Chairperson and hon members, allow me to commence by taking you for a short walk down memory lane. The Act being amended by the Bill was put on the Statute Book as a measure to combat serious crime - that was as far back as 2002. The aim of this legislation was, and still is to regulate, once and for all, the interception and monitoring of all forms of communication in a single statute - something that was lacking in our law. When I say all forms of communication I refer, for instance, to communications facilitated by advances in communication technologies such as cellphones and other electronic forms of communication, which were not covered by the existing and rather outdated legislation in this regard, namely the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act of 1992.
The aim of this 2002 Act is twofold: Firstly, it is on the Statute Book to ensure that the interception and monitoring of communications takes place in accordance with very strict criteria after a judge has considered an application placed before him or her by any of our law-enforcement agencies for such an interception order. The interception of communications is only permissible where a serious crime has been or is likely to be committed. In other words, the interception of communications is directed at the criminal element.
Secondly, this Act is there to protect our law-abiding citizens. It prohibits the interception and the monitoring of their private communications. Any attempt to do so is illegal and indeed punishable. This Act therefore regulates very carefully the manner in which private communications of persons may be intercepted and monitored. It does so in a way which does not offend the Constitution in any manner. The infringement of a person's right to privacy, which this Act permits in very limited and circumscribed conditions, is justified on the grounds, among others, that the interception and monitoring of communications is necessary in order to detect, prevent and investigate serious crime.
The Bill before us relates only to the interception of cellular phone calls. It was promoted at the instigation of the three mobile cellular operators jointly - that is Vodacom, MTN and Cell C. These service providers approached government when the implementation of the principal Act was receiving attention. They requested government not to implement sections 40 and 62(6) of the Act. These sections require persons who sell SIM cards and cellphones to record and store certain information of their clients as well as the particulars of the SIM cards and the cellphones themselves.
These provisions, as they read at present, call for a paper-based registration process - section 40 dealing with the registration of clients after the commencement of that section, and section 62(6) dealing with the registration of persons who are clients at the time this provision is implemented.
The service providers proposed that this paper-based process be replaced by an electronic solution. That in essence is what the Bill is about. It provides for the electronic capturing of certain information to ensure that the principal Act is fully effective and to ensure the achievement of its objects. I know that the Bill has been the subject of lengthy deliberations in and outside Parliament. It has been adapted by the committee in numerous respects. I do not intend to deal with all aspects of the Bill but would rather make a few general observations.
Hon members, since the Bill is aimed mainly at the registration and the verification of certain particulars of owners of cellular phones and SIM cards - addresses and identity numbers for instance - such persons who fail to verify such particulars will not be able to gain access to cellular phone services. Some of the proposed new definitions in clause 1 indicate the portfolio committee's endeavour to ensure that the objective of universal access to electronic communication services, including cellular services, is not compromised - particularly that of the poor who live in outlying areas and who rely very heavily on cellphone communication. It is clear to me that every effort has been made to ensure that the distribution and the availability of cellphone services are not affected negatively.
I am aware that there are still a number of aspects in the Bill with regard to which the service providers have reservations: the requirement of whether to register the handset number and the IMEI number or not; the implications that the Bill will have on visitors to the country who wish to roam on our networks; and the timeframes within which the registration of the existing cellphone clients must be finalised. These are some of the issues that have been raised by the service providers.
I must, however, make my view known, namely that there can be no room for any gaps in this legislation. As I see it, the information that is specified in the Bill and required to be captured is essential - not only for investigation purposes, but also as evidence in our courts. [Interjections.]
Hon Minister, I regret having to interrupt you, but the noise levels in the House are unacceptable. I can actually hear your conversations from the Chair. I want to appeal to the Whips to exercise some management over this particular issue. We have to raise it several times from the Chair. This transmission is broadcast - I don't know whether you want that to be broadcast to the nation. If the Whips can certainly assist in trying to bring some order in the House. Thank you, Minister.
Well, let me then continue by saying that we have had long deliberations around this Bill and the issues involved. I appeal that we now concentrate on how to implement. We must put emphasis on implementation. I am convinced that solutions can be found. I do agree with the approach adopted by the Justice portfolio committee regarding these matters, namely that the registration of cellphone handsets and the requirement for visitors to the country to provide verified personal particulars to our local service providers before they can roam on our networks are essential. Without these requirements, there would be loopholes in the legislation, which criminals could and would exploit, making the legislation meaningless.
Before concluding, I need to emphasise that the Bill, as adapted by the portfolio committee to date, has not deviated from the principles contained in the Bill as approved by the Cabinet and introduced to Parliament. The original principles have in essence all been retained - most notably the registration and the capturing of vital information such as the cellphone handset number, the MSISDN number of the SIM card and an address of the customer.
The implications of the Bill in relation to roaming have also remained unchanged during the parliamentary process. I was heartened to hear that the provisions of the adapted Bill were not opposed by any of the members of the portfolio committee. That is obviously an indication of a pragmatic approach to ensure that this legislation goes forward. I trust that the attitude will prevail when we vote on the Bill shortly.
The adaptations that have been made by the committee, after hearing the views of stakeholders during the public hearings, are positive changes that I think will enhance the application of these provisions. I refer for instance to the new definitions which, as I have already indicated, are intended to ensure that as many people as possible are able to comply with the registration requirements and are not denied the enormous benefits of cellular services.
Mention should also be made of the fact that the introduced Bill required the residential, business and postal addresses of customers to be registered. After hearing the views of stakeholders, the committee changed the Bill to require only one address and the change indicated willingness. I am sure members of the portfolio committee will talk to this.
I would want to conclude by really thanking the officials in my department who have been working with this Bill since 1992. I am here also referring to the principal Bill. I would like to say thank you to Adv Bassett, in particular, and Adv Roberts. I wish to express my appreciation also to Comrade Fatima Chohan-Khota and her portfolio committee members for their inputs and for their unanimous support of the Bill. It is clear that they have spared no effort in trying to ensure that the final product does not detract from the objectives of the principal Act - with as little disruption as possible to the service providers on the one hand and the users of mobile cellular services on the other. I thank you. [Applause.]
Chairperson, hon members, the Bill before us will entail some inconveniences to most of us but it is an important crime-fighting and regulatory measure.
In terms of the regulation of interception of communications Act of 2002, interception of communications is prohibited except under the following circumstances: interception of communications by a party to that communication and interception made in terms of an interception order granted by a designated judge in terms of this legislation, and in instances where there is imminent harm to the lives of persons involved.
Any interception of any communication in any other manner or form is illegal. I want to repeat that. Any interception of any communication in any other manner or form is illegal. This is an important principle to bear in mind when considering the Bill before us. The amendment Bill before us pertains to sections 40 and 62(6) of the regulation of interception of communications Act of 2002, which, as the Minister has said, relates to the requirements pertaining to mobile cellular service operators, or cellular phones as we call them.
The Minister has indicated the history of this and the involvement of the mobile cellular operators in calling for the amendment in question, and I won't be going into that in any detail at the moment.
The Bill, as introduced, requires the registration and verification of certain particulars of customers of mobile cellular services - the addresses and identity numbers of potential customers are required to be recorded, failing which such persons will not be able to gain access to mobile cellular services.
The committee, having been seized with the question of these requirements and having the unintended consequence of restricting the access of mobile telephones into certain sectors, has been at pains to ensure that an adequate balance is found between the matter of access without compromising the overall objective of this legislation by ensuring that there is adequate data on record for the purposes of crime prevention, detection and, more importantly, prosecution.
The definitions of "address", "identity number" and "identity document" were therefore broadened from their usual meaning so that addresses, for example, would include a residential or business address in the normal sense but would also include an address in an informal settlement.
Identity documents, as defined, would include your normal green identity book but also a temporary identity certificate, the proposed new-style identity card, passports, as well as an identity document issued in terms of the Refugees Act of 1998.
It should also be borne in mind that any person may transfer ownership to a family member without the requirement of registering the details of the transferee with the mobile cellular operator.
Conversely, it must be borne in mind that anyone who owns a cellular phone and a SIM card that is activated and who wishes to transfer ownership to somebody other than a family member, as defined, is under obligation to present himself or herself together with the transferee to the relevant service provider to register the details of the new owner prior to handing over the phone to the new user.
In terms of the Act, the mobile cellular operators are obliged to inform customers of their rights and obligations under this legislation, and the various sources of information that have to be captured - and the Minister has dealt with much of that - and ultimately these details will have to be recorded against a natural person, as well as a juristic person.
Cellular phone rental companies are also under similar obligations as mobile cellular operators regarding registration and verification of customers. Section 62 deals essentially with the matter of existing customers of mobile cellular operators and requires the registration of personal and phone details of existing customers within a specified period of 12 months from implementation. Initially, the mobile cellular operators approached the committee to extend this period to four years. The committee responded by requesting a motivation and the provision of accurate data around the number of subscribers that are required to be registered, bearing in mind that all contract customer details had already been captured.
The committee further requested the three mobile cellular operators to provide details of the number of registration points, which would put the committee in a position to rationally ascertain how long the mobile cellular phone operators would require for the completion of this process. They unfortunately declined to offer this information but suggested a period of 36 months. In effect, as we had been poised to pass this legislation already in June 2006, we have, in terms of this law, effectively afforded an extra 12 months to them, and depending on the implementation of the relevant section into law, we are convinced that sufficient time has been afforded the mobile cellular operators in this respect, particularly when considering the experiences of other countries in this regard. Should a customer not register his or her details within the contemplated period such service will be terminated.
The Bill has two very important consequences. The first of these means that both the handset and the SIM card must be recorded prior to a customer getting access to a network. Cellular phones not registered on a network will not be able to work on that network. We are of the view that the registration of phone handsets is necessary in order to put the identity of the owner of the phone beyond doubt. This will assist in proving ownership of cellular phone handsets in certain investigations and, more particularly, enable the preferment of prima facie evidence as opposed to circumstantial evidence in subsequent court proceedings.
Secondly, a foreigner who comes to our shores will be required to register his or her personal details before they are able to roam. The law therefore doesn't prohibit roaming but will require registration by foreigners prior to roaming. It has been argued, inter alia, that this is an unnecessarily heavy-handed provision designed to inconvenience foreign visitors to our shores. The mobile cellular operators suggest that the current method of obtaining foreign customer information through the co-operation of foreign mobile cellular operators is a viable and workable method of securing information for crime fighting. It has been a matter of intense deliberation, and the problems identified with the so-called solution are that, firstly, it has not been indicated to what extent these co-operation agreements with foreign mobile cellular operators are legal in the foreign countries concerned, given the extensive privacy laws that exist in many jurisdictions. Accordingly, their admissibility in court in this country is questionable.
Secondly, there are inherent limitations in the data stored by certain countries that do regulate the storage of customer information, as many jurisdictions do not require the registration of pre-paid SIM cards. This creates a potential loophole in the legislative framework we are spending millions and millions to implement.
Lastly, not all countries even require this minimal storage of data as many countries do not have legislation in this regard at all.
I wish to remind members at this stage that criminals, particularly organised syndicates, use increasingly sophisticated methods to stay a step ahead of law-enforcement agencies. And yes, there is the potential of enormous inconvenience to all of us who own cellular phones.
I would like to quote an extract from the Sunday Times of 1 September 2002 - at that time I still read that paper. That quotation I find particularly apt in this context, and it goes as follows:
South Africans are notorious for loving strong-arm tactics to fight crime, but they are frequently unwilling to be inconvenienced by the actions that are required of them in this fight. This attitude must change if we are rolling back this scourge.
This, members, is a matter for some contemplation on our part.
Lastly, let me please thank the members of the portfolio committee firstly; secondly, Mr Sarel Roberts, Ms Ina Botha and Mr Lawrence Bassett for their invaluable and very, very hard work in this regard. They provided expertise and direction that was enormously valuable to us, and we do thank them very much. Thank you very much, Chairperson. [Applause.]
Sihlalo ngibingelela iNdlu. [Chairperson, I greet the House].
This is the fourth time that we amend Act 70 of 2002 even though the whole Act has not yet come into force.
We supported the principal Act in 2002 as well as all three later amendments and we will also support this amendment today. You are not surprised. You know why? Because you know the DA will always support crime fighting.
However, it is not without reservation that we give our support to this amendment. In the first place, we are concerned about the effect that these amendments may have on bona fide foreign visitors to our country. We definitely do not want a situation where visitors to this country have to fall into a queue to have their cellphones activated whereas roaming is automatic in other countries.
In the second place, we are also concerned about the effective implementation of the amendments. The cellphone market is one of the fastest growing markets in the country and the additional administrational load of service providers will be tremendous. Will they be able to cope? I have serious doubts.
In die derde plek ontstaan die vraag of ons ons prioriteite reg het. Ons het hier te doen met uiters gesofistikeerde programme om misdaad te beveg, waarvan die koste baie hoog is, maar die basiese dinge, soos byvoorbeeld om gewone misdaad alledaags te bekamp - plaasaanvalle, huisbrake, voertuigdiefstal, roof, ensovoorts - bly agterwe.
In die vierde plek, reeds met die aanvaarding van die hoofwet in 2002, het dr Delport daarop gewys dat dit nie billik is om die koste van staatsveiligheid deur diensverskaffers te laat betaal nie. Hierdie wysiging gaan vir seker nog addisionele koste vir selfoonmaatskappye teweeg bring en uiteraard gaan die selfoonverbruiker hiervoor betaal. Dit beteken dat Suid-Afrika se reeds buitensporige ho selfoonkoste nog hor gaan word. (Translation of Afrikaans paragraphs follows.)
[In the third place the question arises whether we have our priorities straight. We are dealing here with extremely sophisticated crime-fighting programmes, of which the costs are very high, but the basics, like, for example, combating ordinary crime daily - farm attacks, housebreakings, vehicle thefts, robberies, etc - remain neglected.
In the fourth place, already with the acceptance of the principal Act in 2002, Dr Delport pointed out that it is not reasonable to have service providers pay the cost of state security.
This amendment will most certainly cause further additional costs for cellphone companies and naturally the cellphone user will have to pay for it. This means that South Africa's already excessively high cellphone costs will become even higher.]
This is a very short piece of legislation. It consists of only seven sections, but the committee nevertheless spent many hours deliberating and the final product is very different from the first reading draft. From the opposition's side I wish to thank the chairperson of the committee for all her efforts in this regard. It is very much her Bill, although some members of the committee refer to it as the Bassett Bill. However, Chairperson, allow me a prediction. This is not the last amendment to Act 70 of 2002. I thank you.
Chairperson, Minister and honourable guests, I am reading this speech on behalf of my colleague, hon Suzanne Vos.
The IFP was unfortunately unable to attend to this Bill in the Justice committee. We must, nevertheless, place on record various concerns. The state's intention with the Bill is the national quest to combat crime and I support it.
It would, therefore, help if various provisions of this Bill could be implemented which, at present, cannot be implemented. The IFP, however, questions the authority and the constitutionality of attempting to employ the Minister to revoke licences. We can only hope that the President will apply his mind to these issues before appending his signature to this Bill.
Other matters relating to the deactivation of handsets prior to registration and international roaming are hugely problematical. The fact that this Bill allows for its own provisions to be suspended for a maximum of three months clearly, with the World Cup 2010 period in mind, is proof enough that various injunctions are neither practical nor viable. The IFP asks that its objection to this Bill be noted. Thank you.
Chairperson, this Bill seeks to amend the Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organisations Act which, members will recall, was enacted to provide a further weapon in the fight against serious crime.
Many of the amendments are of a technical nature and are to be supported. A new section was introduced to cater for the 2010 World Cup where there will be an influx of foreigners with cellphones into the country. In this regard the ACDP appreciates the concern surrounding restrictions on the use of roaming facilities by foreigners visiting South Africa.
However, the global reach of international syndicates outweighs the inconvenience of foreigners having to register their cellphones on arrival. We can possibly consider technology that exists in other countries, which we can make use of to ease registration requirements; mindful, however, of what the portfolio chairperson said in this regard. We cannot allow loopholes that will compromise the laudable objectives of this Act in fighting crime.
The ACDP will consequently support this Amendment Bill. I thank you.
Agb Voorsitter, die doel van die wetsontwerp mag baie edel klink, want ek glo nie daar is een politieke party of enige individu in Suid-Afrika wat nie wil s dat ons misdaad moet beveg en bekamp nie.
Die problem, Voorsitter, is egter dat ons wel die tegnologie het. Ons kan sekere dinge doen om misdaad te bekamp, maar die vraag bly altyd: wie doen dit? Ons kan maar ook s watter maatrels daar is. So mag byvoorbeeld net 'n regter toestemming gee dat daar meeluistering mag wees, maar die feit van die saak is: die publiek het nie vertroue in die regering en die amptenare van vandag om te s dat hulle privaatheid nie geskend gaan word nie.
'n Mens moet te veel verneem van amptenare wat die wet verbreek, wat verkeerdelik optree. In die intelligensiedienste is dit reeds bewys, waar amptenare misbruik gemaak het hiervan en daar nie opgetree is nie. As die agb Minister vertroue wil skep, sal hy moet optree teen daardie lede. Dankie. (Translation of Afrikaans speech follows.)
[Mr P J GROENEWALD: Hon Chairperson, the purpose of the Bill might sound very noble, because I don't believe there is one political party or any individual in South Africa who does not want to say that we should fight and combat crime.
However, the problem, Chairperson, is that we do have the technology. We are able to do certain things to combat crime, but the question always remains: Who does it? We might as well say what measures exist. In this way, for example, only a judge may give permission for telephone tapping, but the fact of the matter is: The public does not have confidence in the government and the officials of today to say that their privacy will not be violated.
One has to learn too often of officials who break the law, who act improperly. In the intelligence services this has been proven already, where officials have made use of this and no action was taken. If the hon Minister wants to create trust, he will have to act against those members. Thank you.]
Chairperson, criminals have such intricate and intelligent methods to commit crime. We only need to observe the horrific statistics of crime in South Africa to realise that we have a duty incumbent upon ourselves to venture all means to securing a safe South Africa.
In view of the cellphone communications of criminals, the MF finds this Bill extremely favourable in tracing crime and assisting the South African Police Service in having a handle on criminals.
With regard to a person needing to inform the service provider when he or she sells his or her Subscriber Information Module - or SIM - a question remains as to the efficiency of this actually being carried out. Also, in view of tourists and the big Fifa games to be hosted in 2010, how will government and the service providers manage this? We do believe that this is a brilliant idea of having a database of users. However, the MF feels that a registry body needs to be put in place that will manage the entire use.
We also feel that clarity needs to be provided as to what communications qualify as electronic communications. The MF will support the Bill.
Chairperson, throughout the world where citizens of democratic societies, such as ours, are faced with threats to life, public order and their property, and where the security of the state is under threat, the interception of communications remains an important tool to be used by law-enforcement agencies so that they can effectively protect those rights. This is done under strict conditions that are set out in the law.
The regulation of interception of communications Act, that is the principal Act, was signed into law by our President in 2002. We are now in 2007, debating the amendments contained in the Bill that serve before this House. Yet, there are many provisions of the principal Act which have yet to be implemented.
What this means is that our law-enforcement agencies are still intercepting communications in terms of Act 127 of 1992 - that is, the Interception and Monitoring Prohibition Act. Indeed, the directing judge who is responsible for considering applications for directives to intercept communications was appointed in terms of Act 127. This is made possible by section 62 of the principal Act, which provides for transitional arrangements.
The point being made here is that, in my view, too much time has lapsed between the signing into law of the Act and the implementation of its various sections.
One of the important measures contained in the principal Act is the creation of the office of interception centres. This office was only established in June/July 2006. Yet, it has taken these past 12 months to get this office up and running efficiently and effectively and in a manner that gains the confidence of our law-enforcement agencies.
As a member of the Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence I have been privileged to be able to interact with all the role-players that deal with the interception of communications. My experiences lead me to one conclusion, Chairperson: The sooner all the provisions of the principal Act are implemented, including the repeal of Act 127 of 1992, the better it will be for all of us, except, of course, for the criminals. Delays may also, heaven forbid, encourage our law-enforcement agencies to abuse the system.
The amendments before this House go a long way towards helping to speed up the implementation of the principal Act and hopefully will bring about legal and operational certainty.
Very briefly, Chairperson, let me respond to some of the issues raised by previous speakers. I want to agree wholeheartedly with the hon Minister when she says the emphasis must now be placed on implementation. The hon Chohan, in her speech, made note of the fact that we were poised to pass this legislation in June 2006 and that we are now in August 2007.
The point raised by the hon Joubert bears consideration, that is that the transfer of costs by the state to the cellphone service providers is perhaps unfair and should not be followed by the state. We want to say that this method is not unique to South Africa. All countries with similar legislative provisions as ours have followed the same route.
With regard to the hon Groenewald: His pessimism with regard to this Bill and this Act is regrettable. We take note of his concerns. It is all about crime prevention, crime investigation and the protection of the properties and rights of the citizens of this wonderful country.
Chairperson, a significant feature of our committee's consideration of this Bill has been the presence of a battery of lobbyists or employees representing the cellphone service providers. Lobbyists are a natural and welcome development within our democratic state; some would say a very necessary development.
In this case, the lobbyists representing cellphone service providers have proved to be a formidable and powerful group of individuals. Of course they participated in the process in order to protect and promote the interests of their respective companies and their shareholders.
However, given our experiences with these lobbyists, it is important to sound a note of warning. Whilst the existence of lobbyists within the parliamentary process is an important part of our democracy, such lobbyists should not be allowed to control that process or to impose their will upon it to such a degree that the process is abused and manipulated for the benefit of the wealthy few or to the detriment of Parliament's democratic process or to the detriment of the public order and the security of the state. Before this happens serious consideration would need to be given to regulating the activities of such lobbyists in this honourable House. I thank you.
Chairperson, firstly I want to thank all the parties that have supported the Bill and all the hard work you put into this Bill, once again. It's really important because the hon Groenewald and others pointed it out. This Bill is not a simple Bill; it is about allowing people to intercept our communications.
This is a serious matter. A matter like this you cannot deal with politically. What you have to do is a necessary evil, even what we need in our society, and this party here, the ANC, knows that better than anyone. We were the ones who suffered under the previous regime by people tapping our phone calls and so on.
So, we fully understand the difficulties and the invasion in one's life and one's privacy. And therefore, this Bill, driven by the ANC, must never become a vehicle similarly to use for political undermining of any person or meddling in their private life and so on.
So, it is very important with legislation like this that we get the right balance, that we get the right checks and balances. Therefore, to those people who worry about this legislation, I take you very seriously because I take myself seriously on this piece of legislation.
This is not a Bill that we just want to have lying around and falling into the wrong hands and being utilised by the wrong people.
I also think that the hon Landers has really covered the issue of the length of time that it has taken for us to pass this Bill. You know that this Bill was started at the end of the 1990s. We then started consulting on this Bill. It went to the SA Law Reform Commission.
The Bill reached us for the first time in 2002. We took a whole year to pass the original Act. It took another three years before we implemented the legislation. It then took another intervention from the mobile cellular operators to stop us for nearly another year to implement this amendment.
I really think that we must take the issues raised by Mr Landers very seriously. With regard to the issue of lobbying, we cannot become like the United States of America. You cannot have people in this House on both sides being the direct spokespersons and the mouthpieces of lobbyists on these issues. [Applause.] The effect of that is that we take almost a year to pass a piece of legislation like this.
We must be careful: This legislation does not just allow us to intercept, it also protects us. The first part of this legislation says that we totally prohibit any form of interception which is not approved in this legislation. So, all these private investigators, you talk about, hon Groenewald, are acting illegally. They have no authority at all to tap or intercept anyone's communications.
In terms of this Act - I want the public out there to listen - if these private investigators or anyone else intercepts your information and uses it to pressurise you in negotiations or in business, lay a charge against them. It is illegal, they have committed a crime.
Should any law-enforcement agency - and Mr Groenewald has mentioned some of those examples - in this country say they have intercepted information, where they never went to a judge to get an order to intercept that information, you must go and lay a charge against them. They are acting illegally and this law protects you.
This law has the balance - on the one hand it says to you that you are protected from being intercepted. Any law-abiding citizen hasn't got a problem. Anyone else who wants to intercept must go to the judge and convince the judge. A law-enforcement agency must convince the judge that there is a proper case to have an order issued against them. Now, some of the amendments today are exactly to make that law work properly.
If someone wants to get an order from the judge they can't just go to the judge and say, well, whatever communications Ms Mentor makes we want to intercept it. They must give specifics to the judge, and that explains why we need a registration process.
During the registration process you need to activate these phones. Now, the principal Act we passed originally contained a registration process, but it was a paper-based registration process and quite rightly, on this issue the mobile cellular operators wanted to correct it by arguing that it is too cumbersome; that's the only issue they have been correcting.
On this issue they came to us as government and said that they wanted to create an electronic solution and therefore the issue of cost, hon Joubert, doesn't come into it because it is their suggestion to do that, it is not ours. They came to government and asked us to change this paper-based system.
If we want to make sure that the law-enforcement agencies can do their work, then every person, when they go and buy a SIM card, must go to one of the outlets of MTN, Vodacom or Cell C and activate it. You activate it by giving them your ID number, the number of your phone, the number of your SIM card and your address. It takes one or two minutes.
They just punch the information into it. It is a little gadget like when you activate your credit card. You put the information in and it takes you one or two minutes. I don't know about the suggestion of long queues. It will depend on how many gadgets MTN and Vodacom have. If they have hundreds of them all over the place, everyone will just go and activate. That is why, of course, you need to allow people to register their phones when coming into the country. Otherwise foreigners will not have to register their phones but citizens will have to register their phones. All I do is to drive across the border to Lesotho or Swaziland and go and buy a SIM card and come back, and the police can never catch me. They can never intercept my calls because I can go everywhere in or outside the country and buy the SIM card and I will be free from the registration system.
All we say is that when you are at a port of entry, there will be cubicles and all you have to do is to go and register just like we South Africans do to register our phones. Give your ID or your passport, put in the number and from there on you are registered.
If you don't do that at the airport you can go to any cubicle and do it there. It is such a simple thing. But if you don't do it, then we can scrap the Bill. We can scrap the Bill because all the big criminals will just go outside the country and get the SIM card and come in from outside and evade the registration system. We will never be able to intercept any of their calls. So, who will ever pass a law like that? No country that has some common sense could pass a law like that.
We have got a bit more than half a brain, as is the case with the IFP and that is why we passed the Bill. You, the IFP, you guys are making yourselves meaningless. You can't come to Parliament at this podium and say we have got a whole lot of members in the committee and we have never attended the committee meetings and therefore we are going to oppose the Bill.
Why are the taxpayers paying you? Why do you come to work? This Bill is so important that you wanted to reject it and not use it as a tool against crime. Why do you not attend these meetings? Why do you come to Parliament to reject the Bill?
At least I can take the hon Joubert's criticism about the Bill and deal with it now because he was part of the committee. He knows what he is talking about. I don't have to agree with him, but at least I am arguing with someone who knows something. But, guys, you come here and you have got the temerity to tell us: "We didn't attend the meetings, yet we are not going to deal with this, we are going to reject the Bill." What kind of craziness is that? You will become completely meaningless in the next election. You will only get 1% of the vote, even less than you are getting now. I don't want to take the last money that you have; save that for when you haven't got jobs.
I think we also have to look at the other issues that have been raised. With regard to the 12 months that we have given for people to register their phones, once this Act kicks in and people start registering, you and I register when we buy new phones, we register and we activate them. But now, people who have already got the SIM cards haven't been registered and we have to register them. The longer period we give for people to register their old cards, the longer the system becomes meaningless because I just use the old card if I am a criminal. I don't buy a new card.
So if you start extending this period to 18 months and 36 months, it means for the next three years this Bill will be useless and you won't be able to use the Bill.
So, that is why we have given a one-year period. Obviously, these mobile cellular operators want to make money so they are going to make sure that everybody who wants to use their phones is going to come and register their SIM cards.
I don't know what the fear is or what the problem is. They are going to put up enough kiosks because otherwise they won't make money. They like making money, like any other business. They are going to put up the kiosks and people are going to register. A 12-month period is more than enough time for doing so.
This means that for 12 months there is a loophole in this Act. For 12 months criminals can use the old SIM card. I am telling them now, and they know it. Sometimes the people that are talking on their behalf not to register their SIM cards are actually the only ones making suggestions advantageous to the criminals. The problem is that we will have problems for 12 months, even when we get the system going.
I thank all who supported this legislation. As I said, we try and get that delicate balance in trying to intercept criminals' calls. They are the people who are not doing the right things. But then, the Act protects all the citizens who are good, law-abiding citizens.
We must remember this. When I saw the newspaper article written about this, they never wrote about the part where the Act is protecting us. For the first time in the history of this country it creates that protection for people's communications not to be intercepted arbitrarily. So, once again, thanks to everyone who played a role in preparing this Bill and I unconditionally support it on behalf of the ANC.
Thank you hon, Deputy Minister. That concludes the debate.
Debate concluded.
Bill read a second time (Inkatha Freedom Party dissenting).