Heads of Department Appointment & Management: Public Service Commission Report & DPME Minister response

Public Service and Administration

23 May 2012
Chairperson: Ms JC Moloi-Moropa (ANC)
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Meeting Summary

The Public Service Commission (PSC) Consultative Report had concluded that the manner in which HoDs were recruited, appointed and managed required a rethink and identified the challenges involved in this process. Key challenges in this area included the fact that the appointment process did not always result in the selection of the best candidates for the job, and the short-term nature of the employment contracts tended to encourage a high level of mobility among HoDs. In addition, the performance management and development process was applied with worrying levels of inconsistency, with some HoDs not being evaluated at all while others only got evaluated after the end of the financial year primarily to inform decisions about financial performance incentives. The recommendations were presented.

After the PSCs presentation, the Minister of the DPME was given an opportunity to respond to the content of the Consultative Report.
He said DPME's proposals were in line with what had been put in the Consultative Report which was that one had to insist on the completion of performance agreements and performance assessments within a specific time frame. In the meantime, there was a need to find alternatives to allow the DPME an opportunity to run a pilot phase before a complete rollout of the new system. In the interim, if Cabinet agreed, the PSC and everyone else would agree to do the work in terms of the current instruments. The DPME hoped that by February 2013 the process would be completed and be able to interface this with the beginning of the next financial year.

Thereafter, committee members voiced their questions and concerns with respect to, but not limited to, the countries chosen for the international comparative study, how the Cabinet would respond to the Consultative Report, whether the lack of evaluation of HoDs was due to capacity constraints and what the challenges were, whether the report was saying that the HoDs were incapable of further training due to heavy workloads and whether Palama would be up to the task of training HoDs. The PSC Chairperson reminded the Committee that PSC was not a policy maker. PSC had been tasked with presenting recommendations on how to deal with the appointment and performance management of HoDs going forward. 

Meeting report

Opening Statement by Chairperson
The Chairperson indicated that she felt greatly honored that the issues had been taken up appropriately and thankful for the good working relationship between the Committee and the Public Service Commission. The attendance of the PSC commissioners, including its Chairperson and deputy Chairperson was appreciated. The PSC was sincerely thanked for the work done, especially around S195 of the Constitution, and that they would be doing more work around S197 of the Constitution. She noted an apology from Minister Manuel.

Heads of Department Appointment & Management: Public Service Commission Consultative Report
Mr Ben Mthembu, PSC Chairperson of the PSC, thanked the Committee for the invitation to share some of its work and findings around the aspect of leadership. The PSC felt that it was important to look into the management of HoDs in the public service, that it was critical for a move away from the post-1994 approach / thinking that it was automatic that HoDs were appointed for life in the public service, but now rather that HoDs would be appointed based on their performance. After 15 years it had become clear that there were certain problems around this paradigm and in this context the PSC conducted the study. The PSC conducted an international comparative study and studied literature on which this Consultative Report was based. Their hope was that the report would bring a positive change.

Prof Richard Levin, PSC Director General, gave the briefing which looked at methodology, the evaluative overview of the appointment and management of the HoDs, recommendations and conclusions. The key issue being that Cabinet had requested the PSC formally over 10 years ago to develop a system for managing the performance and development of HoDs and through that particular involvement the PSC essentially received an acquired instead of a natural mandate. Some of the observations were that even though there was an open recruitment system for HoDs, the PSC had not necessarily seen the selection of the best candidates and, further, that the nature of the short-term contract had led to instability. This instability was most common at the point of elections of new members of the executive at national and provincial level. At the same time the performance management process had been conducted inconsistently. Some HoDs' performance had been evaluated consistently while some HoD's had not been performance managed at all. The focus had been on financial incentives instead of looking at how performance could be improved and how the capacity of Directors General and HoDs could be developed.

Prof Levin said that the Consultative Report drew on all the relevant key findings the PSC had made over the years and built on these having used the comparative study that was completed during the course of the 2008/9 financial year. The Consultative Report therefore effectively constituted a logical sequence in a series of oversight studies that the PSC conducted in this area. The report brought together a large body of work. It looked at the current arrangement for the appointment of HoDs as well as their performance management and ultimately came up with two broad options on how the system could be improved. In the formative years of the system following the request by Cabinet, there were trips undertaken to New Zealand and Canada, which also had some bearing on the outcome of the report. There were study tours to the UK and Kenya to learn more about the systems and processes followed by these countries in the appointment and management of HoDs. A series of meetings were initiated with the foreign embassies of Denmark, France, Sweden and delegations from the Federal Civil Service Commission of Nigeria and the German Agency for Technical Co-operation - the purpose of these meetings was to augment the information gathered during the study tours. This was supplemented by a desktop study of literature, which focussed among others, on the relevant reports produced previously by the PSC in this area. A survey questionnaire was also developed and distributed to heads of national and provincial departments in the Public Service to obtain the views of HoDs on whether the current framework was effective and how this framework could be improved. An analysis of all the data was collated from the aforementioned processes. The Consultative Report was also informed by the recommendations supported by the National Planning Commission (NPC) and by providing the most recent statistical data to reinforce trends.

As for recruitment and selection, the South African Public Service followed a policy of open competition for the filling of vacant posts of HoDs. The selection panel was constituted by a minimum of three Executive Authorities (EAs) and was expected to make a recommendation of the most suitable person for approval by the national or provincial Cabinet. The challenge with the current process was that it did not always lead to the appointment of the best candidate who met all necessary requirements. So the PSC looked at the trend in countries such as the UK, Canada, Kenya and Nigeria. In these countries, provisions had been made for the appointment of the Heads of the Public Service within their systems, a first among equals so to speak. These Heads of the Public Service were responsible for managing the effective functioning of the Public Service and, often with the assistance of their local Civil Service Commission, also facilitated the process of recruiting and selecting HoDs.

Prof Levin said, as the Chairperson indicated, we had moved to a different system soon after liberation for a number of reasons. One of the primary reasons was around the need for transformation in the Public Service, to transform it in a number of ways, particularly around representivity, ensuring that we had a representative Public Service, particularly in line with S195 of the Constitution, but also to play a broader transformative role within the Public Service as a whole and this also led to the introduction of contracts. The introduction of contracts led to a certain level of instability. It was worth observing that in countries where they had a fully developed contract systems as in the US, the material conditions were vastly different. In the case of the US, many of the people who were appointed at the upper echelons were already people who had substantial material bases individually. They were people who might have had successful businesses and who had put this aside for a period and then went back to it. In the contract system in SA, given our history, we had people who did not have a secure material basis who had been put into contractual positions which were quite insecure. It also had some other material implications around professional ethics and business interests, which some HoDs might have developed legitimately in some instances with no conflict of interest, However, it was important to point out that the contract situation in SA led to instability not only for the Public Service, but also the individual. Although the Senior Management Service (SMS) Handbook in SA indicated that the contract period in SA should not exceed the period of five years, a convention emerged where the majority of DGs and HoDs, particularly at national level, were appointed for a three-year term. When the survey was conducted, most of those HoDs and DGs felt that it was not only insecure, but also unstable because it took a while to get up and running to understand the core business, the support, the requirements of the department and no sooner was the particular incumbent on top of a matter, when the contract was starting to expire and the particular individual had to start thinking about his own future and personal security and was therefore unable to really make the kind of contribution that would be expected. On that basis, the PSC had made the recommendation that the contract period of three years should be reviewed. Cabinet considered the recommendation and post 2009 the new administration came in and decided that it would be better to come up with five-year contracts as the norm in SA.

Comparatively, in the UK, HoDs were not appointed on a contractual basis, although there were provisions for HoDs appointed from outside the Public Service to be appointed on a contractual basis. In Sweden, a three-year contract system was used, although HoDs were normally retained within the system until they decide to retire. In Canada, the situation was not really contractual. HoDs were called deputy ministers there. There was a solid pool and there was movement and the head of the Public Service, who was part of the Privy Council, would over time develop a good understanding of the different capacities and capabilities of the HoDs who might be deployed according to specific needs and requirements. Given the fact that the five-year contract was the norm, the contract issue had become less of an issue. The issue now was more how these HoDs would be managed to ensure that they not only make a meaningful contribution and over time improve performance, but also that there be opportunities for development of the particular incumbent so that over time his capacities grow and become a real resource for the public service administration.

Getting back to the performance management and development system, Cabinet's 2002 decision mandated the PSC to facilitate the performance evaluation of HoDs in the Public Service. This involvement of the PSC, in facilitating the evaluation process highlighted certain critical challenges with the current HoD evaluation system, which had to be addressed in order to strengthen the evaluation process and its impact. These challenges and which the PSA was aware of included the tendency for the performance agreements of HoDs to be concluded late (sometimes even long after the financial year had ended); a number of HoDs had not been evaluated for years and the performance evaluations being conducted only at the end of the financial year primarily for the purpose of awarding financial performance incentives. And then the process focussed on an event rather than on the whole, while the SMS Handbook required quarterly reviews to ramp up organisational and individual review, so one was left with a process which focussed on what happened at the end and ultimately whether there would be an incentive awarded at the end. The graphs in the report indicated respectively the decline in the percentage of HoD evaluations being conducted and the increase in the number of performance agreements (PAs) being filed by the due date. The Portfolio Committee played an important part in raising awareness of the importance of filing the PAs in time. [2006/7 the percentage of HoD evaluations conducted was 53%. This percentage dropped to 18% in 2009/10.] [In 2008/09 31% of performance agreements (PAs) were filed by due date, this percentage had increased to 54% in 2011/12.]

Looking at some of the other lessons: in the UK the evaluation of the performance of HoDs was the responsibility of the Head of the Civil Service, often assisted in this process by Her Majesty's Treasury and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. A remuneration committee comprising role players such as individuals from the public and private sectors advise the Prime Minister on the rewards payable to HoDs. Kenya also uses a system involving external role players. There was a Performance Contracts Steering Committee (PCSC) which drives the implementation of performance contracts. The PCSC was assisted by ad hoc Negotiations and Evaluation Task Forces drawn from outside the Public Service (private sector practitioners, retired public servants and academics). The role of the ad hoc task force was to negotiate and evaluate performance contracts of HoDs on behalf of the Head of the Public Service. So the head of the Public Service in different contexts mobilises different kinds of capacity to support the process and ensure that it was rigorous and incorporated different objectives, social actors who were able to contribute to the process in a number of ways, in terms of what appropriate incentives would be in the context of each HOD.

Training and Development
There was a strong feeling amongst the HoDs surveyed that there were not enough opportunities for development and there was a sense that even where there was a commitment from the EA for training and development, often those HODs were so overburdened that they were unable to utilise the opportunities for training and development. This area was problematic and needed a lot of thought and focus going forward.

Executive and the Administrative State Apparatus
One of the key issues which arose out of this whole question of the appointment, the contractual basis, the security of tenure of DGs and HoDs was this whole character of the executive/ administrative interface. It was a complex area, especially if they looked at it in the comparative context as they had in the report. If one looked at the different branches of government, the tendency was always to look at the judiciary, the legislature and the executive, and then they might not really have unpacked those and if they looked at the arrangements/ relationships in other countries, there were different kinds of arrangements which underpin the relationship between political and administrative heads. Obviously the history of SA was of significant importance. The Public Service needed transformation. South Africa opted for an executive which was assigned administrative powers throughout the Public Service Act. The Act assigned administrative powers to EAs who were responsible for Human Resource management and those responsibilities were delegated downwards to various extents. Having looked at the executives of other countries, there was a relative autonomy within the executives, between the executive itself and the administrative apparatus and this was one of the key strategic issues which we would need to face in this country. This was the extent to which one wants to build a relative autonomy between the executive and the administrative state apparatus, because there was a structural issue. Once the EA was assigned administrative responsibilities, then that kind of relative autonomy which one had in other countries simply could not exist because it meant that Ministers were involved in administration. The situation globally was if the administration was in chaos, if there was administrative or operational chaos, then the EA did have to take responsibility, because even where you get the relative autonomy, you would get a situation as in the UK, if the whole office was in chaos, that the Minister would be excused from that chaos. We were to appreciate that this was a complex situation. The accountability was always going to be there even where there was relative separation. But it was important because technically and operationally it did become complicated, especially where there were not delegations in place in the system. Where HODS would argue that administratively their hands were tied because they did not have delegations and there were a lot of things they would need to do in the HR terrain to ensure the efficiency and effectiveness of their departments. In terms of the system we had, there was insufficient clarity and this was what comes through from the Consultative Report. There was insufficient clarity around roles and responsibilities. So the majority of the HODs surveyed felt that there was no standard protocol which fairly delineated the roles and responsibilities between EAs and HoDs and hence the argument for the need for a standardised protocol which would lay this all out and lead to greater clarity on both sides of the relationship and would improve the system of accountability between the two role-players.

Based on the work done, the Consultative Report came up with two options. One option was to create a new system on the appointment and management of HoDs and option two was to retain the existing system with improvements. In terms of a new system, the proposal in option 1, the proposal was the introduction of an administrative head of the Public Service. An administrative Head of the Public Service (HPS) would be responsible for ensuring effective management of the Public Service including the management of career incidents of HoDs. The incumbents would also perform the functions of Cabinet Secretaries which placed them in a position to interact with Ministers on a range of issues including the political-administrative interface. The HPS would be the one who would need to mediate if there were breakdowns in relationships. To implement this system in SA, it would be necessary to amend the Public Service Act so as to give effect to this recommendation. With respect to recruitment and selection of HoDs, the HPS would be charged with the responsibility of advising the President and Premiers in making recruitment and selection decisions. In this regard the administrative heads of the Public Service could constitute a selection panel involving, among others, EAs, stakeholders representing sectors and HoDs. There were also recommendations with regard to the provision of training and development whereby the HPS as a substantive supervisor of HoDs would create enabling conditions for training and development to take place. This implied that each HoD in consultation with the HPS would need to identify his training and development needs and have these stated in the performance development plans (PDPs).

The recommendation with respect to the development of mediation mechanisms on roles and responsibilities within the new system on the management of career incidents of HoDs - the study showed a need to review the current dispute resolution mechanisms provided in the PAs of HoDs. Such a review would have to make provision for interventions when dealing with the roles and responsibilities of the HoDs and EAs, as ambiguity in effectively addressing these matters had led to serious tensions. With regard to termination of service, whether due to non-performance or breakdown in relationship, the HPS would have to advise the President or Premiers on the requirements for the termination of service for HoDs by developing clear guidelines to be followed. As for the centralised performance evaluation system of HoDs, the PSC piloted and now promoted the system of block/ cluster evaluations. In terms of this system a period would be identified wherein all performance evaluations were finalised, utilising a single panel which would be appointed to deal with the performance evaluation for a specific cluster.

On the recommendations for retaining the current system with improvements, there would be a need to ensure that the most suitable person was appointed to the post of HoD with due regard to an open and fair process. The review of the contract appointment was less of an issue now that the five-year contract was utilised, but the HoD should be provided with information indicating whether their contract would be renewed at least 6 months prior to the expiry of the tenure.

The report ended with a graph of the trend lines showing the HOD turnover for the past three financial years. The lines were not straight. Straight lines would of course show stability in the HoD turnover, but this was not the case. The years 2010, 2011 and 2012 show that there was a high turnover rate of HoDs and this was based on the latest information available on PERSAL.

The advantage of the current system was that it allowed Ministers a real opportunity to engage in performance management and evaluation. However, there were real logistical challenges on Ministers in terms of demands on their time and this often led to difficulties in constituting the panel. This led to postponements and the cumulative effect was the declining numbers of HoDs who were actually performance evaluated. Hence the recommendation for the cluster approach to evaluations. In Canada the clerk of the Privy council constituted his panel and they sat for a day or two and dealt with all the evaluations in one block. There was obviously a lot of preparatory work and a lot of analysis and engagement prior to that sitting, but the actual evaluation takes place in a very consolidated way in one sitting.

In terms of the tensions between the political / administrative interface, within the current system a lot more could be done at the election point in particular. In Nigeria there was a facilitated workshop between ministers and HoDs, which enhanced the working relationship because there was greater clarity than we had here. The
Public Administration Leadership and Management Academy (Palama) could play a role in a better induction process which set out roles and responsibilities more clearly. In other countries there was a pool of HoDs and the HPS would over time become familiar with strengths and weaknesses of individual HoDs. This would enhance ability to deploy HoDs appropriately according to their strengths and weaknesses within a particular portfolio or function.

In terms of the National Development Plan (NDP), Chapter 13 made a number of proposals which were supported by the PSC. There was a proposal for the appointment of an administrative head of the Public Service where operational accountability for the administrative function would rest with the Head of Public Service, but senior officials would remain accountable to their political seniors. This illustrated the complexity of administrative accountability of Ministers. Building a model going forward, we would need to recognise that if there were problems in any department, the Minister would always be held accountable. What was really innovative if one made a comparison in the context of the NDP was the hybrid approach which was being recommended. Because the hybrid approach would mean that the HPS would work with the PSC's Chairperson in the recruitment and selection process. They would identify a number of suitable candidates, they would present that to the EA, and then the EA would make the final decision. There were also recommendations to ramp up the powers and functions of the PSC to make it a robust champion of a meritocratic Public Service and obviously the big change in terms of the hybrid approach was that the PSC would come very directly into the recruitment process and this would have other implications in terms of the independence of the PSC. The PSC supported this approach.

The creation of the Ministry in the Presidency of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME) also had major implications for the management of the performance of HoDs. The DPME had developed a management and performance evaluation tool which had been approved by Cabinet. This allowed an assessment of both individual and organisational performance. The DPME was therefore likely to play a more active role in the management of the performance evaluations of HoDs.

In conclusion the management of performance and career incidents of HoDs was critical to the sound functioning of the administration in any country and ultimately one was looking for better service delivery and better outcomes.

Minister on Department of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation response to Consultative Report
The Minister in the Presidency of Performance Monitoring and Evaluation (DPME), Collins Chabane, started with what he called preliminary general statements which might have informed government’s response to the report. The first was that in 1994 government was faced with the challenge of integrating almost 11 Public Service institutions and the challenge that the core of the Public Service was occupied by mainly whites.

Coming to the issues they were dealing with now, the EA rests with the President and the Premiers and in their wisdom they delegated some of their functions to various institutions. Some of the functions had been delegated to the PSC. The Consultative Report went through an extensive wide range of issues with regard to Public Service. The issues related to HoDs had been dealt with eloquently in the report. The National Planning Commission (NPC) having been given a task to look at the general planning of SA society, both from the public sector side and private sector, also tied in with some of the challenges faced. Cabinet had not yet taken a decision on what type of reforms should be introduced. So the DPME viewed the Consultative Report from the PSC as part of the general debate which was encapsulated within the national plan. However it was felt that they could not wait for the National Plan Commission report while faced with certain challenges which impacted on our ability to deliver certain services. As a result of this recognition, Cabinet took the decision to assign the DPME to make proposals in respect of the management of the performance assessment of HoDs. DPME's role was to monitor the performance of departments and to work on a system of improving these departments and to monitor their improvement on a continual basis. The performance of individuals impacted on the performance of departments and that was why DPME had an interest in this. They argued that the performance of HoDs had to be linked in one way or another to the performance of the institutions which they run and therefore the assessment of the performance of the HoDs amongst other things would need to consider the performance of the department/institution which was being administered. This was DPME's primary focus in the work which it was currently doing. The DPME had done a wide range of consultations, with the PSC, the DPSA, National Treasury, the Auditor General, and local government. Cabinet had not adopted the DPME's proposals yet, but hopefully Cabinet would be expressing its views on the proposals next week.

The issue of the contract of the HoD had been settled as a result of the five-year contract having been implemented.

DPME's proposal was that given the current structure, and given the various responsibilities which had been given to various authorities, the Office of the Premiers and of the President needed to play a critical role in the assessment of HoDs. The EA should be given the final role in agreeing with the report. They had proposed that the Directors General both in the Presidency and in the Offices of the Premiers played a critical role on the panel which was supposed to do the assessments of HoDs. The EA needed to play a critical role in the assessment of the DGs. That was the inherent function. Evaluation panels would manage that process as suggested. One of the most important elements was that the DPSA asked the DPME to take the PSC Report with respect to the signing of Performance Agreements and to submit the Report to Cabinet. We did this. The DPME's proposals were in line with what had been put in the Consultative Report which was that we had to insist on the completion of performance agreements and also performance assessments within a specific time frame, without leaving it to chance, but by ensuring that those particular things happen within a specific period so that it could be managed. In the meantime, there was a need to find alternatives to allow the DPME an opportunity to run a pilot phase before a complete rollout of the new system. In the interim, if Cabinet agreed, the PSC and everyone else agreed to do the work in terms of the current instruments. The DPME hoped that by February 2013 the process would be completed and be able to interface this with the beginning of the next financial year.

In conclusion, two things, the architecture of the Public Service regulations and the laws which had been passed and the Constitution, were a response to the historical challenges which had been faced as a country. Therefore, (1) political management was critical for the achievement of the objectives they had set themselves as a nation, that is, to build a non-racial, non-sexist democracy and prosperous society and (2) they were charged within the context of the work which they were doing to develop a system which was going to improve the efficiency of the Public Service across the board.

The Chairperson thanked the Minister for his response.

Department of Public Service and Administration response
Mr Kenny Govender, DPSA Deputy Director General:
Human Resources Management and Development, commented that the DPSA welcomed the PSC Consultative Report. They were quite comfortable with the content of the report and the recommendations arising from the report, a large chunk of which they subscribed to. With respect to recommendations, they had also studied a number of models in other countries and what was important was the separation of the head of state. And perhaps it was necessary to think about that separation and whom the political head in the Public Service is. Part of this process was to review legislation. The main concern was the performance management aspect. With regard to outcomes-based performance management there was a stronger need to align departmental performance with individual performance. With regard to Training and Development, in April 2011 a directive was issued that individuals had to submit performance development plans (PDPs) which identified the competencies of the individual. It was necessary to find a way of ensuring that training took place in terms of those competencies to strengthen the development of the individual and ultimately the institution. The DPSA would also work closely with Palama in order to issue a directive to ensure compulsory training as he believed that the directive would have a profound effect. In terms of management and performance, there was a need to start building a firm understanding of what performance actually meant. He reiterated that the PSC Consultative Report, both findings and recommendations, were welcomed and generally agreed with.

Discussion
Mr Ramatlakane (COPE) asked what would be the mechanism to manage the permanent tension between the administration and the political authority, how would this permanent tension be mediated? [The member left the meeting soon after asking his questions and before the panel had an opportunity to answer him.]

Ms Maluleke (ANC) asked since it was the PSC's mandate to evaluate HoDs and they had said that there were many HoDs who were not evaluated, what the challenge was, what was the problem, why were they not evaluated and whether it remained a challenge now. With respect to the graphs on filing of PAs by the due date, there was an improvement from 24% in 2010/11 to 54% in 2011/12, and it seemed that the improvement took place after the PSC intervened. She asked if the low level of evaluations was due to a capacity issue and she wanted clarity on the meaning of "block evaluations"

Mr Manana (ANC) whilst he appreciated the work of the PSC, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the countries which were selected for the comparative international study. He said the choice almost projected the EA as incapable of selecting suitable comparative countries.

Ms Mohale (ANC) said that one of the challenges indicated in the Consultative Report was the conduct of performance management towards the end of the financial year primarily to obtain a financial incentive, but performance management was about whether the person was doing his job, and if it was found that he was not, even at the end of the financial year, why pay the person? She asked if they had looked into the quality of the evaluation documents. Thirdly, the Consultative Report stated that HoDs could barely manage to utilise training & development opportunities because they were so busy. She asked what was the PSC actually saying? Were HoDs able to be trained further? Did the PSC want the HoD workload to be reduced? Would Palama be up to the task of training HoDs? What would the relationship between the Head of Public Service and the EA be?

Mr Mthembu responded that the PSC's mandate was to facilitate the HoD evaluation process, especially the last evaluation of which there were four per year. It was the EA's role to assess the HoD on a continual and quarterly basis. The PSC only received a mandate from the Cabinet in 2002 and the PSC relied on the EA to conduct the assessments in the ordinary course. The PSC only attended to the final assessment and only on request. The final assessment dealt with bonuses and pay progression. The PSC continually reminded the department to submit their documents and to work with the PSC. If the departments did not go to the PSC, the PSC could not force them because it did not have a mandate to evaluate as the EA did. The PSC could only draft reports to identify shortcomings and implementation problems. The key issue was outcomes. The PSC strove for a Public Service which was people-orientated and which delivered good service. Block evaluation meant that instead of assessing an individual from a department you would assess a number of HoDs from the same sector at the same time. The block approach was aimed at saving time.

In response to Mr Manana, Mr Mthembu said that the PSC had no mandate to make policy, its role was simply to monitor and make recommendations. The PSC provided options to close the gap between policy and implementation. This informed their approach. There were two options. The first option was radical, that is, move away from the current system completely, but if this was not acceptable, to consider the second option which was to modify the current system. If the Consultative Report was read carefully, the Committee would realise that the PSC had been very sensitive to some of the issues and dynamics of this country. It was a complex issue because the following would have to be considered: How would the first option be implemented? How would we balance ministerial accountability? This was the reason for suggesting two options. The PSC also raised the hybrid approach, meaning to retain some elements and introducing some completely new ones. The Consultative Report looked at the diverse nature of SA which informed the content of the PSC report. The PSC objective was to influence policy-makers and the policy maker was the DPSA.

With respect to Ms Mohale's question, the PSC Chairperson said he was very passionate about performance management. Performance management should achieve two objectives, development and accountability, not pay progression. More often than not the
Personal Development Plan (PDP) was ignored. The problem was that as soon as there was one instrument trying to achieve development and accountability objectives there would be a tension, because you would have an instrument which was at variance with itself and therefore the two processes had to be delinked. The issue of HR management should be given to administration. However because of our situation, SA's history, it was given to the EA and there were implementation challenges around that model. The EA had administrative and political duties and was very busy. If we could have a Head of Public Service who was an administrator, we would be able to manage all the career incidents of HoDs, while at the same time holding the EA accountable.

He admitted that he did not have an answer to the question: "Why were HoDs not being evaluated quarterly, what was the problem?"

Ms
Phelele Tengeni, PSC Deputy Chairperson, proceeded to answer some of the questions raised by saying that the PSC had to lift its game in respect of oversight as it was clear from the graphs that when the Portfolio Committee intervened, the results swung in the opposite (and more positive) direction. She was convinced that the same would pertain if the Committee became involved in the issue of HoDs who did not get evaluated. The PSC was concerned that those HoDs command billions of rands and at the end, they had left without assessment, which was actually very surprising because of the political principle to account on a five yearly basis, and how one could allow HoDs not to account, played a very big part. The reason the PSC decided not to interview EAs at the time was informed by the fact that the PSC had a direct mandate on public administration and the relationship between the PSC and the EA was basically a reporting relationship which was why they approached the EA now with a completed piece of work to ask their opinion. There were mandate and relationship issues preventing earlier consultations with the EA. The PSC introduced a cut-off date of 31 July so that if an HoD had not been evaluated by that cut-off date, the PSC would not facilitate the assessment. This was because, if it continued facilitation, then the PSC would be buying into exactly the idea that assessment was about a financial incentive instead of performance management.

Prof Levine also responded to questions and said that Mr Manana had pointed out a very important method flaw in the Consultative Report, that it would have been important to consult with the EAs to obtain their points of view, but at the same time the report was saying that they needed to create structures of support to assist EAs. So in many countries, for example, one did not become a director or even a deputy director without taking an examination (as for instance in India). He could not say that this was not the same in SA, because there were competency tests which any entrant into senior management was required to take, so what they were saying about the hybrid model proposed by the NPC and which the PSC had endorsed, was that the EA still took the final decision but on a basis which was supported by the Head of Public Service and the PSC by identifying suitable candidates. It was important to say that in any system / jurisdiction, there was tension, there were tensions based on personalities or other, between an HoD and a Minister. Those tensions exist, they need to be managed and resolved one way or another. It was very important to define the form that political management took because, as the Minister pointed out, in the SA context, we had to have political management in order to achieve the objectives of the executive. It was the quality of that political management which was always the question, to what extent was it strategic, administrative and operational. Where we were now was that political management would always have administrative elements to it. So the fact that HoDs had not been evaluated was not about lack of capacity in the PSC, it had been more about the actual role which the PSC played as the facilitator of a process and the commitment on the political executive side was fundamental to the success.

They did a survey which said that HoDs indicated that they were very busy. That did not mean that the PSC took it as a finding that HoDs were too busy to be trained. The conclusion drawn was that they needed to structure training better. Training and development could not be left to chance or individuals, it needed to be structured into the whole development and performance management system.

DPME Minister Chabane said that what was due next week to be submitted to Cabinet was the report on the proposal on the performance assessment of HoDs only. The rest of the issues would continue to be discussed within the context of the NPC. The NPC report was in draft which needed to be engaged in society in order to arrive at an appropriate place. Political transformation was a political issue, not an administrative one, which brought the Minister to the issue of choice. He then spoke both as a member of the executive and a Member of Parliament. Every action, he said, was based on the Constitution. SA was not a combination of municipalities but a combination of provinces. It was not a federal state. It was a unitary state with strong federal features. This bore implication to the manner in which one configured processes. We go through an election process and elect a President who becomes the head of State and the head of government and resigns from Parliament. The President then appoints members of the executive from the Members of Parliament, except for two or three. So nearly every member of the executive was a Member of Parliament. The relationship between HoDs and DGs for example therefore needed to be considered and the impact it had. There was a comment in the report that the proposal was based among other things on the notion that the current process was likely to give you a product which was undesirable. What did that mean, what was the current process? If the report was saying that the current process of recruitment of HoDs itself was likely to give you a product which was undesirable then was one saying that the executive and / or the entire Cabinet cannot apply its mind in appointing an HoD? That cannot be correct. The issue of the quality of the performance assessment documents - we deal with the performance of departments - and there was a direct link between the performance of the organisation and the individual's performance. The performance instrument must take this into account. And the documents to evaluate performance must change and be aligned with the objectives of the new system envisaged. If the environment changed, the documents must change to be relevant.

The distinction between head of state and head of executive, his interpretation in order for the report focussed on HoDs. It was not a report about the transformation of the Public Service. And considering the report in the context of the debate of the NPC, and to debate it in isolation of the whole administration, would become problematic because the relationship between the HoD and the executive, had direct bearing on the architecture which the process took.

The relationship between performance and bonuses: The executive did not receive bonuses. The bonus was an incentive for certain work that you perform, but the situation could not persist in which a department performs poorly, but at the end everyone in that department receives a bonus. Receiving a bonus was not automatic. The proposals with respect to transformation in this area would make it clearer whether someone was entitled to receive a bonus.

The DPME was convinced that it would receive 100% compliance in the area of signing performance agreements by the due date.

The Chairperson once again voiced her appreciation for the meeting and thanked the Minister and the Commissioners for making the time to attend.

The meeting was adjourned.

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