Madam Deputy Speaker, studies relating to crime have found that the probability of an individual committing a crime is inversely proportional to the probability of getting caught. In other words, the more likely a person is to get caught committing a crime, the less likely it is that that person is going to commit the crime. In South Africa where the conviction rate for murder is less than 13%, something certainly needs to be done to bolster detective work so that those who commit the crimes are brought to book.
The Criminal Law (Forensic Procedure) Amendment Bill is an attempt to do exactly this. However, in its initial form, it had the potential to be frozen in a quagmire of dissenting voices. In its original format it included the establishment of a DNA database, and numerous organisations, from the Cape Bar Council to the Law Society of SA via the Medical Rights Advocacy Network, had substantial issues which they raised in relation to the creation of such a database.
I take typed notes of all meetings and on 28 October last year I wrote, in despair, "This Bill is becoming a disaster!" There seemed to be no inter- Ministerial co-ordination, budgets were not supplied and sometimes junior members, who were incapable of answering our questions, were sent to come before the portfolio committee.
When budgets did arrive, they were in the hundreds of millions of rands; and rather than simply providing the SAPS with the tools to access fingerprints from other databases such as those in the Transport or Home Affairs Ministries, they were grandiose visions of a massive police database of every fingerprint from any and every person in the country. At one stage the whole process seemed ready to spin out of control.
The Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Police deliberated on this Bill for months and finally determined that, in order to achieve proper outcomes, the Bill needed to be split in two, as the chair has outlined. This section before you today relates only to the taking of fingerprints, palm prints, footprints and photographic images, as well as the keeping of relevant databases.
As for the mooted DNA database, there are certainly over 50 countries throughout the world that have already passed DNA databases and DNA database legislation. Each country has had to address similar issues that arose here. It has been agreed that the committee will travel to investigate international best practice before considering the possibility of introducing such legislation here in South Africa.
If there is anyone in this House who believes that the Portfolio Committee on Police is not unified in its attempts to strengthen the hand of law enforcers in this land, they are wrong. Our members across the board were intimately involved in this amendment and certainly, the DA believes implicitly that granting the SAPS the right to access other databases will assist in the tracking down of, as yet, unconvicted criminals whose fingerprints do not yet appear in the police database.
The second issue, the identification of bodies, is an enormous issue that my colleague, the hon Debbie Schafer, will address. We must, as a nation, be highly alert to the integral link between human trafficking, drug dissemination and money laundering, all under the umbrella of organised crime, as well as, in certain cases, terrorism. By allowing our SAPS to run unidentified fingerprints through the other databases in this country, one will, without a shadow of a doubt, see increased conviction rates.
Certainly, we must all agree that the fight against transnational organised crime must be strengthened and intensified so as to foster solutions involving co-operation with sub-Saharan Africa and the Southern African Developmental Community, SADC. Allowing the SAPS to access other national fingerprint databases will allow them, in turn, to assist law enforcement agencies throughout the world to identify South African members of international syndicates.
As a nation, we have for far too long failed to focus on crime prevention from a global perspective. We have become bogged down in the incident of this terrible murder; that rape of a baby; this multi-million rand fraud - single cases hitting the headlines. Yet where we have failed, is in pulling together the causal strands in order to understand the drivers behind the blood-letting.
We are not alone in this lack of vision; indeed the international community has, as a whole, largely failed to anticipate the evolution of transnational organised crime into the strategic threat which it now poses globally. Transnational organised crime is an instrument to generate profit and it is no longer the sole preserve of specialised criminal organisations. It is now an essential strategy for armed groups around the world, and is a source of funding for corrupt politicians as well as warlords and terrorists.
A global survey from the University of Maryland's Centre for International Development and Conflict Management shows that one of the areas at greatest risk of armed conflict is sub-Saharan Africa. The nature of transnational organised crime syndicates allows them to be structured horizontally, and they operate flexibly with a decentralised leadership, while countries such as ours are limited by the silo mentality with vertical, blinkered thinking, which results in poor information-sharing and co-operation.
To transnational organised crime syndicates, borders are irrelevant, while countries are obsessed with formal sovereignty. Transnational organised crime syndicates are incredibly well funded, while our operations are underfunded and frequently ill utilised. The transnationals are at the top when it comes to new technologies, whereas we are slow to adapt, and, in fact, make little use of new technology.
Once we pass this amendment to the Criminal Procedures Act to allow access to fingerprint databases, the public will presume that we have the technology to allow for a quick computer search, but this will not be the case. The big problem here is that the databases of the SAPS, Home Affairs and Transport and Correctional Services all use different technologies, so that these searches will initially be long and laborious. This is something that needs particular attention.
Certainly, I would wish to see the same determination as has been evident in the preparations for the 2010 Fifa World Cup to be present in the fight against these syndicates, which, for example, see this country both importing and exporting drugs. We have to study this threat to boost our intelligence across regions and shape up our technical ability. This is also pertinent to domestic crime, of course, which is linked in many instances to the transnational organised crime syndicates I have been referring to.
Perhaps the one crime that makes us all feel under siege is house robbery. There has been a 100% increase in house robberies over the last five years, and these crimes are committed by, to quote Professor Rudolph Zinn, "the most callous of criminals." Last year there were 18 000 residential robberies, up from just 9 000 in 2003. In the main, these house robbers are 20 years old and have committed 100 robberies before arrest. They do their homework and they often prepare for up to four months before they strike. They also torture their victims as a means of establishing where valuables are hidden, and they rape and kill without remorse. Currently, the reality is that only 12,5% of robberies with aggravating circumstances end up being prosecuted. We have already fallen behind because of the bad judgement of the previous National Police Commissioner, and statistics have shown shocking increases in crimes in areas affected by the closure of our globally admired specialised units. Consider the 87% increase in drug-related crime since the shutting down of the SA Narcotics Bureau!
Investing in this technology would ramp up our efficacy in relation to the drug crisis in South Africa. The year the bureau was disbanded, the SAPS reported 62 000 drug-related crimes; the figure now stands at 117 000.
Crime must be recognised as the greatest threat to our democracy and to an open society that can be shared and enjoyed by all. Of course, the state has a duty to uphold the Constitution and keep its citizens safe.
Approving this Bill today will give the SAPS a tool that, if efficiently used, will, I have no doubt, assist in pinning down the criminals, not after they have committed 100 crimes, but after they have committed just one. Thank you. [Applause.]
House Chairperson, it is both appropriate and timely to amend the Criminal Procedure Act, Act 51 of 1977 to allow for the forensic procedures to be applied at a crime scene. Cope will support this amendment.
It is our considered view that we must do all in our power to make sure that we capacitate the police in the fight against and combating of crime. Therefore, the amendment today is a tool that is appropriate in capacitating the police in order to make sure that they combat crime and keep a database of criminals.
We all already heard that the Department of Home Affairs has 31 million fingerprints in their database. We already heard about 6 million in the National Traffic Information System, eNaTIS, which the Department of Transport has in the database. We already heard that 2,5 million fingerprints belong to foreigners. But one thing that continues to worry us is that when we talk about the database and we talk about the fingerprints, we do not continue to look at an integrated way of dealing with crime and organised crime.
We continue to be concerned about organised crime, particularly about the data on organised crime and the information that is not kept. We have in our country today many experienced and organised syndicates who come from other countries, but we don't have a database. So we believe that dealing with the amendment of this Act will go a long way in addressing that particular weakness.
Experience has shown all over the world that forensics play a central role in the combating and investigation of crime, particularly fingerprints and all other things that go with it. However, we know that in all the attempts that we need to make, there is always going to be a place where the buck stops.
We believe that the amendment of this particular Act will also begin to give the police, including the commissioner, the power to say what will happen to those who are going to be letting things fall through the cracks. This is where the buck stops. Now that we have this tool, we must make sure that it remains a tool to make sure that the police are capacitated.
Cope won't be found wanting when it comes to the issue of supporting the work of the police to make sure that the police combat and ... [Interjections.] We will not be found wanting; we are going to support this amendment Act. We have already indicated that we are supporting it.
Therefore, the only thing that Cope will not associate itself with is the rhetoric of "shoot to kill". The shoot to kill rhetoric is that one thing that we say we do not associate ourselves with.
We associate ourselves with the tools that make sure that the police fight crime and make sure that it is combated. We want to particularly raise the serious matter of serious organised crime syndicates that are operating. It is a matter that must be looked at and measures must be found as to how we can make sure that we keep a database of those particular criminals so that we are able to make sure that we combat them and nip them in the bud.
Therefore, we know that supporting this Amendment Act brings us one step closer to dealing with organised crime. We know that by supporting this Act, the police will be one step ahead in making sure that they defeat corruption and crime. Today, the debate and subsequent approval of this Act squarely puts the responsibility on you, Minister, to make sure that the work is done.
We will support this amendment. We are supporting it because we know that it is a necessary tool to fight crime and make sure that our people feel safe wherever they are. I thank you. [Applause.]
House Chairperson, the main aim of this Bill is to intensify the criminal justice system by strengthening the SAPS crime-fighting capacity in respect of fingerprinting and body printing.
It is our view that the correct implementation of this Bill will enhance the investigation capacity of the SAPS which is bound to assist in the dramatic reduction of crime. The IFP, therefore, welcomes these changes to the legislation to bring us into the 21st century. We believe that this Bill should be implemented as soon as possible in consultation with the Ministries of Transport, Home Affairs and State Security.
The costing of this Bill will be very high because of the human resources involved and the upgrading of forensic laboratories. This will shorten the time waiting for the courts to get results from the laboratories.
The IFP supports this Bill because it will eliminate forgery and tighten up investigation, thereby finding the criminals guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
The IFP believes that the laboratories will need to be run professionally and they must be transformed, so that they are not used by certain elements with ulterior motives against others as if it is their domain.
The IFP wants to thank all those who were involved in making sure that this Bill came to fruition; that includes all stakeholders and the Chairperson who has been chairing this meeting. I thank you, Chairperson. [Applause.]
Chairperson and hon members, the Bill before us has been the subject of a long and complex process of evolution. Two years ago, there was the case of deep constitutional concerns with regard to citizens' privacy and other rights. After much delay and deliberation, we are today considering a Bill that will allow the police access to the Home Affairs database of fingerprints. In principle, we support this concept, since it should radically improve the odds of the police identifying the perpetrators of crime.
However, allow me to outline three major concerns which relate to the harsh reality that exists in our country. Firstly, we are talking about giving the police access to a database of law-abiding citizens' most basic information. It is fine and well to claim that the police will not abuse this access, but unfortunately the track record of the police is not spotless.
Secondly, the database that we are talking about is situated within the Department of Home Affairs, which one can safely describe as one of the most corruption-riddled departments in government. The Bill seeks to address this concern, with the inclusion of severe penalties for tampering with the database. However, we cannot but wonder to what extent crime syndicates, who have already infiltrated the Department of Home Affairs, will simply manipulate the database to protect their interests.
Thirdly, and most importantly, access to this database is no guarantee of improved police arrest rates, when the police's forensic capacity hardly exists. Anecdotal evidence of the police failing to take fingerprints at crime scenes is rife. On top of that, the official statistics for the state of forensic laboratories indicate that they are on the verge of collapse.
We support the intention of this Bill, but call on the Minister and the security cluster to begin addressing the well-known underlying issues. The UDM supports the Bill. Thank you.
Chairperson, the ACDP will support all legal measures that are taken by the police to nail criminals and to reduce the unacceptably high levels of crime in our country. The fact that the current legislation, as set out in section 37 of the Criminal Procedure Second Amendment Act, Act 85 of 1997, does not make the taking of fingerprints compulsory, even in instances where a person has been convicted of an offence, is a serious oversight.
The taking of fingerprints of certain categories of persons must be compulsory, as we believe it will lead to a significant increase in suspect- to-crime-scene matches. The ACDP believes the police should not only have access to the fingerprints stored on their database, but to all fingerprint databases in the country.
It is unfortunate that even though members of the public have been complaining about low conviction rates, as suspects could not be linked to crimes, the SAPS did not have access to the Hanis system of the Department of Home Affairs, where fingerprints of 31 million citizens and about 2,5 million foreigners are stored, or to the e-NaTIS system of the Department of Transport, where a further 6 million thumbprints are located.
What is of concern to the ACDP, however, is the possible misuse of or tampering with the profiles on the expanded database, even though the committee reached consensus that such abuses must carry a 15-year sentence without the option of a fine. The storage and integrity of the fingerprints database must be tight and unquestionable at all times. The ACDP will definitely support this Bill, as it will enhance the work of the police. Thank you.
Voorsitter, in Suid-Afrika het 'n misdadiger 'n 90% kans om weg te kom met misdaad, want as daar gekyk word na die statistiek sien ons dat die aantal sake wat aangemeld word en daardie sake wat dan suksesvol deur ons howe gevoer word en waar 'n vonnisbevinding plaasvind slegs 10% is. Soos ek reeds genoem het, het 'n misdadiger dus 'n 90% kans om weg te kom.
Hierdie wysigingswetsonwerp is 'n stap in die regte rigting. Die VF Plus verwelkom dit dat die regering darem op 'n stadium gekom het waar hulle besef het dat daar drastiese stappe gedoen moet word. Ek het wel kritiek. Die vraag is: Hoekom moes ons so lank wag? Ons wag nou al vir, kan ek amper s, jare om te s dat daar indringend na die misdaadsituasie gekyk moet word.
Dit help nie dat die Minister van Polisie en sy mense hard werk om misdadigers te vang en aan te keer en dat hul hande dan agter hul re vasgemaak word as hulle sekere ondersoeke moet doen nie. Dit is ook waar. Dit is ges dat die publiek dalk nou die indruk mag kry dat, omdat vingerafdrukke nou ook met Binnelandse Sake en Vervoer gekontroleer kan word, 'n misdadiger baie vinniger opgespoor gaan word. Ons het nou wel die wetgewing in plek, maar dit help nie as die rekenaars nie met mekaar aanpasbaar is nie, want dan sal dit nie vinnig gedoen kan word nie.
Dit sal beteken dat daar kontak gemaak moet word met 'n persoon binne Binnelandse Sake, maar die VF Plus sou wou sien dat die rekenaarstelsel van so 'n aard is dat dit onmiddelik opgevolg kan word. Afhangende van 'n misdaad word daar gepraat van die kritieke 24 uur of die 36 uur of die 48 uur daarna. Hierdie wetgewing is die stap in die regte rigting om dit vinniger moontlik te maak om misdadigers te identifiseer, te ondersoek, en te arresteer. Ek dank u. (Translation of Afrikaans speech follows.)
[Mr P J GROENEWALD: Chairperson, in South Africa a criminal has a 90 per cent chance of getting away with crime, because when statistics are viewed we notice that the number of reported cases that is successfully brought to court and where a sentence is passed only makes up for 10% of these cases. As I mentioned before, a criminal has a 90 per cent chance of getting away with crime.
This amending Bill is a step in the right direction. The FF Plus welcomes the fact that the government at least reached a stage where it realised that drastic steps need to be taken. I certainly have some criticism. The question is: Why did we have to wait so long? We have been waiting for years, so to speak, to say that the incidence of crime should be looked at urgently.
It does not help for the Minister of Police and his personnel to work hard to catch criminals and then their hands are tied when they need to carry out certain investigations. That is also true. It is said that the public may now perhaps get the impression that, since fingerprints could now also be checked with the Departments of Home Affairs and Transport, a criminal would be traced much quicker. Indeed, we may have the legislation in place, but it does not help if the computers are not compatible because then it cannot be done quickly.
It would imply that contact have to be made with a person within Home Affairs, but the FF Plus would like to see that the computer system is of such a nature that it would be possible to follow up immediately. Depending on the crime, reference is made to the critical 24 or 36 or 48 hours thereafter. This legislation is a step in the right direction for making it possible to identify, investigate, and arrest criminals quicker. I thank you.]
Chairperson, hon Ministers, Deputy Ministers, Members of Parliament ...
... maloko a mantle a ANC, [... honourable members of the ANC,]
SA Communist Party, Cosatu and Sanco ... [Laughter.]
Baagi naga ka bophara, ke a lo dumedisa. [Citizens from the length and breadth of our country, I greet you all.]
The Policing the Transition document of the ANC recommended that the SAPSs' capacity be strengthened through training to ensure more effective, investigative and technical skills so that our police would effectively perform their duties in the fight against crime and corruption. This position was later reaffirmed at the 2002 Stellenbosch National Conference.
In 2009, the ANC manifesto proposed that the forensic capacity of the SAPS be strengthened in order to help combat organised crime. The manifesto argues that in order to combat crime there is a need to establish a modernised, efficient and transformed criminal justice system.
This is to ensure increased capacity for fighting and combating crime, thus promoting a co-ordinated and an integrated approach to crime. In this regard, the manifesto prioritised the fight against crime and corruption. It articulates for the enhancement of police capacity through vigorous training on forensics, in particular, to capacitating detective services and crime investigation.
Similarly, the review of the criminal justice system has revealed the need to strengthen the forensic investigative powers and capacity of the police as a priority. South Africa has no specific legislation regulating the collection of fingerprints and similar evidence. There is a need to improve all the laws governing fingerprints and other pieces of law.
The Bill contributes to law enforcement policing through detections and making use of forensic evidence collected from crime scenes. This Bill is at the centre of the philosophy of partnership between the police and the community in the fight against different categories of crime.
In terms of the Bill, an expanded fingerprint capacity is an intelligence tool, particularly in crimes where detection is generally low, such as property crimes, and can lead to a significant increase in suspect-to-crime- scene matches. The Bill emphasises that fingerprints are used not only to prove guilt, but also to prove innocence.
The Bill relates directly to constitutional rights such as equality before the law; human dignity; freedom and security of persons; privacy; children; and arrested, detained and accused persons.
This Bill extends the police's powers not just by strengthening their own database collection and extending the capacity to store fingerprints of more than a limited number of convicted persons; it also enables the Criminal Record and Forensic Science Services of the police to have access to the databases of the Departments of Home Affairs and Transport.
Clause 1 amends the heading of Chapter 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act to ensure that the provisions thereto are not limited to accused persons only. The new section provides for the definitions of "authorised persons", "body prints", "child" and "comparative search".
The new section 36(B) provides for police powers in respect of the taking of fingerprints of accused and convicted persons. It provides for the compulsory taking of fingerprints from certain categories of accused persons and for the retention of such prints. Members are advised to read these amendments because of time constraints.
The Bill has a strong constitutional and political undertone. Politically it appears to strengthen forensic investigatory methods in order to promote the state's capacity to fight crime. There is a need to strengthen economic and political capacity of the developmental state in order to implement the current Bill appropriately in line with the national democratic revolution.
The state's capacity to collect and store fingerprints, body prints and photographic images is of vital importance to ensure accountability, the rule of law and social cohesion. The state's forensic power to fight crime should not suddenly be subjugated to a facilitating role, which would elevate the role of private forensics, as this often presents a risk to state power and national security due to the lack of accountability of such companies.
New scientific methods for crime fighting, information technology and confidential databases should be in the hands of the state as an institution which is accountable to its citizens. Our police must be equipped through training in forensic matters relating to the crime scene, as prescribed in the Bill, for public confidence in them to be strengthened.
In this regard, the police's existing forensic laboratories need to be strengthened and rolled out for all local police stations to have easy access to them so as to ensure that forensic services are consistently deployed at crime scenes.
This calls for community education on the forensic role after a crime has been committed to ensure that victims and witnesses of crimes do not unknowingly temper with the fingerprints, body prints and other evidential information at the crime scene.
In conclusion, this Bill is long overdue to strengthen our fight against crime. We believe that through this Bill we will be able to arrest criminal suspects, reduce court backlogs, improve conviction rates and combat crime. The ANC supports this Bill. Thank you.
Mr Chair, it is very encouraging to note that, in approving this Bill, we are united across political lines in our desire to improve the tools that the police have to detect crime. Given the appalling detection rates such as a mere 15% for property-related crime, they can certainly use all the help they can get.
By providing the extension and enhancement of police databases of prints and photographic images, and for the compulsory taking of these in certain cases, this Bill will ensure that police have access to the biggest possible base for comparative purposes.
By enabling the police to have access to the fingerprints of 31 million citizens and 2,5 million of foreigners, which are retained by the Department of Home Affairs, as well as the 6 million thumbprints in possession of the Department of Transport, the ability to improve the detection rates of all crimes will be substantially increased. This, of course, is based on an assumption that the fingerprint evidence was correctly collected in the first place. However, as this is a definite step in the right direction, let us be positive today and not go down that road.
Whenever police have access to personal information, there is always the very real fear that the potential for abuse exists. The portfolio committee has been very mindful of this fear and we have imposed strict mechanisms for the retention, storage and control of these prints and images.
Firstly, the obligation is imposed on the national commissioner to take all reasonable steps to secure the integrity of the database. In addition, he and the committee of the directors-general of the Departments of Home Affairs, Transport and Correctional Services must, within six months of the commencement of this section, ensure that standard operating procedures regarding access to the databases of the respective departments and implementation of safety measures are developed. This is a very serious obligation, which we believe the commissioner will treat as such.
In addition, the seriousness with which the committee regards any abuse of prints or images stored in any of the databases is reflected in the fact that the penalty we have imposed for any contravention of this legislation, is a maximum of 15 years imprisonment without the option of a fine.
We trust that this will serve as a sufficient deterrent to prevent people from testing just how long the period of imprisonment will be if a court were to take into account the seriousness of our intention in this matter.
The retention of prints on the police database is also strictly regulated so that people who have not been convicted of a crime will not have their details retained on a criminal database. The prints of adults who are convicted of a crime will be retained indefinitely. Children who are convicted will have their prints retained indefinitely, but subject to the provisions relating to the erasure provided for in the Child Justice Act.
With the assistance of the Justice Department's legal advisors, we believe that this Bill is fully in line with the provisions of the Child Justice Act, and that children's rights are adequately protected. In the event that people are found not guilty, their convictions are set aside, or there is a failure to prosecute for any reason, the police are obliged to destroy the prints within 30 days after the officer commanding the division responsible for criminal records has been notified thereof.
An important new development in this Bill, as my colleague the hon Kohler Barnard has referred to, is that the comparison of prints may now also be used for the identification of missing persons and unidentified human remains. This can be an extremely valuable tool in a number of respects. Firstly, by being able to take the fingerprints of people who have lost their memory and comparing them with such a huge database, the police should be able to quickly reunite them with their families.
Secondly, being in a position to quickly identify bodies has two important advantages. If bodies can be identified more quickly, the chances that the perpetrator, in the case of criminal activity, will be more easily and quickly apprehended are significantly increased.
The inability to identify bodies can also have serious implications for the families of the deceased, as they cannot be declared dead. This then means that benefits payable to families, such as insurance policies, cannot be paid out, and estates cannot be wound up. Making it easier for the police to identify these bodies, therefore not only assists in solving possible crimes, but also has very real, practical benefits for the family members.
It is unlikely that we will see an immediate surge in the detection rates as this will be phased in, as my colleague has said. However, if we do not start somewhere, we will never get anywhere. The DA, therefore, is happy today to support this Bill. Thank you.
Chair, to those who are looking for a catfight, I'd like to say that it's not going to happen today!
Hon Ministers and members, there can be no doubt in the minds of any of us that we need to use whatever technological advantages and developments that science brings to us in the fight against crime.
Law enforcement agencies should beat the technological advances that criminals are using in the commission of their crimes. That means that the criminal justice system should be on top of scientific developments in the field of forensics, whatever the crime. Technology changes the way crimes are committed and, as a result, should change the way in which crime is combated.
Today, in this House, as we debate a Bill that would give the SAPS access to the databases of other government departments that store fingerprints, scientific developments are already talking about "bacterial fingerprinting" and "brain fingerprinting" crime as the next advances in forensic science's contribution to the fight against crime.
A crime can occur anywhere, at any time, night or day. It can happen in a place and at a time where there are no witnesses present. Sometimes, the only witnesses present are the clues that are left behind at the scene.
It is the crime scene investigator who collects these clues, which are sometimes things that cannot be seen with the naked eye. It is forensic science that converts these clues into evidence that allows the detective to track the perpetrator, and it is the prosecutors that will use this evidence in the courts of law to ensure that criminals are taken off our streets and that our communities become safer places.
Chair, the Bill is a further step in the ANC's resolution and commitment to the people of the country to create an environment in which people are, and indeed feel, safe. As indicated by others in the debate, this Bill gives the SAPS access to run comparative searches against the databases of the Departments of Home Affairs, Transport and Correctional Services.
This will immediately improve the possibility of the police identifying a suspect if they can retrieve fingerprints from the scene of a crime. This brings us to one of the first requirements for the successful implementation of the legislation: In order for the legislation to make an impact on apprehending and convicting perpetrators of crime, the SAPS will have to ensure that our crime scene investigators are properly trained and that those who are the first on the scene understand and know fully how to preserve a crime scene. Without these supportive actions, the Bill becomes paper filled with good intentions.
I will be dealing with the storage of prints; the comparative searches against other databases; the national instructions relating to the collection, storage, maintenance, administration and use of prints and photographic images; as well as the security measures on the integrity of information on the database.
Clause 15 of the Bill obliges the national commissioner to ensure that any fingerprints, body prints or photographic images are stored, maintained, administered and are readily available, whether in electronic or other form. This clause of the Bill prescribes that the fingerprint database must be located within the division of the service that is responsible for criminal records. It is important that our fingerprint laboratories have proper protocols and effective and efficient training programmes in place, which would put the work conducted in them, above any dispute.
The Bill also gives effect to the Sex Offenders Register. Clause 15(2) directs the national commissioner, or his delegate, to ensure that the fingerprints and photographic images of perpetrators whose names must be included in the National Register for Sex Offenders, are taken and dealt with according to the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, Act 32 of 2007. This clause will thus ensure that the Sex Offenders Register is populated.
The clause further makes it a crime for any person to use or allow the use of fingerprints, body prints or photographic images for anything other than the detection of a crime, investigation of an offence, the identification of missing persons, the identification of unidentified human remains or the conducting of a prosecution. Any person who is found to be tampering with or manipulating the process, or falsely claiming that prints are from one person while knowing they are not, will be guilty of an offence and can be imprisoned for a period not exceeding 15 years.
The Bill, under clause 15(b), gives the SAPS the right to run a comparative search - and I think the fact that it is a comparative search is an important point - against the database of the Departments of Home Affairs or Transport, or any other department within the national sphere of government. So should other departments have databases, those are covered as well.
This simply means that, while the SAPS can currently compare a fingerprint found at a crime scene only with those on their own database, the Bill now allows them to run the print against other existing databases, thereby increasing the chances of identifying the person.
These comparative searches can only be done for the purpose of a crime investigation, for the identification of a missing person or for the identification of unidentified human remains. Doing so for any other reason, or manipulating or tampering with the fingerprint, is declared an offence punishable by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years.
The committee felt that a strong message must go out that the abuse of these prints will not be tolerated and that the integrity of fingerprints as evidence must be protected. We believe that this message is clearly conveyed through the harsh sentences proposed.
The commissioner, in consultation with the Minister, must within six months after the commencement of the Act, issue national instructions. The instructions can address all aspects that are necessary for the implementation of the Act, but must include the following: How to deal with the collection of prints and photographic images; instructions that deal with the storage, maintenance and the administration thereof; how the information collected must be handled; and the manner in which all statistics in this division must be kept concerning all information collected, stored and analysed, including the recording and storage of all exhibits collected from a crime scene.
Furthermore, the national commissioner must develop training courses on the national instructions and ensure that adequate training takes place within the police.
Chair, this is of the utmost importance. We need to establish a uniform way to deal with these prints at every one of our stations. A minimum operational standard needs to exist in order to ensure that evidence used in our courts cannot be challenged or rejected because of the way it was collected, stored or analysed. We want to make sure that this Bill improves our crime-fighting capability by convicting the guilty and ensuring that the innocent remain exactly that.
The integrity of the information on the database is paramount. In clause 15(d), the Bill provides for the necessary measures that must be taken on a technical and organisational level to ensure the protection of the integrity of the database. This will ensure the prevention of the loss, damage or unauthorised destruction of the information on the database. It also ensures that only authorised access to the database takes place and that data are used only for the legitimate purposes set out in the legislation.
It further places a responsibility on the national commissioner or his delegate to ensure that they identify all reasonable internal and external risks to the information on the database. Appropriate safeguards must be put in place against those risks identified, and they must regularly ensure that those safeguards are effectively implemented and updated in response to new risks identified or deficiencies identified in safeguards already implemented.
Due regard must be given to the general information security practises and procedures of the department. The importance of this aspect cannot be overemphasised. Backlogs and systems that are down create a serious threat to the integrity and efficiency of this tool in the fight against crime. This means that everything humanly and technically possible must be done in order to limit and eliminate such problems. It would be good, in preparation for the full implementation of the Act, to do a process analysis and determine where processes can be improved. Downtime, for instance, can be limited by ensuring that automatically scheduled updates and backups of the system take place. This can be done after hours, over weekends, without human intervention and, though the system might be slower at the time, it will prevent downtime or system crashes. We can ill afford that to happen.
The last part of the Bill deals with the standing operating procedures that must be agreed upon between the SAPS, the Departments of Home Affairs, Correctional Services and the national Department of Transport. The Bill instructs the directors-general of these departments, under the chairpersonship of the national commissioner, to agree on the standing operating procedures within six months after the commencement of the Act. The standing operating procedures should address access by the SAPS to these departments' databases for the purpose of comparative searches and the implementation of safety measures to protect the integrity of the information contained on the relevant databases.
Again, this is of the utmost importance since information on the databases of the other departments includes information of innocent people and information on individuals not relevant to the purpose of this Bill. This, hon Groenewald, is why they cannot have free access to other departments' databases. If you had bothered to attend the meeting you would have known that. That is why it is not relevant for the purpose of this Bill. They don't need free access to those databases. SAPS's interaction with these databases should be limited to establishing a hit and identifying the person the prints represent. Any further access would be unnecessary and unlawful.
This Bill - which is supported by the ANC - is a further step, as promised in our 2009 Manifesto, toward establishing a modern, efficient and transformed criminal justice system. It further gives life to our contract that we will increase the capacity of the detective services and forensics. It illustrates the ANC government's commitment to fighting crime with everything available to it.
While I have a few minutes left, just allow me to deal with a few issues. Mr Ramatlakane shouted a lot. That's what happens when you've got too much time and you have only prepared for and are used to two minutes. Now, suddenly, you have more. Mr Ramatlakane said that they will not support the "shoot to kill" policy. There is no such policy, so I am actually glad to hear that. Unlike Cope, the ANC also does not have a policy that says, "Bash a head to lead". [Laughter.]
I would like to say to the UDM: If you had actually read the Bill, you would have seen that there are checks and balances in it to address exactly the concerns that you have raised. It is incredible how people cannot attend one single meeting on a Bill that has been in process for more that two years, and then stand up here in this House and try to make a speech as if they are the people who actually know what is in the Bill!
Agb Groenewald, as jy, soos die res van ons, so bekommerd oor misdaad in hierdie land is - wat ek glo jy is - wil ek jou graag uitnooi om die daad by die woord te voeg, en om 'n slag of wat die komitee te kom bywoon, en om daar te probeer om 'n verskil te maak. Dit sal waardeer word. Dankie. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraph follows.)
[Hon Groenewald, if you, like the rest of us, are so concerned about crime in this country - which I believe you are - I would like to invite you to suit the action to the word, and to attend the committee on some occasions and try to make a difference there. It will be appreciated. Thank you.]
Voorsitter, die agb lid het al klaar weggestap. Ek wou vir haar 'n vraag gevra het, maar siende dat sy klaar weg is sal ... [Chairperson, the hon member has already walked away. I wanted to pose a question to her, but since she has already left I will ...] Chair, I want to raise a point of order: I have listened to hon Diane Kohler-Barnard and hon Anneliese van Wyk. The manner in which they delivered their speeches was so calm that I think they must have taken some or other drug, and I want to know whether that is parliamentary. [Laughter.]
Hon member, that is not a point of order.
Chairperson, I would like to thank all political parties for supporting this Bill and also the House for its enthusiastic support of the Bill. I thank you.
Debate concluded.
The Bill was read a second time.
Consideration of Report of Portfolio Committee on Social Development on Social Assistance Amendment Bill
There was no debate.
Chairperson, I move:
That the Report be adopted. Motion agreed to.
Report accordingly adopted.