Mr Chairman, it is my intention this afternoon not to comment on specific aspects of the budget, but rather to reflect on a number of events that have taken place and the consequent policy implications. Of course, because of the limited time I can reflect on a certain number of events only. There is no doubt in my mind that South Africa's second term as a member of the UN Security Council has been seen to be far more successful than its first. South Africa has what some might call an "eclectic" foreign policy: a policy that is sometimes value-driven and at other times interest-driven. It's not that the two are mutually exclusive but, if not skilfully executed with smart diplomacy, that eclecticism can lead to international misunderstanding, inconsistencies and even contradictions.
As the White Paper on South Africa's Foreign Policy points out, since 1994 the international community has looked to South Africa on many occasions to play a leading role in championing values of human rights, democracy, reconciliation and the eradication of poverty. These are core values reflected in our own Constitution. South Africa's first term as a member of the Security Council was not uncontroversial, with perhaps the low point being reached when South Africa, contrary to its human rights values, voted against a resolution condemning Myanmar for its human rights abuses. International observers do not concern themselves so much with what countries profess in national policy documents, but with their actions. It is here where we have at times, I think, got the balance wrong between our value-driven approach and our interest-driven approach.
Post 1994, Africa has been at the centre of South Africa's foreign policy. Our high profile in global affairs has not only been drawn from our peaceful transition and human rights-based Constitution but also from our close alignment with Africa. The latter has been used by the developed world to assume that South Africa, in this context, can speak for the continent as a whole, and in the past we have been a useful interlocutor. However, in the case of the post-election stand-off in the Ivory Coast, South Africa's value-driven approach took strain. In the process, our credibility was put at risk, both as interlocutor and driver of the African Agenda. Our position was indecisive, badly communicated and somewhat contradictory to our value set.
Initially, South Africa seemed to have flirted with the idea of supporting Gbagbo and, when the UN Security Council tried to force Gbagbo from power by ordering sanctions and demanding that power be handed over to Alassane Ouattaro - who was recognised by the international community as the winner of the election - South Africa demurred, pushing rather for a negotiated settlement. Eventually, South Africa had to accept the AU's original position that Ouattaro be installed, but in the process we were compromised.
Libya has also presented a challenge to us and our African agenda. Faced with the many human rights violations in Libya, South Africa correctly supported resolution 1973 at the Security Council. This position was in line with both the Arab League's position and article 4H of the AU Founding Act, which gave the right to member states to intervene in a country's internal affairs in grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.
The resolution, invoking the "responsibility to protect" doctrine, authorised a no-fly zone but also authorised member states to take all necessary measures to protect civilians under attack in Libya. In the context of a spiralling death toll, Nato started bombing.
Now, I understand South Africa's irritation in this regard, particularly as President Zuma was in the process of leading the AU's mediation efforts in Libya. However, well into the conflict no results were forthcoming and as a result of these efforts, it is questionable as to whether Gaddafi had any serious intention to negotiate.
One of the debates around the "responsibility to protect" doctrine is when to step up the nature of the intervention from diplomatic to sanctions and to other forms of intervention. As with Libya, I see that cycle presenting itself again in respect of Syria, where negotiations have once again stumbled and the death toll is rising. We will see a debate continuing in that context.
The perception of Libya being another failure of South Africa's African agenda needs to be examined and it is through this prism that we need to examine another threat: the Zimbabwean situation. Once again, South Africa has favoured the "quiet diplomacy" approach rather than the route of negotiation. The DA has had serious differences with the government in its approach to solving the Zimbabwean issue, as we have seen that country slide in the process from being the bread basket of the region to being the basket case. We are, however, fully supportive of the road map that has finally emerged. The road map addresses issues such as the constitution- making process, media reforms, electoral reforms, restoration of the rule of law, freedom of assembly and the actual election process. I commend the Minister when she stated quite categorically in her address to the portfolio committee that this government stands fully behind the road map and its chronological order. However, I am of the view that we are still going to be challenged by these things in Zimbabwe. I hope not.
Africa is fast emerging from the shadows of the world stage and with this emergence it is revealing that it is a highly diverse, complex and complicated continent. Not only is there a Francophone-Anglophone divide, but there is a North-South divide, big-small divide, a developing-least developed divide and, of course, ethnic and religious divides.
To the extent that Africa still needs interlocutors, others are emerging, foremost of which is Nigeria, which will continue to pose a challenge to South Africa. Nigeria is also a contender for an African permanent seat at the UN Security Council. Its economy is growing rapidly, and at present rates of growth Nigeria will overtake South Africa as Africa's biggest economy within a decade. It is also noticeable that on all major issues that I have alluded to, Nigeria has been foremost in taking a contrary view to that of our own. It has been quite open about its own African agenda and in this context I am advised that over 50 percent of the senior staff members at the African Union headquarters are Nigerians.
This rivalry has played itself out again in the recent failed attempt to elect a chairperson for the AU commission. While South Africa celebrated the nonelection of Jean Ping, it was Nigeria that claimed the victory of defeating South Africa's attempt. Nigeria was foremost in opposing South Africa's candidate, citing the grounds that the top five members should not be presenting candidates for the top position. There is no doubt that it is a smokescreen. The DA believes that Dr Dlamini-Zuma would be an excellent candidate and in this context she has our full support. [Applause.]
I note that South Africa has indicated that in Lilongwe she is again going to be put forward for that position and we wish her well in that regard. My concern is that she may well be rebuffed again, which may be seen as a major setback for South Africa and its African agenda.
I doubt whether South Africa's apology to Nigeria in the diplomatic row over the barring of 125 Nigerians from entering South Africa is going to persuade Nigeria to change its attitude in the elections. On this issue, let me say that I think South Africa's action of barring entry to those Nigerians was entirely appropriate. There are strict visa requirements between South Africa and Nigeria, part of which is the requirement of a valid yellow fever vaccine certificate. Perhaps the Minister would explain why such an apology was issued.
While South Africa's value-driven approach has met various challenges in Africa and the AU, it has managed to drive its interest agenda very well in such fora as the G20, Brics and Ibsa. The latter two proved particularly useful for South Africa to gain allies in its campaign for the reform of the UN and other international organisations. This is a position that we are in support of completely. It has also used these fora to advance the interests of Africa in global issues, more particularly international trade and development.
Foreign policy in most countries will always be a balancing act between a country's values and interests. South Africa is no exception. Our job as parliamentarians is to be vigilant so as to avoid the scales being tipped in the wrong direction. Of course we need to be pragmatic, but we should never stray too far from our core value set. We do not need another incident akin to our refusal to grant the Dalai Lama a visit to South Africa ... [Interjections.] ... which prompted Human Rights Watch to comment that South Africa's refusal to grant him a visa was essentially about pleasing China and a denial of Tibet's struggle for democracy. [Applause.]