1. The system was not user-friendly, and some staff members did not know how to operate it well as there had been no adequate training on its use. 2. The information technology computerised system experienced slow connectivity 3. Only the EFT (Electronic Funds Transfer) Supervisor could monitor, authorise and check cancellations on JDAS, with another Supervisor responsible for the verification of payments on the system for correctness. The system required that users perform different tasks to enable proper controls. It catered for eight modules, namely, bail, compensation fines, court fines, civil matters, deferred court fines, maintenance and unclassified and general funds. All these modules allowed for receipting and payouts. Before the cash hall could make transactions on these modules, the administrative personnel and their supervisors needed to capture certain information and have it authorised to allow the finance section to do the relevant transactions. 4. The unclassified module of the system was used to keep monies that could not be classified immediately to the correct module. This required the officials to trace the depositor's details and establish the account to which the monies must be paid. 5. There remained a number of unresolved differences on the manual records and the JDAS systems after the rollout of new systems affected balancing on JDAS reconciliations. As a result there were large volumes of unclassified funds, as well as losses. 6. The issuing of receipts, which would normally take ninety seconds, took up to three or more minutes because of the slow response of the system. The processing of payments took up to four to five minutes, which is longer than the expected two minutes. At times, it gave error messages which require the user to quit the session and log on again. 7. There were also challenges with bank reconciliations. 8. On some of the system controls, there were flaws which pointed to the absence of segregation of duties in the design of the system itself. Examples of these included: a) Reports - these can be drawn from the system by whoever has access, and not limited to control officers only b) Power of Attorney - can be added without authorisation on the system, and there is no limit on how many can be added per card c) Authorisations - with each transaction having to be authorised by one controller, and taking up a lot of time especially when the system is slow, backlogs are created on important daily checking; and d) Payments - these can be done without authorisation and there are no controls to confirm and verify signatures. Assurance cannot always be given that the correct person is collecting the payouts. 6. Submission by the Department on the Justice Deposit Account System