Chairperson, many critics are saying our Parliament's oversight function is not robust, assertive or pointed at the executive, and this renders Parliament weak. We, as the Oversight Task Team members, spent time in our research to understand what oversight is and also to engage with this notion and the criticisms levelled against Parliament.
In Chapter 2 of the Oversight Model itself, we tried to give some kind of a definition, as was agreed in the task team. There is one view that says the conventional Westminster view on oversight, as inherited by many former British colonies, is often rather adversarial, and in some instances oversight is professed to be the purview of the opposition politicians and not the legislature as an institution. I think that is one of the criticisms that are guiding this very agreement on this classical narrow definition of what oversight ought to be.
Instead, we are living in a modernised society. Obviously, the Constitution of South Africa has given some kind of requirement and a mandate to Parliament also, as an institution, to then assert itself insofar as oversight is concerned.
The oversight emphasis and argument should always be placed on the oversight rule of legislatures, especially as it relates to ensuring government's compliance with approved public spending. As alluded to by other speakers, section 55(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa states that the National Assembly must provide mechanisms. Unfortunately, unlike other chapters of the Constitution, the oversight mechanisms were not provided for, such as in sections 74, 75 or 76, in terms of how Bills need to be processed in Parliament.
So the National Assembly was, therefore, requested to begin bringing up these particular mechanisms. Firstly, those mechanisms are to ensure that all executive organs of state in the national sphere of government are accountable to Parliament; secondly, to maintain oversight over the exercise of the national executive authority, including the implementation of the legislation and any organ of state. The question is: Why did it take Parliament so many years to come up with such mechanisms? The response is that Parliament does have mechanisms; it is not as if Parliament did not have any form of mechanisms in existence, instituted by it.
It has over a period refined mechanisms such as questions to the President, the Deputy President and the Ministers, as well as members' statements and the new innovation, which was developed in the last few years around the issue of members' statements, which is a prompt mechanism that allows Ministers without any warning to respond or reply to such members' statements.
So those mechanisms have always been there, and also committees themselves have been created to ensure, therefore, that they make the government more accountable and oversee its implementation of the programme.
Maybe the debate should be about the value and quality of questions, members' statements and motions that are being debated generally in this House, and whether they are beginning to assist this institution to effect accountability, ensuring that indeed there is oversight over the executive authority and that it is implementing the constitutional mandate as the preamble states.
For example, the preamble deals with laying the foundation for a democratic and open society in which government is based on the will of the people and every citizen is equally protected by the law. The other point it makes is about improving the quality of life of all citizens, freeing the potential of each person and also building a united and a democratic South Africa, which is able to take its rightful place as a sovereign state in the family of nations, etc. These quality values are being presented in Parliament to ensure that indeed they assist us in achieving all of these things. Those are the issues we ought to be looking at.
Parliament, as it maximises and brings into place new mechanisms, should also deal or engage with robustness and assertiveness and become a people's Parliament as its vision and mission describe. It must also be balanced to be a people's voice and ensure that the respective public representatives and parties that are elected to Parliament also begin to play that particular role.
In responding to the question of what oversight is, the model defines it as follows: Oversight entails the informal and the formal; it has a surprise element; the strategic and structural scrutiny exercised by the legislature in respect of the implementation of laws; the application of the budget and the strict observance of the statutes and the Constitution.
In addition, most importantly, it entails overseeing the effective management of government departments, hence we have portfolio and select committees to do that in respect of individual members of the Cabinet in pursuit of improved service delivery for the achievement of a better life for its citizens.
In terms of the constitutional provisions of the Constitution and the Joint Rules, Parliament has powers to conduct oversight over all organs. The organs are all these agencies or public entities that are publicly funded or partly funded, and we have 700 such bodies at national, provincial and local government levels. We then need to begin looking at mechanisms of overseeing these agencies and whether they are indeed implementing and delivering on their mandate.
The model goes further to describe oversight functions, which aspects include political, administrative, financial and ethical accountability, and legal and strategic elements. Some of the functions are to detect and prevent abuse, arbitrary behaviour or illegal and unconstitutional conduct on the part of government and public entities; to hold government accountable in respect of how taxpayers' monies are used; to detect waste within the machinery of government and public agencies; and to ensure that policies and programmes announced by government and authorised by Parliament are actually delivered. This function includes monitoring the achievements of goals set by the legislation and government programmes. Lastly, it is intended to improve the transparency of government operations and enhance public trust in the government, which in itself is a condition of effective policy delivery.
The model suggests new mechanisms, amongst other things: The first is the passing of the Money Bills Amendment Procedure and Related Matters Bill, which is currently scheduled for passing by both Houses. It will give Parliament impetus and power regarding the procedures of amending Bills, should the need arise.
Secondly, Parliament has also been given a mandate here to amend the Act establishing the Reserve Bank without compromising its independence, although it must account to Parliament, as is the case in other developed nations, like the USA.
Thirdly, it suggests a Government Assurance Committee, the role of which is to monitor and hold the executive accountable on all matters, promises, undertakings and assurances raised on the floor of Parliament during debates or replies or responses to questions.
Fourthly, the model outlines mechanisms to oversee the compliance of government with all treaties, conventions and protocols and to scrutinise the particular reports that go to those agencies.
The fifth mechanism is the establishment of a centre in Parliament, with skilled people to monitor, track and advise committees on oversight work done, outstanding issues to be followed and co-ordination with provinces and other spheres of government to avoid duplication.
The sixth mechanism concerns amendmending the rules to be flexible on the joint reporting of committees.
The seventh concerns the establishment, in the Speaker's Office, of an office that would monitor Chapter 9 institutions. The eighth recommendation outlines creating space for MPs to report on their own constituencies' work so that individual members can stand up in Parliament and present reports so that those reports are considered and processed through parliament, and lastly, to introduce sanctioning in case of noncompliance by the executive.
Should all protocol mechanisms be exhausted, and if they do not comply, we need then to call for their sanction if that need arises.
Therefore, that is the model that we are adopting and we are calling upon the National Assembly to adopt this principle and recommendations so that the forthcoming Parliament can then begin to look at the Rules and effect these changes. I thank you. [Applause.]