, he had noticed the bad tendency of people who took state money and before SAPS dealt with them, that person would take SAPS to court over its disciplinary processes with that same money. Unfortunately, the departmental process was open to court processes which needed to be concluded before a matter was finalised. Once a court was involved, SAPS was bound to follow the court dates until the case was resolved. In order to make sure that cases were not delayed from SAPS’ side, where it was clear that criminal conduct or a breach of departmental conduct had occurred, SAPS went the expeditious route. This had improved the situation in these cases, as SAPS was no longer being taken from pillar to post until the suspension period expired.

Section 81 of the PFMA

Lt Gen Vuma noted the request for names to be sent to the Committee and committed to do so through the Commissioner. It was true that the National Commissioner had instructed that when conducting disciplinary proceedings for misconduct in terms of s 81 of the PFMA, HR must also take into consideration the content of that misconduct. This included officials who had failed to remain in the legislative framework, and those who had made unauthorised, irregular or fruitless expenditure. These charges were included in the disciplinary processes.

Criminal charges

On the recommendation that four SAPS employees referred to in slide 19 must be charged criminally, this meant that investigations would need to be opened against those four employees. The remaining 11 were not implicated in criminal conduct, so disciplinary conduct could be implemented internally.

Telkom contract

Lt Gen Mfazi said that Mr Somyo had raised a critical issue regarding sustainability. He recalled that in about 2018, the Committee had instructed the National Commissioner to act on issues that related to criminality and corruption in the SAPS. Since then, a team had been created to work on specific cases. This team had an integrated approach to dealing with these cases, and more recently, since its establishment, it had been linked to identity documents (IDs), and was now able to create a more comprehensive response in identifying and charging individuals.

On the issue of persons who had resigned, the integrated approach of SAPs involved all disciplines. The critical discipline was that of following the money, so the work of the AFU and financial integration came into play.

Subsequent to the previous interactions with the Committee, SAPS had been able to focus on specific individuals in specific divisions within the SAPS. This had helped it to decide which cases to pursue criminally, division by division. The fact that a person tried to run after being charged indicated that that person had made money out of the proceeds of crime.’

Procurement

There used to be a number of divisions dealing with procurement in the SAPS. However, a specific division should deal with procurement.

Ratio of senior to junior officers charged for corruption

Lt Gen Mfazi referred to the ratio of senior and junior members charged with corruption, and where the junior members were committing the acts under the instruction of senior members. SAPS was now putting up systems in order to identify when this was the case.

Gen Sitole added that there were some criminal cases which had deliberately been allowed to go cold. To deal with these, SAPS had brought in a cold case unit. There were other cases which SAPS was analysing, and the cold case unit was part of its value chain.

Follow-up questions

Mr Somyo said he had asked a question which needed analysis from the National Commissioner about the men and women he relied on, who formed part of his command structure and yet they indulged in criminality in various ways. He asked what the National Commissioner thought about such occurrences and what this said about the ranking structure and strategy of the SAPS. Every category was led by someone. He asked how these occurrences affected the upgrading of individuals into the higher ranks.

Mr B Hadebe (ANC) said that in cases relating to corruption, 94% of cases involved low-ranking officials. However, when it came to the procurement of goods and services, they were mainly high-ranking officers, as those who sat in bid-evaluation committees tended to be more senior. What concerned him, however, was that the number of low-ranking officials was huge. This should be a concern for SCOPA in terms of future growth and the promotion of officials. The critical question raised by Mr Somyo was that by the time the more junior officials were promoted, they would have committed theft, extortion and fraud, and would not yet have been found to have been involved with procurement.

He asked what the presentation meant by ‘sanctions short of dismissal.’ He also noted the cases where officials were brought back because 90 days had lapsed without finalising the case, and commented that having these officers brought back and put in different roles would not inspire confidence in those officers who were doing good work. An effort needed to be made to expedite disciplinary processes, as his view was that when the Act envisioned 90 days, it assumed that no matter the type of case, it would be concluded within that time. It was not a good thing to work with someone accused of corruption and brought into a new team.

SAPS response

Senior officers

Gen Sitole said the posts for senior officers were filled in one of two ways -- either through advertisements according to national instruction, or in terms of regulation 45, where such an officer did not necessarily compete with others. A very clear way of scrutinising a candidate was outlined in the national instruction. Once a person was taken through those criteria, the SAPS was convinced that the person was ready to be an officer. A succession plan, both long and short term -- the former being most beneficial -- had recently been implemented. Leadership growth and talent was identified and nurtured. These members were exposed to management and leadership ethics. Linked to the succession plan was a mentorship strategy. Linked to the long-term succession plan, was a vetting process in the vertical advancement process which included lifestyle audits so that SAPS ensured that members did not venture into financial commitments which were beyond their living means.

After being taken through these processes, SAPS had introduced a community policing strategy as announced by the President. This strategy now assisted SAPS to publicly scrutinise people so that community opinions were taken into consideration regarding specific officials. In this way, for example, in the case of a station commander, SAPS would gain an understanding of who would make a good commander, based on that person’s relationship with the community.

The SAPS had now minimised the promotion of members through the ranks through regulation 45, and was now increasing promotion through advertisements to ensure that members were sufficiently scrutinised.

He noted that most of the transgressions of senior officials were old transgressions resulting from the exploitation of the absence of control measures at that particular time. SAPS was now in the process of reclaiming the corporate image of the SAPS so that it could reclaim it, and re-instil the public’s faith in it. He thanked the Committee for its support.

Lt Gen Mfazi said that there was a link between the two questions. Junior members were actually foot soldiers in criminal activities. Using the COVID-19 period as an example, there had been a great number of junior members involved. However, when corruption was involved, it involved senior members primarily. When senior members behaved like this, they sent a message to junior members. This spoke to the issue of discipline in the organisation -- junior members could see that their senior members were not taking responsibility for their responsibilities. However, there was commitment from management of the organisation, and from the Committee, to ensure that SAPS was brought back to enforcing proper discipline.

The Chairperson asked about the monetary value attached to these cases. Although the number of senior officials was low, they may be involved in exorbitant amounts of corruption. He was particularly concerned about those serving on bid adjudication committees, and he asked whether there had been lifestyle audits conducted on those who remained to ensure that they were people of integrity and morality. He asked the SAPS to provide this information in the report which it was going to provide with further details by Friday that week. The Committee would then be able to compare this with the annual reports, according to the extension given by National Treasury.

He appreciated the thanks given to the Committee, as few appreciated its work. One place where the Committee did not expect corruption was the SAPS. The country needed the SAPS to lead by example. It wanted to see more arrests within the SAPS, with the blue uniforms of those convicted turning into orange outfits. The Committee’s anxieties were reduced from their first meetings, but it wanted to hear more about results at the next meeting.

Committee matters

SAA

The Chairperson told Committee members that the meeting on SAA would be taking place at 18:30 the next day, after the meeting in the House to deal with SAA matters.

Mr Lees referred to the meeting the next day, and said he wanted to put on record his dissatisfaction on the need to have another joint meeting. He asked whether the questions sent in writing had been answered, and asked for a reminder to be sent to the Minister and his Department to send the responses to their questions in advance of the meeting tomorrow.

Mr Hadebe said that the presentation indicated that SAA still needed to receive R10.5 billion. He therefore asked that the Chairperson stress that the written response be sent by SAA by the end of business that day.

The Chairperson said that both National Treasury and SAA would be presenting, and the Committee Secretary would check again to see if any response had been received. However, as far as he knew, there had not been any submission made yet. He also noted that the Gen Holomisa and sent a letter, and the opinion of Parliament had been circulated. He asked that Committee Members study it.

Beitbridge

The Public Protector had also sent correspondence asking SCOPA to make submissions regarding Beitbridge. He had advised the Public Protector that there were currently no resolutions, as the report had not been finalised. The Committee had transcribed some additional issues raised by Minister Mapisa-Nqakula, which would be circulated to the Committee. The Members needed to decide on a date to finalise the report, as the Public Protector needed it for her Beitbridge investigation. However, he did not feel SCOPA was in a position to hand over a draft report. He had also explained to the Public Protector that a fundamental challenge on its part was that the complainant was a Member of the Committee. Parliament’s legal services would, however, inform the Committee on how to proceed.

The meeting was adjourned.