Thank you, hon Speaker. I thought you would give me the honour of saying: "That brings the business of the day to an end, and the House is adjourned."
In any democratic society, healthy relations ideally operate in a triangular relationship comprising security services, civil authority and civil society. Such a relationship contributes positively to the enhancement of peace and security. This model also ensures greater transparency, accountability, and effective civil control. This is the premise on which Cope is addressing this issue. We are very mindful that democratic relations must constitute the manner in which all parties participate.
In the management of healthy civil-security relations, one of the fundamental requirements is that Parliament closely monitors the security forces. It is envisaged that the Ombudsman will address any military personnel matters which cannot be resolved through ordinary existing mechanisms. A military investigator was even positioned within the Public Protector's Office to investigate military-related complaints, but this has not been adequate.
Cope believes that the Office of the Military Ombud will assist in bringing about more transparency. It is, however, not going to be sufficiently independent from political interference because the incumbent will be appointed by the President.
During the public hearings it became clear that several organisations also criticised the Bill for failing to give the Ombud the power to compel the implementation of his or her recommendations. This is fundamental. Creating the office and denuding it of power is totally counterproductive. It does not take a stargazer to show that this inadequacy will subvert the functioning of the office.
The Military Ombud is intended to resolve both internal complaints in the Defence Force and external complaints against the Defence Force. It is, therefore, suggested that the Ombud should not be appointed by the body that it reviews, as correctly pointed out by the hon Maynier. While the Minister of Defence and Military Veterans does not appoint the Military Ombud and the appointment is made by the President, there is not enough independence to allow for quick and assertive action to be taken.
It seems that politicians want to keep control of the process and this will, therefore, limit its effectiveness. It is, therefore, Cope's view that it may be more appropriate for Parliament to have some role in the appointment of the Ombud. That is how Cope would have approached the creation of this very important office.
Cope's policy begins by aligning civil and government relations by asking questions such as: Is the South African Constitution really a people's document owned by the people? Does it alter the existence of those who are poor, homeless, marginalised and excluded? Does it allow for structures that are set up to succeed in their objectives without being constrained by the executive? That is what we would ask.