Public Service Commission: Annual report

Meeting report

PUBLIC SERVICE AND ADMINISTRATION PORTFOLIO COMMITTEE
7 May 2000
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION: ANNUAL REPORT

Documents handed out:
Report on the management of remunerated overtime in the public service (executive summary is attached to end of minutes - Appendix 1)
Report on the investigation into dismissals as a result of misconduct report (executive summary is attached to end of minutes - Appendix 2)
Public Service Commission Annual Report - 1999

Public Service Commission's delegation: Professor S Sangweni (Chair), Mr J Ernstzen (Dep. Chair), Dr E Levin, Dr G Bain, Mr Msoki, Mr Morule, Mr B Wentzel and Ms Rantho.

SUMMARY
The Public Service Commission's presentation covered three areas: (1) a report detailing their investigation into dismissals as a result of misconduct and recommendations arising from it; (2) a report of remunerated overtime management in the Public Service and proposals to improve management of overtime; (3) the Public Service Commission's Annual Report which dealt with the Commission's performance and internal efficiency and the way forward.

MINUTES
Report on the investigation into dismissals as a result of misconduct
Mr Msoki began by explaining that this Public Service Commission report is a product of government's commitment to fight corruption and the Portfolio Committee's call for a revision of misconduct provisions in the Public Service. The investigation had shown that there were poor systems in place for record keeping, monitoring and evaluation and the appeal procedure was inefficient and drawn out.

The Commission had made the following proposals:
- establish a database of misconduct cases that will be updated every six months;
- a follow-up investigation (first quarter 2001) is needed to evaluate effect of the new Disciplinary Codes and Procedures;
- departments ought to have in-built review systems to curtail long delays in appeals;
- development of manuals for use by executive authorities on how to handle appeals;
- assist departments and provincial administrations in monitoring and evaluation systems development;
- intensive training throughout the Public Service;
- Anti-Corruption Initiative to include and consider the findings of the Commission;
- findings of the Commission to be included in workshop programmes;
- good practices adopted in private sector to be evaluated for purposes of including them Public Service;
- continue inviting employee organisations to be involved in follow-up investigations.

He concluded that the constraints that made the dismissal of officials difficult will be assessed in the light of the new Disciplinary Code and Procedure effective from 1999, and that the investigation will be repeated in a cycle of two to three years.

Questions
Mr Sikhakhane (ANC) asked what the Commission is doing in dealing with a serious ambiguity - an employee found guilty of misconduct by an employer department still has to appeal to the same persons who found him guilty (i.e. how can an employer self-investigate?). Mr Msoki replied that an appeal will receive urgent attention from the Commission.

With reference to the report, Mr Grobler (DP) inquired about the department's practice of always stating race when dealing with any given issue. The Commission pointed out that the report was tabled in the period 1996-98 and will therefore bear the racial trademark of the time, future reports are unlikely to do so.

Mr Msomi (IFP) asked if disciplinary measures taken against a wrong doer were for punitive or corrective purposes. The Commission said depending on the misconduct, it is sometimes necessary for measures to be punitive (such as dismissal) or corrective (strict conditions imposed), and in some instances neither of the two (counselling).

Mr de Beer (UDM) commented that the picture one gets is very bleak. There is the feeling that not enough is being done to address the problem. He asked how many government officials have been suspended with full pay.

The Commission argued that much has been done and its performance must be measured by the successes and not by still existent problems since its function is in the form of an on-going process. It conceded that it did not have the number of suspended-with-full-pay officials. The matter shall be prioritised.

Ms September (ANC) suggested that now that the Commission has been able to put Codes in place, it is still the responsibility of the Commission to establish mechanisms to measure the success or failure of the Codes.

The Commission explained that because of the transformation process, there have been many challenges and problems thus making it even more difficult to monitor an unstable and constantly changing terrain. For example, there was no Bargaining Chamber prior to 1993. The effects of the Codes are definitely going to be evident in the near future.

Mr Geldenhuys (NP) complained that the report failed to detail the information by province (since corruption was said to be rife in certain provinces such as the Eastern Cape). The Commission in reply said that it would consider this omission since it is indeed important that it be known what precisely is happening where.

Report on the management of remunerated overtime in the public service
See the Executive Summary for a briefing on this report.

Questions
Mr Sikhakhane wished to know what the Commission had to say about instances where overtime is perpetually inevitable such as in the case of Home Affairs officials deployed at airports during festive/holiday season. The response was that in most instances overtime is the result of bad management. In instances of unavoidable overtime, there is still a need for proper overtime management in order to prevent excessive overtime.

Mr Sithole (ANC) posed three questions - what is being done about managers who deliberately create overtime for monetary benefits; what of managers who had to work overtime because of continual absence of employees; are managers going to be retrained in this area. The Commission offered that the workshops that are being organised shall be focusing mainly on management training, and that steps will be taken against managers found to be defrauding the government with fictitious overtime claims.

Ms September asked whether the Commission has investigated work practices - there appears to be lots of redundant personnel in government departments. The Commission pointed out that some departments have inherited personnel from the previous government who, because of changes effected, have become useless and thus a liability. However unemployment and job losses have to be considered; the Commission seeks to create jobs and not the opposite.

Annual Report
The Commission reviewed their 1999 Annual Report.

Questions
Mr Sithole wanted to know how and with whom does the Commission communicate particular trends detected in specific sectors of public service as the Portfolio Committee and the public must stay informed.

The Commission said it is presently addressing communication because it understands the significance of proper, efficient, and speedy information dissemination. The process of installing a means of communicating with all stakeholders is ongoing and thus it is not possible to give a detailed account.

The Chairperson of the Portfolio Committee pointed out that what remains to be done is for the members to process the reports and if necessary they will consult the Commission. The Chairperson of the Commission thanked the committee for the opportunity to present. He pointed out that this was the first time ever that the Commission had to account for itself . He expressed the hope that the Commission and the Portfolio Committee will continue interacting by other available means as this will assist the Commission in carrying out its mandate.

The meeting was adjourned.

Appendix 1:
REPORT ON THE MANAGEMENT OF REMUNERATED OVERTIME

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 The performance of remunerated overtime poses significant financial implications for employers in the public and private sectors. In accordance with figures obtained from the Personnel and Salary System (PER SAL) R986 million was spent in the Public Service on remunerated overtime in the 1997/98 financial year alone.
1.2 In view of the substantial financial implications attached to remunerated overtime, the Public Service Commission decided, in pursuance of its Constitutional mandate, to conduct an investigation into the management of remunerated overtime in the following eight (8) national departments in the Public Service:

• Agriculture.
• Environmental Affairs and Tourism.
• Foreign Affairs.
• Justice.
• Land Affairs.
• Public Works.
• Trade and Industry.
• Water Affairs and Forestry.

2. MEASURES REGULATING COMPENSATION FOR OVERTIME
2.1 As background to the findings of the investigation a brief summary is provided of the measures that regulate compensation for overtime and of future developments in this regard. Officials were, in accordance with Chapter D.VI of the Public Service Staff Code (PSSC) (the measures which applied when this investigation was conducted), remunerated according to -

• an hourly tariff calculated as one and one-third times the salary of the person concerned for overtime performed during the hours before 20:00 and after 06:00 from Monday to Saturday; and
• an hourly tariff calculated as twice the salary of the person concerned for overtime performed on Sundays, public holidays and hours between 20:00 and 06:00.

2.2 The new Public Service Regulations (PSR), implemented on 1 July 1999, places an obligation on heads of department to establish overtime policies for their departments and differs in two very important aspects from the PSSC and old PSR. Firstly it places the responsibility to manage and control overtime firmly in the hands of heads of departments by requiring the development of departmental policies. Secondly, it places limitations on the level at which persons may be compensated for overtime as well as the monthly compensation that employees may receive for overtime.

2.3 The Basic Conditions of Employment Act (BCEA) 1997 becomes applicable to the Public Service on 1 June 2000. According to the Act an employer must pay an employee at least one and one-half times the employee's wage for overtime worked (as opposed to the one and one-third times the wage currently applicable in the Public Service).

3. BACKGROUND TO THE PERFORMANCE OF OVERTIME IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE

3.1 Reasons for the performance of overtime
3.1.1 The performance of remunerated and voluntary overtime are common practice in the departments investigated. Overtime is generally performed as a result of the following:
• Work environment where a continuity of services is required on a 24 hour basis.
• Additional tasks must be performed.
• The technical and unique nature of work.
• Shortage of staff.
• Lack of trained staff with appropriate experience.
• Inefficient work procedures.
• High absenteeism.
• Backlogs in work.

3.2 The frequency of overtime
3.2.1 The performance of planned overtime in the Public Service occurs either on an ad hoc basis (during certain periods of the year) or continuously throughout the year. The officials interviewed performed an average of 472 hours overtime per person in 1997 (a combination of remunerated and voluntary overtime).

3.2.2 The performance of remunerated overtime has become part and parcel of many officials lifestyles, especially where it was performed for long continuous periods. The income generated through remunerated overtime in such cases is viewed by officials as part of their salary packages and many admitted that it would be to their detriment, financially, to suddenly stop performing remunerated overtime.

3.3 Financial implications of remunerated overtime
3.3.1 Overtime expenditure increased significantly in the 1996/97 financial year and even more dramatically in the 1997/98 financial year. The total amount of overtime expenditure for the eight (8) departments investigated increased from R9 million in the 1993/94 financial year to R13 million in the 1997/98 financial year, as indicated in Chart 1. Overtime expenditure in these departments individually increased between 179% and 10012 % during this period.

Chart 1: Combined overtime expenditure
1993/94 to 1997/98 [not included]

3.3.2 The reasons for the increase in overtime expenditure since 1996/97 are two-fold. Firstly, there has been an increase in the number of hours overtime performed per annum by officials. Secondly, the basis for the calculation of the overtime tariff was adjusted with effect from 1 July 1996.

4. ABILITY OF DEPARTMENTS TO EFFECTIVELY MANAGE REMUNERATED OVERTIME
4.1 Knowledge of and accessibility to the relevant prescripts
4.1.1 The extent to which officials are conversant with the relevant prescripts were probed. The following problems were observed:

• The national prescripts are not always accessible to all managers.
• Newly appointed managers are not provided with the necessary training.
• A minority of the managers interviewed were neither familiar with the basis for the calculation of the tariff for overtime nor familiar with the requirements regarding control prescribed in the PSSC.
• Senior officials perform the same work during overtime as subordinates but are remunerated at higher rates calculated according to their salaries.

4.2 Departmental policies
4.2.1 A definite need exists for departmental policy frameworks to guide the management of remunerated overtime. The following four departments investigated have already developed such policies or are in the process of developing and implementing such a policy:
• Environmental Affairs and Tourism.
• Land Affairs.
• Trade and Industry.
• Water Affairs and Forestry.

4.2.2 Although the departmental policies prescribe the relevant control measures to be utilised by managers, these control measures in the majority of cases amounted to no more than a summary of the prescripts contained in the PSSC. Guidelines are not provided on how to deal with unique circumstances and problems encountered in departments.

4.3 Strategies to limit overtime expenditure
4.3.1 The following attempts to limit the financial implications attached to remunerated overtime were detected in the investigation:
• Limiting approval for the performance of remunerated overtime.
• Appointment of casual employees.
• Expedited filling of vacancies.
• Assessment of work procedures and the utilisation of staff.

4.4 Process for the funding and approval of remunerated overtime
4.4.1 In the majority of the departments investigated, inputs for allocations in respect of remunerated overtime are made by each of the components in which overtime is/will be performed. Not all components, however, budget for the payment of remunerated overtime. Another practice observed in certain of the departments studied was to fund overtime from savings on personnel expenditure.

4.4.2 Approval for the performance of remunerated overtime, in respect of components where overtime is performed on a continuous basis, is linked to the budgeting process. Ad hoc approval for overtime is also obtained for the performance of overtime when the need arises.

4.4.3 Once approval has been obtained the details thereof are captured on the Personnel and Salary System (PERSAL) The field provided on PERSAL limits the payment of overtime to the officials, number of hours, costs and period in respect of which approval has been obtained.

4.4.4 Top management in all of the departments appears to be strict in granting of approval for remunerated overtime.

4.5 Control over the performance of remunerated overtime
4.5.1 The basic control measures utilised by departments are the keeping of overtime registers, the verification of claims for overtime payment by supervisors and the limitations placed as captured on PERSAL.

4.5.2 The levels of supervision in a large number of the components were not adequate. Personnel are allowed to perform remunerated overtime at home or without supervision at work. Additional control measures include the following:
• Registers kept by security divisions
• Provision on overtime registers for personnel to indicate exactly
what they have done and the quantity thereof.
• Control mechanisms on computer networks.
• Strict planning of overtime and the allocation of time frames to complete tasks.
• Components to investigate fraud.
• Audits of overtime claims.

4.6 The role of managers
4.6.1 Managers have an integral part to play to ensure that overtime is managed effectively. According to the managers interviewed remunerated overtime is open to manipulation if the necessary control measures are not applied. Certain managers in the absence of departmental policy, limit the hours of overtime performed per day, week and month as well as the number of personnel that perform overtime to the absolute minimum required. Overtime is generally scheduled well in advance by managers and officials are informed timeously of the need to perform overtime.

5. CORE PROBLEM AREAS IDENTIFIED
5.1 The following is a list of the most significant problems identified during the investigation:
• The financial implications of remunerated overtime are alarming due to a sharp increase in expenditure since 1996/97.
• Officials view income generated through overtime as part of their basic salary.
Departments do not strategise on how to curb overtime expenditure.
• Managers are not trained to manage remunerated overtime.
• Prescripts are not accessible to all managers and where accessible are not understood.
• Prescripts are not adhered to.
• Control measures are inadequate.
• Criteria for the approval of remunerated overtime are not consistently applied.
• The need for remunerated overtime is sometimes fictitious.
• Time off is not utilised as an alternative to compensate personnel.

6. OVERTIME MANAGEMENT AS APPLIED BY OTHER lNSTITUTIONS IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
6.1 The manner in which institutions in the public and private sectors manage overtime was investigated with a view to determine whether any lessons could be learned in respect of the Public Service. It was found that, as in the Public Service, the effectiveness of the control measures applied by their institutions depends largely on the consistent application thereof by managers. Certain of these institutions have, however, instituted systems which, although not fool proof, assist managers with their responsibilities in respect of control (such as an access control and clock card system).

6.2 An advantage that these private sector institutions have is that the majority of managers operate, manage and take full responsibility for their own budgets. The same limitations which apply to Public Service managers are therefore not applicable to them. The fact that they have the authority to approve remunerated overtime within the limits of their budgets, increases their awareness of the need to effectively control the performance of remunerated overtime.

7. PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE THE MANAGEMENT OF REMUNERATED OVERTIME
Emanating from the findings of the investigation and the provisions of the new PSR, the following proposals are made on how the management of remunerated overtime can be improved:

7.1 Development and implementation of comprehensive departmental policies on overtime
Based on the problem areas that were identified proposed that the following be included in departmental policies on overtime:
• Provision should be made for the system of time off as an alternative form of compensation for overtime.
• The number of hours overtime that may be performed should be limited.
• The process for the approval of remunerated overtime should be clearly defined.
• Guidance should be given to managers on specific control measures that can be utilised.
• Strategies to limit the performance of remunerated overtime should be developed.

7.2 Training should be provided and access to prescripts improved

All personnel involved with the management of overtime should be provided with training and management should be specifically provided with guidance on their responsibilities in respect of the management of overtime.

7.3 Managing overtime with due regard to basic employee rights
Departments are encouraged to proactively start preparing for the implementation of the BCEA, 1997, in the Public Service. It is pointed out that the basic employee rights enshrined in this Act should be taken into consideration when departments draft their departmental policies on overtime.

8. CONCLUSION
8.1 The investigation revealed that the control mechanisms applied by departments should be strengthened to avoid the possible manipulation and abuse of remunerated overtime.

8.2 Managers should be provided with guidance to approach the control of overtime with the seriousness that it deserves.

8.3 The Department of State Expenditure should devise a monitoring mechanism to determine if the trend in expenditure on remunerative overtime is increasing or decreasing over the current and next financial years.

Appendix 2:
REPORT ON DISMISSALS AS A RESULT OF MISCONDUCT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Corruption has become increasingly prevalent in South African Society. Government has repeatedly expressed its concern and has committed itself to the fight against corruption. Cabinet mandated a Ministerial Committee in 1997 to consider a campaign against corruption in the Public Service. This resulted in the holding of the Public Sector Anti-Corruption Conference and the National Anti-Corruption Summit which took place in the Old Parliament Buildings, Cape Town. A key consideration at both events was the handling of discipline and the effectiveness of the disciplinary procedures.

1.2 The Portfolio Committee on Public Service and Administration also identified the need for the revision of the misconduct provisions in the Public Service. In pursuance of the Constitutional mandate of the Public Service Commission to promote and maintain a high standard of professional ethics and effectiveness in the Public Service, it was deemed appropriate that an investigation into dismissals as a result of misconduct be embarked upon.

1.3 The report provides statistics of the misconduct cases attended to by national departments during the period 1996 to 1998, the problems and delays associated with the disciplinary process and a commentary on he developments in respect of the disciplinary processes in the Public Service.

2. FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION
2.1 Statistical information
The following statistics have been drawn out in respect of the misconduct cases in the national departments:

• Out of a total of 2 247 misconduct cases, 1 077 cases were finalised and
1 170 cases are still in the process of being finalised.
• There were 281 corruption related cases and further 793 cases that were not corruption related.
• Of the 1 077 finalised cases, 964 officials were found guilty of misconduct and 113 officials were found not guilty.
• With regard to the punishment imposed, 238 officials were dismissed from the Public Service, out of the 964 officials found guilty of misconduct. The other officials had sanctions other than dismissal imposed.
I
• Thirty eight appeals were lodged against the finding of guilty of the presiding officer and/or decision of the head of department.
• Of the 238 officials dismissed from dismissed from the Public Service, 102 officials were dismissed for corruption related offences.

2.2 Inefficiency Cases
The need for a separate future investigation in respect of inefficiency cases was analysed/ There were four inefficiency cases in total over the three year period. All four were found unfit for duty/incapable of carrying out their duties efficiently and had resigned voluntarily.

2.3 The involvement of the employee organisations/unions in the investigation

Misconduct procedures are matters of mutual interest and employee organisations have a vested interest therein. The twelve employee organisations/unions admitted to the Public Service Co-ordinating Bargaining Council were requested to furnish any information that could assist in the investigation. The response from the organisations/unions was poor.

3. ROLES OF OTHER BODIES
3.1 Portfolio Committee on Public Service id Administration

The Portfolio Committee raised concerns n the Public Service and made certain recommendations. These are incorporated in the report.

3.2 Agreement on the New Disciplinary Code and Procedures
Emanating from one of the recommendations by the Portfolio Committee, the Department of Public Service and Administration drafted a new streamlined, Disciplinary Code for the Public Service, which was compliant with the Labour Relations Act. Agreement on the new Code had been reached in the Public Service
Co-ordinating Bargaining Council and the Code became effective on 1 July 1999. The key issues that emerged from the new Code are the following:

• The new Code replaces the procedures contained in the Public Services Act, Public Service Regulations and the Public Service Staff Code.
• Discipline becomes a corrective measure and not a punitive one.
• The new process has been designated to expedite the handling of misconduct and time frames have been stipulated.
• No legal representation is allowed, unless the employee herself/himself is a legal practitioner.
• Discipline is a management function.
• No formal enquiry is required in instances where the nature of the misconduct warrants counselling, verbal written or final written warnings. Disciplinary enquiries may be held in more serious misconduct cases.
• The new Code is formulated in a user friendly manner. It serves as guidelines.
The executing authority will now consider appeals. The appeal authority may be either the executing authority or an employee appointed by the executing authority who was not involved in the disciplinary action.

3.3 Finalisation of a grievance procedure by the Public Service Commission
With regard to the Portfolio Committee's concern that hand-in-hand with a disciplinary procedure a grievance procedure is also required, interim rules for dealing with complaints and grievances of officials in the Public Service were published by the Public Service Commission in Government Notice No. R.800 dated I July 1999. The Commission has commenced a broad and thorough consultation process on the final grievance rules.

4. OBSERVATIONS
The following observations, including observations draw from the study undertaken by the Portfolio Committee on Public Service and Administration, were made. Whilst these observations may be of concern, some of the proposals will address these concerns.

4.1 Increase in cases
The total number of misconduct cases increased from 305 in 1996 to 829 and 1113 in 1997 and 1998 respectively.

4.2 Outstanding cases
From 1996 and 1997. some two to three years later. 126 and 402 cases respectively are still outstanding. This could be attributed to the protracted and unwieldy nature of the existing misconduct provisions. Furthermore, the question also arises around the effective management of the disciplinary procedures and the apparent abdication of responsibility on the part of managers.

4.3 Discrepancies
The number of misconduct cases attended 1 077 and 1170 revealed during the investigation of Agriculture and the South African Police Service had no record of the misconduct cases attended to during 1996. The Department of Correctional Services did not furnish information on misconduct cases attended to during three years.

4.4 Poor record keeping
Poor record keeping and in certain instances the complete lack of record keeping inhibited the assimilation of data.

4.5 Poor monitoring and evaluation systems
Departments not furnishing the information requested by the Public Services Commission could be attributed to poor monitoring and evaluation systems that exist in departments or the non-existence of these systems.

4.6 Effect of delays in misconduct cases
Managers could be reluctant to initiate disciplinary steps against officials in view of the length of time it takes to finalise misconduct cases. This inaction by managers encourages further transgressions.

4.7 Appeals
The transfer of the appeal function to the executing authority could have adverse consequences in terms of inconsistencies in the consideration of appeals by the different executing authorities.

4.8 Role of the Public Service Commission
In terms of the role and function of the Public Service commission to monitor I investigate and evaluate the personnel practices in the Public Service, continuous evaluations of the disciplinary process in the Public Service will have to be undertaken by the Commission.

4.9 Inputs from employee organisations/unions
Although the responses from the unions were poor which could be attributed to the inputs furnished to the Portfolio Committee, the unions should continue to
make evaluations and inputs on the disciplinary procedures as they have a role to play in the process.

5. PROPOSALS
The following proposals are made:

5.1 Database
The established data base regarding misconduct must be updated by the Public Service Commission on a six-monthly basis. A mechanism should be developed by the Commission for departments to submit statistics for purposes of the update.

5.2 Follow-up investigation
A follow-up investigation during the first quarter of 2001 is considered necessary. This will afford the new Disciplinary Code and Procedures reasonable time to be implemented after which its efficiency and efficacy should be evaluated by the Commission. The effectiveness of dismissing officials from the Public Service in terms of the new Code will have to be determined.

5.3 Review
To curtail the long period of time it takes to finalise misconduct cases persistent follow-up on all outstanding cases need to be done. Department and provincial administrations should build into their policies a review system pertaining to all outstanding cases.

5.4 Development of manual
The executing authority is now tasked to consider appeals. The Public Service Commission, in view of its previous role in the handling of appeals, will be responsible for the development of a manual containing guidelines to assist executing authorities in the handling of appeals.

5.5 Monitoring and evaluation Systems
The Public Service Commission will assist departments and provincial administrations in developing a monitoring and evaluation system that will facilitate the provision of information.

5.6 Training
The Department of Public Service and Administration should undertake intensive training programmes on the new Disciplinary Code and Procedures throughout the Public Service.

5.7 Anti-Corruption Initiatives
The findings of this investigation. Especially those issues relating to the corruption related cases, must be included in the Anti-Corruption Initiatives being undertaken by the Public Service Commission.

5.8 Code of Conduct
The findings of this investigation should also be included in follow-up workshops being conducted by the Public Service Commission on the Code of Conduct. This will create the awareness amongst participants that corruption-related transgressions are being monitored.

5.9 Good Practices
The good practices adopted in the private sector, Telkom, Parastatals and Local Government should he evaluated in the follow-up investigation to determine whether any of these practices can be incorporated in the Public Service to improve the disciplinary process.

5.10 Involvement of employee organisations/unions
Despite the poor responses from he employee organisations. they should nevertheless be invited to participate in the follow-up investigation as the disciplinary procedures are matters of mutual interest.

6. CONCLUSION
6.1 The investigation revealed that there are constraints in effecting the dismissal of officials and in finalising misconduct cases expeditiously. Seemingly, these
concerns have been addressed in the new Disciplinary Code and Procedures for the Public Service which took effect from 1 July 1999

6.2 The investigation will be repeated in a review cycle of two to three years. This will enable the effectiveness and efficiency of the guidelines contained in the new
Disciplinary Code and Procedures, especially the speed with which misconduct cases are being handled, to be determined.