Chairperson, hon members, there is no doubt whatsoever that the oversight and accountability model is both necessary and well overdue. The committees, task teams and consultants of Parliament worked extensively for some years to develop this model. They really did their research and to a large extent have developed a good and comprehensive model.
I do, however, believe that there needs to be some tweaking. It is important that it becomes fully functional. Considering that the Joint Rules Committee adopted the model as far back as March 2008 and that 11 months later we now are only debating this issue, it raises some very serious concerns, specifically about the administration of this Parliament.
We can have, as Mr Davidson has said, all the good intentions in the world, but if we do not act on our decisions, as has so often been the case in this Parliament over the years, then we might just as well not make decisions at all; we might as well function as an entity that is not in fact Parliament.
The chairperson of the committee is very correct in saying that this is a unique Parliament - all too often we take decisions we do not follow through on! We have over the years lost many good opportunities to improve our lot as Parliament, and the lot of our electorate.
We put in place the Parliamentary Oversight Authority, POA, which rarely meets. We have a Joint Rules Committee that seldom meets; and when it does, it takes decisions that get nowhere, apropos what I said earlier on about this report that we are debating only today, 11 months later.
Our committees, portfolio committees and ad hoc committees meet, make decisions, resolve to get things happening. And what happens? By the time these resolutions and decisions get to Parliament, circumstances have overtaken them, and we're back to square one.
An example of this is the Private Members' proposal on the remuneration for public office bearers. What happens, of course, is that other processes have overtaken them, and nothing can be done.
As Parliament, we also need to ensure that the laws we make are constitutional, that they can, in fact, be enforced and that the departments concerned have the will and the resources to carry out our decisions. As Parliament, we do not hold the executive accountable as we should and the executive certainly does not always accept that it is the role of Parliament to hold them accountable.
Many of our executive members are arrogant and refuse to report to Parliament as requested. I cite the example of the Minister of Correctional Services, who refused to report to Parliament on a very serious issue relating to problems in that department.
He pushed out a man in charge of that department who was doing an outstanding job of exposing corruption and refused to say anything to Parliament or to our committee about it, notwithstanding our concerns.
The ruling party has become arrogant, making unilateral decisions without consulting opposition parties. For example, the recent axing of President Mbeki was such arrogance. Parliament, in terms of our Rules, our Constitution and our oversight and accountability model, elects the President, and it should have been Parliament that took the decision as to whether or not to axe the President.
We provided the oversight and the accountability model. Now we have to put in place the processes, the resources and the will to carry on with our responsibilities.