Chairperson, the Reserve Bank, as we know, is a crucial independent institution in South Africa, mandated inter alia with determining monetary policy. Public hearings on this Bill exposed a very high level of mistrust between shareholders and government, as well as confirming concerns that some shareholders seek to influence not only executive management decisions but also operational issues, including monetary policy decisions.
This is clearly beyond the mandate of shareholders, as previous speakers have indicated. This is a situation that is untenable, resulting in these amendments before us. The amendments require that board members - certain board members - must be screened by a panel to determine their suitability, whether they are fit and proper persons with appropriate skills and experience, taking into account the requirements contained in the Banks Act of 1990.
The amendment clarifies that bank directors owe their fiduciary duty and that of care and skill to the bank, and to no one else. The bank must serve the public interests and not a personal shareholder's objective. Directors must therefore avoid any conflict of interest between his or her interests and those of the bank.
The ACDP raised certain questions as to why this panel will only screen the shareholders-nominated directors and not the directors appointed by the President. We accept the explanation that this would impinge upon the President's powers, but it did seem slightly odd to us during deliberations.
The President's appointments must in any case satisfy the same requirements, of being fit and proper persons to be appointed with appropriate skills and experience. Significantly, the whole policy debate as to whether there should be shareholders at all has been postponed to a later occasion. In view of this and of the concerns surrounding the shareholders, the ACDP will support this Amendment Bill.
As the last issue, relating to what Mr Oriani-Ambrosini said, may I just say that these are valid concerns that we as parliamentarians also need to consider. Clearly the Reserve Bank is accountable to Parliament in the final instance. At least in future we should engage and consider some of those concerns that Mr Oriani-Ambrosini raised, particularly to the secrecy box and in the view of the fact that the Reserve Bank is accountable to Parliament. I look forward to engaging with the Reserve Bank in more detail to discuss those concerns. I thank you.