... that his favourite President, former President Zuma, failed to uphold the Constitution, trying to defend the indefensible by saying the President's violation of the Constitution was not that serious. [Interjections.] Every year during these debates the finalisation of the court administration model was put on the back burner by your predecessor by announcing further research and consultations, future colloquiums, Cabinet committees on the issue, pending Cabinet decisions, none of which were ever heard of again in the time between these budget debates. We note your statement today that you will soon take this matter to Cabinet. Minister, please, do not be that kind of Minister. Finalise this matter. As in the past, we confirm our stance that to enhance the independence of the judiciary we are in support of a judicially led court administrative model in which the judiciary is not dependent on either the executive or the legislature for the budgetary appropriation that is to be entrusted to it.
The other matter not resolved yet in South Africa and which Justice Mzikamanda identified as essential to judicial independence is that of judicial accountability. A judicially led court administration model does not mean that the judiciary is not to account for the
manner in which it administers its budget and the manner in which it self- regulates in respect of all matters other than the content of its decisions. This legislature, Parliament, has been found wanting - and rightfully so - by our courts over the last few years for not properly performing our duties of oversight and holding to account the Executive. The source of our oversight duties - colleagues - and our functions is, of course, to be found in the constitutional duty to oversee the manner in which public money is spent, by every institution to which it has been entrusted for the performance of a public function. Therefore, a system with which all branches of government are either equally happy or unhappy with will have to be developed to ensure that the judiciary not only accounts for the money it receives from the public purse but also for the operational standards one can reasonably expect of an optimally functional judiciary. It must also follow that while the tenure and remuneration of individual members of the judiciary is an inalienable right in South Africa, as with all other rights, it brings with it a responsibility. In this case the responsibility of the judiciary having to deal with the thorny issue of administering discipline in the case of allegations of misconduct against their own, not only a fair manner but also in a speedy and final manner.
Judge President Mzikamanda in the article I referenced states that public confidence in the judiciary is yet another important element of its independence. The uncertainty around the failure to finalise the decade-old complaints against Judge President Hlophe and to bring to finalisation the matter against Judge Motata after his disciplinary hearing was concluded on January 2018 and the tribunal found him guilty of misconduct in April 2018 already creates the very real possibility, unfortunately, that public confidence and trust in the judiciary could be broken down. This is very dangerous because the authority of our courts are grounded in, amongst other things, confidence on the part of the public that the judiciary is earmarked by integrity and impartiality and that it displays moral authority. We know that the Chief Justice is in agreement with us. Last year in November at the Judicial Accountability session convened by him, he stated and I quote:
Lack of confidence in the judiciary has the potential to erode the moral authority of the judiciary. We as the judiciary do not control the army, the police or the public purse. Our orders as the court are obeyed because of the moral authority we enjoy. If we lose public confidence, we are finished.
Therefore, in conclusion, the only thing that remains on this issue of self- discipline is for the form to follow function. I thank you. [Applause.]