Deputy Speaker, colleagues, hon members, ladies and gentlemen, I stand before this House to call on all members in this House to support this Bill. I will now give you the rationale.
The Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1997, which came into operation on 1 May 1998, dealt with the abolition of the death penalty and created a legal regime of discretionary minimum sentences in respect of certain serious offences. During the Second Reading debate on the Criminal Law Amendment Bill, on 6 November 1997, our beloved late Minister of Justice, Dullah Omar, described the introduction of discretionary minimum sentences for certain serious crimes as an important matter for our country and in the fight against crime in particular.
Discretionary minimum sentences are only provided for in respect of a small number of serious and defined offences. In each case the presiding judicial officer has the discretion to impose a lesser sentence than the prescribed minimum sentence, if he or she is satisfied that substantial and compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of such a lesser sentence.
The offences to which discretionary minimum sentences are applicable are listed in schedule 2 of the Act. These offences are categorised in terms of their degree of seriousness. For instance, Part 1, which carries potential life imprisonment, comprises murder with aggravated circumstances, as well as many instances of rape such as gang rape and rape of a minor. The Act also provides that these provisions will lapse unless they are renewed, for periods of two years at a time, by the President with the concurrence of Parliament.
The discretionary minimum sentences provisions were extended on 1 May 2007 for a further period of two years in order to allow Parliament time to consider and pass the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Bill. The Bill proposes the repeal of the provision in terms of which the minimum sentences provisions shall lapse after two years, and it will therefore not be necessary in future to follow this procedure.
When the minimum sentences provisions were first debated and even once they were enacted, stakeholders in the legal fraternity were divided on their constitutionality. Some argued that their prescriptive nature constituted an unwarranted interference in the judicial function of sentencing. The late Minister Omar, in summarising the main arguments in favour of the introduction of minimum sentences during the Second Reading debate of 1997 referred to earlier, stated the following in this regard:
In terms of the proposed legislation, the courts are granted discretion to deviate from the prescribed minimum sentences. The introduction of minimum sentences could therefore not be regarded in this Bill as being interference with the independence of the judiciary.
In deciding challenges brought against the minimum sentences legislation in the years following this enactment, the Constitutional Court, on two occasions, as well as the Supreme Court of Appeal held that the provisions were indeed consistent with the Constitution and in line with the executive's and the legislature's interest and mandate as far as sentencing was concerned.
In State v Dzukuda of 2000, the Constitutional Court dismissed allegations that section 52 of the Act infringed on an accused's right to a fair trial in terms of section 35 of the Constitution.
A year later, in State v Dodo of 2001, the Constitutional Court had to deal with an application from the High Court for confirmation of a declaration of constitutional invalidity of section 51(1) of the Act. The High Court declared the section in question to be constitutionally invalid, because it was inconsistent with section 35(3)(c) of the Constitution and was also inconsistent with the separation of powers required by the Constitution.
The Constitutional Court, in interpreting the words "substantial and compelling circumstances" in section 51(3) of the Ac, endorsed the step-by- step sentencing procedure set out in State v Malgas by the Supreme Court of Appeal. The Court held in this regard that this interpretation of the SCA steers an appropriate path, which the legislature doubtless intended, respecting the legislature's decision to ensure that consistently heavier sentences are imposed in relation to the serious crimes covered by section 51 and, at the same time, promoting the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights.
It is therefore necessary to briefly highlight some of the main points made in the Malgas case. Section 51 has not eliminated the courts' discretion in imposing a sentence in respect of offences referred to in Part 1 of Schedule 2. Courts are required to approach the imposition of sentence conscious of the fact that the legislature has ordained life imprisonment as the sentence that should ordinarily and in the absence of weightier justification be imposed for the listed crimes in the specified circumstances. [Time expired.] [Applause.]
The Minister of Justice is going to lend me her speech so that I can finish it for her.
Hon members, the Bill before us is an amendment to the Criminal Law Act on minimum sentences which was passed in 1997. That Act put in place a regime of minimum sentences for certain serious offences which the Constitutional Court has correctly described as discretionary. This is so because a judicial officer, upon finding substantial and compelling circumstances, may deviate from the minimum sentences set down in the legislation.
Up to now, this House has not guided the courts in any way as to the precise meaning of the phrase "substantial and compelling". As members, we will know that the 1997 Act, which the Minister has already alluded to, was not necessarily well received by some members of the judiciary and the legal fraternity. In not one but two Constitutional Court cases that court found the legislation entirely constitutional. In one of those cases, State v Dodo, Justice Ackermann quoted, with approval, the first certification judgment, where the court said:
The separation of powers anticipates the necessary or unavoidable intrusion of one branch on the terrain of the other. No constitutional scheme can reflect a complete separation of powers. The scheme is always one of partial separation.
However, notwithstanding these and other definitive judgments, including the superb judgment alluded to by the Minister in State v Malgas, where the court detailed the finer aspects relating to the application of "substantial and compelling", disdain for this legislation in some quarters has persisted. This is particularly true in rape cases.
Members are familiar with the case of State v Abrahams where the courts held that the accused, who had raped his 14-year-old daughter, was not a threat to society as a whole, and this was, in itself, a mitigating factor. Although the Appeal Court in that case found that the judge had misdirected himself, tendencies along this line of reasoning persist in our courts.
In State v Mahomotsa, the accused, who was 23 years old, raped a girl under the age of 16 after brandishing a firearm. He was arrested and, while awaiting trial, he raped another girl under 16, threatening to stab her with a knife. In both cases, he raped these girls more than once. I now want to quote from the judgment delivered so that members can see for themselves the kinds of attitudes that prevail in regard to rape cases. The judge says and I quote:
Although there was intercourse ...
note "intercourse" -
... with each complainant more than once, this was the result of the virility of a young man still at school who had intercourse with other school pupils against their wishes ...
and notes -
... school pupils who had previously been sexually active. Where one is dealing with school pupils and where, in addition, it appears that the two girls concerned had already had intercourse before, one really shouldn't lose perspective, especially not in relation to the first count, which dealt with a complainant who had, in any event, been naughty a few days earlier, and had intercourse with somebody else.
The injustice which she suffered in this case does not demand an unusually severe punishment.
There are many examples of clearly inappropriate and often sexist pronouncements emanating from some quarters in our judiciary.
Lest we are too quick to conclude that these attitudes vest only in male judges, I would refer members to the appeal of Nkomo v the State where it was left to Acting Justice of Appeal Theron, in a dissenting judgment, to restore to the victim a measure of dignity.
In this case, the victim was held hostage all night by the perpetrator. She was forced to remain naked for the entire period. She was physically assaulted to overcome her resistance to performing oral sex on the perpetrator. She was raped on four occasions. In her desperation to escape, she jumped from the second floor of a building despite the potential danger to her life and notwithstanding the unanimous finding by the court, "It is difficult to imagine a rape under much worse conditions", Justice Lewis of that court found that because there was no serious injury, and the victim's wounds were superficial, the perpetrator was young - he happened to be 29 years old - and there was a prospect of rehabilitation, the maximum sentence was not then pronounced.
Arising from these and other very sadly indicting tendencies in some of our courts, we have veered into the terrain of the absolute discretion of the courts in deciding what does and what does not constitute "substantial and compelling circumstances". We now propose the following factors will not in future be able to be considered "substantial and compelling circumstances" so as to attract a lesser sentence for the accused.
These factors are, firstly, the victim's sexual history; secondly, the apparent lack of physical injury to the victim; thirdly, the accused's cultural or religious values regarding rape; and, fourthly, any previous relationship between the accused and the victim.
Previously - coming now to the issue of jurisdiction - after convicting accused persons for crimes listed in Part 1, which are the most serious crimes, our regional courts stopped proceedings and referred such cases to the High Court for sentencing, owing mainly to a lack of statutory jurisdiction to pass the sentence of life imprisonment. Apart from the administrative delay caused in transferring a case from one court to the other, some High Courts refused to simply sentence the accused based on the record of the proceedings in the lower court, and insisted on rehearing evidence. This often led to secondary trauma for victims, particularly in rape cases when a woman or a child victim had to give evidence not once, but twice before our courts.
This two-tier process is now being removed, with the necessary jurisdiction being conferred on the regional court to pass life-imprisonment sentences. Where a person is sentenced to life imprisonment in a regional court, an automatic right to appeal will attach. At the same time, we now require the National Prosecuting Authority to clearly stipulate a policy on prosecuting the most serious crimes in the High Court as the court of first instance. We intend by this measure that, as far as possible, most serious crimes will be prosecuted in the High Courts and not in the regional courts, as has been the practice up to now. This is to reassert the role of dominus litus in respect of the National Prosecuting Authority.
Lastly and finally, the committee has added the ritual murder of people or the so-called "witch killings" to Part 1 of the schedule to the Act. In this regard, while all premeditated murders are already in this category, it was thought to abide by the request of the Premier of Limpopo to deal harshly with crimes of this nature so as to send a strong message that muti murders or witch killings, the victims of which are largely women and children, are cowardly crimes which will be dealt with extremely harshly by the state in all its manifestations. I thank you for your attention, hon members. [Applause.]
Voorsitter, my inligting is dat dit waarskynlik die laaste keer is wat die agb voorsitter van die portefeuljekomitee hier in daardie hoedanigheid optree. Ek wil vir haar s dit was 'n voorreg om saam met haar te werk.
Ons sal haar skerp intellek en deeglike voorbereiding mis. Sy is bekend as iemand wat nogal hardkoppig kan wees, maar ek moet bys sy is altyd diplomaties hardkoppig. Dit is jammer dat ons so min tyd het om werklik belangrike wetgewing te debatteer in hierdie Huis. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)
[Dr T J DELPORT: Chairperson, my information is that this is probably the last time that the hon chairperson of the portfolio committee will act in this capacity here. Therefore, I want to tell her that it has been a privilege working with her.
We will miss her sharp intellect and thorough preparation. She is known as someone that can be somewhat stubborn at times, but I should add that she is always diplomatically stubborn. It is a pity that we have so little time to really debate important legislation in this House.]
I cannot do justice to what I have to say in four minutes, let alone enter into a debate with the hon Deputy Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development on specific issues.
Laat ek s ons ondersteun hierdie wetgewing en ons ondersteun absoluut sterk en streng vonnisse. Trouens, ons wil graag h alle kriminele moet voor die gereg kom staan en deur 'n behoorlike proses gaan. Sover dit verkragting betref, laat ek dit dadelik s, ek persoonlik sou vir verkragting met verswarende omstandighede - en ek praat nie namens my party nie, maar persoonlik - die doodstraf sou wou sien. S sterk voel ek daaroor. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraph follows.)
[Let me say that we support this legislation and we absolutely support harsh and strict sentences. In fact, we would like to see all criminals brought before a court of law and go through a proper process. With regard to rape, let me say immediately, that for rape with aggravating circumstances - and I am not talking on behalf of my party, but in my personal capacity - I would like to see the death penalty. This is how strongly I feel about this.]
Against this background I must express some reservations on the constitutionality of the clause that limits the discretion of the court to deviate from the prescribed minimum sentence. In terms of the Bill, a court may not rely on certain factors in order to find a reason to impose a lesser sentence, and the chairperson did list these instances.
I am of the opinion that Parliament, here at the very least, borders on interfering with the discretion of the court. We know that the Constitutional Court has ruled that minimum sentences are not per se unconstitutional.
Hierdie bepaling gaan nou veel verder. Dit is nog altyd die imperatief dat 'n hof die totale posisie van 'n beskuldigde sal oorweeg by die oplegging van 'n gepaste vonnis. Wat ons hier vind is dat daardie diskresie, nee ek wil verder gaan, daardie verpligting op die hof om na die totale prentjie te kyk nou aan bande gel word.
Ek dink ons wil 'n probleem wat bestaan op die verkeerde plek regmaak, want nie alleen kan daar dalk geargumenteer word - ek s nie dit is so nie - dat ons hier inmeng met die bevoegdheidsonafhanklikheid van die regbank, maar daar is 'n ander fasset wat net so belangrik is. Sal 'n beskuldigde nie kan aanvoer dat hy nie 'n regverdige verhoor gekry het nie omdat sy totale prentjie nie deur die hof oorweeg mag geword het nie? (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)
[This provision now goes much further. It has always been the imperative that the court will evaluate the total position of an accused when imposing an appropriate sentence. What we find here is that this discretion, no I want to go further, this obligation of the court to look at the whole picture is now being restricted.
I think we want to rectify an existing problem in the wrong place, because not only could it be argued - I am not saying this is the case - that we are interfering with the competency independence of the judiciary, but there is another facet that is just as important. Could an accused not say that he did not get a fair trial because his total circumstances could not be considered by the court?]
The imposition, however, of minimum sentences is but a small part of the solution to the overall problem we have. The criminal justice system as a whole needs to be upgraded if the crime wave is to be stopped in its tracks.
As far as this legislation and this particular clause are concerned, I will await further developments, possibly in our courts, with bated breath. We support this Bill, because we think extreme situations like those we are experiencing today need extreme measures. I thank you.
Chairperson, the IFP welcomes this Bill as we have long been concerned about the delays and other negative aspects caused by having a person convicted in a regional court transferred to a High Court for sentencing in terms of the 1997 Act.
This matter has repeatedly been brought to our attention by senior members of the judiciary and we therefore welcome the action taken by the department to repeal the relevant provisions. This should, we believe, end the delays caused by having to transfer cases to the high courts and should, in our opinion, lead to a quicker finalisation of serious cases.
As a consequence, we also welcome the provision made in this Bill for regional courts to hand down life sentences and the introduction of an automatic right of appeal in such cases. We would, however, have liked to see that the automatic right of appeal also be extended to cases where the regional courts impose direct prison terms and not just life sentences.
The question of "substantial and compelling circumstances" to be considered by the judiciary in altering the prescribed minimum sentences remains a vexed problem. The IFP has never been in favour of such prescriptions as they potentially impinge on the discretion of judicial officers - something that the previous member, hon Delport, said. However, we accept that the Constitutional Court found these prescriptions to be constitutionally valid and the hon Minister referred to this earlier.
We also welcome the provision that a court may take into account the period an accused spent as an awaiting-trial prisoner when deciding on a sentence. We would, however, like this provision to be made compulsory.
The Bill also inserts two further grounds for murder. In this instance, we would have liked to see a third ground, namely murders committed against the farming community, also being included, because there have been a number of these murders taking place in our country at this moment in time.
The IFP will support the Bill. Thank you.
Chair, most South Africans are overwhelmed and even preoccupied with crime, its effects and how to combat it. Most categories of crime are at unacceptably high levels. The callousness of the crimes, particularly the rapes and murders, has resulted in society calling for harsher measures, including the reintroduction of the death penalty.
In view of the absence of the death penalty, clearly, the only deterrent left is long prison sentences, including life imprisonment. Regrettably, some members of the judiciary have not applied minimum sentences consistently, resulting in the need for this amending legislation.
As the chair of the portfolio committee has said, the ACDP believes that it is necessary to provide that certain circumstances shall not constitute substantial and compelling circumstances justifying a lesser sentence than that prescribed for rape.
The ACDP will support this amending legislation, as it will further regulate the imposition of minimum sentences for serious offences including murder and rape. Thank you.
Chairperson, rape, murder, robbery and violence have South Africans living in fear. And this paranoia exists no matter what statistics say. When our beloved comrades envisioned our free South Africa, in no way did they envision the people to once again live lives of oppression, but this time at the hand of crime.
Poverty has been utilised as a scapegoat for crime in South Africa. While the MF believes that poverty does have repercussions on the fabric of South Africa, we believe that criminals in our free South Africa have opted by free will to commit crime. We don't believe that poverty tells one to rape, murder or become violent.
While our national Constitution and legislation govern us with principles and values that pertain to a good people, domestic morals and values have been replaced by material desires and evil. In this respect we need to inculcate the teaching of respect for life and consciousness of our actions, as our fathers taught us generations before.
We need to redress this important aspect of being South African. The MF calls for intense and effective rehabilitation of criminals. The MF will support this Bill. I thank you.
Chairperson, turning the tide in dealing with the backlog of criminal cases in our courts remains one of the primary challenges, yet it is also one of the critical objectives if you want to win the fight against crime. Our magistrates' courts currently have to deal with more than a million cases, of which it is reported that only about 375 000 have been finalised thus far and of which 86% have resulted in a conviction.
Our regional courts are apparently the worst hit, given that, since June, there has been a total of about 47 000 cases outstanding, of which 17 000 are back-dated more than nine months. The current Bill provides for the streamlining of sentencing, especially relating to serious crime, giving certain powers to regional courts to impose sentences such as life imprisonment.
The nature of crime in South Africa is characterised by high levels of murder, rape and aggravated robbery, and we trust that this Bill will successfully achieve its intended objectives. Being able to effect high levels of sentencing does not necessarily mean that crime is under control. First of all, the Bill elucidates certain provisions to guide the imposition of minimum sentencing.
The Bill limits mitigating factors of certain circumstances that may have a bearing on the nature of sentencing imposed by the court. The Bill correctly comes down hard on offenders convicted of rape and it is moving in the right direction to assess ways to control the occurrence of rape. The effective implementation of this Bill may lead to a reduction in the numbers of offenders on the street, but whether we will experience a reduction in crime is a matter equally important to consider if we wish to equate conviction rates with crime reduction. The FD supports this Bill, but wishes that further strategies relating to deterrents of crime, such as increased, visible policing and improvement in crime-detection mechanisms, be enhanced to complement the provisions contained in this Bill. I thank you.
Chairperson, hon members, Parliament has previously passed legislation providing for minimum sentences. What this means is that our presiding officers are given discretion to impose a sentence. However, the legislation compels them to order sentences between certain parameters and based on certain criteria. In other words, the court may not impose a sentence that is less than a certain prescribed minimum, unless the court has found substantial and compelling circumstances in the case. The court can only deviate from this minimum sentence and, in other words, impose a lesser sentence, if the court finds that there are substantial and compelling circumstances in the case.
The legislation was not passed to make sentences mandatory. Presiding officers still have discretion when it comes to sentencing, except that the legislation sets out the minimum sentence that the court may impose. Despite the passing of the legislation, cases show that there are still presiding officers in our courts who are imposing sentences which are inappropriate. An example is the case of the State v G, in which the accused was convicted of raping a 10-year-old girl. The accused was in a position of trust over the child, as he was the mother's boyfriend. The court found that the accused showed absolutely no remorse whatsoever and that the victims suffered continuous trauma because of the rape. Despite this, the court still imposed a lesser sentence because the court found that the violence used during the rape was not excessive and he therefore did not inflict serious physical injuries on the complainant.
The court seems to forget that rape, in and of itself, is a serious injury both physically and psychologically. Pronouncements such as these are unacceptable in a society that has to protect its women and children. Sentencing is all about attitudes, and this House has a duty to send a message that crimes such as the rape of children are unacceptable and demand a heavy sentence.
The Bill before us will make it very clear that our courts may not use factors such as the complainant's sexual history, an accused person's cultural or religious beliefs about rape, any personal relationship between the accused and the complainant or a perceived lack of physical or psychological harm on the victim as mitigating factors to justify lesser or lighter sentences.
This House needs to speak for victims of rape who cannot speak for themselves. For example, in the case of the State v Swart the accused had been convicted of housebreaking with the intent to rape, two counts of rape and two counts of indecent assault. The evidence showed that the accused was heavily under the influence of alcohol at the time.
The court found it was more important to cure the accused of his alcohol abuse, and therefore sentenced the accused to only seven years' imprisonment, suspended on condition that he seek treatment for his drinking problem. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal overturned the sentence and imposed a sentence of 12 years, of which only eight years had to be served.
Die Grondwet verbind ons tot die daarstel van 'n samelewing wat vry is van rassisme en seksisme. Ons kan slegs 'n vrye, nie-rassige en geslagsgelyke samelewing gebou op beginsels van menswaardigheid, gelykheid en vryheid ten volle verwesenlik, indien ons as `n samelewing ons denke so kan verander ten einde dit te bereik.
As gevolg van sommige toonaangewende hofuitsprake, veral deur ons Konstitusionele Hof, is daar reeds groot vordering gemaak op die gebied van geslagsgelykheid. Tog wil dit voorkom asof daar in verkragtingsake veral sommige howe is wat steeds onsensitief is teenoor die slagoffers van verkragting en vonnisse opl wat nie die misdaad pas nie. Dit is hoekom ons hierdie wetgewing, wat nou voor die Huis dien, nodig het. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)
[The Constitution enjoins us to establish a society that is free of racism and sexism. We can only fully realise a free, non-racial society with gender equity, built on the principles of human dignity, equality and liberty, if we as a society can change our mindset so as to achieve this end.
As a result of several authoritative judgments, especially by the Constitutional Court, there has been significant progress in the field of gender equity. But it would appear that, in rape cases in particular, some courts continue to be insensitive to the plight of rape victims, and still impose sentences which do not fit the crime. That is why we need this legislation that is now before this House.]
In conclusion, I wish to quote from a comment by the Association of Regional Magistrates, who will primarily be tasked with the implementation of this legislation:
We support the objectives of this Bill fully and are committed to ensure that this Bill is put into operation and shall be properly and responsibly applied. We are also committed to providing training and guidance to our members, pertaining to the appropriate use of the new sentencing powers extended to us in this Bill.
We commend our regional courts for this positive approach. With such enthusiasm we can certainly look forward to the successful implementation of this important piece of legislation. The ANC supports this Bill. [Applause.]
It is a great pleasure to come and speak, seeing that all the parties have agreed with this Bill. I really do thank members ... well, I like smiling [Interjections.] ... particularly Mike here. Thank you very much for supporting this Bill and we have not put politics before it.
Clearly, the House is unanimously of the view that this legislation is still vitally important to give guidance on issues of sentencing in our society. Members have quite correctly, and particularly Dr Delport and others, highlighted the one issue in the Bill that should be discussed properly and that is that in the case of rape we have created and placed certain limitations on the discretion that may be used in that regard. Obviously, this will go to the Constitutional Court, but it is for us to argue strongly why we have to do this.
I think we are starting to analyse the statistics around rape and there is a very scary trend that is starting to develop. We now find that more than 50% of rapes in this country are actually perpetrated on girls younger than 16. The perpetrators are in 80% to 85% of cases people older than 18. We are getting grown-ups targeting children and we see it in the newspapers. Young kids are being raped. The problem is that the extent of it is enormous.
If we as legislators do not do something about this, wouldn't it be right for our people to ask questions about it? I am prepared to put my head on a block on this issue, although there may be some difficulties with what we doing, to argue to the court why we are doing it. We have tons of court cases. The women's organisations have brought it to us and said: Here is a problem. Look at what the judiciary is doing in terms of their perceptions of rape in this society.
If one judicial officer said it, I'd say: Okay. But what worries me, for example, is that if you rape your daughter, your niece, your stepchild that there is a quite broad acceptance amongst judicial officers that that is somehow a lesser crime. We had a judge here in the Cape who specifically said in one case, where the stepfather had raped the daughter, that this was not really a problem because it was all done within the family and therefore it's not from outside. It is very scary, with the deeper inner socialisation of people coming out when they write judgments, particularly on sentencing.
We argued when we introduced minimum sentences that the one thing that minimum sentences are going to do is not necessarily that more people are going to get higher sentences. What it does is that it forces judicial officers to put their reasons on paper why they don't want to give the sentence. What we are seeing, I submit, is rather scary.
One of the cases mentioned is the Nkomo case. I want to read to you exactly what the judges have said. These are two senior judges in the SCA that have said this. This is a case in which a woman was forced upstairs, raped; the chap then went downstairs to drink in the bar. She then jumped out the window from the second floor. He grabbed her when she landed in front of the bar, took her upstairs, raped her four more times that evening, assaulted her, forced her to have oral sex with him, she escaped the next day and the High Court gave him a life sentence. The judges said this - why they did not want to give a life sentence:
In this case the appellant did not use any weapon, although he did assault the complainant. He did not seriously injure her though he callously and cruelly disregarded her injury caused when she tried to escape from the hotel room. I emphasise in particular the brutality with which the appellant treated the complainant - raping her four times after she had been injured ...
That's after already raping her once -
... trying to escape from him; that he forced her to perform oral sex on him, assaulting her when initially she refused; that he showed absolutely no remorse; that he was in a comparatively better position than her with education and a permanent job. He should have known. He behaved like a sexual thug. That said, I do not believe that this crime should attract the heaviest sentence permitted by our law: life imprisonment. I recognise that it may be difficult to imagine a rape under much worse conditions, but it is possible. And I consider that the prospect of rehabilitation of a 29-year-old and the fact that the appellant is a first offender must be regarded as substantial and compelling circumstances.
The two judges then gave 16 years to this man, instead of life imprisonment. The other judge, who gave a minority judgment, says this ...
Deputy Minister, you are fast running out of time. I can give you half a minute.
One minute please. He says:
In my view, the rape of the complainant is one of the worst imaginable. If life imprisonment is not appropriate in a rape as brutal as this, when will it be appropriate?
That is the problem that we are facing. I would have preferred not to actually prescribe the discretion in rape cases more than we have done. But against the background of what is happening out there with young girls in particular and what we are seeing in the judgments that they do not want to impose these sentences, our Parliament has no other recourse than to actually say: We are restricting the discretion. I am prepared for us to go to court to argue that point very strongly on behalf of those women that are being raped and not being treated with the necessary respect in our courts. Thank you very much. [Applause.]
Debate concluded.
Bill read a second time.