I will continue, thank you. Much has been made of the matter but, of course, in terms of section 179(2) of the Constitution provision was made for an intelligence-gathering function for the DSO. Now, is the solution for the executive's manifest failure to address the few problems, highlighted in the months of self-evaluation by the unit, the fault of the DSO?
Is the solution to disband the DSO, to remove all of the elements that rendered it so successful; is that what we are going to do? Despite the fact that the ministerial committee was a de facto entity from 2000, it did not meet. The Ministers failed to do their job. The mess is not the fault of the DSO. It is the fault of the executive to fulfil their responsibilities and the DSO is being blamed for their failure.
You have ignored the very reasons for creating the DSO, as an elite unit outside SAPS, in the first place. To even suggest that you intend to pool highly qualified specialists, who are civilians, into a ranking structure is a folly of monumental proportions and has resulted in a mass exodus of skilled personnel.
The SAPS has a very poor track record of anticorruption initiatives managed from within, with little or no progress or results. In addition, SAPS closed down the successful anticorruption unit in 2002 - thank you, Jackie Selebi - on the grounds of a lack of accountability and transformation. This closure created a void that the ICD has not been able to fill.
By combining all anticorruption authorities under one roof, SAPS becomes especially vulnerable to corruption from within. Who will police the police? More importantly, who will police the politicians? The answer is: No one. That, hon members, is what you are achieving here today.