Agb Voorsitter, Minister, agb lede, alle lede van die intelligensiegemeenskap en gaste, die einde van die Vierde Parlement is in sig. Die afgelope jaar is veral gekenmerk deur nuwe wetgewing van toepassing op die intelligensiegemeenskap. Dit is egter duidelik dat die wetgewing ten doel het om bestaande wetgewing sodanig te reguleer wat deursigtigheid beperk.
Dit is aanvaarbaar dat gebeure elders in die wreld, waar die veiligheid van die staat en sy inwoners bedreig word, verskerpte sekerheidskontroles en optredes regverdig en dat hersiening van wetgewing voor-die-hand-liggend is.
In die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks is daar twee stukke wetgewing voorgestel wat doelbewus vrae laat ontstaan. Dit is die Protection of State Information Bill met drakoniese voorstelle en veranderinge, asook die Algemene Wysigingswet op Intelligensiewette, wat veronderstel was om, volgens die Minister, slegs tegniese veranderinge teweeg te bring. As daar egter vanaf 'n politieke oogpunt na laasgenoemde wetgewing gekyk word, blyk dit dat beginsels, soos vervat in die Witskrif oor Intelligensie van 1995, nie meer geld nie.
Die Witskrif fokus op die totstandkoming van 'n nuwe doktrine waar daar weg beweeg word van 'n militr-strategiese benadering na 'n nuwe burgerlike diens - binnelands sowel as buitelands - en daar word slegs op 'n indirekte wyse na militre sowel as kriminele intelligensie verwys. Met verwysing na die samestelling van die intelligensiegemeenskap word daar soos volg aangehaal uit die Witskrif. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)
[Mr J STUBBE: Hon Chair, Minister, hon members, all members of the intelligence community and guests, the end of the Fourth Parliament is in sight. The past year was characterised by new legislation with regard to the intelligence community. However, it is clear that the intention of the legislation is to regulate existing legislation in such a manner that transparency becomes limited.
It is acceptable that events in other parts of the world where the security of the state and its inhabitants is threatened justifies increased security controls and actions and that the revision of legislation is obvious.
Within the South African context two pieces of legislation were proposed which deliberately raise questions. This applies to the Protection of State Information Bill with its draconian proposals and changes, as well as the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill, which, according to the Minister, was supposed to bring about only technical changes. However, if the latter is viewed politically, it seems that the principles, which are contained in the White Paper on Intelligence of 1995, are not valid any longer.
The White Paper focuses on the establishment of a new doctrine in which the movement is away from a military strategic approach to a new civilian service - nationally as well as internationally - and reference to military as well as criminal intelligence only occurs indirectly. With reference to the composition of the intelligence community the following is quoted from the White Paper:]
After the amalgamation of the various intelligence formations, this arrangement:
... will lead to the eventual establishment of two civilian intelligence agencies, one focusing on domestic intelligence (and retaining the name National Intelligence Agency) and a service focusing on foreign intelligence (to be named the South African Secret Service).
The mission of the domestic intelligence service (the National Intelligence Agency) will be to conduct security intelligence within the borders of the Republic of South Africa in order to protect the Constitution. The overall aim shall be to ensure the security and stability of the State and the safety and wellbeing of its citizens.
The mission of the foreign intelligence service (the South African Secret Service) will be to conduct intelligence in relation to external threats, opportunities and other issues that may affect the Republic of South Africa, with the aim of promoting the national security and the interests of the country and its citizens.
The most significant departure from the old dispensation is that instead of one centralised national civilian intelligence organisation, there will be two. This arrangement will not only ensure that the new intelligence dispensation in South Africa corresponds with general international trends, but will promote greater focusing, effectiveness, professionalism and expertise in the specialised fields of domestic and foreign intelligence.
In outlining the function, control and mandate of the new security services, the White Paper emphasises democratic principles and the centrality of the Constitution. Certain key principles are set out to ensure meaningful government control over the intelligence community. Essentially, the White Paper clearly established a decentralised national intelligence structure.
If we look at the evolution in the intelligence sphere prior to the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill, Gilab, it is interesting to note that every Minister designated to assume political responsibility for the intelligence services sought amendments to the national legislation in order to further expand their authority over the intelligence services. This is in line with the statement in the White Paper referring to the concept of international trends.
However, except for the reference in the Constitution to a multiparty parliamentary committee that has oversight, a body to co-ordinate intelligence, and an inspector, no mention is made either in the Constitution or in the White Paper of the existence of entities such as the Intelligence Academy, Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd, Comsec, or the National Communications Centre, NCC. The said entities exist, however, but fall under the jurisdiction of NIA.
With the introduction of the General Intelligence Laws Amendment Bill, there is a definite shift from the prescriptions referred to in the White Paper - back to the colonial system, Minister.
Die nuwe Algemene Wysigingswetsontwerp op Intelligensiewette, ingevolge 'n proklamasie deur die President in 2009, het hoofsaaklik ten doel om die voormalige Nia, Sass en ander entiteite, waaronder die akademie, Comsec en die Nasionale Kommunikasiesentrum, NKS, saam te snoer as die Staatsveiligheidsagentskap. Dit het tot gevolg dat wysigings aangebring is aan, onder meer, die Wet op Nasionale Strategiese Intelligensie van 1994, die Wet op Toesig oor Intelligensiedienste, Wet 40 van 1994, asook die Wet op Intelligensiedienste, Wet 65 van 2002, terwyl die Wet op Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd, Wet 68 van 2002, in geheel opgeskort is.
'n Verdere uitvloeisel van die wysigingswetsontwerp vereis dat daar dringend gekyk moet word na die bepalings van die Wet op Toesig oor Intelligensiedienste, Wet 40 van 1994 deur die Gesamentlike Staande Komitee oor Intelligensie, GSKI. Aangesien alle entiteite wat vroer afsonderlik onderwerp was aan parlementre oorsig nou opgeneem is in die SVA, vereis dat die oorsigrol dus herdefinieer moet word.
Die GSKI se oorsigrol word verder bemoeilik omdat sperdatums vir sertifikate bepaal deur die Inspekteur-generaal asook die Ouditeur-generaal nie nagekom word nie en daar dus nie volledig verslag aan die Parlement gegee word nie. Die begroting van die Kantoor van die Minister is ook verskans in die begroting van die SVA, wat dit onmoontlik maak om te bepaal of sy begroting oor- of onderspandeer is. Die uitsprake dat die instelling van die SVA 'n wesentlike besparing op die begroting gaan meebring, kan ook nie gemeet word nie vanwe die kompleksiteit van die entiteit.
Het die tyd nie dalk aangebreek dat die modelle wat tans gebruik word, soos die samestelling van die GSKI teenoor 'n staande komitee, die bevoegdhede van die Inspekteur-generaal, en die hele oorsigwetgewing, oordink moet word nie? Tans is die GSKI ingestel om reaktief aandag te skenk aan probleme wat in die intelligensiegemeenskap ontstaan, pleks daarvan om voorkennis te gebruik alvorens 'n probleem opduik. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)
[The new General Intelligence Laws Amendment Act, in terms of a proclamation introduced by the President in 2009, in the main aims at linking the former Nia, Sass and other entities, which includes the academy, Comsec and the National Communication Centre, NCC, into the State Security Agency. This resulted in the introduction of amendments, amongst others, to the Intelligence Services Act of 1994, the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, Act 40 of 1994, as well as the Intelligence Services Act, Act 65 of 2002, whilst the Electronic Communications Security (Pty) Ltd Act, Act 68 0f 2002, was abolished in its entirety.
A further consequence of the amendment Bill requires that the provisions of the Intelligence Services Oversight Act, Act 40 of 1994 by the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence, JSCI, should be urgently looked at. Seeing that all entities which were subject to parliamentary oversight earlier on are now included in the State Security Agency, this requires that the new role regarding oversight should therefore be redefined.
The oversight role of the Joint Standing Committee on Security is made more difficult because deadlines for certificates determined by the Inspector- General as well as the Auditor-General are not adhered to and a complete report to Parliament is therefore not given. The budget of the Office of the Minister is also ensconced in the budget of State Security Agency, which makes it impossible to determine if its budget is overspent or underspent. The comment that the institution of the State Security Agency in essence effects a saving for the budget can also not be measured due to the complexity of the entity.
Has the time not perhaps arrived for the models which are being used at present, for example the composition of the Joint Standing Committee on Security as opposed to a standing committee, the competence of the Inspector-General, and the entire legislation concerning oversight, to be rethought? At present the Joint Standing Committee on Security is geared to pay attention in a reactive manner to problems which originate within the intelligence community, instead of applying prescience before a problem occurs.]
Three issues that come to mind are the following. Firstly, there is the Gupta invasion of the Waterkloof Air Force Base with its status as a national key point. Had this happened elsewhere in the world, such an aircraft would have been shot down if no preflight clearance had been given - and there is ambiguity about whether such clearance was given or not. This is a poor reflection on the readiness of our security services.
In the second case, reports were received only yesterday that the international terrorist group, Al Qaeda, has been operating training bases under our noses without any intervention from our security establishment.
The third issue is the fact that intelligence information regarding the tragic deaths of South African troops in the Central African Republic was appalling. I can recall that two weeks ago, during the debate when we were voting on the Protection of State Information Bill, the hon Landers looked up at the gallery and proclaimed that spies were walking in the passages of Parliament. I just wonder if their presence here might perhaps be to gather prior knowledge and act as an early warning system, instead of trying to do damage control after an incident has occurred.
The Minister is no doubt aware that there has been speculation in the media, claiming that the Minister intervened to stop legal or illegal investigation by the SSA into the undue influence of the Guptas. Will the Minister tell us whether this is true? A simple yes or no will do. I thank you. [Applause.]