Speaker, hon Ministers present here, hon members, the amending Bill owes its existence to two important decisions that necessitated the principal Act to be reviewed.
Firstly, the Constitutional Court had found out that the Constitution does not authorise provincial legislatures to pass their own financial management legislation. Consequently, various provincial statutes dealing with the financial management of provincial legislatures are unconstitutional and invalid. Only Parliament has the legitimate authority.
Parliament was directed by the Constitutional Court's ruling to either assign such authority or powers to the provincial legislatures or pass national legislation to deal with the financial management of provincial legislatures.
The committee was therefore tasked by Parliament to amend the provisions relating to the financial management for provincial legislatures.
Secondly, in September 2012, informed by technical challenges that arose in the implementation of the Financial Management of Parliament Act, the NA referred the Act to the Standing Committee on Finance, and requested the committee to review the Act and introduce the amending legislation.
The key challenge cited was the composition of the oversight mechanism of Parliament. The task given to the committee was to align the governance structures of Parliament with the oversight mechanism contemplated in the Act.
On the amendments of the membership of the oversight mechanism and conflict of interest, the current Act provides that the executive authority - which is the Speaker and the Chairperson of the NCOP, the Deputy Speaker and the permanent Deputy Chairperson - may not be members of the oversight mechanism and may only participate in the deliberation of the oversight mechanism at the request of the oversight mechanism or body.
The amendment that the Standing Committee on Finance has introduced provides for the governance and functions to be placed under the co- chairmanship of the Speaker and the Chairperson of the NCOP, including planning and budgeting functions. This change therefore means that the executive authority will participate and preside over the oversight mechanism.
The standing committee in its deliberations resolved that the executive authority could only perform the planning and budgeting functions of Parliament by being present on the oversight mechanism.
The amendments effected by the standing committee require that the Joint Rules of Parliament be amended so as to provide that no member of the oversight mechanism may deliberate on a matter in which he or she has a material interest, particularly on matters of procurement in Parliament, in order to prevent any real or perceived conflict of interest arising from the procurement processes.
The amendments further promote transparency and accountability and will also limit the possibility of corrupt practices in the procurement system. In arriving at these decisions, the standing committee was informed by a number of comparative international experiences.
On the financial management of provincial legislatures, the decision of the standing committee took cognisance of the views of the Speakers' Forum in coming to its decision.
The standing committee resolved that the financial management of provincial legislatures be provided for in an amendment to the Financial Management of Parliament Act and not by legislative competence being assigned to the provincial legislatures.
The amendments have drawn upon similar pieces of legislation or experience from similar legislation such as the Powers, Privileges and Immunities of Parliament and Provincial Legislatures Act.
The Standing Committee on Finance in accordance with Rule 243 submits the Financial Management of Parliament Amendment Bill for approval by the House. Thank you. [Applause.]
There was no debate.
Declarations of Vote:
Speaker, the Financial Management of Parliament Act was passed in 2009 to regulate the House's financial assets and, as the chairperson indicated, the procurement of goods and services.
The Act integrates various processes such as budgeting, procurement and the financial system.
The courts, as correctly stated, asked Parliament to make an uncontroversial amendment to the law to resolve the question around the financial management of provinces. The committee did this without any problems.
Unfortunately this presented an opportunity to the majority of members on the committee to look at an unrelated aspect of the Bill with regard to an oversight mechanism. The mechanism, and this is our view, would be a committee of Parliament with all the powers of Parliament and with membership from the parties decided in the normal way.
It would be one of the most important committees in Parliament. I say "most important", Speaker, because the oversight mechanism would for the first time give us, as members, a direct oversight over Parliament's finances.
However, unfortunately - and it needs to be noted - this committee has not been established in the past four years, meaning that Parliament has not fulfilled its obligations under the law. To remedy this, the DA proposed that we insert a clause forcing the establishment of the oversight mechanism.
This was voted out by a majority of members of the committee, but they did not vote out - unfortunately - a proposal that a committee resolves a provision in the existing law that prevents the Secretary and the Speaker from sitting on the Oversight Mechanism Committee.
Let me remind the members of the House that this committee is meant to have oversight over the Secretary to Parliament and the Speaker, which is why the MPs who drafted the 2009 Bill specifically excluded them from sitting on the committee.
The valid question is: How can people we are overseeing sit on the committee which does the oversight? Deputy Speaker, I therefore urge all members in the House to vote against this Bill, which compromises our ability to do effective oversight over our own institution.
Today we have an opportunity to set an example in terms of effective oversight in establishing the oversight committee and ensuring that the Speaker and the executive committee are not present in the oversight mechanism. I thank you. [Applause.]
Mr Speaker, the burning issue, as quite correctly said by the previous member, in this matter is whether the Speaker and the Chairperson can serve on the oversight mechanism.
The original merger in terms of the old Act, the 2009 Act, excluded them from serving on it. However, the oversight committee was never established, as has been said. The work was left for the Parliamentary Oversight Authority, the POA, and the Budget Forum, on which both the Speaker and the Chairperson serve.
It appears that when the previous Bill was adopted in 2009, the easy way was to construe the oversight mechanism in a similar fashion as a typical standing committee doing oversight over a department.
The fact is that Parliament is not a department, and the Speaker and the Chairperson are not Ministers. Parliament is a slightly different animal; and it is autonomous.
This Bill proposes that the governance functions of the POA and the Budget Forum are given to the new oversight committee created in clause 4. Section 13 of the Financial Management of Parliament Act requires the Speaker and the Chairperson to oversee Parliament's strategic performance plans and the Budget.
Also, clause 7 of this Bill amends section 17 of the Financial Management of Parliament Act to compel the Speaker and the Chairperson to table the above plans.
The vital question is whether the Speaker and the Chairperson can perform this function without serving on the oversight committee. I do not think so. Parliaments are different. There are many examples in the world where they allow the executive authority to serve on such a committee.
Cope is prepared to give this new era a chance and we shall support the Bill. [Applause.]
Speaker, I want to say to the hon Ross, or maybe to the DA: You seem to be conflating the oversight mechanism with operational management.
The purpose of the oversight mechanism is not to interfere in the management of Parliament's finances. Your proposal to make the accounting officer accountable to the oversight mechanism conflates, if not deliberately muddles, the responsibility.
As the ANC, I must indicate that we are champions of accountability and transparency. [Interjections.] We have done it in the past and we will continue to do it throughout our existence. [Interjections.]
We would not support this Bill if it were not going to ensure that the noble principles of transparency and accountability are promoted.
I urge you to move out of your closet and learn from the best. Your baseless fear and vigilance is comprehensible. By the way, you are still recovering from a bruising autocratic practice. Without any knowledge of most of the DA members, you recently woke up to the reality of a rented leader.
You are the last people to tell us about transparency and openness. Stop throwing stones when you are living in a glass house.
To allay your fears, the ANC has led the discussion on openness and transparency in the Bill. We have strongly recommended that this be strengthened in the Joint Rules of Parliament. We have negated any possibility of a conflict of interest by any member of the oversight mechanism. Hence, as the ANC, we wholeheartedly throw our weight behind the Bill. I thank you. [Applause.]
Bill read a second time (Democratic Alliance dissenting).